they are accredited, and consuls within their respective districts, may solemnize marriages between parties either or both of whom are members of the nation of such officer, pursuant to such forms and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by that nation. Such marriages are valid, as if solemnized or contracted within the territorial jurisdiction of such nation according to its laws. This Article is suggested by the British Consular Marriage Acts of 1849 and 1868, 12 and 13 Vict. 224, ch. 68; 31 and 32 Vict. 264, ch. 61; and the American act of June 22, 1860, § 29, 11 T. S. Stat. at L., 55. Burge lays down the rule, that: The parties are excused from conforming to the lex loci contractus, if they belong to the State, the subjects of which form a separate and distinct community in the foreign country in which they are married, as in the case of the British factories established in various parts of Europe and Asia; or if they belong to a State which has taken hostile possession, and is in the occupation, of the foreign country; or if they belong to the State whose ambassador is established in the foreign country. In these instances the parties may celebrate their marriage according to the law of their own country. Burge on Foreign and Colonial Law, I., p. 200. Criminal offenses. 552. A marriage, though valid according to the law of the place where it is contracted, will not be recognized as valid in any country in which the circumstances of such marriage would render the personal relation between the parties a crime. Evasion of home law. 553. The act of persons contracting marriage in a nation in which they are not domiciled, in evasion of the law of the nation or domicil of either, may be made a criminal offense, but the validity of the marriage, if consummated, and the legitimacy of its issue, shall not be affected thereby. There is not wanting sanction for the opinion that such a marriage is void. But Westlake, (Private Intern. Law, p. 323,) forcibly points out the embarrassment resulting from making the validity of a marriage depend on so uncertain an element as the opinion, which a court may form, respecting the motive of a journey. Personal, marital and parental rights. 554. Except as otherwise provided by this Code,' the personal, marital and parental obligations and corre lative rights of the parties to a marriage at any time, are governed exclusively by the law of the place where they may be, unless polygamy there exists. This depends on the principle that it is within the jurisdiction of any State to regulate the personal relations of all persons within its limits. When married parties go from one jurisdiction to another, their marriage status assumes the peculiar hue, which the law of the place, where they temporarily or permanently are, gives to it. Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, § 407. See Chapter XXI., on DOMICIL, ORIGINAL AND SECONDARY. Polygamy. 555. A polygamous union, though contracted in a polygamous nation, does not sanction the cohabitation or the divorce, of the parties, in any other nation ;' but the obligations and restrictions in other respects resulting from marriage, and the rights of property dependent thereon, may be recognized by any nation as applicable to the parties to such a union, in cases within its jurisdiction.' ' Hyde v. Hyde, 35 Law Journal, (N. S., ) Divorce Cases, 75. ? It is submitted that, for the purpose of such obligations, toward the public, as arise out of the relation, a polygamous marriage should be recognized. For instance, it should preclude the polygamist from contracting a subsequent marriage, during the life of any existing consort; it should not exonerate him from the obligations arising out of the relation of parent and child. It seems proper, too, that on the question of the succession to foreign assets, it should be considered as part of the law of the polygamous nation, whenever that law comes in to regulate the suc cession, Legitimacy. 556. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a person, as deduced from the law of the place where a marriage of the parents was contracted, is a personal attribute, and does not affect the succession to immovables situated in any other country, which would not recognize the person as legitimate, if the marriage had been contracted in such country, at the time when it was actually contracted. Story, (Confl. of L., § 93 b, &c.,) regards it as generally admitted by foreign jurists, that, as the validity of the marriage must depend upon the law of the country where it is celebrated, the status, or condition of their offspring as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, ought to depend on the same law, especially if the parents were domiciled there; and there would be some authority for extending this rule to control the succession to real property in foreign States. According to Savigny, the laws of the place, where the birth of a child born out of wedlock actually takes place, exclusively determine whether he can be legitimated by subsequent marriage. Savigny, p. 257. Schaeffner. See also, Story, Confl. of L., § 93, s. But a legitimation of a subject by the rescript of his sovereign, if effectual according to the laws of the country where the person legitimated has his domicil, has the same virtue everywhere. Savigny, p. 258. CHAPTER XL. GUARDIANSHIP AND MENTAL ALIENATION. ARTICLE 557. Natural and testamentary guardians. 559. Sanity. Natural and testamentary guardians. 557. The natural guardianship of a father or mother over the person of a child, and testamentary guardianship,' acquired or conferred according to the law of one nation must be recognized in every other nation; subject to the power of the courts to interfere in the cases prescribed in Article 634. 1 By the law of some States, the natural guardianship of the mother is recognized, upon the death of the father, and this Article accordingly provides for the mother's right, * Testamentary guardianship is also included in this Article because it stands in the place of natural guardianship. Westlake, (Private Intern. Law, p. 380,) however, is of opinion that testamentary guardianship depends on the same principle as judicial or statutory guardianship. Judicially appointed guardians. 