*386 It organized and doing business there, an open | the mail notifying the company of the property contract for marine insurance to cover cotton to be purchased and shipped. Shipments to be covered were required to be reported by letter addressed to the company at New York. Allgeyer mailed in Louisiana such a letter addressed to New York City. A Louisiana statute made it a crime for any one to do any act to effect insurance in any marine insurance company which had not established a place of business within the state and appointed an authorized agent upon whom process might be served. The insurance company there referred to had not been authorized to do business in Louisiana and actually did no business there. Allgeyer was sentenced for mailing the letter. This court held that the statute was unconstitutional as construed by the state court, because it denied to a citizen of the United States rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. But the case did not require the court to decide, whether a state could prohibit its citizens from making contracts with corporations organized under the laws of and doing business in another state; nor whether the contract there involved had been made in New York; nor whether it was valid. And it did not in fact decide any of those questions; for they were not in issue. It was admitted (a) that the contract there involved -the open insurance policy-had been made in New York and (b) that it was valid. The only question presented to this court was, whether the state, in order more effectually to enforce its foreign corporations act, could prohibit its citizens from doing, within the state, certain acts which were essential to the enjoyment of rights secured by such a valid contract made without the state. In the paragraph near the close of the opinion (165 U. S. 593, 17 Sup. Ct. 432, 41 L. Ed. 832) | this is pointedly expressed: "In such a case as the facts here present the policy of the state in forbidding insurance com panies which had not complied with the laws of the state from doing business within its limits cannot be so carried out as to prevent the citizen from writing such a letter of notification as was written by the plaintiffs in error in the state of Louisiana, when it is written pursuant to a valid contract made outside the state and with reference to a company which is not doing business within its limits.' The more elaborate discussion which preceded this paragraph makes clear the ground of the decision. "In the case before us the contract was made beyond the territory of the state of Louisiana, and the only thing that the facts show was done within that state was the mailing of a letter of notification, as above mentioned, which was done after the principal contract had been made." 165 U. S. 587, 17 Sup. Ct. 430, 41 L. Ed. 832. to be covered by the policy already delivered. Fourth. Furthermore, the right of citizens of the United States which the Allgeyer Case sustained “is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons." Northwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, supra, 203 U. S. 255, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 51 L. Ed. 168, 7 Ann. Cas., 1104. While a state may not (except in the reasonable exercise of the police*power) im-* pair the freedom of contract of a citizen of the United States, "it can prevent the foreign insurers from sheltering themselves under his freedom." Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 553, 558, 22 Sup. Ct. 238, 46 L. Ed. 324; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 35 Sup. Ct. 504, 59 L. Ed. 839. The insurance company cannot be heard to object that the Missouri statute is invalid, because it deprived Dodge of rights guaranteed to natural persons, citizens of the United States. Erie Railroad Co. v. Williams, 233 U. s. 685, 705, 34 Sup. Ct. 761, 58 L. Ed. 1155; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576, 35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364. In my opinion the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Mr. Justice DAY, Mr. Justice PITNEY, 66 # * In this case the only act which it is claimed was a violation of the statute in and Mr. Justice CLARKE concur in this disquestion consisted in sending the letter through sent. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS Disposed of at October TERM, 1917 No. 287. Pedro GUTIERREZ, plaintiff in | error, v. Walter B. GRANT, sole surviving executor of the will and estate of Frank B. Cotton, deceased. April 1, 1918. Mr. A. Seymour Thurmond, of El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Walter B. Grant, of Boston, Mass., for defendant in error. In error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas. Dismissed per stipulation. C., and Walter L. Clark, of Baltimore, Md. (Fred S. Ball and Edmund R. Beckwith, both of Montgomery, Ala., of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. Horace Stringfellow, B. P. Crum, and Leon Weil, all of Montgomery, Ala. (Steiner, Crum & Weil, of Montgomery, Ala., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. No. 893. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, petitioner, v. Carrie SALYER, administratrix, etc. April 1, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 794. Mr. Edward C. O'Rear, of Frankfort, Ky. (Allie W. Young, of Morehead, Ky., and J. B. Adamson, of Frankfort, Ky., of counsel), for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 901. W. C. STERRETT, as receiver, etc., petitioner, V. SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF CINCINNATI, Ohio. April 1, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 753. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted. No. 906. COOPER GROCERY COMPANY, petitioner, v. G. H. PENLAND, trustee, etc. April 1, 1918. For opinion below, see 247 Fed. 480. Messrs. W. L. Eason and B. Y. Cummings, both of Waco, Tex., for petitioner. Messrs. W. M. Sleeper, Chas. A. Boynton, Ben. G. Kendall, and J. D. Williamson, all of Waco, Tex., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. No. 908. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, petitioner, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MONTGOMERY, Ala. April 1, 1918. For opinion below, see 246 Fed. 892. Messrs. William C. Prentiss, of Washington, D. No. 915. COMPANIA PALOMAS DE TERRENOS Y GANADOS et al., petitioners, v. Sigmund LINDAUER et al. April 1, 1918. For opinion below, see 247 Fed. 428. Messrs. James R. Garfield, of Cleveland, Ohio, D. J. Cable, of Lima, Ohio, and Francis C. Wilson, of Santa Fé, N. M., for petitioners. Messrs. Walter D. Hawk and Samuel S. Holmes, both of Chicago, Ill., A. B. Renehan, of Santa Fé, N. M., and Charles A. Douglas, of Washington, D. C., for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS DISPOSED OF IN VACATION No. 139. COAL & COKE RY. CO., Plaintiff | twenty-eighth rule. Mr. James A. Veasey, of in error, v. David F. DEAL. July 16, 1917. Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph In error to the United States Circuit Court of P. Rossiter, of Henryetta, Okl., for defendant in Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. For opinion error. below, see 231 Fed. 604, 145 C. C. A. 490. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the twentyeighth rule. Mr. George E. Price, of Charleston, W. Va., for plaintiff in error. Mr. H. W. Houston, of Charleston, W. Va., for defendant in error. No. 241. John A. BELL, Plaintiff in error, v. Lizzie E. FITZPATRICK. July 31, 1917. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. For opinion below, see 157 Pac. £34. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the No. 182. CINCINNATI, N. O. & T. P. RY. CO., Plaintiff in error, v. W. E. GOODE. August 15, 1917. In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky. For opinion below, see 169 Ky. 102, 183 S. W. 264. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the twenty-eighth rule. Messrs. John Galvin and Edward Colston, both of Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Emmet Puryear, of Danville, Ky., for defendant in error. (246 U. S. 434) GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. et al. v. LAGE OF CLARA CITY. of way, so that the sidewalk will connect with the said planking in either direction, but not so as to include in such construction the building of any sidewalk or crosswalk along that part of the street now occupied by said roadbed or curely planked for crossing purposes." (Submitted March 12, 1918. Decided April 15, tracks, which part is already sufficiently and se 1918.) No. 185. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 297 ROADS 95(2) DUE PROCESS OF LAW Laws Minn. 1913, c. 78, § 1 (Gen. St. 1913, § 4256), making it the duty of every railroad company whenever its right of way crosses a public street in a municipality to construct a suitable sidewalk to connect with and correspond to sidewalks constructed by the municipality or owners of abutting property, is not subject to attack under Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as denying due process or equal protection of law to railroad companies, but, in view of the principle that the state is the primary judge of police regulations, should be deemed a valid exercise of the police power. The general laws of Minnesota contain a provision requiring the planking of railroad crossings where the same cross a public street. Section 4256 of the General Statutes of Minnesota. By amendment of 1913 the following provision was added: "And a suitable sidewalk shall be constructed by said company to connect with and correspond to sidewalks constructed and installed by the municipality or by owners of abutting property, but cement or concrete construction shall not be required in track space actually occupied by the railroad ties if some substantial and suitable sidewalk material is used in lieu thereof." Laws of Minnesota 1913, chapter 78, section 1. The lower court in Minnesota dismissed In Error to the Supreme Court of the the petition, which