resulting from a misconception of wherein negation in a proposition truly lies. (Cf. St Hilaire, La Logique d'Aristote, Preface.) The difficulties of the application of Kant's Categories to the matter or possible objects are, moreover, insuperable. These cannot be applied to this or that matter, with conscious discrimination, unless on the supposition of the object being already constituted, and apprehended as such, in accordance with the category, which is wholly opposed to the idea of the constitution of the object by category. Indeed, the difficulty commences at an earlier stage; for intuition cannot put a timeless matter into time, or a spaceless matter into space, far less tell when time alone is to be applied, or both time and space. As has been well said, the Kritik is really the romance of the Pure Reason. On Hegel's misconceptions and misrepresentations of the Categories of Aristotle, see especially Waitz, Organon, i. p. 272 et seq. 57 CHAPTER VII. LOGIC THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT-WHAT THOUGHT IS- § 71. As a term Thought is ambiguous. (1.) It is used as a general name for every mental phænomenon as in consciousness. In this use, it emphasises the fact of consciousness as attaching to the mental phænomena in general. It thus embraces acts of Intellect, Will, states of Feeling and Desire. Thought in this application is matter of the science of Psychology. (2.) Thought is used to denote all the acts of the Intelligence or Cognitive side of consciousness, whether Perception, Memory, Imagination, or Understanding. As thus used, it excludes Feeling, Desire, Volition. (3.) Thought in its strictest sense denotes the Faculty of the Understanding. Here it may be used to mark (a) the Faculty itself; (b) the Process; (c) the Product of this Faculty. These latter are the Concept or Notion, Judgment, and Inference, including Reasoning. This faculty has various names, such as Comparison, Discursive Faculty, Aiávoia, Διάνοια, Verstand. Logic contemplates Thought in the sense indicated by this Faculty. It may be called Thought Proper. § 72. Intuition is the basis of all thought and of all knowledge of objects, whether of outer or inner experience, in so far as objects are viewed as real. As to possible or ideal objects or classes of objects, these too depend on intuition. The limit of construction of the possible object, on its material side, is the intuition, separately it may be, of the qualities. combined. § 73. Every intuition is distinct from every other. This is 1 founded on the condition of our experience of it-viz., time or succession. The intuition of one moment differs from the intuition of the next moment, by the element of succession, before and after. A continuous intuition is really a series of intuitions repeated with more or less vivacity. Even supposing the object of the intuition to be the same or similar, the intuitions differ by relation to time, and in respect to external objects in relation also to space. $74. Intuition gives us a unity, the undivided unity of an object in a given time, or time and space. Thought also gives us a unity; but this is a unity of identity or resemblance between things, or units numerically different. The whole of intuition is a Singular; the whole of thought is a Universal. Even the combination of parts in intuition, for example, surface or extension, is but an undivided whole or singular; for it is the percept of a definite time, or definite time or place, and no other. § 75. Thought in its rudimentary form is Conception, and this is the knowledge of the common or general in individuals, of the one in the many. It is the knowledge or notion of the point or points in which a plurality of impressions or objects to self-consciousness agree. This feature of community, or generality of knowledge, is itself the common character of all the acts and products of Thought or Understanding-viz., Conception, Judgment, Reasoning. To know what Judgment and Reasoning mean, we must first understand what Conception means. Let us illustrate meanwhile the first or rudimentary act of thinking-viz., Conception. § 76. In this explanation will come out at least the logical distinction between Perception or Intuition and Thought. Let us take any object which is before us, any object of the senses, say what we call a tree or a house. What object exactly means it is not now necessary to consider. To suppose that it means only impression on consciousness is enough. We naturally speak of this as what we see; we suppose that we obtain all our knowledge of it from the faculty of vision. The tree I see has a particular size, form, colour, and shape of leaf. It exists now before me as I see or perceive it. It is through the sense of vision, or perhaps the sense of vision combined with the other senses, that I apprehend those points about the tree. But supposing that I get this knowledge from the sense or senses, is this all which I know about the object before me? Is this all even which I say about it, when I call it a tree? If you reflect a little, you will see that this question must be answered in the negative, ere I think and say this is a tree. I have already mentally compared it with other objects which I also call trees; I have found that it resembles those other objects; and I have already set it along with those other objects in my mind; in a word, I have assigned it to a class of things,-I have classified it. But what does classifying imply? It implies that while assigning it to a definite class, I have excluded it from other classes to which an object might have been assigned. I say it is a tree,—not a house, not a table, not a chair. I have said further it is a tree-i.e., it is one among many other trees. Now in order to do all this, I must have more knowledge than I get in the single act of vision, by which I see what I call the tree; for this tells me nothing but that the object exists before me, now and here. I must have the knowledge implied in a class-notion,-I must have a knowledge of the points of resemblance, or the common features of all trees, I must have a knowledge of the relation which these objects bear to each other; in a word, I must have a notion, or concept, or general idea; and in applying this general knowledge to the particular case before me, I apply or exercise thought, logical thought, in its most rudimentary form. This apprehension of points of resemblance,. or of relations between objects, is not an act of sense, nor is it an object of sense; it is an act of the Intellect or Understanding, by which I break away from or rise superior to the limitations of my sense knowledge. And this effort, this rising to a knowledge of relations, renders judgment and reasoning possible for us. Its first result in language is the term or general term, or common noun of our grammars. It is distinguished, of course, from the singular term or proper noun. City is a general term, because it is capable of being applied indefinitely to the objects of the class. Glasgow or this city are singular terms, because they denote only one object of the class. Observe that term does not necessarily mean a Glasgow is a single word and a singular term; single word. but this city is as much a singular term, because it is a phrase which denotes but one object of thought. Whatever word or set of words indicates the general in our thought is a Common Term; whatever word or set of words indicates the particular, or individual, or one in our thought, is a Singular Term. § 77. There are thus two sides in knowledge or consciousness. There is the function of the Sense or Perception which notes the features of an object now and here; and there is the function of Thought or Comprehension which grasps them together by means of the Notion or General Idea, and classifies and names the object perceived. The one is the intuitive or particular side of our knowledge; the other is the general, even the universal. But for the latter power our sense knowledge would be chaos; we should simply be bewildered amid recurrent and conflicting impressions from things. What thought does in regard to ordinary objects, science does in regard to other and more remote objects. It grasps things by means of conceptions or notions, and laws; holds the variety in the unity of thought. It is in this sense, the true and proper sense, that knowledge is power. It is the power of the kingdom of man over the world. $ 78. To explain this more fully, we may say that thought, as considered by Logic, does not properly begin until we have compared this thing with that other thing, and found a point of similarity,-some common mark or attribute. We now have in the community of the attribute a class of things, either an actual class or an ideal class, or both. We can now observe and note a third or fourth thing as possessing an attribute or mark like that we already know. There is thus a recognition, the recognition of similarity in the mark. Having noted and named the mark lustrous, as in several metals we have seen, we recognise it in other objects which come up in the course of observation; and thus know them as lustrous. So with any common mark, or sum of marks once we hold them. I have in my mind, as the result of comparison, certain marks which I include in the name mountain, river, sea, tree. In forming these, in grouping them, I have exercised thought. There have been apprehension and recognition. And for the future, on every occasion on which I recognise the marks as |