scope, not less than that granted by the Cov- , after this grant to individuals, but never one ington charter, declared :

unlimited in terms with the city contending “Under the general power of a municipal gov- always that this franchise was for twentyernment to control and regulate the use of the five years only, and with the courts, Legisstreets of a city, it cannot grant to any person or corporation the right to lay down a railway lature, and bar of the state united in thinkin a street.

The right of the general ing that there was no power in the municicouncil to contract with a railway company pality to make even a limited street railroad grows out of the special acts of the Legislature grant without special legislative warrant, I heretofore quoted.'

cannot bring myself to consent to construe, Whether this statement was necessary to as the court does, an obscurely worded clause the decision of the case then under considera- of a single sentence, found in a grant to intion or not, in the following year it was par- dividuals, of the right to construct an insigaphrased and adopted in a Covington Street nificant horse railroad, which the son of the Ry. Co. Case, 9 Bush (Ky.) 127, and, almost grantee in an affidavit alleges required an twenty years after that it was again approv- expenditure of only $48,000, so as to impose ed in a Covington Case, 90 Ky. 390, 14 S. W. upon the municipality "the unspeakable bur361.

den" of a perpetual franchise to operate Thus, during the entire period covered by street railroads in its streets. the grants here involved, it was the law of Fully realizing the futility, for the present, the state, as its highest court understood and of dissenting from what seems to me to be an announced it, that the city of Covington did unfortunate extension of the doctrine of the not have, under its charter, power to make a Owensboro Case, 230 U. S. 58, 33 Sup. Ct. 988, street railway grant, “without special author- 57 L. Ed. 1389, I deem it my duty to record ity so to do from the Legislature."

my dissent, with the hope for a return to tbe That this was also the opinion of the Leg- sound, but now seemingly neglected, doctrine islature of the state and of that part of the of Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 463, 26 bar of the state concerned with the grants Sup. Ct. 427, 50 L. Ed. 801, declaring that here involved is conclusively shown by the a corporation which would successfully asfact that in the charter of every one of the sert a private right in a public street must three street railway companies concerned come prepared to show that it has been con. herein there is a special grant of power to ferred “in plain terms,” “in express terms," the city of Covington to make the contem- and that any ambiguity in the terms of the plated contract for the use of its streets for grant must be resolved in favor of the public street railway purposes.

and against the corporation “which can claim This obscurely worded grant, thus made to nothing which is not clearly given.” The Abbott without special legislative authority, reason given by the court for this rule is is not helped out by subsequent recognition that "grants of this character are usually by the city, for we find the parties, almost prepared by those interested in them," and from the beginning of its term, dealing with that "it serves to defeat any purpose, coneach other constantly at arm's length, the cealed by the skillful use of terms, to accity claiming that the grant was, at most, complish something not apparent on the face limited to twenty-five years, and the railway of the act." This is declared to be "sound company claiming it to be perpetual.

doctrine which should be vigilantly observed For instance, as early as 1887, when the and enforced." right to use electric power was granted, a

Believing that the application of this wise typical provision was inserted in the ordi- rule to the decree before us must result in nance, accepted in writing by the company: its reversal, I dissent from the opinion of

“That nothing in this ordinance shall be con- the court. strued to nor shall it give to said railway any further or longer time than it now has to oper Mr. Justice BRANDEIS concurs in this ate its lines."

dissent. Again, in 1892, for a reduction of fare and other considerations the city agrees "for

(246 U. S. 525) the period of twenty years after the accept- LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. HOLLOWAY. ance of this ordinance” not to offer for sale (Submitted March 15. 1918. Decided April 15,

1918.) any of the rights or franchises of the defend

No. 209. ant in error in the said streets; and it was

DAMAGES INSTRUCnot until after the expiration of this period 1. DEATH 104(6) that the proposition to grant a new franchise

In an action under the federal Employers' was made, which the decision of the court Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 permanently enjoins.

Stat. 65 (Comp. St. 1916, 88 8657–8665]), an inThis is sufficient of detail to indicate why struction that plaintiff's measure of recovery

was such an amount in damages as would fairly I am of opinion that the meager and equivo-compensate the widow of the deceased employé cal grant of 1869 should not be regarded as for the loss of pecuniary benefits she might reahelped out by the subsequent dealings of the sonably have received if deceased had not been assignees of it with the city.

killed, while general, was correct, and was not

objectionable as implying that the verdict should Under the circumstances thus presented, I be for the aggregate of the several benefits pay. with limited franchises granted before and able at different times, without making any al.


