Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691), and that the courts of one independent government will not sit in judgment on the validity of the acts of another done within its own territory (Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 253, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456; American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed.). This last rule, however, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once ac quired over a case. It requires only that when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it. It results that the title to the property in this case must be determined by the result of the action taken by the military authorities of Mexico and that, giving effect to this rule is an exercise of jurisdiction which requires that the first question be answered in the affirmative · The second question reads: "If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does the subsequent recognition by the United States government of Carranza as the legitimate president of the Republic of Mexico and his government as the only legitimate government of the Republic of Mexico de prive this court of jurisdiction on this appeal to decide and adjudge the case on its merits?" Our answer to the first requires a negative answer to this second question. The third question reads: "If question 2 is answered in the negative, did the seizure, condemnation, and sale of the bullion in the manner and for the purposes stated to be assumed in question 1 have the effect of divesting the title to or ownership of it of a certain citizen of the United States of America not in or a resident of Mexico when such seizure and condemnation occurred?" [8] The answer to this question must be in the affirmative, for the reasons given and upon the authorities cited in the opinion recently announced in cases Nos. 268 and 269, Oetjen v. Central Leather Company. The fact that the title to the property in controversy may have been in an American citizen, who was not in or a resident of Mexico at the time it was seized for military purposes by the legitimate government of Mexico, does not affect the rule of law that the act within its own boundaries of one sovereign state cannot become the subject of re-examination and modification in the courts of another. Such action when shown to have been taken, becomes, as we have said, a rule of decision for the courts of this country. Whatever rights such an American citizen may have can be asserted only through the courts of Mexico or through the political departments of our government. The first and third questions will be answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative. And it is so ordered. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1917 No. 148. PUGET SOUND TRACTION, | March 4, 1918. On writ of certiorari to the LIGHT & POWER COMPANY et al., plain- United States Circuit Court of Appeals for tiffs in error, v. Fred W. NEWELL et al., Commissioners, etc. March 4, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Mr. James B. Howe. of Seattle, Wash., for plaintiffs in error. Mr. James C. Hering, of Washington, D. C., for defendants in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) First National Bank v. Estherville, 215 U. S. 341, 346, 30 Sup. Ct. 152, 54 L. Ed. 223; Rogers v. Clark Iron Co., 217 U. S. 589, 30 Sup. Ct. 693, 54 L. Ed. 895; Roller v. Murray, 234 U. S. 738, 34 Sup. Ct. 902, 58 L. Ed. 1570; (2) St. Anthony Fails Water Co. v. Board of Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349, 358, 370, 371, 18 Sup. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497; Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 342, 26 Sup. Ct. 478, 50 L. Ed. 776; Weems Steamboat Co. v. People's Co., 214 U. S. 345, 355, 29 Sup. Ct. 661, 53 L. Ed. 1024, 16 Ann. Cas. 1222; (3) Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102, 105, 33 Sup. Ct. 80, 57 L. Ed. 140; Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co.. 228 U. S. 596, 600, 33 Sup. Ct. 605, 57 L. Ed. 982; Ennis Water Works v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658, 34 Sup. Ct. 767, 58 L. Ed. 1139. No. 179. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, appellant, v. John S. CHAMBERS, as Controller of the State of California, et al. March 4, 1918. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. Mr. W. F. Williamson, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with costs upon the authority of Arkansas Building & Loan Association v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 20 Sup. Ct. 119, 44 L. Ed. 159; Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup. Ct. 426, 53 L. Ed. 796; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942, 57 L. Ed. 1288. No. 232. H. A. MOSS and J. F. Bradford, plaintiffs in error, v. C. C. MOORE et al. March 4, 1918. Mr. A. E. Shaw, of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. Burke Corbet, Julius Kahn, and Alfred Sutro, all of San Francisco, Cal., for defendants in error. Death of Peter Martin suggested and appearance of Union Trust Company of San Francisco, administrator, etc., as a party defendant in error filed and entered on motion of Mr. Alexander Britton for the defendants in er ror. No. 331. David GOLDSMITH et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Alfred C. F. MEYER. March 4, 1918. In error to the St. Louis Court of Appeals of the State of Missouri. For opinion below, see 185 Mo. App. 707, 171 S. W. 606. Mr. David Goldsmith, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs in error. Dismissed per stipulation. No. 413. INTERBORO BREWING COMPANY (Inc.), petitioner, v. The STANDARD BREWING COMPANY OF BALTIMORE. the Second Circuit. For opinion below, see 229 Fed. 543, 144 C. C. A. 3. Messrs. Warren H. Small and George Ramsey, both of New York City, for petitioner. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the petitioner. Nos. 474 and 475. ALASKA PACIFIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al. March 4, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. For opinion below, see 174 Cal. 389, 163 Pac. 204. Messrs. Ira A. Campbell and Edward J. McCutchen, both of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Christopher M. Bradley, of San Francisco, Cal., for defendants in error. the effect that the same judgments may be PER CURIAM. Stipulations of counsel to entered in these cases as in case No. 476 (246 U. S. 648, 38 Sup. Ct. 315, 62 L. Ed.) having been filed, the judgments are therefore reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. No. 476. STEAMSHIP BOWDOIN COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al. March 4, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. For opinion below, see 174 Cal. 390, 163 Pac. 204. Messrs. Edward J. McCutchen and Ira A. Campbell, both of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Christopher M. Bradley, of San Francisco, Cal., for defendants in error. PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed upon the authority of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900: Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255, 37 Sup. Ct. 545, 61 L. Ed. 1116. No. 489. GLASGOW NAVIGATION COMPANY (Ltd.), appellant, v. MUNSON STEAMSHIP LINE. March 4, 1918. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Messrs. J. Parker Kirlin and Charles R. Hickox, both of New York City, for appellant. Mr. John W. Griffin, of New York City, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) Section 128, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1133 [Comp. St. 1916, 11201); Ore gon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Balfour, 179 U. S. 55, 21 United States, 213 U. S. 288, 29 Sup. Ct. 490, Sup. Ct. 28, 45 L. Ed. 82; See MacFadden v. 53 L. Ed. 801; Chott v. Ewing, 237 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 571, 59 L. Ed. 913. (2) Section 237, Judicial Code, as amended by the act of Congress of September 6, 1916 (sec. 2, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726 [Comp. St. 1916, § 1228a]). See Glasgow Nav. Co. (Ltd.), v. Munson S. S. Co., 243 U. S. 643, 37 Sup. Ct. 405, 61 L. Ed. 944. No. 539. John KNOELL et al., plaintiffs in | C. A. 519. Petition for a writ of certiorari to error, v. The UNITED STATES. March 4, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 1918. In error to the United States Circuit the Fifth Circuit granted. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. opinion below, see 239 Fed. 16, 152 C. C. A. 66. Mr. R. O. Moon, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff in error. The Attorney General, for the United States. For PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of MacFadden v. The United States, 213 U. S. 288, 29 Sup. Ct. 490, 53 L. Ed. 801; Friedman v. The United States, 244 U. S. 643, 37 Sup. Ct. 650, 61 L Ed. 1367. No. 821. MACBETH-EVANS GLASS COMPANY, petitioner, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY. March 4, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 695. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 631. David GOLDSMITH et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Alfred C. F. MEYER. March 4, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. For opinion below, see 196 S. W. 745. Mr. David Goldsmith, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs in error. Dismissed per stipulation. No. 808. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY, petitioner, v. HOUSTON ICE & BREWING COMPANY et al. March 4, 1918. For opinion below, see 241 Fed. 817, 154 C. No. 831. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. John R. SHUART et al. March 4, 1918. For opinion below, see 117 N. E. 1084. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted. No. 843. John L. CREVELING, petitioner, v. J. T. NEWTON, Commissioner of Patents. March 4, 1918. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. (246 U. S. 335) WELLS v. ROPER, First Assistant Postmas- UNITED STATES No. 103. 125-ACTIONS AGAINST shall be deemed and taken, for all purposes, to be the acts of the Postmaster General, within the meaning and intent of this contract." Plaintiff expended considerable sums of money and incurred substantial obligations in providing automobiles and other special equipment necessary for the performance of the contract, and continued to perform it Where the Postmaster General, acting un- for nearly two years. Then the Postmaster der Appropriation Act March 9, 1914, c. 33, 38 General, acting under a provision of an apStat. 