judgment was reversed State of Minnesota. Petition by the State of Minnesota, on the relation of the Village of Clara City, for a writ of mandamus against the Great Northern Railway Company and another. On relator's appeal an order sustaining demurrer to the petition was reversed (130 Minn. 480, 153 N. W. 879), and respondents bring error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota. Affirmed. Messrs. E. C. Lindley, M. L. Countryman, and Thomas R. Benton, all of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiffs in error. Mr. C. A. Fosnes, of Montevideo, Minn., for defendant in error. *Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was brought to compel the railroad companies to build a sidewalk on the south side of Bunde street in the village of Clara City, Minnesota, where the right of way of the railroad companies crosses that street. The right of way of the companies is of the width of 300 feet at the place where Bunde street crosses the same. At or near the center of this right of way the companies have constructed three railroad tracks. There are business houses upon both sides of the right of way, and it becomes necessary for people to cross the same frequently. The case was decided in the lower court in Minnesota upon demurrer to the petition in mandamus, and the record contains this statement: by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the railroad company was required to construct the sidewalk at its own expense. 130 Minn. 480, 153 N. W. 879. The court held that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. The contention here made is that the statute as thus enforced denies to the companies due process of law and the equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. of this court to require extended discussion It is too well settled by former decisions, quired by the states in the exercise of the here that railroad companies may be re police power to make streets and highways crossed by the tracks of such companies reasonably safe and convenient for public use, and this at their own expense. Such companies accept their franchises from the state subject to their duties to conform to regulations, not of an arbitrary nature, as tc the opening and use of the public streets for the purpose of promoting the public safety and convenience. This principle was applied by this court in C., I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, 31 Sup. Ct. 93, 54 L. Ed. 1060, 20 Ann. Cas. 1206, wherein the railroad, because of the extension of a street through an embankment upon which the railroad was built, was required to construct at its own expense a bridge across the street. In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341, 52 L. Ed. 630, it was held that a municipality of the state of "For the purpose of the demurrer it was ad- Minnesota might require a railroad company mitted by relator that that part of the street to repair a viaduct constructed by the city in question which is occupied by the roadbed or after the opening of the railroad notwithtracks of the respondents was and is properly, standing a contract relieving the railroad securely and sufficiently planked the full width of the street, such planking extending the full from making repairs thereon for a term of length of the ties and between the tracks as in years, that the police power of the state was that particular required by statute; that the a continuing one, and could not be contractsole object and purpose sought to be attained in ed away, and that uncompensated obedience and by these proceedings is to compel the respondents to construct a sidewalk on one side of to laws, passed in its exercise, did not conthe street as it is located across the entire right travene the federal Constitution. This case For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 436 was followed with approval in St. Paul, ed unconstitutional where they are arbitraMinneapolis & Manitoba R. Co. v. State of ry or unreasonable attempts to exercise auMinnesota, 214 U. S. 497, 29 Sup. Ct. 698, thority vested in the state in the public in53 L. Ed. 1060. In Chicago, Milwaukee & terest. We are not prepared to say that this St. Paul R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. statute is of that character, and the judg 430, 34 Sup. Ct. 400, 58 L. Ed. 671, this court ment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court Affirmed. of Minnesota requiring a railroad company to build at its own expense a bridge required in order to permit a municipality in that state to construct a canal connecting two lakes within the limits of a public park. In (Argued March 15, 1918. Decided April 15, the opinion in that case previous decisions in this court are collected and reviewed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the instant case held that the railroad companies might be required to construct a side walk upon the right of way on both sides of the planked crossing. In the opinion of the court the sidewalk, leading