For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Inderas


lowance for the fact that the whole amount of was affirmed with ten per cent. damage by the verdict would be presently paid.

the Court of Appeals (168 Ky. 262, 181 S. W. 2. TRIAL Om256(13)-INSTRUCTIONS–GENER


The case comes here under section In an action for death, where the court gave 237 of the Judicial Code. The errors asa correct general instruction as to the measure signed in this court and now insisted upon of recovery, defendant was entitled to have in

are these: struction supplemented by other more particular

The first assignment: That the Court of 3. DEATH Ow103(4)—ACTIONS-DAMAGES.

Appeals erred in approving the giving of an In an action under the federal Employers' instruction and the refusal of anotheri by Liability Act for the death of an employé, de which the trial judge had denied to the com-* fendant is not entitled to have it declared as a matter of law that the sum awarded as dam- pany the benefit of the rule declared in Chesages should be treated on the basis that it would apeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 483, return an income at the rate of 6 per cent. per 491, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. Ed. 1117, L. R. A. annum, the legal rate of interest, or that de- 1917F, 367, that in computing damages re ceased would not have survived his probable expectancy.

coverable for the deprivation of future finan4. COURTS 394(25)_SUPREME COURT-RE cial benefits, the verdict should be based on VIEW OF LOCAL PRACTICE.

their present value. Where an action under the federal Employers' Liability Act is tried in a state court, ques

The third assignment: That the Court of tions purely of local practice are not reviewable Appeals erred in refusing to reverse the judgby the Supreme Court of the United States on ment of the trial court on the ground that the writ of error to the highest state court.

damages were excessive, and in holding as 5. Courts Cw394(24)-SUPREME Court-Ex- part of the loss of benefits the widow might CESSIVE DAMAGES-REVIEW OF VERDICT.

1.n. an action under the federal Employers have received and which the jury was entitled Liability Act, tried in the state court where a to consider "not only her support and maintejudgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the high- nance of $50.00 a month, but in addition there. est state tribunal, the question of the excessive- to, one-half of the savings, which decedent ness of damages cannot be reviewed in the federal Supreme Court on writ of error.

might have accumulated if he had lived out 6. DEATH Em 104(4)-DAMAGES.

his allotted span" of life. In an action under the federal Employers' (1-4) First. The instruction given, though Liability Act, a judgment of the state court bas- general, was correct. It declared that the ed on the theory that in estimating the widow's pecuniary damage the jury might consider not plaintiff was entitled to recover “such an only amounts expended for her support and amount in damages as will fairly and reasonmaintenance, but what she would otherwise ably compensate" the widow "for the loss of have received from her deceased husband, is not pecuniary benefits she might reasonably have objectionable as allowing consideration as benefits of savings which the deceased might have received" but for her husband's death. This accumulated.

ruling did not imply that the verdict should In Error to the Court of Appeals of the be for the aggregate of the several benefits State of Kentucky.

payable at*different times, without making Action by E. S. Holloway, administrator

iny allowance for the fact that the whole of the estate of John G. Holloway, deceased, amount of the verdict would be presently against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad paid at one time. The instruction bore rathCompany. A judgment for plaintiff was

er an implication to the contrary; for the sum affirmed on defendant's appeal (168 Ky. 262, was expressly stated to be that which would 181 S. W. 1126), and defendant brings error “compensate.” The language used was simito the Court of Appeals of the state of Kentucky. Affirmed.

1 The instruction given was: “The measure of re

covery if you And for the plaintiff, being such an Mr. B. D. Warfield, of Louisville, Ky., for amount in damages as will fairly and reasonably plaintiff in error.

compensate the widow of the said John G. HolloMessrs. Clay & Clay, of Henderson, Ky., for she might reasonably have received if the deceased

way, deceased, for the loss of pecuniary tenefits defendant in error.

had not been killed, not exceeding the amount

claimed; to wit: $50,000.00." Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opin The instruction refused was: “The court instructs ion of the court.

the jury that if they shall And for the plaintiff,

their verdict cannot, in any event, exceed a sum Holloway, locomotive engineer, was which will yield, at interest at 6 per cent., a sum killed on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad which will represent the proven pecuniary benefits while engaged in the performance of his which Mrs. Holloway received from her husband in


his lifetime, and had reasonable expectation of reduties. His administrator brought, for the ceiving from him if he had not been killed. And benefit of his widow, an action under the the court further instructs the jury that the amount federal Employers' Liability Act in a state so awarded by them should be diminished by such court of Kentucky and recovered a verdict amount as that, by using the interest and a part

of the principal sum each year, the principal sum of $32.900. The judgment entered thereon will have been exhausted at the expiration of dewas reversed by the Court of Appeals (163 cedent's expectancy of 28.62 years."

