The case turns wholly on the meaning of the term "tapering ends" and "tapering sockets," as used in the claim. If these terms are to be interpreted as describing a rod with a tapering screw and a socket with a tapering chamber, the defendants do not infringe. If they describe a rod with a tapering stem having vanishing threads cut upon it, and a socket to correspond, infringement is established. It is entirely clear that the "tapering threads" of the claim are synonymous with the “vanishing threads" of the specification.

The patentee was the first to combine in a coupling a sleeve and screw in which a vanishing male and female thread were made to correspond with each other. By doing this, he effected a more perfect metallic contact throughout between the socket and the screw, and made a more perfect and secure joint than had been done before. The expert for the defendants admits that he knew of no instance in the state of the art in which a vanishing screw-thread cut upon a tapering mandrel or cone was combined with a tapering female thread cut upon the surface of a hollow cone prior to the date of the patent in question. The patentee was therefore entitled to claim broadly a sleeve or socket and screw in which a vanishing male and female thread were made to correspond with each other. But the question in this case is whether the terms of his claim, when interpreted, as they must be, by the specification, are not narrower than the real invention, and such as to enable the defendants to deny infringement. The claim by itself, so far as it relates to the rods, is capable of an interpretation which would fully cover the real invention. If a rod with a tapering end is to be regarded as a rod in which the stem of the screw is tapering, the claim is ample, and embraces the rod of the defendant. On the other hand, if the term "tapering end" is intended to describe a rod with a tapering screw,-that is, a rod in which the exterior lines of the screw-threads form a tapering end,-the coupling of the defendant is not an infringement. A rod with a tapering end may mean a rod in which the stem, mandrel, or solid part of the end tapers, or it may mean one in which the end, screw-thread included, as adapted to be fitted into a sleeve or recess, is tapering. The term, as used in the claim, is therefore capable of two meanings; and, being ambiguous, the true meaning must be ascertained by resort to the descriptive part of the specification in order to discover what the patentee describes as new, and what the public have a right to understand was intended to be claimed.

An examination of the specification denotes quite plainly that the patentee supposed that the gist of his improvement upon the couplings. previously in use consisted in substituting a tapering screw having vanishing threads, in conjunction with a sleeve or socket adapted to receive such a screw, for tapering screws without the vanishing thread, and a socket not adapted to receive a tapering screw. The drawings distinctly denote this. In describing the advantages of his invention he dwells upon the objections to the use of a "slightly tapering screw" with a socket which does not taper to receive it. Each of the drawings shows a tapering screw, but Fig. 2, which shows the objectionable coupling, has no vanishing thread upon the screw, and has no tapering recess in the socket,

while Fig. 3, which illustrates the improvement, shows a tapering screw with a vanishing thread, and a tapering recess with a vanishing thread. Nevertheless, the inquiry is not what the patentee may have supposed, but what he has described, his invention to be. He states, in the general statement of the nature of his invention, that the tubes are to have "tapering and vanishing screw-threads," not "tapering or vanishing." He points out the objections to the use of a "slightly tapering screw" on the ends of the tubes in the old coupling, with a socket which did not taper to receive it. Then, in describing the difference between his coupling and the old one, he says that he cuts a "tapering screw" on the end of his tube; but, instead of cutting his threads at a uniform depth, he cuts them so that the thread shall vanish gradually until it disappears. He thus declares unequivocally that what he has done which is new is to make a tapering screw with a peculiar form of thread. The specification contains no suggestion to indicate that a rod having a tapering stem, but not a tapering screw, could be employed. Such a stem could not be employed with the socket described in the specification. The specification requires the ends of the rod to be adapted to fit into a tapering recess, "as clearly indicated in the drawing." The claim itself makes a sleeve having a tapering socket an element. A tapering socket is one adapted to receive a tapering screw. Read by the aid of the context, it does not seem open to fair doubt that the rods with tapering ends and tapering threads specified in the claim are rods with a tapering screw and vanishing threads upon the ends. Some significance should also be attached to the description of the rods in the claim by a reference to the drawings, which shows a rod with a tapering screw.

It follows that the bill must be dismissed.

THE CHADWICKE.

BOLCKOW, VAUGHAN & Co., Limited, v. THE CHADWICKE, etc.

(District Court, S. D. New York. January 19, 1887.)

1. CHARTER PARTY-BILL OF LADING-INHARMONIOUS CLAUSES-CONSTRUCTION. Where the provisions of a charter party are inharmonious, the general intent, as evidenced by its written portions, and its evident leading purpose, should control the minor provisions. Similar incongruities between the bill of lading and the charter party will also be controlled, as between the ship and the charterer, by the charter-party, as the more deliberate instrument in expressing the intent. Unless there is sufficient evidence of a waiver of the provisions of the charter, or of some new contract, mere loose and inharmonious expressions in the bill of lading, which refer to the charter, will not supersede the latter, as respects matters which the charter was clearly designed to cover.

2. SAME DELIVERY AT ONE OF SEVERAL PORTS "AS ORDERED ON ARRIVAL"ALTERNATIVE PORTS-DIFFERENT COLLECTION DISTRICTS.

On January 11, 1886, at Middlesbro' on Tees, the libelants chartered the C. to take 1,300 tons of iron, and "proceed to the port of New York, Perth Amboy, Hoboken, or Brooklyn, and there to deliver the same as ordered on arrival.

