source entitled to credit that he has written to Madrid advising the ratification in forcible terms, and stating correctly what would be the effect of a different course.

The general opinion here, both with this government and with the best-informed ministers of other powers, is that the treaty will be ratified. I think that this opinion is entertained even by the British legation. But I must add that whenever I have been able to ascertain on what that opinion was founded, I found that it rested more on conjecture than on any positive fact, and that the conviction that a rejection would be fatal to Spain is the principal reason for believing that she will ratify. I have made every verbal observation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs which the occasion required. His disposition is very friendly, and this government is sensible of the danger which that of Spain would run by not ratifying. The French ambassador will give his advice accordingly, but with what degree of energy and what effect I cannot say; and, as it is only a ratification for which they are anxious, he may advise also Mr. Forsyth to exchange the ratifications without minding the land claims. This gentleman is, however, on his guard in that respect, and I write to him on the subject in order that he may fully understand the views of this government. It is still disbelieved here that the British had any agency in Yrujo's removal, that their government has acquired any influence in the Spanish counsels, or that they have interfered against us with respect to Florida.

I have the honor, &c.

GALLATIN TO JOHN FORSYTH, UNITED STATES MINISTER TO SPAIN. PARIS, July 9, 1819.

DEAR SIR,-I have received your letters of the 13th, 23d, and 26th of June, and thank you for the information they contain.

It was probable that the British government did not view our acquisition of Florida as dangerous to themselves, not, at least,

in the exaggerated manner in which it has been represented by the English papers; and I had believed that, unwilling to irritate us, and aware of their want of influence with the Spanish Cabinet, they had made up their mind not to interfere. What may be the effect of an invitation on the part of Spain it is difficult to judge. There is as yet no fact within my knowledge proving their intention to accede to proposals such as you allude to. Their foreign enlistment bill is a proof that they intend to regain the interest they had lost in Spain, but not that they would run any great risk for that purpose. Toledo has passed through this place on his way to London. Mr. Rush will be

better able to give you information on the dispositions of the English government than I can be. I will not fail to communicate anything that I may learn.

The government of France continues to be friendly and disposed to render such good offices in this case as may be done without too great commitment on their part. But, although they wish Florida to fall into our hands rather than in those of any other power, the only point in which they really feel any interest is that there should be no rupture between us and Spain. Provided an accommodation takes place, the terms are a matter of indifference to them. They acknowledge that a confirmation of the large land grants would be contrary not only to the understanding of both parties, but to the spirit of the treaty; that since five millions of dollars are to be paid out of the proceeds of the sales of the lands, that pledge cannot be lessened under the pretence of grants made about the same time that it was offered or ordered to be offered. But they nevertheless care provided the treaty is rati

not whether we lose the lands or not, fied. I do not know what are the instructions of the Duke of Laval; but I am confident that he will at the same time advise the Spanish government to acknowledge the nullity of the grants and you not to insist on that point.

I will regret with you that the treaty should not be ratified. But I wish the King of Spain would be made to understand that the treaty is as advantageous to her as to the United States; that Florida was an expensive, insulated, and useless possession; that in exchange for it Spain obtains the cession of our claim to a ter

ritory intrinsically more valuable, to her infinitely more important, since it gives her the so much desired barrier to Mexico; that if she does not accept the proposal at present, there is no chance of its being hereafter renewed; and that, supposing she pays the five millions, and we are good-natured enough to put up with her breach of faith in refusing to ratify a treaty made in conformity with the King's instructions, the least she can expect is that we will take immediate possession of the country we claim, at least as far as the Colorado. We certainly will then keep it; and will that preserve Florida from ultimately and by the irresistible course of events falling in our hands? But Spain has greater and more immediate dangers to expect from a refusal to ratify, and if she chooses that course she must abide the consequences. Sure am I our government will not suffer itself to be made a dupe, and that it will be supported by the nation in the course which will be thought most eligible on the occasion. What that will be I do not pretend to know and will not try to conjecture.

