10. Due process—Omission in charge to jury of statement of presumption of
innocence.
When the highest court of the State has decided that in a criminal trial
it is sufficient to charge the jury correctly in reference to reasonable
doubt and that an omission to refer to any presumption of innocence
does not invalidate the proceedings, such an omission cannot be re-
garded by this court as a denial of due process of law. Howard v.
Fleming; Howard v. North Carolina, 126.

11. Equal protection-Infringement of right by State in exemption law.
The rights of an individual under the Fourteenth Amendment turn on the
power of the State.
A State does not infringe his rights under that
amendment by exempting a corporation from a tax either wholly or in
part, whether such exemption results from the plain language of a
statute or from the conduct of a state official under it. Missouri v.
Dockery, 165.

12. State-Power to limit jurisdiction of state courts.
Consistently with Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
a State may deny jurisdiction to the courts of the State over suits by
a corporation of another State against a corporation of another State
on a foreign judgment. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis
Co., 373.

13. State-Taxation of evidence of credits in hands of agent.
There is no inhibition in the Federal Constitution against the right of a
State to tax property in the shape of credits where the same are evi-
denced by notes or obligations held within the State, in the hands of
an agent of the owner for the purpose of collection or renewal, with
a view to new loans and carrying on such transactions as a perma-
nent business. A foreign corporation, whose business in Louisiana
was in the hands of an agent, furnished to customers sum of money
and took from them collateral security; for reasons satisfactory to
the parties, instead of taking the ordinary evidence of indebtedness,
the customers drew checks, never intended to be paid in the ordinary
way, but intended by the parties to be held as evidence of the amount
of money actually loaned; these loans could be satisfied by partial
payments from time to time, interest being charged upon the out-
standing amounts, and if not paid at maturity the collateral was sub-
ject to sale; when paid, the money might be again loaned by the
agent to other parties, or remitted to the home office, and the business
was large and continuing in its character. Held, that as such checks
were given for the purpose of evidencing interest bearing debts, they
were the evidence of credit for money loaned, localized in Louisiana,
protected by its laws, and properly taxable there under the provisions
of the tax law of 1898 of Louisiana, which has already been sustained
as constitutional by this court. (New Orleans v. Stempel, 165 U. S.
309.) Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National, 388.

See RES JUDICATA.

CONTRACTS.

1. Breach by government of contract for supplies.
The United States bought hay for a camp, providing that the quantity
bought be decreased at its option, not exceeding twenty per cent, and
if the troops should be wholly or in part withdrawn the contract
should become inoperative to the extent of such reduction, and that
deliveries were to begin within five days and proceed at daily rates of
at least one sixtieth of the amount, or in such quantities and in such
times afterward as might be designated by the quartermaster. The
troops were withdrawn, orders were delayed beyond sixty days and a
little less than the whole amount was ordered. The claimant pro-
tested and claimed damages but accepted payment for the whole with-
out reserving any rights at the time. Held that there was no breach
of contract by the United States even if it was still open to the claim-
ants to demand damages in case of a breach, and if the setting up of
the invalidity of the contract by the United States in answer to the
demand would have opened the way to a quantum valebat. St. Louis
Hay & Grain Co. v. United States, 159.

2. Executed-Recovery on a quantum valebat precluded.

When a void but not illegal contract of sale has been performed on both
sides, the vendor cannot recover on à quantum valebat less the amount
already paid. Ib.

Notice-False impressment in foreign country-Sale of article in United
States.

Prior to the amendment of March 3, 1897, there was no provision in the
copyright laws forbidding the importation into, or the sale after its
importation within, the United States of an article falsely stamped
with the copyright notice in a foreign country and the proviso in the
amending act expressly saved the right to sell such an article if it
had been imported prior thereto. McLoughlin v. Raphaet Tuck Co.,
267.

See STATUTES, A, 1.

CORPORATIONS.

Foreign-Power of State as to.

A corporation created by one State can transact business in another State
only with the consent of the latter, which may accompany its consent
with such conditions as it thinks proper to impose, provided they are

not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, or
inconsistent either with those rules of public law which secure the
jurisdiction and authority of each State from encroachment by all
others, or those principles of natural justice which forbid condemna-
tion without opportunity for defense. Cable v. Life Insurance Co.,
288.

Question for jury-Care in crossing railroad tracks.

Where it is an issue in the case whether a man was killed at a crossing
by a regular train which he should know was approaching at about
that hour, or by a runaway car of which he had no knowledge, and
there is evidence on such issue from which reasonable men might
draw different conclusions, it is not error to leave it to the jury to
determine whether or not it was a want of ordinary or reasonable care
and prudence for deceased to attempt to cross the track at the time
and under the circumstances, the jury being charged that their ver-
dict should be for the defendant if they found that he had been killed
by the regular train. Baltimore & Potomac R. R. Co. v. Landrigan,
461.

See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

DAMAGES.

Condemnation of land-Prospective damages.

Where the government condemns part of a parcel of land the damage to
the remainder of that parcel arising from the probable use which the
government will make of the part taken is a proper subject of award,
but when the entire parcel is taken the owner cannot recover for
prospective damages, owing to such probable use, to separate and ad-
joining parcels owned by him. Sharp v. United States, 341.
See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 2.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See NEGLIGENCE, 2 (Mosheuvel v. District of Columbia, 247);
PRESUMPTION, 1 (Baltimore & Potomac R. R. Co. v. Lan-
drigan, 461);

RAILROADS, 2.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

EJECTMENT.

Alienable title-Power of municipality to convey land acquired under
patent.

An act of Congress entitled "An act to enable the City of Denver to pur-
chase certain lands for a cemetery” authorized the mayor to enter
the lands at a minimum price" to be held and used for a burial place
for said city and vicinity." A patent was issued conveying the land
to the "mayor in trust for said city and to his successors " which
was confirmed by a later act. The Catholic Bishop of Denver peti-
tioned the common council for a conveyance of a part of the land to
him and his successors on the ground that it had been bought by him
and used as a burial place. The petition was granted and the mayor
made a deed in the name of the city, the grantee being described as
Bishop of Colorado, habendum to him and his heirs. Subsequently
the bishop conveyed a part of the land so conveyed to him which had
not been used for burial purposes to defendant's predecessor in title.
A later mayor brought ejectment for this part. Held that the title
was not in the plaintiff. Semble that the title was in the city, that
it had power to convey the land and that the deed executed was
sufficient so far as the question was open. Wright v. Morgan, 55.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

See DAMAGES;

EVIDENCE, 2, 3;

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 1.

EQUITY.

He who seeks equity must do equity-National Banks and state taxation.
Where the amount of a State tax which shareholders of a National Bank

should pay if all the deductions they claimed were allowed, is ascer-
tainable, neither they, nor the bank itself on their behalf, can main-
tain an action in equity to restrain the collection of the entire tax.
They should, under the rule that he who seeks the interposition of a
court in equity, must himself do equity, first offer to pay that part of
the tax which under their contention is not illegal. People's National
Bank v. Marye, 272.

ESTOPPEL.

See RES JUdicata.

EVIDENCE.

1. Burden of proof of lawful taking of logs in an action by United States
for conversion-Cannot be shifted.

Where, in an action by the United States against a railroad corporation
for the conversion of logs cut from government lands, the defendant
admits the taking but justifies its action under a statute permitting it
to take timber for construction and repair of its railway, the burden of
proving that the logs were taken and used in accordance with the stat-
ute is upon the defendant. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 162
U. S. 366. This burden cannot be shifted to the plaintiff because the
timber was cut by an agent of the defendant. The presumption at-
taching to public officers that they act within the scope of their au-
thority does not apply to agents of private persons sued for conver-
sion. United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 84.

2. Competency-Condemnation proceedings-Offers received.

On condemnation proceedings it was not error, under the circumstances
of this case, to exclude evidence offered by the owner as to offers re-
ceived by him to purchase or lease the property. Evidence as to offers
for real estate is entirely different from evidence as to prices offered
and accepted or rejected for articles which are constantly dealt in and
have a known and ready sale in the markets and exchanges. Sharp
v. United States, 341.

3. Competency-Condemnation poceedings on new trial de novo.
Where on condemnation proceedings, under the practice in New Jersey,
after a trial in the District Court there is a new trial in the Circuit
Court with a jury, the trial is de novo and the only testimony to be
considered is that received on the second trial supplemented by the
personal view of the premises by the jury. Ib.

See MARITIME LAW, 3.

FEDERAL QUESTION.

1. Essentials for bringing Federal question before Supreme Court.'
When a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or con-
troversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, upon the determination of which the result de-
pends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution or laws; and it
must appear on the record, by a statement in legal and logical form,
such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to a right
which depends on the construction of the Constitution or some law
or treaty of the United States, before jurisdiction can be maintained
on this ground. Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 184.

2. State not Federal—Amount of benefits—Decision of assessment board.
The amount of benefits resulting from an improvement, and assessed under