Institutes of LogicW. Blackwood and sons, 1885 - 551 sider |
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Side 6
John Veitch. at its nature , kinds , degrees . It cannot be denied that we know , or believe we know . Even in such a denial there would be an assertion of knowledge . Knowing is a fact or phænomenon of experience . It is the inner fact ...
John Veitch. at its nature , kinds , degrees . It cannot be denied that we know , or believe we know . Even in such a denial there would be an assertion of knowledge . Knowing is a fact or phænomenon of experience . It is the inner fact ...
Side 24
... denies Hegel's doctrine that " pure thinking " has a character or beginning distinct from all other thinking , ordinary or reflective , and can arise specially for itself . He properly makes human thought dependent on per- ception ...
... denies Hegel's doctrine that " pure thinking " has a character or beginning distinct from all other thinking , ordinary or reflective , and can arise specially for itself . He properly makes human thought dependent on per- ception ...
Side 29
... deny.3 There is the assertion of a relation of identity or congruity , or the denial of this , between the notion or term spoken of , and that which is 2 Cf. Aristotle , De Int . , c . i . 1 Σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοήματων ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων . 3 ...
... deny.3 There is the assertion of a relation of identity or congruity , or the denial of this , between the notion or term spoken of , and that which is 2 Cf. Aristotle , De Int . , c . i . 1 Σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοήματων ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων . 3 ...
Side 38
... denied , and spoken of as " not absolute , " - that is , the actual oppositions of experience may be denied to be such , because it is assumed that behind this experience there is some one thing , or force , or entity which , being one ...
... denied , and spoken of as " not absolute , " - that is , the actual oppositions of experience may be denied to be such , because it is assumed that behind this experience there is some one thing , or force , or entity which , being one ...
Side 41
... denying the very same point , cannot be made at all . § 56. Another view which professes to follow Aristotle in substance is that of Ueberweg , who makes Logic " the science of the regulative laws of human knowledge . " He explains his ...
... denying the very same point , cannot be made at all . § 56. Another view which professes to follow Aristotle in substance is that of Ueberweg , who makes Logic " the science of the regulative laws of human knowledge . " He explains his ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
absolutely abstract actual affirmative animal antecedent applied Aristotle assertion attribute biped Boethius called cause common Comprehension conceived concept conclusion consciousness consequent contains contradiction contradictory contrary conversion copula definite deny determined disjunctive distinction doctrine Enthymeme essential exclusion existence experience expression Extension fact fallacy false Figure formal formal fallacies generalisation genus gism given ground Hamilton Hegel hypothetical immediate inference individual object Induction intuition judgment knowledge law of Identity law of Non-Contradiction laws of thought logicians major premiss mark matter means middle term Mill moods nature necessarily necessary negation negative Non-Contradiction notion Occam opposition organised Organon particular phænomenon plant positive possible Prantl predicate principle properly proposition quantity reality reasoning recognised reference regarded relation rule sense sentient simply singular Socrates speak species sphere subject and predicate sublate supposed Syllogism thing thought tion triangle true truth Ueberweg universal valid whole wholly words
Populære avsnitt
Side 215 - Tis not because the ring they ride, And Lindesay at the ring rides well, But that my sire the wine will chide If 'tis not fill'd by Rosabelle.
Side 473 - If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.
Side 475 - If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 474 - If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 478 - Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.
Side 62 - Thought is the knowledge of a thing through a Concept or General Notion, or of one Notion through another. In Thought, all that we think about is considered either as something containing, or as something contained; — in other words, every process of Thought is only a cognition of the necessary relations of our Concepts. This being the case, it need not move our wonder that Logic, within its proper sphere...