12. 7th March.-Dobbie v. Halbert (Dumfries). An action of interdict as to possession of a pew in a parish church. The Sheriff-Substitute allowed the defender to sist the party for whom he acted. The Sheriff granted the interdict. The Court dismissed an advocation.

13. 29th January.-M'Culloch v. Gordon (Wigton). An action to interdict commissioners from laying pipes to carry water to a town. The Sheriff-Substitute granted interim interdict; and made a remit to regulate the size of the pipes. The Sheriff recalled and dismissed the action. The Court (Second Division) affirmed the Sheriff's judgment.

14. 20th February.-Beattie v. Mitchell (Falkirk). A question of settlement by residence under the Poor Law Act. The Sheriff-Substitute found for the settlement. The Sheriff adhered. The Lord Ordinary (Neaves) affirmed; but the Second Division unanimously reversed-Lord Neaves doubting.

15. 13th March.-Carson & Co. v. Miller (Glasgow).

An application for interdict, involving a question of right-of-way. The Sheriff-Substitute, after proof, dismissed the action. The Sheriff reversed, and granted the interdict. On an advocation, the Court (Second Division) unanimously returned to the Interlocutor of the Substitute.

16. 19th March.-Cooper v. Clydesdale Shipping Company (Glasgow).

An action of damages for breach of contract in supplying provisions to an emigrant vessel. The Sheriff-Substitute assoilzied. The Sheriff altered and decerned. The Court unanimously altered and assoilzied.

17. 30th March. Ferguson & Co. v. Scottish Central Railway Company (Glasgow).

An action for delivery of goods. The Substitute dismissed the action as not brought against the contracting company. The Sheriff altered, and allowed a proof. The Court (First Division) affirmed the

Sheriff's Interlocutor.

18. 31st March.-Gray & Co. v. Sommerville (Glasgow).

An action of damages for injury sustained in a coal mine. The Sheriff-Substitute assoilzied. The Sheriff reversed, and decerned for damages. The Court (First Division) affirmed the Sheriff's decision.

19. 13th May.--Ross v. Fraser (Sutherland). In a case of filiation of a bastard, the Sheriff-Substitute assoilzied. The Sheriff adhered. The Lord Ordinary (Ormidale) recalled and decerned, and the Court (Second Division) unanimously adhered.

20. 28th May.-Morrison v. Robertson (Peterhead). An action for an account. The Sheriff-Substitute found the claim prescribed. The Sheriff altered, and held the constitution admitted, and that resting-owing had only to be proved. On the defender's deposition the Substitute found the claim proved. The Sheriff reversed and decerned. The Court (Second Division) altered and assoilzied.

21. 16th June. Airth v. Menmuir (Kincardine). An application for interdict, by a tenant against his landlord, from planting trees. The Sheriff-Substitute granted interdict. The Sheriff recalled. The Court (First Division) adhered to Sheriff's judgment.

22. 8th July.-Rose v. Kennedy (Aberdeen). Sums deposited in name of a third party were claimed, after the death of the depositor, by his nextof-kin and the person in whose name the receipts were taken. The Sheriff-Substitute held the donation proved. The Sheriff reversed; but the Court (First Division) recalled the latter decision, and returned to that of the Substitute-Lord Deas dissenting.

ABSTRACT.

1. Where decision of the Sheriff-Substitute was adhered to by Sheriff, and both affirmed by the Court, Nos. 5, 6-Two.

2. Where decision of Substitute was adhered to by the Sheriff, and both reversed by the Court, No. 19-One.

3. Where decision of the Substitute was reversed by the Sheriff, and the Sheriff's judgment affirmed by the Court-Nos. 12, 13, 17, 18, 21—Five.

4. Where decision of the Substitute was recalled by Sheriff, and returned to by the Court-Nos. 3, 10, 11, 15, 16, 20, 22—Seven.

5. Where decision of the Substitute was affirmed by Sheriff and by Lord Ordinary, but reversed by the Court, No. 14—One.

6. Where decision of Substitute was affirmed by Lord Ordinary, but reversed by the Court, No. 1One.

7. Where decision of Substitute was reversed by Sheriff, in its turn set up by Lord Ordinary, bu reversed by the Court, No. 2-One.

8. Where decision of Substitute (in bankruptcy] was reversed by the Lord Ordinary and the Court No. 4-One.

9. Decision of Sheriff-Substitute (in bankruptcy sustained on other grounds, No. 8—One.

10. Decision of Sheriff-Substitute (in bankruptcy affirmed, No. 9-One.

11. Decision of Substitute (sustaining his jurisdic tion under special statute) recalled by Sheriff, bu found competent by Lord Ordinary and Court, N 7-One.

