Institutes of LogicW. Blackwood and sons, 1885 - 551 sider |
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Side 47
... consequent with antecedent , a question may be raised as to whether we have in this agreement any ground for holding it to represent material or real truth . We think the consequent as dependent on the antecedente.g . , the motion of ...
... consequent with antecedent , a question may be raised as to whether we have in this agreement any ground for holding it to represent material or real truth . We think the consequent as dependent on the antecedente.g . , the motion of ...
Side 129
... consequent ; the relation between the reason and the consequent is the logical connection or consequence.1 " " a ( a ) Leibnitz was the first to make the principle of Sufficient Reason , as a law of inference co - ordinate with that of ...
... consequent ; the relation between the reason and the consequent is the logical connection or consequence.1 " " a ( a ) Leibnitz was the first to make the principle of Sufficient Reason , as a law of inference co - ordinate with that of ...
Side 130
... consequent . In all immediate inferences from a simple proposition this also is true ; and in all strictly syllogistic inference , which only evolves the contained and necessitated . " The principle of Sufficient Reason , " says ...
... consequent . In all immediate inferences from a simple proposition this also is true ; and in all strictly syllogistic inference , which only evolves the contained and necessitated . " The principle of Sufficient Reason , " says ...
Side 131
... consequent . Cause is a reason of a thing being ; Reason is a cause of a thing being thought or known : the one is ... Consequent ; but nevertheless this is a wholly different relation from that of Cause and Effect . Cause and Effect may ...
... consequent . Cause is a reason of a thing being ; Reason is a cause of a thing being thought or known : the one is ... Consequent ; but nevertheless this is a wholly different relation from that of Cause and Effect . Cause and Effect may ...
Side 134
... consequent . That must be determined by intuition and experience , and may be wholly contingent . The prin- ciple is satisfied if a reason be set forth , and if it can be con- sistently joined with the consequent or predicate ; and if ...
... consequent . That must be determined by intuition and experience , and may be wholly contingent . The prin- ciple is satisfied if a reason be set forth , and if it can be con- sistently joined with the consequent or predicate ; and if ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
absolutely abstract actual affirmative animal antecedent applied Aristotle assertion attribute biped Boethius called cause common Comprehension conceived concept conclusion consciousness consequent contains contradiction contradictory contrary conversion copula definite deny determined disjunctive distinction doctrine Enthymeme essential exclusion existence experience expression Extension fact fallacy false Figure formal formal fallacies generalisation genus gism given ground Hamilton Hegel hypothetical immediate inference individual object Induction intuition judgment knowledge law of Identity law of Non-Contradiction laws of thought logicians major premiss mark matter means middle term Mill moods nature necessarily necessary negation negative Non-Contradiction notion Occam opposition organised Organon particular phænomenon plant positive possible Prantl predicate principle properly proposition quantity reality reasoning recognised reference regarded relation rule sense sentient simply singular Socrates speak species sphere subject and predicate sublate supposed Syllogism thing thought tion triangle true truth Ueberweg universal valid whole wholly words
Populære avsnitt
Side 215 - Tis not because the ring they ride, And Lindesay at the ring rides well, But that my sire the wine will chide If 'tis not fill'd by Rosabelle.
Side 473 - If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.
Side 475 - If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 474 - If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 478 - Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.
Side 62 - Thought is the knowledge of a thing through a Concept or General Notion, or of one Notion through another. In Thought, all that we think about is considered either as something containing, or as something contained; — in other words, every process of Thought is only a cognition of the necessary relations of our Concepts. This being the case, it need not move our wonder that Logic, within its proper sphere...