Two days after, the cargo was loaded, and a bill of lading signed by the master, stating that the steamer was "bound for New York, and the cargo to be delivered at said port of New York to C. L. P., 30 Pine street, or his assigns; all other conditions as per charter-party." The vessel, on arrival at quarantine, New York, was ordered by the charterer's agents to go to Perth Amboy, a neighboring collection district. The master refused, and this suit was brought for the difference in price on a sale of the iron, for its non-delivery at Perth Amboy. Held that, under the circumstances, New York was presumably the primary port at which the order for ultimate delivery, according to the alternative contained in the charter-party, was to be given; that the privilege secured by the charter was a valuable one; that the bill of lading was intended to be but a receipt for the iron and a direction to the primary port only; that the option as to the place of final delivery was not waived, nor intended to be waived, by the bill of lading, and the master was not authorized so to treat it; and that there were no such difficulties, through the naming of different collection districts in the charter, as prevented or excused the ship from delivery at Perth Amboy, as directed at quarantine; and that the ship was therefore liable.

In Admiralty.

Wilcox, Adams & Macklin, for libelants.

Butler, Stillman & Hubbard and W. Mynderse, for claimants.

BROWN, J. The libel in this case was filed to recover damages against the steam-ship Chadwicke, for refusing, on arrival at New York, to go to Perth Amboy to unload, as it is claimed she was bound to do, on request, under a stipulation of the charter.

On the eleventh of January, 1886, at Middlesbro' on Tees, England, the vessel was chartered to the libelants to take on board 1,300 tons of spiegel iron, etc., and, "being so loaded, therewith to proceed to the port of New York, Perth Amboy, Jersey City, Hoboken, or Brooklyn, and there deliver the same as ordered on arrival." The charter, however, provided that the vessel was "to be addressed to the freighter's agent at the port of discharge; the captain to sign bills of lading as presented, with out prejudice to this charter." Three days afterward, the cargo being put on board, a bill of lading, in the common printed form, was signed by the master, stating the steamer to be "bound for New York," and that the cargo was to be delivered "at said port of New York, unto C. L. Perkins, Esq., 30 Pine street, or his assigns, all other conditions as per charter-party;" the port and consignee's name being written in the usual blank spaces.

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The steamer arrived at the quarantine station of the port of New York on the fifth of February, 1886, where a telegram from Mr. Perkins to the master dated January 30, 1886, was awaiting his arrival, and was received by the master, directing the steamer to Lehigh Valley Railroad dock, at Perth Amboy. Instead of going thither, he came up the bay, anchored off the Battery, reported to Mr. Perkins, the charterer's agent in New York, demanded to be unloaded there according to the terms of the bill of lading, and refused to go to Perth Amboy. After the charter had been signed, the libelants informed Mr. Perkins, by telegram, of the option contained in the charter. Thereupon the agent obtained an advance of 50 cents a ton upon a contract then pending, in consideration of a delivery of 1,000 tons of the iron at Perth Amboy, instead of "ex

ship" at New York. The option was worth to the libelants precisely $500.

Perth

The claimants contend that the bill of lading, in making the port of New York the place of delivery, determined the charterer's option; and that he had no right afterwards to direct the vessel elsewhere. Amboy is a different port, and in a different collection district, from New York, although not much further from quarantine, where the master first received his notice, than are the ordinary discharging berths for such cargo in the port of New York. The consular invoices, sworn to by the libelants before the consul at Middlesbro', declared that the cargo was shipped for New York, and designed to be entered there. The Revised Statutes require that manifests shall be prepared at a distance of four leagues from the coast, stating the destination of the cargo, and the intended port of entry, and require the vessel, when ariving within the limits of the port, to make entry there; although there are provisions under which goods destined for different ports, or arriving for orders, may, after arrival at one port, proceed to another port for delivery of the cargo. Sections 2776, 2779, 2807, 2811, 2812. The master in preparing his manifest stated New York as the only port, and entered his vessel at the New York custom house.

The disposition of the cargo was evidently designed to be left to the charterer's agent in New York. All the other places of alternative delivery named in the charter are in the immediate vicinity of New York. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the shipper, in making out the consular invoices and the bill of lading for "the port of New York," actually intended either to waive his option as to the place of final delivery, or to charge himself with any irregularity in a delivery at Perth Amboy, should that be directed by his agent, even if he knew that Perth Amboy was a different collection district from New York, which he probably did not know. The charter-party provides that the cargo is to be delivered at any one of the five places named, "as ordered on arrival.” The very terms of the charter provide, therefore, for an option to be exercised at the end of the voyage; not at the beginning of it. The designation was to be made on arrival; but on arrival where? Necessarily there must be some place short of the ultimate destination where the orders were to be received, and the master must have understood that fact. But all the other places named are so near to New York, and New York is so naturally the head-quarters for this region, that the master must have understood, when he signed this charter-party, that he was first to go to or near New York, and there await orders as to the particular place of delivery. It is in this sense that the subsequent printed clause in the charter party must be construed, viz.: "The vessel to be addressed to the freighter's agent at the port of discharge." Clearly, this printed clause in the charter cannot be construed as intended to take away the option previously stipulated for in the written clause, nor to override the written clause, making the ultimate place of delivery dependent on directions to be given "on arrival" at the primary port. The words "port of discharge" are not strictly compatible with the prior