which I received yesterday, that you had directed General Pack" to consider his secure retreat as a primary object, and that, upon evacuating the place, he should blow up the remainder of the fortifications, and destroy the military stores," adverting, of course, to my memorandum to you of the 15th May. According to this memorandum, Almeida should not have been abandoned till it was necessary; and yet it appears, by your letter of the 9th instant, to have been so little necessary, that General Pack left in that neighborhood one regiment of his brigade, which is there still.

There can be no reason whatever why that regiment should now remain at Almeida. The place, and everything it contained, are destroyed, and the regiment should be directed to join the brigade; but as I have had a good deal of correspondence with the Government upon the subject of Almeida, and they have taken some pains and incurred some expense in preparing to repair the place, it is desirable that I should have a copy of the orders sent to General Pack, and his official report of the mode in which he executed them; and that the necessity for abandoning and destroying the place should be made clear. Upon this last point, it would be desirable to have in detail the reports of the enemy's situation on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, and the situation. of Barbacena's cavalry and of our posts.

I requested Colonel Murray to write to you yesterday respecting the passage of the Tagus by the troops under your command; since which I have received Captain Grant's letter of the 7th, from the enclosures in which it would appear that the passage of the Tagus by the army of Portugal, although a probable operation, is not absolutely decided. I request, therefore, that the following disposition. may, for the present, be made of the troops under your command, instead of that directed in Colonel Murray's letter of yesterday: the Light division, and one brigade of cavalry, at Niza, as therein directed; the 1st division, the right at Villa Velha, the left in the villages between Villa Velha and Castello Branco, and one brigade of cavalry in front of Castello Branco, towards Salvaterra; the 5th division in the cantonments, as directed in Colonel Murray's letter of yesterday.

I have seen Mr. Kennedy regarding your supplies.

From your letter, I understand that the whole have, or will have, bread to the 15th inclusive; 100,000 rations of bread have been ordered to Castello Branco, which it is apprehended may not arrive there. But there are 50,000 rations at Villa Velha, and the magazine is at Abrantes, about nine leagues from Niza.

'MY DEAR SPENCER,

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I received this morning your two letters of the 10th. You had better send the sick you may have to Abrantes, but not by water from Villa Velha. The Portuguese should also go from Castello Branco to Lisbon by Abrantes.

‹ SIR,

To Colonel Austin.

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

In consequence of the expected early collection of the enemy's whole force in Estremadura, I think it probable that General Blake's corps will return to the Condado de Niebla, and that they will pass through Portugal on their way thither. I have desired the Commissary General to prepare for their passage with provisions at Beja and at Villa Viçosa; and I request you to have from 12,000 to 15,000 rations of bread and meat, and 1500 rations of forage, prepared for them at Mertola, and boats collected at that place, in order to transport them across the Guadiana. I cannot say exactly when they will march, but it is desirable that all the preparations should be made immediately; and I will give you the earliest intimation of the movement.

I will pay any expense that may be incurred to collect

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

'Quinta de Granicha,

ce 12 Juin, 1811.

'J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 11, et je conviens avec vous que vous ferez bien de porter les opérations du corps d'armée de votre Excellence dans le Condado de Niebla, en cas qu'il devienne nécessaire pour l'armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise de se porter sur la Caya.

'Je vous envois une route par laquelle seule votre artillerie pourrait marcher, et vous verrez à la note la provision qu'on aura faite pour votre marche. J'ai donné ordre qu'on fasse provision pour 12,000 hommes et 1500 chevaux, et je vous prie de me faire savoir s'il vous en faut plus.

Le siége de Badajoz sera entièrement levé cette nuit. 'Je n'ai pas encore de nouvelles du mouvement du Maréchal Soult; mais je crois qu'il aura été joint par le corps 'de Drouet aujourd'hui, et probablement qu'il se mettra en mouvement demain. Son premier mouvement sera, il y a apparence, vers Hornachos, ou même plus à sa droite, pour éviter toute affaire avec nous, jusqu'à l'arrivée de l'armée de Portugal. Je suppose que votre premier mouvement sera sur Valverde pour attendre celui de l'ennemi. Celui de nos troupes en avant sera sur Albuera.

Les 3me et 4me divisions de l'armée de Portugal, sous les ordres du Général Regnier, sont arrivées à Plasencia le 9 de ce mois. C'est un jour plus tard que je n'ai compté, mais elles pourront toujours arriver à Merida le 16; et si elles font la jonction par le pont de Medellin, elles la feront le 15.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, de donner ordre qu'on conserve la discipline en passant par le royaume de Portugal.

Je suis bien fâché que je n'ai pas eu le plaisir de faire la connaissance de votre Excellence; mais j'espère que l'occasion est seulement retardée pour le moment.

'Le Capitaine Général

Don Joaquin Blake.'

'J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

• WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

MY DEAR SIR,

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

I was allowed by the Commander in Chief to recommend for brevet promotion a certain number of Officers; and I was under the necessity of course of taking them from all parts of the army. I was also obliged to attend to the claims of seniority in instances in which the senior Officer had besides the claim of merit. Under these circumstances, although the light regiments had their proportion of this promotion, I was not enabled to recommend your brother, Captain J. Stewart, although I certainly wished it.

General Craufurd has since proposed to me a plan, under which I could have got him the rank of Major, if that plan had been practicable; but the Spaniards were to be concerned; and if the plan was practicable, so much time must elapse before they can be brought to consent to it, that it is useless to undertake it.

I assure you that it will give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to forward the views of your brother in the service, not only for his advantage, but for that of the public.

Major General

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

the Hon. W. Stewart.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 17th May, and I am much obliged to you for the desire you express to render your department useful to us in this country.

The Portuguese commissariat, and all the departments. attached to that army, are in a miserably inefficient state from two causes the want of authority to enforce obedience to order and regulation; the want of money to defray the necessary expenses.

The departments attached to the army are not liable to the military law; we therefore have no power to punish those guilty of any offence; and, as for expecting punishment from complaint to the Government or to the civil tribunals, it

would be just as reasonable to expect the coming of the Messiah, or the return of King Sebastian.

6

These unfortunate Governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partizan. Those malversations in office; those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partizans, are passed unnoticed; and notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office.

The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the Government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes, of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this bubble the Government of Portugal, as well as the successive Governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all Governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The Government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favorites with the mob. They have a general income tax called ten per cent., and in some cases twenty per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, from want of money, they can pay nobody, and of course have not even the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.