the boundary follows the varying course of the stream; while if the stream suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one, the resulting change of channel works no change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel although no water be flowing in it. Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra. A correct application of this rule to changes 1. EVIDENCE 48-JUDICIAL NOTICE-REC

It results that the judgment of the state of the Court. court must be

Reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

These two cases involving the same question, were argued and will be decided together. They are suits in replevin and involve the title to two large consignments of hides,

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

ed together a largely attended meeting and after negotiations with General Villa as to the amount to be paid, an assessment was made on the men of property of the city, which was in large part promptly paid. Martinez, the owner from whom the plaintiff in error claims title to the property involved in this case, was a wealthy resident of Torreon and was a dealer in hides in a large way. Being an adherent of Huerta, when Torreon was captured Martinez fled the city and failed to pay the assessment imposed upon him, and it was to satisfy this assessment that, by order of General Villa, the hides in controversy *were seized and on January 3, 1914, were sold in Mexico to the Finnegan-Brown Company. They were paid for in Mexico, and were thereafter shipped into the United States and were replevied, as stated.

which the plaintiff in error claims to own as, money by an assessment upon the community, assignee of Martinez & Co., a partnership en- to having their property forcibly seized, callgaged in business in the city of Torreon, Mexico, but which the defendant in error claims to own by purchase from the Finnegan-Brown Company, a Texas corporation which it is alleged purchased the hides in Mexico from General Francisco Villa on January 3, 1914. The cases were commenced in a circuit court of New Jersey in which judgments were rendered for the defendants, which were affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals (87 N. J. Law, 552, 94 Atl. 789, L. R. A. 1917A, 276; 87 N. J. Law, 704, 96 Atl. 1102), and they are brought to this court on the theory that the claim of title to the hides by the defendant in error is invalid because based upon a purchase from General Villa, who, it is urged, confiscated them contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land; that the judgment of the state court denied to the plaintiff in error this right which he "set up and claimed” under the Hague Convention or treaty; and that this denial gives him the right of review in this court.

A somewhat detailed description will be necessary of the political conditions in Mexico prior to and at the time of the seizure of the property in controversy by the military authorities. It appears in the record, and is a matter of general history, that on February 23, 1913, Madero, President of the Republic of Mexico, was assassinated; that immediately thereafter General Huerta declared himself Provisional President of the Republic and took the oath of office as such; that on the 26th day of March following General Carranza, who was then governor of the state of Coahuila, inaugurated a revolution against the claimed authority of Huerta and in a "Manifesto Addressed to the Mexican Nation" proclaimed the organization of a constitutional government under "the plan of Guadalupe," and that civil war was at once entered upon between the followers and forces of the two leaders. When General Carranza assumed the leadership of what were called the Constitutionalist forces he commissioned General Villa his representative, as "Commander of the North," and assigned him to an independent command in that part of the country. Such progress was made by the Carranza forces that in the autumn of 1913 they were in military possession, as the record shows, of approximately two-thirds of the area of the entire country, with the exception of a few scattered towns and cities, and after a battle lasting several days the city of Torreon in the state of Coahuila was captured by General Villa on October 1 of that year. Immediately after the capture of Torreon, Villa proposed levying a military contribution on the inhabitants, for the support of his army, and thereupon influential citizens, preferring to provide the required

[1] This court will take judicial notice of the fact that since the transactions thus detailed and since the trial of this case in the lower courts, the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico, on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456.

On this state of fact the plaintiff in error argues that the "Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land" constitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico; that these "Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of property as we are considering in this case; and that, therefore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale made by General Villa and the property may be recovered by the Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this country.

[2] It would, perhaps, be sufficient answer to this contention to say that the Hague Conventions are international in character, designed and adapted to regulate international warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in purpose, apply to a civil war. Were it otherwise, however, it might be effectively argued that the declaration relied upon that "private property cannot be confiscated" contained in article 46 of the Regulations does not have the scope claimed for it, since article 49 provides that "money contributions for the needs of the army" may be levied upon occupied territory, and article 52 provides that "requisitions in kind and services may be demanded for the needs of the army of occupation," and that contributions in kind? shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash, and when not so paid for a receipt shall be given and payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible. And also for the reason that the "Convention" to which

*303

(246 U. S. 304)

of jurisdiction once acquired over a case, but

RICAUD et al. v. AMERICAN METAL CO., only requires that the action of the foreign gov

ernment on the subject-matter of litigation shall be accepted by our courts as a rule for their Decided March 11, decision, and to accept such ruling authority and decide accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction, but an exercise of jurisdiction.