No other instruction on the measure of damages Ky. 125, 173 S. W. 343); and, at the second

was given; and none was requested except an intrial, a verdict was rendered for $25,000. struction, not now insisted upon, limiting the recov. Judgment was entered on this verdict, and ery specifically to $13,737.60.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

lar to that in which this court has since ex- | “not only her support and mair.tenance of pressed, in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, $50.00 a month, but in addition thereto, onesupra, 241 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. half of the savings, which decedent might Ed. 1117, L. R. A. 1917F, 367, the meas- have accumulated,” it is a sufficient answer ure of damages which should be applied 2. that the trial court did not give any instrucThe company had, of course, the right to tion on that subject, nor was it requested to require that this general instruction be sup- give any, and that the Court of Appeals did plemented by another calling attention to the not hold as stated that the widow could share fact that, in estimating what amount would in the loss to the estate. It held that the pecompensate the widow, future benefits must cuniary benefit which the jury was entitled be considered at their present value. But it to consider in estimating the widow's damdid not ask for any such instruction. In- ages was not merely what she would have stead it erroneously sought to subject the spent for maintenance and support, but what jury's estimate to two rigid mathematical she would otherwise have received from her limitations: (1) That money would be worth husband. to the widow six per cent., the legal rate of Affirmed. interest; (2) that the period during which the future benefits would have continued

(246 U. S. 533) was 28.62 years—the life expectancy of the UNITED STATES v. WEITZEL. husband according to one of several well

(Argued March 7, 1918. Decided April 15, known actuarial tables. The company was

1918.) not entitled to have the jury instructed as

No. 567. matter of law either that money was worth 1. BANKS AND BANKING 256(3)–OFFENSES that rate, or that the deceased would not in -"AGENT." any event have outlived his probable expec- the Comptroller of the Currency under Rev. St.

A receiver of a national bank appointed by tancy. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, $ 5234 (Comp. St. 1916, $ 9821), being an officer supra, 241 U. S. 490 492, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 of the United States instead of the bank, is not L. Ed. 1117, L. R. A. 1917F, 367. Nor need St. 1916, § 9772), denouncing the offense of em

in agent of the bank within section 5209 (Comp. we determine whether the local rule of prac-bezzlement and making false entries by every tice, that if instructions are offered upon any president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent issue respecting which the jury should be in- of a national bank; the conclusion being structed and they are incorrect in form or sociis, in view of the position of the word

strengthened by the principle of noscitur a substance it is the duty of the trial court to “agent" in the section. prepare or direct the preparation of a proper (Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words instruction upon the point in place of the de- and Phrases, First and Second Series, Agent.] fective one (see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. 1 2. BANKS AND BANKING Ew256(3)—STATUTES

m 241(1)-OFFENSES-CONSTRUCTION. De Atley, 241 U. S. 310, 316, 36 Sup. Ct. 564,

Statutes creating and defining crimes are 60 L. Ed. 1016), was applicable in the case not extended by intendment because the court at bar. That is a question of state law, with thinks the Legislature should have made them which we have no concern. * In the De Atley denouncing the offense of embezzlement or mak

more comprehensive. Therefore Rev. St. § 5209, Case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals as-ing false entries by a president, director, cashsumed for the purposes of its decision that the ier, teller, clerk, or agent of a national bank, local rule applied, and was thereby led to cannot by implication be extended so as to em

brace receivers appointed by the Comptroller of decide a question of federal law. Conse

the Currency, on the ground that otherwise quently we had and exercised jurisdiction to there would be no statute applying to embeze review its decision upon that question.

