the property was neutral; not that it was not taken without probable cause. Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 2. To similar effect, The Liverpool Packet, 1 Gallison's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 513; The Rover, 2 Id., 240; Maisonnaire v. Keating, 2 Id., 328. If a captor transcend his powers and rights, he becomes guilty of a marine trespass, and is amenable in damages for the injury sustained; and where the vessel has been lost in consequence of such illegal acts, the value of the vessel, the prime cost of the cargo, with all charges and the premium of insurance, are to be allowed in ascertaining the damages. The Anna Maria, 2 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 327. If a ship be detained without probable cause, the liability of the commander extends, says Lushington, (Naval Prize Law, p. 9, §§ 56, 57,) to the extent of making good losses by inevitable accident while the prize was in his hands. If there was probable cause, he is not liable for casualties. 4 By the treaty between the United States and the Dominican 66 XXI., 12 Id., 1003, Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, Art. XVIII., 15 U. S. Stat. at L., (Tr.,)167. Bolivia, May 13, 1858, the commanders of the public armed ships of either nation are made responsible with their persons and property for any extortion, violence or ill-treatment caused, when visiting ships of the other nation on the high seas. And by the treaty between the United States and Venezuela, Aug. 27, 1860, Art. XXII., 12 U. S. Stat. at L., 1143, the commander is also made liable for all damages, and the interest thereof, of whatever nature the damages may be. 5 Lushington's Naval Prize Law, p. 20, § 109. Misconduct on the part of the captors,-e.g., a wrongful spoliation of property on board a prize, or separation of the officers or crew from her, may destroy the legality of the capture, and subject the captors, personally, to punishment for the infringement of the laws of maritime warfare. The right of seizure by the belligerent is dependent upon the lawful use of that power by the captors at sea. The Jane Campbell, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 101. Treaty between France and Peru, March 9, 1861, Art. XXV., 8 De Clercq, 201. There is no rule of law which requires a captor to exercise extraordinary diligence in the care of a prize. The case is not distinguishable in this respect from that of a bailment, beneficial to both parties; and the captor is liable for ordinary diligence only. The George, 1 Mason's U. 8. Circ. Ct. Rep., 24. The commander is bound to use the strictest care. Omission to employ a pilot in places where pilotage is usual is want of care. Lushington's Naval Prize Law, p. 19, §§ 105-108. 10 Lushington's Naval Prize Law, p. 13, § 71; and cases cited. 11 Id., p. 21, § 115. The same. 888. The commander of a visiting ship is responsible in damages for the wrongful acts of all under his command, whether he himself be present or absent, when they are committed. He is not exonerated by being under a superior officer, unless the latter was actually present and co-operating, or issued express orders to do the act in question. Lushington's Naval Prize Law, p. 2, § 7; The Mentor, 1 Ch. Robinson's Rep., 179; The Diligentia, 1 Dodson's Rep., 404; The Acteon, 2 Id., 48; The Eleanor, 2 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 346. Right of all ships to defend against attack. 889. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, every ship, whether public or private, has a right to repel the attack of an enemy,' and to capture and send in as prize the attacking ship.' 1 Haven v. Holland, 2 Mason's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 230; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 1; affirming 3 Mason's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 116. The Anne, 3 Wheaton's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 435. Salvage. 890. Where property captured in war is recaptured at sea, the recaptors may send it into a court of adjudication, in order to have their claim of salvage established. See Halleck, Intern. Law and Laws of War, p. 867; and note to Article 893. CHAPTER LXVII. BLOCKADE. It is thought that the abandonment of the right of making purely commercial blockades will be but a small sacrifice of belligerent power, compared with the immense diminution it will effect in the evils of It has been remarked by Lushington, (Naval Prize Law, Intro.. war. p. xiii.,) that the effect of steam commerce will be to make such block. ades, if not more rare, at any rate, of less significance than formerly; since only to ports very exceptionally situated will the temporary loss of maritime intercourse be a very serious matter so long as there is left open to them land communication by railway. ARTICLE 891. Objects of blockade. 892. "Military port" defined. Objects of blockade. 891. A belligerent may blockade military ports, and no others, and so far only as is necessary to capture contraband of war. 892. A military port is a fortified port or one occupied by a military force larger than is necessary for the preservation of domestic order. The principal existing rules, as modified by modern treaties, may be indicated as follows: 1. Objects of blockade. A belligerent may blockade all or any part of the coasts, ports and roadsteads of the hostile nation, so far as necessary for attaining the object of the war. A war must exist de facto; but a civil war in which one party claims sovereign rights as against the other, is within the rule. Prize Cases, 2 Black's U. S. Supreme Court Rep., 635. And in the case of The Mary Clinton, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 556, it was held that the proclamation of the blockade is sufficient and conclusive evidence of the existence of the war. 2. Classes of blockades. Blockades are either, 1, simple; or, 2, public. A public blockade is one which has been duly notified to other nations by the nation establishing it. All others are simple blockades. In the case of a simple blockade, captors are bound to prove its existence at the time of capture; while in the case of a public blockade, the claimants are held to proof of discontinuance, in order to protect themselves from the penalties of attempted violation. The case of The Circassian, 2 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 135, (see Bluntschli, Droit International Codifié, § 831), allows an effective blockade in anticipation of notice. 