As to yourself, my dear sir, although my congratulations may have been premature, your own course is safe, and whilst you adhere to your instructions, and make no abandonment of the rights of the United States, you will be supported and applauded whether your efforts are crowned with success or not. But I have no doubt that attempts will be made, perhaps from various quarters, to divert you from that course. European diplomacy is very crooked, and for that reason very silly. I dare say that Onis, whom I do not trust any more than any other, applauds himself, and thinks in that affair of grants he has overreached our government. But to what purpose? The declaration which you are instructed to make will probably be sufficient to defeat the fraud. But if it did not, and the grants should afterwards produce some embarrassment, the only consequence would be our right, after such declaration, to make new demands against Spain, which would be enforced, and which good faith on her part, or on that of her negotiators, would have prevented.

The general opinion here continues to be that the treaty will be ratified. Onis, who was to leave Paris yesterday for Madrid, has said the same thing; but he has made some allusions to the

obligation of the United States to preserve their neutrality and to carry their laws into effect. Whether this is a new battery intended against you, or whether he intends this pretence to reconcile his conduct as negotiator with what may be required from him if he should be made minister, I do not know. He is, however, said to have written to Madrid in favor of the ratification.

I understand that the Duke de Laval has also written that in his opinion the treaty would be ratified, and that you might have detained your corvette some time longer.

It is not believed here that the British government had anything to do with the fall of Yrujo.

Mr. Lowndes has gone to Italy and Switzerland, but is expected to return through Paris on his way to England and the United States. I will keep your letter till his return.

I remain, with perfect respect, dear sir, your obedient servant.

CRAWFORD TO GALLATIN.

WASHINGTON, 24th July, 1819.

MY DEAR SIR,-The departure of Mr. Hyde de Neuville offers so favorable an opportunity of presenting my respects to you that to omit using it would be something like an act of disrespect to him.

He is, as you no doubt have been informed by Mr. Adams, quite a favorite with the Administration, and no less so with the citizens. He deserves the esteem of both.

He will be able to give you the secret history of the Spanish negotiation, which but for his good offices would probably have been postponed for years.

You have, no doubt, seen the report of the bank committee during the last session of Congress, and have learnt the result of the efforts of its chairman. A more unfair exposition of the transaction of the bank could not have been offered to the public.

When fairly represented they were highly censurable, and

deserved the severest animadversion. Such a representation would probably have forwarded the views of the chairman more effectually than the one he thought proper to make. The old proverb, "Let envy alone and it will punish itself," was never more perfectly verified than in this case. I have been strongly censured for not throwing myself between the bank and the investigation which was set on foot. The folly of the censure is manifest. The object of the inquiry was to ascertain what I had no legitimate means of knowing, and what in fact I did not know, except from the newspapers and common rumor. The bank never communicated to me their determination not to receive their own paper except where payable, its determination to discount upon their own stock at $125 for $100, or any other act which I had not a right to demand of it. It was, therefore, impossible for me to shield the bank against the examination, unless a declaration that it had discharged its duties to the Treasury would furnish that shield. The examination has, however, saved the bank, without, however, the consent of the majority of the committee. It is impossible that specie payments could have been continued to this time with Mr. Jones at its head. In saying this I am very far from insinuating anything against his integrity, industry, zeal, and, I may add, talents; for he has certainly a considerable degree of talent. I regretted extremely the necessity there was for his retiring from office, and reluctantly gave my advice for the election of his successor. His removal, however, was indispensable, not only as a propitiatory offering upon the altar of public opinion, but for the preservation of the bank itself. He had so completely enveloped himself in the policy of the Baltimoreans, so completely was he taken in their toils, that he obeyed no other impulse. It is now ascertained that the branch direction of Baltimore wished the suspension of specie payments, and were conducting the affairs of the office to effect that object. The president, cashier, and teller of the bank made use of the funds of the institution as if they were their own, taking what they wanted and dividing the rest out among their confederate friends. A scene of fraud and swindling has been exhibited there which would suit much better the Court of VOL. II.-9