when nations shall not lift up their sword against nations, nor learn war any more.

In order to prove the importance of religious knowledge to the interests of society, one consideration more, deserving particular attention, remains to be mentioned. It is, that if good seed be not sown in the field, tares will infallibly spring up. The propension towards religion is strong in the human heart. There is a natural preparation in our minds for receiving some impressions of supernatural belief. Upon these, among ignorant and uncultivated men, superstition or enthusiasm never fail to graft themselves. Into what monstrous forms these have shot forth, and what various mischiefs they have produced to society, is too well known. Nor is this the whole of the danger. Designing men are always ready to take advantage of this popular weakness, and to direct the superstitious bias of the multitude to their own ambitious and interested ends. Superstition, in itself a formidable evil, threatens consequences still more formidable when it is rendered the tool of design and craft. Hence arises one of the most powerful arguments for propagating with zeal, as far as our influence can extend, the pure and undefiled doctrines of the Gospel of Christ; in order that just and rational principles of religion may fill up that room in the minds of men which dangerous fanaticism will otherwise usurp.

THE CULTIVATION OF THE CONSCIENCE.

THE next duty after acquiring knowledge, particularly of moral truths, is to cultivate the faculty by which we judge of moral conduct. This, by some, has been called the moral sense, but is gene

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rally known by the name of conscience. Like all other faculties, it is, in its power and acuteness, under the influence, to a certain degree, of education and culture. It is both an active and an intellectual power. It is intellectual, inasmuch as by it we have our notions of right and wrong, merit and demerit, and all moral obligation or sense of duty. It is active, inasmuch as the performance of every duty, of every action receiving approbation, must be more or less influenced by it, or excited by its dictates. Like the other powers of the mind, it comes gradually to perfection, and its progress is much influenced by instruction and unrestrained

exercise.

Some have imagined, that the ideas of sweet and sour reside in the mind or senses, altogether independent of the object to which they are referred, and therefore must depend on the state of the mind. That, in the same way, the ideas of virtue and vice, right and wrong, are dependent on a moral sense in which, and not in the actions or things themselves, these qualities lie. According to this theory, the sole use of reason is to distinguish be tween truth and falsehood, whilst virtue and vice, like the notions of beauty and deformity, belong to taste, morality depending on the peculiarity of the sense which is to perceive it. This theory, subversive of all radical distinction of good and evil, rests on mere assertion, for our notions of right and wrong must be referred to reason and not to taste. The distinctions of right and wrong are not arbitrary, more than the qualities of sweet and hot. They are immutable, and their nature and existence are no more affected by our taste and judgment than truth and falsehood, or than the shining of the sun is dependent on a man perceiving his light.

If, then, there be a natural distinction between right and wrong, there must be some power of the mind capable of discovering the difference, in the same way as there is a capability of discriminating between truth and falsehood. Blessed be God who hath made us rational creatures, and endowed us with those faculties, which, if rightly exercised, lead to happiness and peace. We have a faculty by which we judge of our conduct, and the decisions it forms are attended with personal feelings and affections, with a strong sentiment of approbation or disapprobation. They gratify and reward the man, who acts according to the dictates of conscience or a sense of duty. They torment and punish him who transgresses its laws.

In Scripture we find mention made of a 'pure conscience, by which we may understand a faculty capable of readily distinguishing between right and wrong, a well instructed conscience, and the power of discerning that which is holy. We also read of a conscience void of offence, and the testimony of a good conscience, by which we understand that the dictates of conscience, the decrees of the court, have been obeyed, and that the sentence is favorable. On the other hand, we are told of blindness of mind, and of a mind and conscience which are defiled. We therefore from Scripture, as well as from reason, may prove the necessity of possessing a good, that is, an enlightened conscience, and the testimony of a conscience void of offence, that is, the approbation of this well-instructed faculty. It is the duty of every man to cultivate his conscience, which is done by making himself well acquainted with the will of God, and those duties ordained by him, and by diligently attending to, and implicitly and promptly obeying the na

tural admonitions given by conscience, even to those who are not acquainted with Christianity. It is generally, I do not say universally, the case, that the first and instantaneous decision given on any point, by the unsophisticated conscience, is the most correct. For it often happens during subsequent deliberation, that the judgment comes to be warped by the special pleading of the inclination. It must, farther, be carefully recollected, that the faculty is apt, imperceptibly, to be influenced by passions and various causes, and therefore it is necessary to compare our judgment with deductions from the proper principles of action, and particularly with the rules delivered in the word of God. Paul thought he acted right in persecuting the Christians, and his error lay not in following the dictates of a misguided conscience, but in not using all the means in his power to obtain better information, in not candidly examining the grounds on which Christianity rested. A man is always culpable, even when he follows the dictates of conscience, if his conduct be wrong, provided he has neglected any one mean in his power of instructing his judgment.

THE REGULATION OF THE PASSIONS AND DESIRES.

ANOTHER essential duty is the regulation of our passions and desires, according to the rules of propriety and virtue.

Virtue is a steady and fixed purpose of the heart, to adhere to principles approved by the sense of duty, to act according to a rule consonant to the judgment, and declared by it to be duty. Strictly

speaking, it is the performance of every duty in a perfect manner, and therefore it is not to be found in any mortal. Particular virtues are fixed and perpetual purposes, to perform particular duties as duties. One act of justice, or of benevolence, does not constitute a just or a benevolent man. An act of justice may even be performed without any regard to justice, and merely from the influence of passion or the feeling of the moment. To be an act of virtue, it must be performed from a sense of duty. Virtues have been divided into four, which were called cardinal, and from which all the rest sprung. These are justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude, giving rise to benevolence, charity, patience, and all those other virtues which adorn and comfort human life.

Vice is the omission of a duty, or the violation of a positive law. It generally originates from the passions, as virtue does from reason and conscience. It is not an original principle in the mind, for in that case it must have been conferred by the Creator. But it is a perversion of our faculties; and to produce, a single vice, the perversion is often very complex. All principles which are good, were originally implanted in man, and he had, by consequence, a principle leading him to dislike and disapprove of evil, though evil did not then exist in his knowledge. When, by sad experience, he acquired the knowledge of good and evil, and his nature became debased and changed, then, either by desires, in themselves natural and proper, being carried to a degree disproportionate to the value of their object, or by the passions overcoming reason, vice was produced.

For our present purpose, the operations of mind may be divided into three classes. First, those