zlement by such receivers. (5, 6] Second. The third assignment, in so In Error to the District Court of the far as it relates to the refusal of the Court United States for the Eastern District of of Appeals to reverse the judgment “on the K tucky. ground that the damages are excessive," is Fred W. Weitzel was indicted under Rev. not reviewable here. Southern Railway Co. St. § 5209, for embezzlement, and, a dev. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 86, 34 Sup. Ct. 566, murrer having been sustained on the ground 58 L. Ed. 860. It does not appear in the case that he did not fall within the terms of the at bar, as it did in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. act, the United States brings error. Afv. Gainey, 241 U. S. 494, 496, 36 Sup. Ct. 633, firmed. 60 L. Ed. 1124, that the action of the Court

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren, of Appeals in sustaining the verdict was for the United States. necessarily based upon an erroneous theory

Mr. A. E. Stricklett, of Covington, Ky., for of federal law. As to the alleged error of

defendant in error. the Court of Appeals in holding as part of the benefit the widow might have received * Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the

opinion of the Court. ? "The damages should be equivalent to compen

The Comptroller of the Currency is chargsation for the deprivation of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits that would have re-ed with the duty of supervising national sulted from the continued life of the deceased." banks. When he deems it necessary to take

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


ten years.

possession of the assets of a bank and as-, be discharged by returning the bank to the sume control of its operations, he appoints a control of its stockholders or by the appointreceiver under Revised Statutes, $ 5234 (Comp. ment of a liquidating agent under Act of St. 1916, § 9821). Weitzel, so appointed re- June 30, 1876, C. 156, 19 Stat. 63. Whether, ceiver, was indicted in the District Court of as the government assumes, such statutory the United States for the Eastern District agent who is elected by the stockholders is of Kentucky under Revised Statutes, $ 5209 included under term "agent" as used in sec(Comp. St. 1916, 8 9772), for embezzlement and tion 5209, we have no occasion to determine. making false entries. That section does not The question was expressly left undecided in mention receivers, but provides that “every Jewett v. United States, 100 Fed. 832, 840,

president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, 41 C. C. A. 88, 53 L. R. A. 568. But the asor agent” of a national bank who commits sumption, if correct, would not greatly aid these offences shall be punished by imprison. | its contention. The law can conceive of an ment for not less than five nor more than agent appointed by a superior authority; but

The government contended that the term “agent" is ordinarily used as imthe receiver was an “agent" within the mean- plying appointment by a principal on whose ing of the act. A demurrer to the indict- behalf he acts. The fact that in this secment was sustained on the ground that he tion the words "clerk or agent" follow is not. The court discharged the prisoner "president, director, cashier, teller" tends, and the case comes here under the Criminal under the rule of noscitur a sociis, to confirm Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. the inference. United States v. Salen, 235 1246 (Comp. St. 1916, $ 1704).

U. S. 237, 249, 35 Sup. Ct. 51, 59 L. Ed. 210. [1] The receiver, unlike a president, direc- Furthermore, the term "agent of a bank" tor, cashier, or teller, is an officer, not of would ill describe the office of receiver. the corporation, but of the United States. [2] Section 5209 is substantially a reenIn re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 458, 17 Sup. actment of section 52 of the Act of February Ct. 385, 41 L. Ed. 782. As such he gives to 25, 1863, c. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 680, the first Nathe United States a bond for the faithful tional Bank Act. It is urged by the governdischarge of his duties; pays to the Treasur-ment, that the punishment of defalcation by er of the United States moneys collected; a receiver is clearly within the reason of the and makes to the Comptroller reports of statute and that, unless the term "agent" his acts and proceedings. Revised Statutes, be construed as including receivers, there $ 5234. Being an officer of the United States was no federal statute under which an emhe is represented in court by the United bezzling receiver of a national bank could States attorney for the district, subject to have been prosecuted, at least until the Act the supervision of the Solicitor of the Treas- of February 3, 1879, c. 42, 20 Stat. 280, ury. Section 380 (Comp. St. 1916, 8 556); | (Comp. St. 1916, § 10265), made officers of the Gibson v. Peters, 150 U. S. 342, 14 Sup. Ct. United States so liable therefor; and, in134, 37 L. Ed. 1104. And because he is such deed, cannot now be, because he should not officer, a receiver has been permitted to sue be held to be an officer. The argument is in the federal court regardless of citizenship not persuasive. Congress may possibly have or of the amount in controversy. Price v. believed that a different rule should be apAbbott (C. C.) 17 Fed. 506. In a sense he plied to an officer of the United States who acts on behalf of the bank. The appointment is selected by the Comptroller for a purpose of a receiver does not dissolve the corpora- largely different from that performed by oftion. Chemical National Bank v. Hartford ficers of the bank, and who gives bond for Deposit Co., 161 U. S. 1, 7, 16 Sup. Ct. 439, the faithful discharge of his duties. Fur40 L. Ed. 595; the assets remain its property, thermore a casus omissus is not unusual, Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462, 26 L. particularly in legislation introducing Ed. 832; the receiver deals with the assets new system.2 The fact that in 1879 Con. and protects them for whom it may concern,


• For example: 1. Extortion by Government "ofn including the stockholders; and his own

Act of March 3, 1825, c. 65, $ 12, 4 Stat. 118 compensation and expenses are a charge (R. S. § 5481 [Comp. St. 1916, § 10253]); United States upon them. Section 5238 (Comp. St. 1916, v. Germaine, 99 V. S. 508, 25 L, Ed. 482; amended 8 9825). But a receiver is appointed only by Act of June 28, 1906, c. 3574, 34 Stat. 546 (Comp.

St. 1916, § 10253), to include "clerk, agent, or emwhen the condition of the bank or its prac. ployé," and every person assuming to be such oftices makes intervention by the government ficer, etc. 2. Mailing obscene writings: Act of July necessary for the protection of noteholders 12, 1876, c. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (R. S. § 3893 (Comp. st. or other creditors.1 While the receivership 255, 10 Sup. ct. 756, 34 L. Ed. 117; amended by Act

1916, § 10381]); United States v. Chase, 135 U. S. continues the corporation is precluded from of Sept. 26, 1888. C. 1039, 25 Stat. 496, to include dealing by its officers or agents in any way "letters," Andrews v. United States, 162 V. S. 420, with its assets. And when all creditors are

16 Sup. Ct. 798, 40 L. Ed. 1023; 3. Intimidating wit.

ness: Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 satisfied or amply protected the receiver may (R. S. § 5406 (Comp. st, 1916, § 10306]); Todd v.

United States, 158 U. S. 278, 15 Sup. Ct. 889, 39

L. Ed, 982; amended by Criminal Code (March 4, See Revised Statutes, $$ 5234, 5141, 5151, 5191, 5201, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1113 [Comp. St. 1916, § 10306]) 5205, 6208 (Comp. St. 1916, 88 9821, 9678, 9746, 9762, $ 136, to include witnesses before a "United States $767, 9770).

commissioner or oficer acting as such," as well as



gress should have found it necessary to en-, lish without determining the question of the diact a general law for the punishment of of- vision of the same, so as to prevent undue disficers of the United States who embezzle crimination in favor of the shipper owning the

stock of the terminal company. property entrusted to them, but not owned 3. COMMERCE @ 87 — INTERSTATE COMMERCE by the United States, shows both how easily COMMISSION-CONTROVERSIES. a casus omissus may arise and how long a In a proceeding before the Commission to time may elapse before the defect is discove require trunk line railways to absorb charges ered or is remedied. Statutes creating and of discrimination as trunk lines continued to ab

of a terminal railway company, on the ground defining crimes are not to be extended by sorb charges of a terminal association, the intendment because the court thinks the leg. stock of which they owned, such terminal railislature should have made them more com

way and shippers served by it having sought

no special relief because of the Anti-Trust Act prehensive. Todd v. United States, 158 U. (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (Comp. S. 278, 282, 15 Sup. Ct. 889, 39 L. Ed. 982; St. 1916, § 8820 et seq.)) are only entitled to L'nited States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 20 bearing on the question of discrimination that

have the Commission consider as a circumstance Sur. Ct. 609, 44 L. Ed. 780.

the terminal association had been adjudicated a The judgment of the District Court is combination in restraint of interstate commerce. Affirmed.



MISSION. (246 U. S. 457)

The Interstate Commerce Act, § 3 (Comp. MANUFACTURERS' RY. CO. et al. v. UNIT- St. 1916, § 8565), and section 15, as amended ED STATES et al. (two cases).

in 1910, do not denounce every discrimination, (Argued March 21 and 22, 1917. Decided

preference, and prejudice, but only those that

are undue or unreasonable, and the question April 15, 1918.)

whether a discrimination, preference, or preju. Nos. 24, 25.

dice is unreasonable is for the Commission. 1. COMMERCE 87 INTERSTATE COMMERCE


COMMISSION-ORDERS OF. While Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4,

Under Interstate Commerce Act, 88 15, 16, 1887, c. 104, 8 15, 24 Stat. 384, as amended by 4, 5, 34 Stat. 589, 590, and Act June 18,

as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 88 Act June 18, 1910, c. 309. § 12, 36 Stat. 551 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8583), places on carriers the 1910, c. 309, 88. 12. 13, 36 Stat. 551, 554 burden of proving that an increased rate or pro- (Comp: St. 1916, 88 8583, 8584), decisions of the posed increased rate is just and reasonable, the Commission as to whether a preference, advanInterstate Commerce Commission in a proceed tage, or discrimination is undue or unreasoning by petitioner, a terminal railway company operating in futuro, will not be disturbed by

able, made the basis of administrative orders. in which shippers served by it joined, to require the courts except upon a showing that they are trunk line railroads to re-establish former absorptions of such railway's charges on the unsupported by the evidence, were made withground that the continued practice of absorb- out hearing, exceed constitutional limits, or ing the charges of a terminal association, the for some other reason amount to an abuse of stock of which was owned by the trunk line power. railroads, constituted a discrimination against | 6. COMMERCE Cm 95 — INTERSTATE COMMERCE shippers on the line of petitioner, having found

COMMISSION-ORDERS OF. that terminal railway was a common carrier, different finding by the Commission, and its

That the evidence would have warranted a and that there was no discrimination, may assume that the through rates charged by the first order. was contrary to the last,' does not trunk line railroads which had been in effect warrant disturbance of a finding that the rebefore the cancellations of the absorptions were fusal of trunk line railways to absorb the reasonable.

charges of a terminal railway was not unjust, 2. COMMERCE Cm 87 — INTERSTATE COMMERCE 7. CARRIERS 32(2)— INTERSTATE COMMERCE

unreasonable, or discriminatory. COMMISSION ESTABLISHMENT OF RATES. Though a large shipper controlled the stock

-DISCRIMINATIONS. of a terminal railway company, whose charges

That the trunk line railways entering a trunk lines refused to further absorb, the Com

common point absorbed the terminal charges of mission, in a proceeding by the terminal com

a terminal association, the stock of which they pany to compel further absorptions, may, under owned, does not as a matter of law entitle the Interstate Commerce Act, & 15, as amended in terminal railway company, though a common 1910, fix a maximum for the joint rates which the carrier, which had no trunk line, and did termi. terminal and trunk line companies might estab- nal switching only, precisely the same treat

ment. witnesses before "courts." 4. Introducing liquor into 8. COMMERCE 89—FEDERAL COUrts-Dis. Indian country: Act of March 15, 1864, C, 33, 13

TRICT COURTS-JURISDICTION. Stat. 29 (R. S. $ 2139 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4136a]);

Act Oct. 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219 (Comp. Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570, 14 Sup. ct. St. 1916, s 992), vested in the federal District 720, 38 L. Ed. 556; amended by Act of July 23, Courts only the same jurisdiction that was for1892, C, 234, 27 Stat. 260 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4136a), to merly vested in the Commerce Court by Act prohibit the introduction of “ale, beer, wine, or 10- June 18, 1910; hence where the Commission toxicating liquor or liquors of whatever kind,” as while recognizing a terminal railway as well as "ardent spirits." 5. Perjury: Act of March common carrier and fixing maximum joint rates 3, 1869, c. 130, 15 Stat. 326; Act March 3, 1825, c. failed to fix the allowances and divisions of 65, § 13, 4 Stat. 118 (R. S. § 5211 (Comp. St. 1916, rates which might be accorded by the trunk 9774) : see also R. S. § 5392 (Comp. St. 1916, § 10295]); lines, the District Court is without jurisdiction United States v. Curtis, 107 U. S. 671, 2 Sup. Ct. 501, in the first instance to exercise such adminis27 L. Ed. 534 ; amended by Act of Feb. 26, 1881, trative authority. C. 82, 21 Stat. 352 (Comp. St. 1916, § 9775), to in- 9. COMMERCE 85 — INTERSTATE COMMERCE clude false swearing before a "notary public" or COMMISSION-SUSPENSIONS. "any state officer" properly authorized by the state Where, pending proceedings on complaint to administer oaths.

of a terminal railway and its controlling stock. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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