1. COURTS 384 CERTIFICATION OF CASES S. INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 RELATIONS BY CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.

BETWEEN STATES.

Under Supreme Court rule 37 (32 Sup. Ct. The action of a military commander reprexiv), requiring a certificate from the Circuit senting the Carranza government, in seizing and Court of Appeals to contain a proper statement selling bullion for military purposes, is not subof facts on which the questions and propositions ject to re-examination and modification in the of law arise, a certificate containing a state-courts of this country, though title to the bulment of what was alleged and denied by the par- lion was in an American citizen, who was not ties, with the additional statement that there in or a resident of Mexico at the time it was was evidence tending to establish the facts as seized, and whatever rights he has can be asclaimed by each party, but without any finding serted only through the Mexican courts, or whatever as to what the evidence showed the through the political departments of our govfacts to be, and assuming facts as the basis of ernment. the first question on which the others depended, was not in proper form.

On a Certificate from the United States 2. EVIDENCE 48-JUDICIAL NOTICE-REC-| Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth CirOGNITION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

Judicial notice will be taken of the recognition by the United States government of the government of Carranza as the de facto and later as the de jure government of Mexico. 3. COURTS 279-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADING.

A petition alleging the required diversity of citizenship, and further alleging that certain bullion was plaintiff's property, and had been forcibly taken from its possession in Mexico by unknown persons without any reference being made to a state of war prevailing therein at the time, that it was consigned to one of the defendants in Texas, and was in a bonded warehouse in the possession of another defendant as collector of customs, who, unless restrained, would deliver it to the other defendants, was sufficient in form to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the federal District Court. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68(1)-LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

The recognition of the Carranza government by the political department of our government as the de facto and later as the de jure govern ment of Mexico binds the judges, as well as all other officers and citizens of the government. 5. INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENT-EFFECT.

The recognition of the Carranza government by the government of the United States is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions of that government from the commencement of its existence; and hence the act of a military commander representing that government in 1913, in seizing and selling bullion for the purpose of purchasing military supplies, must be regarded as the action of a duly commissioned general of the legitimate government of Mexico. 6. INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

The courts of one independent government will not sit in judgment on the validity of the acts of another, done within its own territory. 7. INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. Where the petition in a suit involving the title to bullion was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction to determine the title to the property, though it was made to appear that the bullion had been seized and sold by a military commander representing the Carranza government, since recognized by the United States government as the de jure government of Mexico, since the rule that the courts of one government will not sit in judgment on the validity of the acts of another done within its own territory does not deprive the courts

cuit.

Suit by the American Metal Company, Limited, against Eduardo Ricaud and others. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendants appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified certain questions to the Supreme Court. Questions answered.

Messrs. Frank E. Hunter, of El Paso, Tex., and Ernest Wilkinson, of Washington, D. C., for Ricaud and others.

Mr. U. S. Goen, of El Paso, Tex., for American Metal Co., Limited.

*Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this suit in equity, commenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the plaintiff in that court claims to be the owner of and entitled to a large consignment of lead bullion held in bond by the collector of customs at El Paso, Texas. An injunction was granted restraining the collector until further order from delivering the bullion to either of the other defendants.

Barlow, one of the defendants in the District Court, claims to be the owner of the property by purchase from the defendant Ricaud, who it is claimed purchased it from General Pereyra, who in the year 1913 was the commander of a brigade of the Constitutionalist army of Mexico, of which Venustiano Carranza was then First Chief.

It is not seriously disputed that General Pereyra, in his capacity as a commanding officer, in September, 1913, demanded this bullion from the Penoles Mining Company, a Mexican corporation doing business at Bermejillo, Mexico; that when it was delivered to him he gave a receipt which contains a promise to pay for it "on the triumph of the revolution or the establishment of a legal gov. ernment"; that Pereyra sold the bullion to defendant Ricaud, who sold it to the defendant Barlow; that the proceeds of the sale were devoted to the purchase of arms, am

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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*305

munition, food and clothing for Peryra's | Republic of Mexico, had the District Court of troops, and that Pereyra in the transaction the Western District of Texas, into which the represented and acted for the government of General Carranza, which has since been recognized by the United States government as the de jure government of Mexico.

