dollars a year, and mileage at the rate of "twenty cents a mile, to be estimated by the nearest route usually traveled in going to and returning from each regular session." The pay of the Speaker was fixed at eight thousand dollars per annum, this being the salary of the Vice-President.

In 1873, March 3d, another change was made. The compensation was raised from five thousand to seven thousand five hundred dollars, with actual traveling expenses. The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate were to receive ten thousand dollars. In 1874, January 24th, the act was repealed so far as concerned these salaries, thus making them, as before, five thousand and eight thousand dollars respectively.

The change made in 1816, from six dollars a day to fifteen hundred dollars a year, was received by the people with great disfavor, and many members were not returned to the next Congress in consequence. The more recent change, in 1873, also called forth very severe criticism. The members were blamed for the large increase of salary, and still more for making it retroactive. A number of members refused to receive the increase for the time already expired. The retroactive feature is, however, not peculiar to the act of 1873. The law of 1816- March 16th- was operative from March 4th, 1815. That of August 16th, 1856, increased the compensation from March 4th, 1855. So that of July 28th, 1866, took effect from March 4th, 1865. Every act of Congress, therefore, to increase the pay of Senators and Representatives, has been retroactive in its operation, covering a period varying from twelve months to twenty-four.

All the acts prior to that of 1866 were separate and independent acts; but the one of 1866, and that of 1873, were sections in appropriation bills. They were both passed on the last days of the respective sessions.

From 1789 to the present time, then, the compensa

tion has been as follows: 1789 to 1815, $6.00 a day; 1815 to 1817, $1500 a year; 1817 to 1855, $8.00 a day; 1855 to 1865, $3000 a year; 1865 to 1871, $5000 a year; 1871 to 1874, $7500 a year; 1874 and since, $5000 a year.

By act of March 29th, 1867, each Senator, Representative, and Delegate, after having taken the required oath, is entitled to receive his compensation at the end of each month.

The privilege of freedom from arrest has belonged to legislative bodies in Europe for many years. The exceptional cases are what are called indictable offenses. Whoever should cause the arrest of a member would be liable for trespass, and might also be punished for contempt of the House. The privilege commences from the time of the election, and before the member takes his seat or is sworn.

Freedom of debate is secured by this clause. But the privilege is confined to words spoken in the course of parliamentary proceedings, and does not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty; while a member can not be questioned for a speech delivered in the House, he might be liable if he should cause the speech to be published.

The privilege from arrest secures the member, of course, against all process, the disobedience to which is punishable by attachment of the person, as a subpoena, or a summons to serve on a jury. 'a jury. (Story, Vol. II, p.

608.)

Clause 2.-No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.

The first part of this clause was intended to prevent

corruption and secure the integrity of the members. It would tend to diminish the temptation to create lucrative offices which they themselves might hope to fill. But the security is only partial, as an office created during the term of a member might be held by him many years after his membership had expired.

The acceptance of an office under the United States, by one who has been elected a member of Congress and has taken his seat, operates as a forfeiture of his seat. But if one holding an office under the United States is elected to Congress, he may hold the office until he is ready to take his seat, when he must resign.

In Great Britain, the members of the Cabinet may also hold seats in Parliament, but our Constitution prohibits Cabinet officers from being members of Congress. The subject has been often discussed, but no serious attempt has been made to amend the Constitution in this respect. By the present arrangement, the Legislative and Executive departments of the government are more widely separated, and any undue influence of the Executive is better guarded against.

Sec. 7, Clause 1.—All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

This is the practice in the British Parliament. All bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Commons. The subject was discussed at great length in the Convention, and was not finally decided till near the day of adjournment. It was so connected with other provisions of the Constitution as to render it difficult to ascertain by what principles it was settled. As first acted upon by the Convention, the clause was much more comprehensive than in its present form: "That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United States, shall originate in the first

branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch."

Our circumstances differ so widely from those of Great Britain that there seems to be no sufficient reason why the Senate may not originate bills for raising revenue as well as amend them; why they may not provide for raising revenue as well as make appropriations. During the third session of the Forty-first Congress, the Senate passed a bill to repeal the law imposing the income tax. But the House of Representatives, instead of acting upon it in the usual way, passed a resolution calling the attention of the Senate to this clause of the Constitution.

Bills looking to the raising of money have originated in the Senate and have passed into laws: as the bill to establish the post-office, that to establish the mint, and bills to regulate the sale of the public lands. Raising revenue is understood thus to be confined to levying taxes.

Clause 2.—Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large in their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented

to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

This clause gives the President some participation in legislation. The Executive and Legislative departments are not entirely disjoined. But the President's participation is negative. This returning of a bill with objections is called vetoing the bill, though the word veto does not occur in the Constitution. In Great Britain the sovereign possesses an absolute veto, but it is said not to have been exercised since 1692, in the reign of William III, with, perhaps, a single exception.

In the Convention various plans were discussed for revising the bills passed by Congress. One was to give the right of revising all bills to the Executive and the Judiciary. This was Mr. Randolph's plan, and was approved by Mr. Madison. Some members wished the President to have an absolute veto. At one time the Convention voted in favor of requiring a vote of threefourths of each House in order to pass a bill over the President's veto.

The present method has commended itself to the people of the country. It is, doubtless, better than one admitting an unqualified veto, and better than one that should require a three-fourths vote in each House. The practice in the State governments is not uniform. In some the Governor has no veto, while in others a bill may be passed over a veto by a bare majority in each House.

The veto power has been used by most of the Presidents. Washington vetoed two bills; Madison vetoed five and retained one; Monroe vetoed one; Jackson vetoed seven and retained two; Tyler vetoed five; Polk, three; Pierce, four; Buchanan, one; Johnson vetoed twenty-one and retained nineteen which became laws. No bill was passed over the veto of the President till the admin