12. Lord Ordinaries' judgments affirmed by Cour Nos. 4, 10, 19—Three.

13. Lord Ordinaries' judgments reversed by Cour Nos. 1, 2, 7, 14-Four.

14. Court unanimous, Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21-Fourteen.

15. Judge dissenting, Nos. 1, 11, 22—Three. 16. Judge doubting, Nos. 5, 14-Two. 17. Total number of judgments of Sheriff Cour reviewed during the year-Twenty-two.

CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY.
[COMMUNICATED.]

WE purpose noticing a few cases under this catego which were in the calendar, and tried at the recent Circ Court of Justiciary at Perth. Margaret Kinninmont a young woman from Auchtertool, Fifeshire, was charg her father's house at Auchtertool, “bring forth a m with the statutory offence, in so far as she did, with child, and did conceal her being with child during whole period of her pregnancy, and did not call for a make use of help or assistance in the birth; and the s

child was (eight days afterwards) found dead under the tick of a bed in a bed-closet in the said house." The woman, who had shortly after her apprehension been Eberated on bail, pled not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution was of the ordinary kind, showing the woman's apparent pregnancy at one period, her suddenly altered appearance thereafter, and the finding of the child's body on a search by the police. The medical evidence showed that the child was healthy and full-grown, and had arrived at the full period of gestation. The umbilical cord had not been tied, and was torn. In the opinion of the doctors, the child had never respired. In her judical declaration, which was produced in evidence, the woman admitted the birth, and said: "I cannot say if the child was born alive, but there was not the smallest Egn of life about it. When I was able to look at it, I wrapped it up and placed it underneath the bed on the for. I was scarcely able to do anything at the time. When I had recovered a little, I took up the body and put it under the tick in the same room. There was no person present with me at the birth, and I did not call for assistance, as I had no time to do so, from labour having come upon me suddenly and prematurely. I had been in doubts whether I was in the family way or not; and at anyrate I did not expect to be confined for a month later. The birth took place early in the morning before daylight. My father and my mother and a young girl were the only persons in the house at the time, and they were not in the same room with me. I did not tell Ly one of my pregnancy; for, as before declared to, I doubtful whether I was in that state or not, from Laving been different from other women in that state." It was the case for the prosecution. In defence, an old woman, an aunt of the accused, was examined, and gave evidence to the effect that on one occasion she spoke to her niece, and hinted the suspicion of her pregnancy, and that her niece thereupon admitted she was pregnant. In cross-examination she said that she afterwards saw her nece confined to bed, between the date of her delivery and her apprehension; but it never occurred to her that the illness had any connection with the former revelation. She further deponed that she told no one what her niece hal revealed to her. This was the evidence for the defence evidence certainly somewhat inconsistent with the circumstances of the case, and directly contradictory of the woman's declaration, in which she distinctly stated that she did not reveal her pregnancy, because she had dubts whether she was in that condition. The proseer, without any reference to her declaration, left the e in the hands of the jury, with the remark that, if they believed the evidence of the old woman, there was ase against the accused. Her counsel humorously the jury that the declaration was an instrument of arture, which had come in place of the thumb-screws, for the purpose of extorting a confession from the Prisoner; and, referring to that part of it in which she ed she had not revealed her pregnancy, he dismissed by simply telling them that she did not understand the meaning of the word pregnancy-a deplorable state of rance certainly for a woman of 29 years of age. Judge left the case in the hands of the jury, as the Afrocate-Depute had done, without any reference to the daration; and the jury, apparently satisfied that that rament was not to be relied on, returned a verdict of guilty, which was hailed, as all such verdicts are, applause from the sympathetic occupants of the Art gallery.

Another case of the same nature was that of Jane Watson or M'Dougall, a widow, aged 36, from Dundee. a case was not brought to trial, because of two witDres being in attendance at the Circuit, to depone that e woman had revealed her state to them; and on this ng made known to the Public Prosecutor, an order was granted for her liberation. She had been in prison

since the month of October. The indictment narrated that the birth had taken place between the 31st August and 12th October, the particular day being unknownthat the sex of the child was unknown, because of its remains being found in a state of decomposition in an attic of the woman's house. We have made ourselves acquainted with the facts of this case, which are as follows:-The woman had five children, and, as already stated, was a widow. Her appearance, both before and after delivery, had been observed by her neighbours, none of whom spoke to her on the subject, and to none of whom she made any communication. The attic of her house was above the house of a neighbour, who, for several days before the discovery of the body, was offended by a strong smell proceeding from the attic. She was surprised one day to find a number of maggots on her floor, which she found had dropped from the attic. Along with others of the neighbours, she proceeded to the attic, and found the remains of the child in a bag on the floor. The remains were taken possession of by the police, and handed over to two medical gentlemen for examination. In their report they said:-"The body was in a very advanced state of decomposition; so that neither the sex of the child could be discovered, nor any of the internal organs examined, these being almost consumed by maggots. Judging, however, from the size of the child and the ossification of the bones, we are of opinion that the child had arrived at or near the full period of utero gestation; and that it must have been dead four or five weeks; and whether born alive or not we have no means of determining." The woman was apprehended, and denied having had a child, or of knowing anything of the body in the attic; but afterwards, in her declaration before the Sheriff, she admitted the birth, and said: "The child was dead born, and I took up the dead body to the garret and left it there. The child was come to maturity, but I never told any person I was with child. I could not tell whether the child was male or female."