to the crossing, tended to promote the safety and convenience of the public, and, after discussing the well-established authority of the state to require planking at crossings, as to the additional requirement to build the connecting sidewalk, said: "There can be no controlling difference between the requirement of sidewalk and of planking. Planking is, to be sure, more to prevent persons in vehicles from injury, or the vehicles or teams from damage, by being stalled on the crossing. But, where a crossing is much traveled, safety, to say nothing of convenience, may require a separate space, like a sidewalk, reserved for pedestrians. There is a peculiar peril to travelers on foot, where many vehicles pass and the attention of the drivers is diverted to looking out for trains liable to use the crossing. Again, unless a well-defined walk be provided, there is danger of pedestrians crossing the tracks at places unexpected to those in charge of trains or cars, not to mention the inconvenience where mud and impassable conditions compel those on foot to deviate from the street proper. "It is said defendant, if obligated to lay a sidewalk across its right of way, might likewise be required to construct sidewalks along such right of way where it borders a highway or street. The sufficient answer is that the statute does not call for anything of the kind. (246 U. S. 523) BETHLEHEM STEEL CO. v. UNITED STATES. PAYMENT 1918.) No. 191. cancel a contractor's bond and to notify the That the Secretary of the Navy refused to surety thereof was no ground for recovery from the United States of premiums paid, where it nowhere appeared that the contractor was obligated to pay premiums until such cancellation. Mr. Justice McKenna dissenting. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by the Bethlehem Steel Company against the United States. From a judgment of the Court of Claims (51 Ct. Cl. 394), denying a part of the relief sought plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Mr. James H. Hayden, of Washington, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Bethlehem Steel Company entered into a contract, dated September 27, 1909, with the United States to manufacture and deliver for the Navy large quantities of several groups of armor plates, and agreed to replace any accepted armor which should prove defective within six months after it had been fastened on the ship. The contract required the company to furnish a bond with "The contention is also that defendant has so sureties in a sum equal to ten per cent. of the much larger right of way than it needs or occu- total cost of all groups, and provided that pies for its three tracks that for the greater dis- "at the end of each calendar year the amount tance the sidewalk, as a safety provision, is out of place. It is to be assumed that the right of of said bond may be reduced to correspond to way is such only as is needed for and devoted the estimated cost of armor then undeliverto railway purposes, and such as is rightfully ed." The bond was furnished; and delivery exempt from taxes and assessments because of the payment of the gross earnings tax. Within its right of way defendant may at any time place additional tracks, or change the location of those it maintains, and, for that reason, it also seems proper that the safety of the passage for the traveler for the whole distance should be placed upon the railroad company. The statute merely prescribes that it shall maintain a sidewalk over its legitimate right of way to correspond and connect with the walk maintained under the supervision of the municipality, so as to afford the pedestrians a reasonably safe and convenient crossing." On January 27, of all the armor originally specified was completed May 2, 1911. But on March 26, 1912, plates aggregating at cost prices more than the penalty of the bond were found to be defective, and a part of this was not replaced until November 22, 1912. 1912, the company formally requested the Secretary of the Navy to cancel the bond and notify the surety, but he refused to do so except upon certain conditions which were not complied with until May 15, 1912, when This court considers a case of this nature the bond was canceled. The company had in the light of the principle that the state expended $5,509.62 in payment of premiums is primarily the judge of regulations requir- on the bond from May 3, 1911, until May 15, ed in the interest of the public safety and 1912, and demanded reimbursement by the welfare. Such statutes may only be declar- government. Payment being refused, suit For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *525 RIGHT OF WAY was brought in the Court of Claims to recov- [4. PUBLIC LANDS 92 er this amount and also a balance of $3,170.69 GRANT OF PUBLIC LANDS. for plate delivered. Judgment for the latter Stat. 395, a railroad company was granted a Where, under Act Dec. 15, 1870, c. 2, 16 sum was entered; but the court held that right of way over public lands, it is entitled to the company was not entitled to recover a right of way over lands within an incorporatfor the premiums paid. The case comes here ed city, despite the town-site law, for it could not have been intended that the right of way under section 242 of the Judicial Code (Act would stop at the city limits. March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1157 [Comp. St. 1916, § 1219]). The lower court held that the bond covered merely the original delivery of the armor plate and not the replacement of defective plates; but it refused recovery of the amount paid for premiums after May 3, 1911, on the ground that the payment thereof was voluntary, because the condition of the bond had then been complied with. The government contends that the bond covered the replacement also; that the contract made reduction of the bond permissive, not mandatory; and that the Secretary was, in any event, under no obligation to cancel the bond prior to the request made January 27, 1912. We have no occasion to consider any of these contentions. It nowhere appears that the company had bound itself to continue to pay premiums until the Secretary canceled the bond and gave the surety notice thereof. So far as disclosed by the record, the payment of premiums was voluntary. The judgment of the Court of Claims is Mr. Justice MCKENNA dissents. (246 U. S. 446) SALT LAKE INV. CO. v. OREGON SHORT (Argued March 8, 1918. Decided April 15, 1. PUBLIC LANDS 29 ENTRIES TOWN Under the Pre-emption Act (Act Sept. 4, 1841, c. 16, 5 Stat. 455) § 10, excluding from acquisition thereunder all lands within the limits of any incorporated towns, an entryman who filed a declaratory statement and secured, a patent to lands within the boundaries of an incorporated town acquired no title thereto, even though the property was never actually occupied as a town site or attempted to be entered as such. 2. PUBLIC LANDS 29-RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-GRANT OF PUBLIC WAY. Public land included within lands granted to a railroad company as a right of way is not excepted because of the mere presence of a squatter thereon, where there was no such exception contained in the act. 3. PUBLIC LANDS 29-ENTRYMAN-RIGHTS OF WAY. Where an entry on public lands within the corporate limits of a city was invalid under the pre-emption law, and rights of a railroad company to such land as part of its right of way had become vested, Act March 3, 1877, c. 113, 19 Stat. 392, subsequently enacted, cannot be deemed to have divested the rights of the railroad company, and confirmed the pre-emption entry which was originally invalid. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Action by the Salt Lake Investment Company against the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, which counterclaimed, pleading title in itself. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed and remanded, with directions to set aside the same and enter judgment in favor of defendant quieting its title (46 Utah, 403, 148 Pac. 439), and plaintiff brings error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Judgment affirmed. Messrs. W. H. King, E. A. Walton, and M. E. Wilson, all of Salt Lake City, Utah, and T. T. Ansberry, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Henry W. Clark, of New York City, and George H. Smith, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court. A small parcel of land in Utah is here, the subject of conflicting claims-one under) a patent to Malcolm Macduff issued under the Pre-Emption Act, c. 16, 5 Stat. 453, and the other under an act, chapter 2, 16 Stat. 395, granting a right of way "through the public lands" to the Utah Central Railroad Company. The court below sustained the latter claim, 46 Utah, 203, 148 Pac. 439, and the case is here on a writ of error allowed before the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, became effective. Macduff's pre-emption claim was initiated by settlement June 10, 1869; his declaratory statement was filed in the local land office July 21 of that year; he paid the purchase price and secured an entry January 19, 1871, and the patent was issued June 5, 1871. The right of way was granted December 15, 1870. At that time the railroad was completed and in operation for its full length. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2 Sess. 4512, 5635; Moon v. Salt Lake County, 27 Utah, 435, 442, 76 Pac. 222. It was constructed late in 1869 or early in 1870, after Macduff filed his declaratory statement and before he paid the purchase price or secured his entry. Continuously after 1860 the tract sought to be pre-empted was within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, as defined by a public statute, but was never actually occupied as a town site nor attempted to be entered as such. The parcel in controversy is within that tract, is also within the exterior lines of the right of way, and is occupied and used for right of way purposes. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |