Institutes of LogicW. Blackwood and sons, 1885 - 551 sider |
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... PARTICULAR , SINGULAR , XX . MODALITY IN PROPOSITIONS , XXI . COMPOSITE JUDGMENTS - HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL , DISJUNCTIVE , DILEMMATIC , XXII . HEGEL'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT , • 165 182 207 220 246 261 • 270 • 275 XXIII . THE POSTULATE ...
... PARTICULAR , SINGULAR , XX . MODALITY IN PROPOSITIONS , XXI . COMPOSITE JUDGMENTS - HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL , DISJUNCTIVE , DILEMMATIC , XXII . HEGEL'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT , • 165 182 207 220 246 261 • 270 • 275 XXIII . THE POSTULATE ...
Side 7
... particular or singular with the contingent . It assumes , further , that the understanding may think in experi- ence in a way different from that in which it must think , if it thinks at all . This is not so . There is only one way of ...
... particular or singular with the contingent . It assumes , further , that the understanding may think in experi- ence in a way different from that in which it must think , if it thinks at all . This is not so . There is only one way of ...
Side 31
... particular , of observation , classification , general- isation , induction of causes . At the same time , it is not to be regarded as divorced from the conditions of our knowledge of the real . The laws with which it deals relate to ...
... particular , of observation , classification , general- isation , induction of causes . At the same time , it is not to be regarded as divorced from the conditions of our knowledge of the real . The laws with which it deals relate to ...
Side 32
... particular sciences . ( Cf. Logik , and Ueberweg , § 28. ) Kant's full conception of Logic is as follows : - " Logic is a rational science , not only in respect of mere form , but also of matter ; a science a priori of the necessary ...
... particular sciences . ( Cf. Logik , and Ueberweg , § 28. ) Kant's full conception of Logic is as follows : - " Logic is a rational science , not only in respect of mere form , but also of matter ; a science a priori of the necessary ...
Side 36
... particular instances . The strength of the particular thought which embodies truly a law is as great as the strength of the abstract law itself ; it is only not so extensive as the law . ( b ) " Ratio de suo actu rationari potest ...
... particular instances . The strength of the particular thought which embodies truly a law is as great as the strength of the abstract law itself ; it is only not so extensive as the law . ( b ) " Ratio de suo actu rationari potest ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
absolutely abstract actual affirmative animal antecedent applied Aristotle assertion attribute biped Boethius called cause common Comprehension conceived concept conclusion consciousness consequent contains contradiction contradictory contrary conversion copula definite deny determined disjunctive distinction doctrine Enthymeme essential exclusion existence experience expression Extension fact fallacy false Figure formal formal fallacies generalisation genus gism given ground Hamilton Hegel hypothetical immediate inference individual object Induction intuition judgment knowledge law of Identity law of Non-Contradiction laws of thought logicians major premiss mark matter means middle term Mill moods nature necessarily necessary negation negative Non-Contradiction notion Occam opposition organised Organon particular phænomenon plant positive possible Prantl predicate principle properly proposition quantity reality reasoning recognised reference regarded relation rule sense sentient simply singular Socrates speak species sphere subject and predicate sublate supposed Syllogism thing thought tion triangle true truth Ueberweg universal valid whole wholly words
Populære avsnitt
Side 215 - Tis not because the ring they ride, And Lindesay at the ring rides well, But that my sire the wine will chide If 'tis not fill'd by Rosabelle.
Side 473 - If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.
Side 475 - If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 474 - If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Side 478 - Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.
Side 62 - Thought is the knowledge of a thing through a Concept or General Notion, or of one Notion through another. In Thought, all that we think about is considered either as something containing, or as something contained; — in other words, every process of Thought is only a cognition of the necessary relations of our Concepts. This being the case, it need not move our wonder that Logic, within its proper sphere...