295, authorizing expenditures for ex-propriation act approved March 9, 1914 perimental deliveries, determined in the interests of the service that the experiment should be conducted at Washington, D. C., and for that reason the First Assistant Postmaster General, as authorized by its terms, notified plaintiff in writing of the cancellation of the contract under which he furnished motorcars for use in collecting and delivering mail in Washington, plaintiff's suit to enjoin such First Assistant from annulling the contract must be deemed one against the United States, and hence cannot be maintained. Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Bill by Josephus Wells for an injunction against Daniel C. Roper, First Assistant Postmaster General of the United States. A decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing the bill was affirmed (chapter 33, 38 Stat. 295, 300), by which he was authorized in his discretion to use such portion of a certain appropriation as might be necessary "for the purchase and maintenance of wagons or automobiles for and the operation of an experimental combined screened wagon and city collection and delivery service," determined it to be in the interest of the public service that such an ex periment should be conducted at Washington, D. C., and in order to do this deemed it nec essary to discontinue the service then being performed by plaintiff. Accordingly the First Assistant Postmaster General notified, plaintiff in writing that it was essential for the purpose mentioned that his contract* should be canceled, and that "under the third by the Court of Appeals (44 App. D. C. 276) stipulation of the contract the use of all the and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. automobiles furnished thereunder will be disMessrs. Daniel Thew Wright and T. continued at the close of business January Morris Wampler, both of Washington, D. C., 31, 1915, and the contract canceled effective for appellant. Mr. G. Carroll Todd, As-on that date." Notwithstanding protest by sistant to the Attorney General, for appellee. Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. This was a suit in equity brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for an injunction to restrain Daniel C. Roper, First Assistant Postmaster General, from annulling a contract theretofore made between plaintiff and the Postmaster General acting for the United States, and from interfering between plaintiff and the United States in the proper performance and execution of the contract by plaintiff. The Supreme Court sustained a motion to dismiss the bill, its decree to that effect was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (44 App. D. C. 276), and plaintiff appeals to this court. plaintiff, this decision was adhered to, and the present suit was commenced. Both courts held it to be essentially and substantially a suit against the United States. and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and in this view we concur. The effect of the injunction asked for would have been to oblige the United States to accept continued performance of plaintiff's contract, and thus prevent the inauguration of the experimental service contemplated by the act of 1914-a direct interference with one of the processes of government. The argument to the contrary assumes to treat defendant, not as an official, but as an individual who, although happening to hold public office, was threatening to perpetrate an unlawful act outside of its functions. But the averments of the bill make it clear that defendant was without personal interest and was acting solely in his official capacity and within the scope of his duties. Indeed, it was only because of his official authority that plaintiff's endangered by what he The contract was made February 14, 1913, and by it plaintiff agreed for a stated compensation to furnish, during a period of four years a number of automobiles (with chaffeurs) specially equipped according to speci-interests were at all fications for use in collecting and delivering proposed to do. mail at Washington, D. C. One of its provisions (the third) was a stipulation that: "Any or all of the equipments contracted for herein may be discontinued at any time upon ninety days' notice from the said party of the first part," meaning the Postmaster General. Another was: "18. That all acts done by the First Assistant Postmaster General in respect of this contract That the interests of the government are so directly involved as to make the United States a necessary party and therefore to be considered as in effect a party, although not named in the bill, is entirely plain. And the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule that the United States may not be sued without its consent, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes nor its executive agents subjected to the control of the courts respecting the performance of their official duties. It cannot successfully be contended that any question of defendant's official authority is involved; it is a mere question of action alleged to be inconsistent with the stipulation under which it purported to be taken; nor can it be denied that the duty of the Postmaster General, and of the defendant as his deputy, was executive