The plaintiff, appellee here, claims to have purchased the bullion from the Penoles Mining Company in June, 1913.

The District Court rendered a decree in favor of the plaintiff from which defendants appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and that court certifies three questions as to which it desires the

instruction of this court.

[1, 2] The sufficiency of the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals is challenged at

the threshold.

said bullion had been imported from Mexico, jurisdiction to try and adjudge as to the validity of the title acquired by and through the said seizure, appropriation and sale by the Carranza forces as against an American citizen claiming, ownership of said bullion prior to its seizure?"

[3] There can be no doubt that the required diversity of citizenship to give the District Court jurisdiction of the case was stated in the petition for injunction. The certificate shows that it was alleged in the petition that the bullion was the property of the plaintiff and that it had been forcibly taken from its posession in Mexico by unknown persons but without any reference being made to a state of war prevailing therein at the time; that it was consigned to defendant Barlow warehouse in the possession of of the defend

at El Paso, Texas, and was in a bonded

less restrained by the court would deliver it

to the other defendants.

*There is no denying that there is much of merit in the objection to the form of this certificate, including the form of the ques-ant Cobb, as collector of customs, who, untions, for the reason that the certificate, instead of containing a "proper statement of the facts on which the questions and propositions of law arise," as is required by rule 37 of this court (32 Sup. Ct. xiv), contains a statement of what is "alleged and denied" by the parties plaintiff and defendant in their pleadings, with the additional statement that there was evidence "tending to establish the facts as claimed by each party," but without any finding whatever as to what the evidence showed the facts to be, and the first question, on which the other two depend, is in terms based entirely on an "assumed" statement of facts.

If this certificate had not been supplemented by the recognition by the United States government of the government of Carranza, first as the de facto and later as the de jure government of Mexico, of which facts this court will take judicial notice (Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456), it would be our duty to declare the certificate insufficient and to return it to the Circuit Court of Appeals without answering the questions (Cinn., Ham. & Dayton Rd. Co. v. McKeen, 149 U. S. 259, 15 Sup. Ct. 1038, 40 L. Ed. 143; Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435, 16 Sup. Ct. 799, 40 L. Ed. 1030; Cross v. Evans, 167 U. S. 60, 17 Sup. Ct. 733, 42 L. Ed. 77; Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 422; 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285).

But this recognition of the government under which General Pereyra was acting, as the legitimate government of Mexico, makes the answers to the questions so certain and its effect upon the case is so clear, that, for the purpose of making an end of the litigation, we will proceed to answer the questions. The first question is:

|

This form of petition brought the case within the jurisdiction of the District Court (United States v. Arredondo et al., 6 Pet. 691, 709, 10 L. Ed. 93; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor et al., 2 How. 319, 11 L. Ed. 283; Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 632, 17 L. Ed. 886), and the question is whether the circumstance that the bullion was seized, condemned and sold under the conditions stated in the question, deprived the court of jurisdiction to go forward and adjudge as to the validity of the title acquired by the seizure and sale by the Carranza forces.

[4, 5] The answer which should be given to this question has been rendered not doubtful by the fact that, as we have said, the revolution inaugurated by General Carranza against General Huerta proved successful and the government established by him has been recognized by the political department of our government as the de facto and later as the de jure government of Mexico, which decision binds the judges as well as all other officers and citizens of the government. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. Ed. 471; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 12 Sup. Ct. 453, 36 L. Ed. 232; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691. This recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions of the Car ‘anza government from the commencement of its existence (Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186, 24 L. Ed. 716; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 253, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456), and the action of General Pereyra complained of must therefore be regarded as the action, in time of civil war, of a duly commissioned general of the legitimate government of Mexico.

[6, 7] It is settled that the courts will take judicial notice of such recognition, as we have here, of the Carranza government by

I. "Assuming that the bullion in suit was seized, condemned, and sold for war supplies by the Constitutionalist forces in revolution in Mexico, acting under authority from General Carranza, the political department of our government claiming to be the provisional president of the (Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11