558. The guardianship or other custody of the person or property of one not having legal capacity, created by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, in the cases provided in Article 633, must be recognized and respected by courts of any other country into which the ward comes, subject to the power of the courts to interfere in the cases prescribed in Article 634. This provision is founded on the decisions in Nugent o. Vetzera, Law Rep., 2 Equity, 704; and Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minnesota Rep., 412, extending it to other cases than that of infancy. In the first mentioned decision Vice-Chancellor WOOD said: "Having regard to the present international law and to the course which all courts have taken, recognizing the proceedings of the regularly constituted tribunals of all civilized communities, and especially of those in amicable connection with this country, it is impossible for me entirely to disregard the appointment of a guardian by an Austrian court over these children, who are Austrian subjects and children of an Austrian father, merely because those who preceded the defendant in his guardianship have taken the course of sending them over to this country for the purpose of educating them, seeing that he is now desirous of revoking that arrangement. It would be contrary to all principles of right and justice if the court were to hold that where a parent or guardian in a foreign country avails himself of the oppor tunities for education afforded by this country, and sends his children over here, he must do it at the risk of never being able to recall them, because this court might be of opinion that an English grade of educa tion is better than that adopted in the country to which they belong." And in this case an order appointing English guardians was declared to be without prejudice to the foreign appointment; and that the foreign guardians as such should have the exclusive right to the custody and control of the infants, with liberty to apply for the removal of the children from the country. In the case of Townsend v. Kendall, above referred to, the court said: That it would lead to great inconvenience if it should be held that a guardian could not exercise his authority or be recognized out of the state, or locality of his appointment. It would embarrass the guardian in investing the funds of the ward in securities of other states, and render it necessary that he should be reappointed in every state or country through which he should pass with his ward in traveling, if an emergency should arise in which it became necessary to exert his authority. The court added, (referring to Story, Confl. of L., §§ 495–507,)" From a very careful examination of all he says, and the cases to which he refers, which have been attainable, we think the better rule is, upon principle and authority, to recognize the foreign appointment of a guardian, as creating that relation between the parties in this State, subject, of course, to the laws of this State, as to any exercise of power by virtue of such relation either as to the person or property of the ward. Provision has been made by the statutes of this State for the manner in which foreign guardians shall act when they desire to sell the real property of their wards situated within this State. (Comp. Statutes, p. 423, §§ 43, 44.) all that is necessary to obtain full recognition as guardian, is to file an authenticated copy of the foreign appointment in the Court of Probate of the county where the land is situated, and the foreign guardian is at once admitted to the same rights and powers over the real estate of his ward situated within the county that are possessed by a guardian of our own appointment." Consult, also, Westlake Private Intern. Law, p. 380; and Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Clark & Finnelly's Rep., 114. It was held in New York Surrogate Court, 1869, Biolley's Estate, 1 Tucker's Rep., 422, that the usual treaty provision as to succession of foreigners (Treaty between the United States and Switzerland, 1850,) does not require a reciprocal recognition of foreign guardians. The foregoing Article is restricted to the case of guardians appointed judicially, so that the right of appointment by will, which in many of the States is recognized as existing in the parent, may be included in the previous Article respecting natural and testamentary guardians. Surrogate BRADFORD, in stating the rule that foreign guardians have no extraterritorial authority, says: "The reason upon which a foreign guardian is denied any recognition of his title, is substantially this,that all his authority springs out of his official character; and a civil officer, as such, can, of necessity, possess no power beyond the limits of the sovereignty by which he is appointed. Such exceptions as may exist have been admitted not de jure, but ex comitate. The lex fori primarily prevails in the form and order of the administration of justice, and foreign law is only received so far as it is found consonant with sound principle and public convenience-it is accepted on the basis of international comity, and not because of any inherent right. The continental jurists go further, and insist upon the absolute right and title of the guardian appointed at the place of domicil, wheresoever the ward is to be represented; but neither in England nor in the United States does this doctrine prevail." McLoskey v. Reid, 4 Bradford's (New York) Surrogate Rep., 334. Woolsey, (International Law, p. 122,) states that, the guardian empowered according to the law of the ward's domicil, which will usually be that of the deceased parent, exercises control over the ward's property wherever situated. But in the case of immovable property the lex loci rei sita may prevent such control of a foreigner, and it may be necessary to appoint a special guardian residing within the jurisdiction. Sanity. 559. The laws determining the lunacy or idiocy of any person are territorial only; and a decision that a person is a lunatic or idiot will bind that person and his movables, whether he be a citizen or an alien, only while he is domiciled within the jurisdiction of the country in which such decision was made, and will bind the immovables of such person situated in that country, whether the domicil therein do or do not continue, but will not bind such person in any other country, nor the immovables of such person situated in any other country. See, however, Westlake, Private Intern. Law, § 402, who says that "While the English law remains as it is, it must, on principle, be taken as excluding, in the case of transactions having their seat there, not only a foreign age of majority, but also all foreign determination of status or |