3. Authority of officer. A blockade of any port established by a commanding officer is not void for want of special authority, unless disavowed by his government. Some authorities question the right of an officer to establish a blockade without instructions, if he be near enough to the government to enable him to receive them; but the better opinion seems to be that the neutral can not impeach the officer's authority so long as the act is not disavowed by his government. Halleck, Intern. Law and Laws of War, p. 537; and see The Circassian, 2 Wallace's U. 8. Supr. Ct. Rep., 135; In re Rolla, 6 Robinson's Adm. Rep., 364; Cameron v. Kyte, 3 Knapp, P. C. 332. 4. Notice. A private neutral ship destined for a blockaded port can not be seized, unless notice of the blockade has first been given to it, and indorsed upon its papers by a ship of the blockading squadron. The indorsement must state the day and the place of giving such notice. Treaty between France and Peru, Art. XXII., March 9, 1861, 8 De Clercq, 201. The same rule was adopted by Italy in the war of 1866, with Austria. Lushington's Naval Prize Law, Introd., p. ix., note. The mere intention to enter a blockaded port unconnected with any other fact, is not sufficient for the condemnation of a neutral vessel. The treaty between the United States and Great Britain provides that every vessel may be turned away from every blockaded or besieged port or place, which shall have sailed for the same without knowledgeof the blockade or siege; but she shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, be confiscated, unless, after notice, she shall again attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to any other port or place she may think proper. And this treaty is conceived to be a correct exposition of the present law of nations upon this point. The intention must be manifested in such manner as to be equivalent to an attempt. Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 185. See also treaty between the United States and The Two Bolivia, } Oct. 1, 1855, Art. II., 11 U. S. Stat. at L., 639, Venezuela, Aug. 27, 1860, Dominican Feb. 8, 1867. "XX., 12 Id., 1003. XII., 12 Id., 1143. 15 Id. (Tr.,) 167. In the absence of such a treaty, the courts do not require notice; see5 Cranch's Rep., 335; 1 Kent's Commentaries, 150; 1 Robinson's Rep., 72, 130; 2 Id., 94; The Circassian, 2 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 135; Wheaton on Capture, 193-207; The Hallie Jackson, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 2, 48; The Empress, Id., 175: except where the vessel sails without a knowledge of the blockade; The Nayade, 1 Newberry's Adm. Rep., (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 366. In the case of the Louisa Agnes, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) p. 107, it was held that the departure of a ship from the blockaded port, under the compulsory direction of a blockading cruiser, does not reintegrate her to the state of an innocent trader, and she may still be arrested for the offense of attempting to violate the blockade. A notice of a blockade to the officials of a neutral government is 2 deemed a sufficient notice of it to the subjects of such government. 5. Efficiency. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast by the enemy. Congress of Paris, 1856. Although this rule admits occasional absence of blockading vessels, from stress of weather or other contingencies, yet the law demands the allotment and stationing of that amount of force for the service which shall render it physically hazardous for other craft to evade the blockade. 1 Kent's Commentaries, 144–161; 3 Phillimore's Intern. Law, 287; Woolsey's International Law, § 186; 1 Spink Prize Cases, 111, 171; The Sarah Starr, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 69. In the case of an inland port, a blockade may be maintained by batteries commanding the river or inlet by which it may be approached, supported by a naval force sufficient to warn off innocent vessels, and capture offending vessels attempting to enter. The Circassian, 2 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 135. A blockade ceases whenever the vessels which maintain it are withdrawn, whether with or without compulsion from the enemy, so that the undertaking is, for the time, at least, abandoned. Woolsey's International Law, § 187. 6. Violation. Unless the blockade be directed against ingress or egress alone, a vessel violates the law of blockade, by any positive act towards entering or quitting, or by showing a clear and speedy intention to enter or leave a blockaded port, except in distress. The Coosa, 1 Newberry's Admiralty Rep., (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 393; 1 Ch. Robinson's Rep., 86, 151, 171; The Hiawatha, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) p. 1; The Empress, Id., p. 175; Halleck's Intern. Law & Laws of War, ch. 23, $ 23. A remote intention to violate a legal blockade, entertained at the outset of the voyage, is not sufficient cause to authorize the seizure of a vessel. Woolsey's Intern. Law, § 188. However earnestly the criminal intent may have been entertained and proceeded upon for a time, if it be really given up before the arrest, the property is not liable to confiscation because of the previous wrongful purpose. 1 Kent's Commentaries, 147; The John Gilpin, Blatchford's Prize Cases, (U. S. Dist. Ct.,) 291. Persisting in the intention to enter a blockaded port, after warning by the blockading force, is not an attempt to enter, nor a breach of the blockade, unless connected with some act on the part of the vessel. Under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, a second attempt to enter must be made after notification of the blockade. Lingering about the place, as if watching for an opportunity to sail into it, or the single circumstance of making immediately for some other port, |