*318 in Woodford county, Kentucky, and nowhere plainant's [Gaines & Co.'s] sales under the else. Complainant caused the same to be registered in the Patent Office under the provisions of the act of Congress so providing. The value of the trade-mark is $500,000 and an integral part of the good will of complainant's business and the whisky is of greater value than any other of equal age. Since January, 1903, the defendants, in violation of complainant's rights and good will, have made or caused to be made and sold in the city of St. Louis a certain spirituous or alcoholic fluid not made under complainant's process and have labeled it with the words "Old Crow" without license from the complainant and against its consent. Such unlawful use will greatly lessen the value of complainant's business and good will, and complainant is without adequate remedy at law. designation 'Old Crow' whisky, nor by asserted superiority of its product." The court concluded as follows: "(1) That inasmuch as the defendants' predecessors in business prior to the use or the adopwords 'Old Crow' as a trade-mark, employed tion of the designative word 'Crow' or the those words in descriptive terms in connection with their business as dealers in whisky in St. Louis, Mo., and said predecessors and the limited extent, up to the time of the institudefendants so continued to use the same, to a tion of this suit, in good faith, they are not guilty of infringing the complainant's claimed trade-mark; and (2) that the defendants are not guilty of having engaged in unfair competition with the complainant in the prosecution of their business." It will be observed that the issues in that case were the same as those in the present case as to the right to the use of the word "Crow" with any of its qualifications. But There was the usual prayer for an account- in this case there is another ground of reing and an injunction. There was a supplemental bill to the same effect, but charging that A. M. Hellman & Co. had become the successors of the original defendants and had continued the acts alleged in the original bill. To the bill the defendants answered, with denials, and alleged the use of the word "Crow", "Old Crow" and "J. W. Crow" in connection with their own business upon packages of whisky and in their and their predecessor's business from 1863 and prior thereto; that the whisky sold by complainant was an unrefined, harmful and deleterious article and that the whisky sold by them was a brand largely free from impurities. The defendants also filed a cross-bill which, however, was not insisted upon. These, then, were the issues, and upon them and the evidence adduced to sustain them the Circuit Court entered a decree establishing complainant's right to the word "Old Crow" as a trade-mark, enjoined the use thereof by defendants and found them guilty of unfair competition in business and ordered an accounting. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree. The latter court made a careful review of the evidence, denominating it a mass of the relevant and irrelevant, and felt that it was not necessary to consider the comparative excellence of the whiskies, and remarked that the evidence did "not show that Glenn's creek in any way entered into the composition of the whisky" and that "there was no secret about the process employed by Crow nor did it differ materially from that employed by every other distiller of the same period." To the objection that the "designative words" were rarely used by the Hellmans and that their product was of inferior quality, the court replied that the right to use could not be measured by the extent to which the Hellmans employed it, "whether more or less frequently," nor "by the overshadowing comparative amount of the com covery alleged; that is, the application for and the receipt of the certificate of registration for the word as a trade-mark for straight rye and straight bourbon whisky. The District Court, however, adjudged that the decree of the Circuit Court in Missouri and its affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals constituted a bar to this suit. To, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, reversing the action of" the District Court, this certiorari is directed. [1] The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not yield to all of the views of the Gaines Company. It refused to decide, as urged to do, that the defendants in this suit were not in privity with the defendants in the other and it rejected the contention that the use of the trade-mark established in the Hellman Company for a blended whisky was not an adjudication of the right to use it upon a straight whisky. In the rulings on both contentions we concur. The first needs no comment; we adopt that of the court on the second. The court said that: "Whatever the extended classifications and subclassifications of the Patent Office practice may contemplate, neither the common law nor the registration statute can intend such confutrade-mark as belonging to different people for sion as must result from recognizing the same different kinds of the same article. Established trade-marks directly indicate origin; but if they have any value, it is because they indithat the seller of a blended whisky might proprectly indicate kind and quality; and to say erly put upon it a mark which was known to stand for a straight whisky, or vice versa, would only as to the origin, but also as to the nature be to say that he might deceive the public not and quality, of the article." The philosophy of this might be questioned. But it seems to have become established, and, however it may be disputed in reason, there is an opposing consideration. As said by Circuit Judge Sanborn in Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co. (C. C. A.) 182 Fed. 35, 39, 104 C. C. A. 475, 479 (32 L. R. A. [N. S.] 274): *322 *321 Uniformity and certainty in rules of prop- the conclusion was the conclusion of the erty are often more important and desirable court, and necessarily had to be, else there than technical correctness." would have been no decision or decree. And And this reasoning prevailed with the Cir- it was thoroughgoing. It is manifest from cuit Court of Appeals which, after citing the excerpts we have made from the opinion cases, said that it was forced to think "that that the judgment of the court was not limwhatever was adjudicated regarding com- ited as to time or territory; nor did the plainant's title to the trade-mark applies to pleadings so limit it. The complainant in its use of both kinds of whisky." And, of that case (respondent here) alleged that it course, conversely we may say that whatever was the sole and exclusive owner of the was decided against its title to its trade-trade-mark and had used it from 1835 to the mark applies to its use on both kinds of whisky. In other words, if defendants were adjudged to have title to the words "Crow" or "Old Crow" on blended whisky, they have a right to use it on straight whisky without infringing any right of complainant. We come back, therefore, to the question as to what was adjudged in the prior suit. [2] To this question the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit gave great care and in an opinion of strength decided the negative of it. The court, in concession to the argument, assigned a prior use to the Hellmans, but expressed the view that the existence of such "general or prima facie exclusive right is not inconsistent with an inability to enforce it against some persons and under some circumstances." And it was added: "Instances may arise where the affirmative conduct or the laches of the first appropriator, and with reference to what he was at first entitled to call an infringement, has been such that on the principles of estoppel or the rule of laches a court of equity cannot tolerate that he should enforce against the later user the right which might have been originally perfect. Under these considerations and upon reference to the pleadings and the proofs in the Hellman Case, we conclude that the latter case is of the class where the refusal to give an injunction to the first appropriator of the mark may be justified upon the ground of his laches or estoppel; and so this ground of support must be considered in determining what is the true basis of that decrec." The court hence concluded that it, the decree, did not adjudge title to the Hellmans but adjudged them a "defensive right and nothing more," and, explaining the right, the court said that it "does not extend to any whisky not mixed or blended so as to be of the same general type as that to which defendants [Hellmans] had been making or to trade or territory in which they were not selling when the bill was filed." present time, being virtually the successor of the first producer of the product. Defendants (petitioners) contested the claim and asserted a right in themselves based on prior adoption and continuous use, and that right was adjudged to them. Decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and that of the District Court affirmed. (246 U. S. 353) PENDLETON v. BENNER LINE. (Argued March 11 and 12, 1918. Decided March 25, 1918.) No. 178. 1. SHIPPING 53 LOST CARGO SUIT BY CHARTERER AS BAILEE AGAINST OWNER. Though the charter party provided that bills of lading should be signed without prejudice to the charter, and they were signed by the master or agents of the vessel, yet where the charterer held itself out as a common carrier, solicited and accepted cargoes, fixed and received freights, and signed or had the bills of lading signed in its office, the charterer, suing at the request of insurers who had paid the loss, may recover on the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness despite the contention that there was no bailment to it. 2. SHIPPING 137-LIMITATION OF LIABIL ITY. the name of a partnership of which he was a Where the managing owner of a vessel, in member, signed a charter party, he cannot escape liability for breach of warranty of seaworthiness under Act June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 57 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8028), providing for limitation of shipowner's liability, for the contract was personal as to such owner, and so did not fall within the statute. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Libel by the Benner Line against Fields S. Pendleton and another, copartners doing business under the firm name of Pendleton Bros. A decree of the District Court against the named respondent, which limited his liability (210 Fed. 67), was, on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed and remanded (217 Fed. 497, 133 C. C. A. 349), and respondent brings certiorari. We are not able to assent. The court admitted that the language in the body of the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is consistent with the interpretation petitioners put upon it, that is, "that the trade-mark, in its general, prima facie, affirmative aspect, belonged to the Hellman's prior appropriation"; but the court added that the last paragraph of the opinion indicated "that the two judges (only Messrs. Harvey D. Goulder, of Clevetwo sitting) did not unite in putting the de-land, Ohio, and Avery F. Cushman, of New cision on that ground." We think this was York City, for petitioner. Affirmed. an oversight. The opinion was that of the Mr. D. Roger Englar, of New York City, court, though delivered by one judge, and for respondent. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes ⚫354 1917) PENDLETON v. BENNER LINE 331 Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin- the cargo should go as against the owners ion of the Court. of it or of the ship. The cargo went in the This is a libel brought by the Benner Line space it had hired. We agree with the lowagainst the Pendleton brothers upon a char- er Courts that the Benner Line did not dister party purporting to be made between appear from its contract to carry the goods "Pendleton Bros., agents of the schooner, when the bills of lading were signed and 'Edith Olcott'" and the libelant, and signed that it would have been answerable to the "Pendleton Brothers." The ground of the owners, or to the insurance companies when suit is that the vessel was unseaworthy at they became subrogated to the owners' the beginning of the voyage and that by rights, if they had elected to sue it. The reason thereof she sank and her entire car- owners of the vessel had warranted the seago was lost. Both Courts below held that worthiness of the ship to the charterer, of the unseaworthiness was proved, and on the course in contemplation that a cargo would evidence that question may be laid on one be shipped as to which they would be liable, side. As one of the Pendleton brothers was in some form. Wherever in theory of law not interested in the vessel he was dismiss- the* technical possession may have been, we ed from the suit without objection. The do not perceive why the charterer should be other, the petitioner, who signed the firm denied full damages upon the express conname, being a part owner, was held by the tract when its liability over also was deDistrict Court to be bound by the warranty termined by contract exactly as was expectof seaworthiness contained in the contract, ed. The ground upon which bailees have but entitled to the statutory limitation of been allowed to recover the full value of liability. Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, goods from wrongdoers has been stated for 23 Stat. 57 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8028); 210 centuries to be their liability over. Y. B. Fed. 67. The Circuit Court of Appeals held 9 Ed. IV, 34, pl. 9, is an example of what that the statute did not cover the case. 217 has been repeated from that day to this. Fed. 497, 133 C. C. A. 349. A decree was See Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass. 57, 59, entered against the petitioner for the total loss. Both Courts agreed that the Benner Line although owning none of the cargo was entitled to sue for the loss of it and this proposition and the matter of the applicability of the Act of 1884 are the two questions argued here. [1] The ground on which the right of the Benner Line to recover the value of the cargo is denied is that the anomalous doctrine by which a bailee can recover the value of goods that he does not own (The Beaconsfield, 158 U. S. 503, 507, 15 Sup. Ct. 860, 39 L. Ed. 993), stands on the bailment, and that here there was no bailment to the Benner Line. The charter party provides that bills of lading be signed without prejudice to the charter. The bills of lading were signed by the master or agents of the vessel (the Benner Line), and, it is contended, bound only the vessel. The charter was not a demise of the ship, and it may be assumed, as the bill of lading seems to assume, that the technical possession of the goods was in the ship owners, since they remained in possession of the ship. The Benner Line has not paid or been called upon to pay anything to the owners of the cargo, but brings this suit at the request of the underwriters on the same, who have paid for the loss. 49 Am. Rep. 5. Whatever may be the inadequacy, in history or theory, of the reason as applied to torts, it applies with real force to contract relations like those in this case. The whole question is hardly more than technical as there is no doubt that this suit really represents the owners' interests since it is brought at the request of the insurers who have paid the loss. [2] On the proposition that the petitioner is entitled to limit his liability under the act of 1884 it is urged that the act is an absolute limit, irrespective of privity or knowledge, in regard to contracts as well as torts, and that this contract, if it bound the petitioner at all, did so only as an indirect result of its execution. The last point hardly is intelligible. The petitioner signed the charter with the name Pendleton Brothers, which included himself, and apart from the fact that although described as agents the Pendleton brothers purport to be contracting parties, if we look only them as part owner of the vessel. The conto the principals the petitioner was one of tract was between human beings and the petitioner by his own act knowingly made himself a party to an express undertaking for the seaworthiness of the ship. That But as was observed by the Courts below, the statute does not limit liability for the personal acts of the owners done with the Benner Line held itself out to the public as a common carrier, solicited and received knowledge is established by Richardson v. the merchandise that it offered to transport Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 32 Sup. Ct. 27, 56 L. by acceptance of such merchandise contract- Ed. 110. It was said in that case, 222 U. S ed to be answerable for the transportation, chartered the vessels to carry what it received, employed the stevedores who put it aboard, fixed and received the freight and signed or had the bills of lading signed in its office. It determined the vessel on which 106, 32 Sup. Ct. 27, 56 L. Ed. 110, that section 18 leaves the owner "liable for his own fault, neglect and contracts." The princi ple was held to apply to contracts less personal than this in Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Mill Transportation Co., 155 Fed. 11, 83 wholly without the privity or knowledge of the petitioner. But that is not the material question in the case of a warranty. Unless the petitioner can be discharged from his contract altogether he must answer for the breach whether he was to blame for it or C. C. A. 607, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 769, and in MEMORANDUM DECISIONS Disposed of AT OCTOBER TERM, 1917 No. 767. Hugo YANYAR, plaintiff in error, |tion for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme PER CURIAM. Judgments affirmed upon the authority of Arver v. The United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. No. 823. Jacob ROUSS, petitioner, v. The ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. March 11, 1918. For opinion in Supreme Court, see 169 App. Div. 629, 155 N. Y. Supp. 557; in Court of Appeals, see 221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 782. Mr. Charles E. Le Barbier, of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. George W. Wickersham and Einar Chrystie, both of New York City, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York denied. No. 832. Alfred T. PETERSON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 118. Messrs. R. A. Ayers, of Big Stone Gap, Va., W. S. Cox, of Gate City, Va., and Bond & Bruce, of Wise, Va., for petitioner. Mr. John W. Davis, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. No. 837. Anne Marie BERG et al., petitioners, v. Charles D. BAKER. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 164 N. W. 588. Mr. Halvor Steenerson, of Crookston, Minn. (Messrs. Gunderson & Leach, of Alexandria, Minn., Hilton & Thompson, of Fergus Falls, Minn., and Samuel Herrick, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota denied. No. 842. Mattie RIEGER, petitioner, v. Robert ABRAMS. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 167 Pac. 76. Mr. Dallas V. Halverstadt, of Seattle, Wash. (Messrs. Wilmon Tucker, Ivan L. Hyland, and F. W. Crary, all of Seattle, Wash., of counsel), for petitioner. Peti No. 846. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. Edwin J. HILT, Jr., an infant, by his next friend, et al. March 11, 1918. For writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit opinion below, see 246 Fed. 800. Petition for a Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted. No. 850. CAPITAL SAVINGS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, v. INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF FRAMINGHAM. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 553. Messrs. Charles F. Choate, Jr., and Ralph A. Stewart, both of Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Messrs. Alfred Hemenway and Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., both of Boston, Mass., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. No. 851. Edward B. PRYOR et al., as receivers, etc., petitioners, v. Allega WILLIAMS. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 200 S. W. 53. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri granted. No. 854. The CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. L. J. RAY, administratrix, etc. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 168 Pac. 999. Messrs. R. J. Roberts, C. O. Blake, W. H. Moore, and J. E. Du Mars, all of El Reno, Okl (Mr. M. L. Bell., of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. No. 855. MCCLINTIC-MARSHALL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, petitioner, v. Elnora FORGY. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 193. Messrs. O. H. Dean, W. D. McLeod, and H. M. Langworthy, all of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner. Messrs. C. W. Prince, Edw. A. Harris, John E. Westfall, James N. Berry, and Daniel V. Howell, all of Kansas City, Mo., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. No. 867. HAMBURG-AMERIKANISCHE-State of Mississippi. For opinion below, see PACKETFAHRT AKTIEN-GESELL- 111 Miss. 574, 71 South. 827. Messrs. Thos. A. SCHAFT, etc., et al., petitioners, v. The UNIT- Evans, of Memphis, Tenn., and Roger MontED STATES of America. March 11, 1918. gomery, of Tunica, Miss., for plaintiffs in error. For opinion below, see 250 Fed. 747. Mr. Wal-Mr. W. R. Wood, of Charleston, Miss., for deter C. Noyes, of New York City, for petitioners. fendant in error. Dismissed with costs, per Mr. John W. Davis, Sol. Gen., of Washington, stipulation. D. C., and Mr. Charles Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. No. 874. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAIL ROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. Alline SKINNER, administratrix, etc. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 177 Ky. 62, 197 S. W. 552. Messrs. Trabue, Doolan & Crawford, of Louisville, Ky., Wheeler & Hughes, of Paducah, Ky., and R. V. Fletcher, of Chicago, Ill. (Mr. Blewett Lee, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. Jno. K. Hendrick and Frank N. Burns, both of Paducah, Ky. (Mr. David A. Baer, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky denied. No. 885. Frank A. BONE. petitioner, y COMMISSIONER OF MARION COUNTY. March 11, 1918. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted. For opinion below, see 249 Fed. 211. No. 886. The MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 353. Messrs. Frank E. Robson and J. Walter Dohany, both of Detroit, Mich. (Mr. Henry Russel, of Detroit, Mich., of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. John W. Davis, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., Mr. G. Carroll Todd, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Henry S. Mirchell, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 896. GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, petitioner, v. KINGDOM OF ROUMANIA. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 250 Fed. 341. Mr. Frank M. Patterson, of New York City (Mr. Franklin H. Mills, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. White & Case, of New York City (Mr. John M. Hartfield, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. No. 898. GRAYSONIA-NASHVILLE LUMBER COMPANY et al., petitioners, v. Alvin D. GOLDMAN, trustee. March 11, 1918. For opinion below, see 247 Fed. 423. Messrs. H. S. Priest, T. E. Francis, and Morton Jourdan, all of St. Louis, Mo. (Mr. G. T. Priest, of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for petitioners. Messrs. W. E. Hemingway, G. B. Rose, D. H. Cantrell, J. F. Loughborough, and V. M. Miles, all of Little Rock, Ark., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. No. 251. The BATESVILLE SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. M. H. MIMS. Jan. 4, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the No. 187. JOHN GUND BREWING COMPANY, appellant, v. The GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al. March 18, 1918. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. Messrs. Frederick W. Zollman, of St. Paul, Minn., Robert Crain, of Washington, D. C., and Louis R. Frankel, of St. Paul, Minn. (Mr. Levi Cooke, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellant. Mr. Charles Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States. Mr. Alfred Jaques, of Duluth, Minn., for appellee. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed upon the Wall. 616, 624, 20 L. Ed. 227; Whitney v. Robauthority of: 1. The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 ertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194, 8 Sup. Ct. 456, 31 504, 511, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244. 2. L. Ed. 386; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188, 23 L. Ed. 846. See Perrin v. Unit387, 58 L. Ed. 691. 3. Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 ed States, 232 U. S. 478, 483-485, 34 Sup. Ct. U. S. 422, 34 Sup. Ct. 794, 58 L. Ed. 1383. No. 188. Oliver H. SMITH, Jr., plaintiff in error, v. WASHINGTON-SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. March 18, 1918. In error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. For opinion below, see 45 App. D. C. 192. Messrs. James S. Easby-Smith and Ralph B. Fleharty, both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, John Spalding Flannery, G. Bowdoin Craighill, and W. Clayton Carpenter, all of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Macfarland v. Brown, 187 U. S. 239, 246, 23 Sup. Ct. 105, 47 L. Ed. 159; Macfarland v. Byrnes, 187 U. S. 246, 23 Sup. Ct. 107, 47 L. Ed. 162; Earle v. Myers, 207 U. S. 244, 28 Sup. Ct. 86, 52 L. Ed. 191; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 418-419, 35 Sup. Ct. 625, 59 L. Ed. 1027. No. 196. Anna MARTIN, administratrix, etc., plaintiff in error, v. CHICAGO, MILWAU KEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY. March 18, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin. For opinion below, see 162 Wis. 595, 156 N. W. 1087. Messrs. W. L. Gold and Henry Mahoney, both of Milwaukee, Wis. for plaintiff in error. Messrs. C. H. Van Alstine, H. J. Killilea, and Rodger M. Trump, all of Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. costs upon the authority of Chicago Junction Judgment affirmed with Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222, 32 Sup. Ct. 79, 56 L. Ed. 173; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U. S. 668, 673, 35 Sup. Ct. 481, 59 L. Ed. 777; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 355, 36 Sup. Ct. 126, 60 L. Ed. 324; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Knapp, 240 U. S. 464, 466, 36 Sup. Ct. 399, 60 L. Ed. 745; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, |242 U. S. 169, 37 Sup. Ct. 33, 61 L. Ed. 228. No. 229. Peter MARSHALL, plaintiff in error, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. March 18, |