S.C. 1901. Ex parte GAUKRODGER, matter of fact we are, in my opinion, bound to accept; and since, as I have already stated, I hold, as the Committee has held, that it is sufficient if the requirements of the Act are complied with before the licence is granted, and that it is not necessary that they should be complied with when notice is O'DRISCOLL'S given of an intention to apply for a licence, I am of opinion that this motion should be dismissed with costs. I have said nothing about the action for prohibition and the motion thereon. These were not pressed before the Court; and the motion was obviously too late after the licence was granted. They must therefore be also dismissed, with costs. EDWARDS, J.:— Counsel for the plaintiff in this case admits that the writ of prohibition cannot go, as the proceedings before the Licensing Bench are complete, and there is nothing which may be prohibited. The main ground upon which counsel for the plaintiff relied in support of the motion for a writ of certiorari is that the withdrawal of the application for a licence of the Village Inn and the grant of a new licence for the Hotel Commonwealth is a fraud upon the Licensing Acts, since it, in effect, amounts to a removal of the Village Inn licence for more than a quarter of a mile. In my opinion, the case is, upon this point, determined by the decision of the House of Lords in Laceby v. Lacon (1). The only ground upon which it was sought to distinguish the present case from that case is that it is said that the prohibition of the removal of a licence to a house more than a quarter of a mile distant from the house in respect of which the licence was first granted has been made. in the public interest, whereas in Laceby v. Lacon (1) only the private interest of the landlord was at stake. Under the English statute 35 & 36 Vict., c. 94, section 50, the consent of the landlord to the removal of the licence was, however, made a condition precedent to the power of the Justices to make an order sanctioning the removal. Therefore, if the grant of a new licence could have been held to be a removal, there could be no doubt that the Justices acted without jurisdiction. The case turned, as this case turns, upon the question whether or not the dropping of an old licence and the grant of a new licence could be held to be a removal. It was held that it could not. The reasoning in Laceby v. (1) [1899] A. C. 222. In re APPLICATION. S.C. 1901. Ex parte GAUKRODGER, APPLICATION. Lacon (1) appears to me to apply to the present case, which is really indistinguishable from it. The next objection is that, as the full number of licences In re permitted by law was in existence when the defendant O'DRISCOLL'S O'Driscoll lodged his application with the Clerk of the Licensing Committee, and also when the application came before the Licensing Committee and was heard by the Licensing Committee, no certificate could issue for the new licence now sought to be quashed. In support of this contention Dr. Findlay urges that the Licensing Committee were bound by subsection 5 of section 44 of the Act of 1881 to take and dispose of all applications for new licences before the applications for renewals were dealt with. He also contends that as, at the time when the application for a licence for the Hotel Commonwealth was lodged, and also at the time when the hearing was begun, application for renewals of all existing licences had been duly lodged, and as, under the provisions of subsection 6 of section 12 of the Act of 1893, No. 21, the holders of such licences were (except as therein mentioned) entitled to renewals of such licences, it follows that there was no jurisdiction to grant a new licence. The result of this construction of the statute would be that no new licence could in any case be granted until a year had elapsed after some existing licence had lapsed or had been cancelled. I think that it is clear that the provisions of section 44 are rules of procedure, and that they are merely directory. That this is so with respect to subsection 5 of section 44 is shown by sections 59 and 43, which entitle the applicant for a licence to an adjournment in case an objection shall be taken without notice, as therein mentioned. If the plaintiff's contention were correct it would follow that if an objection under section 59 were made to the granting of a new licence, then, as the hearing of the application for such new licence must be adjourned, of necessity all other business before the Licensing Committee must also be adjourned. It is quite clear that this was not the intention of the Legislature, and that the provisions of section 44 are directory. The provisions of section 44 being directory, I see no reason why the Licensing Committee should not postpone the determination of the application for a new licence until the applications for renewal had been disposed of. If when the applications for renewal had been disposed of it appeared that the new licence could lawfully be (1) (1899] A.C. 222. granted, and if the Licensing Committee were honestly of opinion that it was to the public benefit that such new licence should be granted, then I see no reason why the Committee should not issue its certificate for such licence. S.C. 1901. Ex parte GAUKRODGER, In re APPLICATION. The last objection is that the premises in respect of which O'DRISCOLL'S the application was made did not, on the last day upon which application could be made for a new licence, comply with the requirements of the Licensing Acts, nor did they so comply when the application was heard. This objection has been so exhaustively dealt with in the judgments of Mr. Justice Williams and of Mr. Justice Denniston, in which I entirely concur, that I do not think that anything can be added to what has been said by those learned Judges. I agree that the motion should be dismissed, and judgment entered in the action for the defendants, with costs, £50. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 2. Tort. See NEGLIGENCE. AGREEMENT-Breach. See DAMAGES. APPEAL From District Court. From Magistrate's Court Evidence. Un- BY-LAW-Making- Validity - The Counties See MAGISTRATE'S COURT. 1 and 2. Pay- BANKING LAW Post-dated Cheque Where, therefore, a bank paid a post-dated Held, That the customer was entitled to re- McGill v. Bank of North Queensland (Queens. BILL OF EXCHANGE. See REVENUE. 3. BOUNDARIES. See LAND TRANSFER. BRIDGE-Protective Works--Contribution. 1-Index L.R. 174 66 66 Held, That these words are sufficient to autho- Such a charge for inspection is not a charge Such a by-law, providing for payment for Where a by-law provided that a licence in Held, That this provision, if ultra vires, was Semble, That such a by-law should provide for Subclause (g) of subsection 2 of section 130 |