in character, not ministerial, and required an exercise of official discretion. And neither the question of official authority nor that of official discretion is affected, for present purposes, by assuming or conceding, for the purposes of the argument, that the proposed action may have been unwarranted by the terms of the contract and such as to constitute an actionable breach of that contract by the United States. See Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 165, 171, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123, and cases cited; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17, 18, 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L Ed. 599; School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 108, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 47 L. Ed. 90; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570. The United States has consented to be sued in the Court of Claims and in the District Courts upon claims of a certain class, and not otherwise. Hence, without considering other questions discussed by the courts below or raised by appellant in this court, we conclude that the dismissal of the bill was not erroneous. Decree affirmed. (246 U. S. 330) UNION PAC. R. CO. v. HADLEY. (Argued March 7, 1918. Decided March 18, 1918.) No. 174. INSTRUCTIONS SEPARATE 1. TRIAL 214 SUBMISSION LIGENCE. In an action for the death of a brakeman killed in a rear-end collision, where there were numerous circumstances besides the mere collision from which negligence of the company could be inferred, such as negligence of the train dispatcher in routing trains in view of an unusual snowstorm as well as the negligence of the crew of the following train who passed the automatic block signals giving warning of the train upon which deceased was a brakeman, the submission to the jury of the general question of negligence and denial of defendant's requests for rulings on the several items specified in the declaration as negligence was proper. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT 289(39) RIES TO SERVANT GENCE. INJU- Though a brakeman killed in a rear-end collision was contributorily negligent in remaining in the caboose instead of going back to warn the following train, if the railroad company was negligent, and neither train would have been at the place of collision if it had done its duty, it cannot be declared as a matter of law that the proximate cause of the brakeman's death was his contributory negligence, and that under Act St. 1916, 8 8657), it did not result in part from April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (Comp. the negligence of any employé of the railroad company. 3. TRIAL 337-JURY - DISREGARD OF IN STRUCTIONS. brakeman, the circumstances were such that the Where, in an action for death of a railroad jury might have concluded that, because his duty was nearly impossible of performance, no substantial deduction should be made because of subject to remittitur if too high, is not open to nonperformance, an award of damages, while attack on the theory that the jury disregarded instructions directing a diminution of recovery. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska. Action by Charles M. Hadley, as administrator of the estate of Charles M. Cradit, against the Union Pacific Railroad Company. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on condition of the entry of a remittitur (99 Neb. 349, 156 N. W. 765), and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Mr. Nelson H. Loomis, of Omaha, Neb., for plaintiff in error. Mr. John J. Halligan, of North Platte, ion of the Court. This is an action under the Federal Em ployers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, for causing the death of Cradit, the plaintiff's (the defendant in error's) in testate. ⚫331 before the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, The case was brought to this Court, 39 Stat. 727, and with the exception of one or❤ two matters that need a word, presents only the ordinary questions of negligence that it is not our practice to discuss at length. The deceased was a brakeman on an eastbound freight train known an Extra 504 East. At Dix, in Nebraska, it was overtaken by another eastbound train known as Extra 501 East. There is a single track from Dix to Mile Post 426, 17 miles distant, and train 504 went ahead to this latter point. Train 501 followed for about half the distance to Potter and was held there until 504 had reached Mile Post 426, seven miles further on, when 501 was started on again, leaving its conductor there. But an Extra 510 West had broken down at Mile Post 426 and the train dispatcher at Sidney, about twelve miles still further east, ordered train 504 to take the disabled engine of 510 back to Sidney. The engineer asked the dispatcher to allow 504 to go on and to let 501, when it came up, take back the engine of 510, but it was refused. No. 501 came up, ran into 504 and killed Cradit and some others. The plaintiff says that the accident was due to at least contributory negligence of the railroad-the defendant that it was not negligent, that Cradit would not have been killed if he had done his duty and had gone back to warn the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |