appeared as counsel for John Fries, in the trial now under consideration. Neither that learned gentleman, nor his able colleague, then thought proper to raise the question of law, "whether resisting and preventing by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a levying of war against the United States," according to the true meaning of the constitution? although a decision of this question in the negative, must have acquitted the prisoner. But in the next trial, that of Mitchell, this question was raised on the part of the prisoner, and was very fully and ably discussed by his counsel; and it was solemnly determined by the court, both the judges concurring, "that to resist or prevent by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and consequently is treason, within the true meaning of the constitution." The decision, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, although not absolutely obligatory, ought to be viewed with very great respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.

On the 9th of July, 1798, an act of Congress was passed, providing for a valuation of lands and dwelling houses, and an enumeration of slaves throughout the United States; and directing the appointment of commissioners and assessors for carrying it into execution: And on the 4th day of July, in the same year, a direct tax was laid by another act of Congress of that date, on the lands, dwelling houses, and slaves, so to be valued and enumerated.

In the months of February and March, A. D. 1799, an insurrection took place in the counties of Bucks and Northampton, in the state of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resisting and preventing by force, the execution of the two last mentioned acts of Congress, and

particularly that for the valuation of lands and dwelling houses. John Fries, the person mentioned in the arti cle of impeachment now under consideration, was apprehended and committed to prison, as one of the ringleaders of this insurrection; and at a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, A. D. 1799, he was brought to trial for this offence, on an indictment for treason, by levying war against the United States, before James Iredell, esq. then one of the associate justices of the supreme court of the United States, who presided in the said court, according to law, and the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, who sat in the said circuit court as assistant judge.

In this trial, which was conducted with great solemnity, and occupied nine days, the prisoner was assisted by Wm. Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, esqs. two very able and eminent counsellors; the former of whom, Wm. Lewis, is the person who assisted as above mentioned, in conducting the defence of Vigol, on a similar indictment. These gentlemen, finding that the facts alleged were fully and undeniably proved, by a very minute and elaborate examination of witnesses, thought proper to rest the case of the prisoner, on the question of law which had been determined in the cases of Vigol and Mitchel above mentioned, and had then been acquiesced in, but which they thought proper again to raise. They contended, "that to resist by force of arms a particular law of the United States, does not amount to levying war against the United States, within the true meaning of the constitution, and therefore it is not treason, but a riot only." This question they argued at great length, and with all the force of their learning and genius; and after a very full discussion at the bar, and the most mature deliberation by the court, the learned and excellent judge who then presided, and who was no less distinguished by his humanity and

tenderness towards persons tried before him, than by his extensive knowledge and great talents as a lawyer, pronounced the opinion of himself and his colleague, "that to resist or prevent by force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, does amount to levying war against them, within the true meaning of the constitution, and does therefore constitute the crime of treason:" thereby adding the weight of another and more solemn decision, to the precedent which had been established in the above mentioned cases of Vigol and Mitchel.

Under this opinion of the court on the question of law, the jury, having no doubt as to the facts, found the said John Fries guilty of treason, on the above mentioned indictment. But a new trial was granted by the court, not by reason of any doubt as to the correctness of the decision on the question of law, but solely on the ground, as this respondent hath understood and believes, that one of the jurors of the petit jury, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.

The yellow fever having appeared in Philadelphia in the summer of the year 1799, the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, did according to law appoint the next circuit court of that district, to be held at Norris town therein: Pursuant to which appointment, a circuit court was held at Norris town aforesaid, in and for the said district, on the 11th day of October, in the last mentioned year, before Bushrod Washington, esq. then one of the associate justices of the supreme court of the United States, and the above mentioned Richard Peters; at which court no proceedings were had on the aforesaid indictment against John Fries, because, as this respondent hath been informed and believes, the commission of the marshal of the said district had expired, before he summoned the jurors to attend at the said court, and

had not been renewed; by reason of which no legal pannel of jurors could be formed.

On the 11th day of April, A. D. 1800, and from that day until the 2d day of May in the same year, a circuit court of the United States was held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, before this respondent, then one of the associate justices of the supreme court of the United States, and the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsyl vania. At this court, the indictment on which the said John Fries had been convicted as above mentioned, was quashed ex officio by William Rawle, esq. then attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and a new indictment was by him preferred against the said John Fries, for treason of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force, in the manner above set forth, the execution of the above mentioned acts of Congress, for the valuation of lands and dwelling houses and the enumeration of slaves, and for levying and collecting a direct tax. This indictment, of which a true copy, marked exhibit No. 1, is herewith exhibited by this respondent, who prays that it may be taken as part of this his answer, being found by the grand jury on the 16th day of April, 1800, the said John Fries was on the same day arraigned thereon, and plead not guilty. William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, esqrs. the same persons who had conducted his defence at his former trial, were again at his request assigned by the court as his counsel; and his trial was appointed to be had, on Tuesday the 22d day of the last mentioned month of April.

After this indictment was found by the grand jury, this respondent considered it with great care and deliberation, and finding from the three overt acts of treason which it charged, that the question of law arising upon it, was the same question which had already been decided twice in the same court, on so

f

lemn argument and deliberation, and once in that very case, he considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the correctness of which on full consideration he was entirely satisfied; and by the authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself. They are morcover in perfect conformity with the uniform tenor of decisions in the courts of England and Great Britain, from the revolution, in 1688, to the present time, which, in his opinion, added greatly to their weight and authority.

And surely he need not urge to this honorable court, the correctness, the importance, and the absolute necessity of adhering to principles of law once established, and of considering the law as finally settled, after repeated and solemn decisions by courts of competent jurisdiction. A contrary principle would unsettle the basis of our whole system of jurisprudence, hitherto our safeguard and our boast; would reduce the law of the land, and subject the rights of the citizen, to the arbitrary will, the passions, or the caprice of the judge in each particular case; and would substitute the varying opinions of various men, instead of that 'fixed, permanent rule, in which the very essence of law consists. If this respondent erred in regarding this point as settled, by the repeated and solemn adjudications of his predecessors, in the same court and in the same case; if he erred in supposing, that a principle established by two solemn decisions, was obligatory upon him, sitting in the same court where those decisions had been made; if he erred in believing that it would be the highest presumption in him, to set up his opinion and judgment over that of his colleague, who had twice decided the same question, and of two of his predecessors, who justly rank among the ablest judges that have ever adorned a court; if in all this he erred, it is an error of which he cannot be ashamed, and which he trusts will not be deemed criminal in the eyes of this honorable court,.