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191 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

bama, 594; Klein v. Nugent Gravel Co., 66 N. E. Rep. 486 (Ind. App.); Jones Co. v. Perry, 26 Ind. App. 554; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Indiana, 503, 507; Heick v. Voight, 110 Indiana, 279, 285; Paul v. Detroit, 32 Michigan, 108, 118; Sanborn v. Fellows, 22 N. H. 473; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Harmon v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 388; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244; Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. 272; McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 536; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324.

IV. Due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that no man shall be judge in his own cause.

Plaintiff claims while town trustees may apportion and determine the special benefits of a local assessment the benefits must be apportioned and determined by due process of law; and that among the certain established and recognized maxims of right that are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, is that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. The old maxims show that this is essential. Coke, Litt. 141a; Broom Max. (8th Am. ed.) 116; Littleton, § 212; Earl of Derby's case, 12 Coke, 114; Jenk. Cent. Cas. 40; Pandect's Pass. II, lib. 5, 17.

If the duty to be exercised is of such a judicial character that under the influence of his interest in the subject matter the judge may so decide as to give to himself an unjust or inequitable advantage and perforce impose upon other parties a corresponding inequity or disadvantage, it is a case where the constitutional guaranty of due process of law is applicable. North Bloomfield G. M. Co. v. Keyser, 58 California, 315; Helbron v. Campbell, 23 Pac. Rep. 122; Meyer v. City of San Diego, 121 California, 102; Inhabitants of North Hampton v. Smith, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 390; Taylor v. Williams, 26 Texas, 583.

As to taxpayers being disqualified the disqualification does

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

191 U.S.

not spring from the fact that the judge is a citizen, inhabitant and taxpayer of the city, but from the circumstance that he owns property within the city which may or may not be liable to taxation as he may decide. The authorities agree that in such a case the citizen and taxpayer is disqualified. City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 California, 249; State v. Young, 31 Florida, 594; Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, 21 N. J. L. 656; Ex parte Harris, 26 Florida, 77 (23 Am. St. Rep. 548); City of Guthrie v. Shaffer, 7 Oklahoma, 459; Austin v. Nalle, 85 Texas, 520; State v. City of Cisco (Tex. Civ.), 33 S. W. Rep. 244; Jefferson Co., etc., v. Milwaukee Co., etc., 20 Wisconsin, 139.

The disqualification is applicable to all officers and boards whose duties are judicial. Elliott on Muncp. Corporations, § 130; Markley v. Rudy, 115 Indiana, 533; Meyer v. Shields, 61 Fed. Rep. 713, 723; Stockwell v. Township Board of White Lake, 22 Michigan, 341; Conklin v. Squire, 29 Weekly Law Bull. 157.

Had one of the appellees brought suit against the town to determine and collect the cost of paving the street crossings, and all the members of this town board had been on the jury, either plaintiff or defendant could have challenged them for cause, for the reason that they were residents and taxpayers of the town. Hern v. City of Greensburg, 51 Indiana, 119; Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Indiana, 545, 549; City of Goshen v. England, 119 Indiana, 368; Gaff v. State, 155 Indiana, 277. Necessity does not cure this defect except in general and universal questions which do not apply to this case. Board of Com. of Fountain Co. v. Loeb, 68 Indiana, 29; State v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394, 400; Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52; 84 Am. Dec. 114; Washington Ins. Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 1; Anonymous, 1 Salk. 396.

Nor is the legislature the final judge of this necessity. To say that the legislature is the final judge in all cases of what interest will disqualify, would be to repudiate all our constitutions, both written and unwritten, and to leave the citizen at the mercy of every legislative whim and caprice.

191 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Such a legislative act is unconstitutional. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 506, et seq.; Conklin v. Squire, 29 Weekly Law Bull. 157; Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85; Hasketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847; Bonham Case, 8 Coke, 212, 219, 224; Great Charte v. Kensington, 2 Stra. 1173; State v. Castleberry, 23 Alabama, 85; Chamber v. Hodges, 23 Texas, 104.

The judgment rendered under such circumstances is void -not voidable and can be attacked collaterally. Sanborn v. Fellows, 22 N. H. 473; Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52; Stearns v. Wright, 51 N. H. 600; Bass v. City of Ft. Wayne, 121 Indiana, 389; Chicago & Atlanta Ry. Co. v. Summers, 113 Indiana, 10; Gay v. Minot, 3 Cush. 353; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Massachusetts, 219; Taylor v. County Com. of Worcester, 105 Massachusetts, 225; State v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394; Wetzel v. State, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 17; Donnelly v. Howard, 60 California, 291; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. 380.

The only reason given for denying the right to collaterally attack the judgment of interested tribunals is that the complaining party should either take a change of venue to an impartial tribunal or attack the judgment directly by appeal or writ of error. Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 Indiana, 417; Bass v. City of Ft. Wayne, 121 Indiana, 389; Board of Com. of Carroll Co. v. Justice, 133 Indiana, 89.

For other cases on the point that no one can be a judge in his own case, see Bacon's Abr. "Jury" M, 3; Bouvier Law Dict. tit. Judge; 1 Brook's Abr. 177, tit. conusans, 27; Burns's Justice, III, 132; C. 3, 5, 1; Com. Dig. 101, 4, Justices, I, 3; Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 506; Domat's Public Law, lib. 2, tit. 1, sec. 2, 14; Elliott on Mun. Corp. § 130; 4 Inst. 71; Just. Code, lib. 1, tit. 1, 16; Pothier's Pro. Civ. C. 2, sec. 5; Rolle, Abr. Judges, Pl. 11; Voet. ad. Pand. lib. 5, tit. 1, 43; Jenk. 40, case 76; 90, case 74; Bonham Case, 8 Coke, 212, 219, 224; Queen v. Com. for Cheltenham, 1 A. & E. N. S. 468; Reg. v. Canal Co., 14 Q. B. 853; 68 E. C. L. R.; Regina v. Justices, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 93; Ranger v. Great Western Ry. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 72, 88, 89; State v. Castleberry, 23 Alabama, 85; Heydenfeldt v. Towns,

Argument for Defendants in Error.

191 U.S.

27 Alabama, 423; Lent v. Tillson, 72 California, 404, 428; Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 California, 443; Hadley v. Dague, 130 California, 207; Hawley v. Baldwin, 19 Connecticut, 585; Appeal of Nettleton, 28 Connecticut, 268; Ochus v. Shelden, 12 Florida, 138; Klein v. Tuhey, 13 Ind. App. 74; Hudson v. Wood, 52 N. E. Rep. 612 (Ind. App.); Shoemaker v. Smith, 74 Indiana, 71, 75; Fechheimer v. Washington, 77 Indiana, 366; Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 Indiana, 417; Block v. State, 100 Indiana, 357; Pearcy v. Mich. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Indiana, 59; Zimmerman v. State, 115 Indiana, 129; Board v. Heaston, 144 Indiana, 583; Chicago &c. Co. v. City of Huntington, 149 Indiana, 518; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Indiana, 467; Clifford v. York Co. Com., 59 Maine, 262; Buckingham v. Davis, 9 Maryland, 324; Gay v. Minot, 3 Cush. 352, 354; Tolland v. County Com., 13 Gray, 12; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Massachusetts, 324; Taylor v. County Com. of Worcester, 105 Massachusetts, 225; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Massachusetts, 219; Ames v. Port Huron Log Driving & Booming Co., 11 Michigan, 139; Paul v. Detroit, 32 Michigan, 108, 117; Russell v. Perry, 14 N. H. 152; State v. Newark, 1 Dutcher, 399, 405; Schroder v. Ehlers, 31 N. J. L. 44; Traction Co. v. Board of Works, 56 N. J. L. 431; Foster v. Cape May, 60 N. J. L. 78, 82; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547; Converse v. McArthur, 17 Barb. 410, 411; Edwards v. Russell, 21 Wend. 64; Diveny v. City of Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; White v. Connelly, 105 N. C. 65; Gregory v. Cleveland R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 675; Schroder v. Overman, 61 Ohio St. 1; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50; Templeton v. Giddings, 12 S. W. Rep. 851 (Tex.); Barnett v. Ashmore, 5 Washington St. 163; Findley v. Smith, 42 W. Va. 299; Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wisconsin, 314, 351; Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Brumfield, 94 Fed. Rep. 423; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386, 388; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371.

Mr. Lawson M. Harvey, with whom Mr. William A. Pickens, Mr. Linton A. Cox and Mr. Sylvan W. Kahn were on the brief, for the defendants in error:

191 U. S.

Argument for Defendants in Error.

That this statute of Indiana is not unconstitutional has been repeatedly decided in Indiana. Adams v. Shelbyville, 154 Indiana, 467; Leeds v. Defrees, 61 N. E. Rep. 930; Shank v. Smith, 61 N. E. Rep. 932; Martin v. Willis, 60 N. E. Rep. 1021; Schaeffer v. Werling, 156 Indiana, 704, affirmed 188 U. S. 516. The decision of the state Supreme Court will be followed. French v. Barber Asphalt Co., 181 U. S. 328; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black. 510; Whitman Co. v. Buffalo, 118 Fed. Rep. 773; Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 306, 307.

This court will not again consider a question it has directly and specifically decided. Swope v. Lefingwell, 15 Otto, 3; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201.

The procedure of the trustees cannot render the statute unconstitutional. Cummings v. Bank, 101 U. S. 153.

The decision of the state court rests on a ground of estoppel or waiver of rights which is broad enough to support the decision, hence a Federal question, if raised, will not be considered. Schaeffer v. Werling, supra; Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658; Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Cleveland, etc., Co., 178 U. S. 280; Peirce v. Somerset Ry. Co., 171 U. S. 641, 648.

The decision of the state court holds that plaintiff in error had a remedy under the laws of the State and failed to invoke the same. Smith v. Shank, 61 N. E. Rep. 932.

In Indiana a remedy by injunction exists to prevent any action by interested trustees. Board v. Justice, 133 Indiana, 95.

A petition for injunction before action is an adequate and direct remedy. A defence of the character here made after judgment or assessment is a collateral attack. Jackson v. Smith, 120 Indiana, 521; Johnson v. State, 116 Indiana, 375; Kiphart v. R. R. Co., 7 Ind. App. 124; Jackson v. State, 104 Indiana, 516.

The state court construes such a judgment to be voidable only. Board v. Justice, supra.

No Federal question is involved in the construction by the state court of a state judgment. Newport Co. v. Newport, 151 U.S. 527.

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