A third case was a Perthshire one, which also was not brought to trial. On the statement of counsel that the woman could, if allowed time, produce the father of the child, who could give evidence that she had revealed her pregnancy to him, the case was not called. The woman had been previously liberated on bail. We cannot in the meantime, make any further reference to this case.

The importance of the subject, and the interest we feel in it, tempts us to notice at some length the law as to concealment of pregnancy. In 1690, on account of the frequency of the crime of child murder, and the difficulty of obtaining legal proof of the crime, an Act was passed, by which juries were empowered and bound to convict on certain legal presumptions, without direct evidence of murder. The Act, which was entitled "Act anent Murthering of Children," was as follows:

Majesties [William and Mary], considering the frequent "Our Sovreign Lord and Lady the King and Queen's murthers that hath or may be committed upon innocent infants, whose mothers do conceal their being with child, and do not call for necessary assistance in the birth, whereby the newborn child may be easily stifled, or, being left exposed in the condition in which it comes into the world, it must quickly perish: For preventing whereof, their Majesties, with advice and consent of the Estates of Parliament, do statute, enact, and declare, that if any woman shall conceal her being with child during the and assistance in the birth, the child being found dead whole space, and shall not call for and make use of help or amissing, the mother shall be holden and reputed the murtherer of her own child;"

and the Act concluded by declaring that the woman shall be convicted of the murder, "though there be no appearance of wound or bruise upon the body of the child."

Under this Act there were many convictions and executions, and under it the memorable trial of the unfortunate Effie Deans took place. The Act remained on the Statute-Book till 1809, when the present Act was passed, which proceeded on the preamble that the punishment of death was "too rigorous for such an offence," and substituted imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. Though the pregnancy has been concealed, and no assistance called for in the birth, there is no offence, unless the child be found dead or be amissing; if no assistance is called for, and the child be found dead or be amissing, there is no offence unless there has also been concealment of pregnancy during the whole period; the statute requires the concurrence of the three requisites-concealment, failure to call for help, and the death or missing of the child. A defence on the statute is invariably based on the concealment clause-a defence on the two latter, never.

Proof of disclosure of pregnancy will liberate from the statute, though the woman has made no preparation for the birth; and obviously, therefore, the disclosures could not have been made with the intention of providing for the birth of the child; or, if such intention then existed, it was afterwards abandoned. The failure to provide for the birth, together with the failure to call for help, and the child being dead or amissing, raises a presumption against the mother which the disclosure of pregnancy cannot repel; and we humbly think that the element of concealment might, without operating harshly on frail mothers, be struck out of the statute. We think we shall be borne out in this, by the cases we have above noticed, and the general practice under the Act. It is held sufficient to free the woman from the pains of imprisonment under the Act-which, in practice, average from three to twelve months-that she has disclosed her pregnancy to one witness, who may be her nearest relation, or the reputed father of the child, who, of course, was previously aware of her unchastity, and who may have acted in complicity with her in the statutory offence. The disclosure to the single witness,-who may not always have such a strict regard for truth as honest Jeanie Deans,-need not even be positive; a mere laugh or gesture is sufficient, if the witness depone that he thereby understood her to make known her condition; and this though she has studiously concealed her state from those with whom she was in daily communication, and who could have rendered her assistance, and though she has persistently denied the fact to all else. Her acquittal will be none the less certain that, in her judicial declaration, she made no pretensions of disclosure; but deliberately stated, after being cautioned and warned of her privilege to decline answering questions, that she made no revelation of her pregnancy. No doubt, in such conflicting cases, it is left for the jury to say whether they believe the woman or the witness; and, if the jury arrive at a true verdict in such cases, it is an extraordinary fact that unfortunate mothers should almost uniformly state deliberate untruths to their own disadvantage -that they should give a detailed statement, truthful in every respect but on the essential point of concealment or disclosure—that they should persist in declaring they concealed their pregnancy, when they actually revealed their condition. We might well be spared many undignified judicial exhibitions, if the grave mistakes made in such declarations were rectified before the cases reached our Criminal Courts. But perhaps it would be the better course to dispense with such declarations altogether, seeing that they are now valueless as adminicles of evidence.

The bodies of children thus clandestinely brought into

the world, and as clandestinely disposed of, are frequentl found about the bed of the woman, or in a chest or box or otherwise concealed about the house; where more tim has elapsed, the bodies are found in privys, dunghills, o superficially buried. In many cases the bodies are neve found. It is no offence to deny the rites of burial to su bodies. But the graver aspect of such cases remain It is a painful fact, that the bodies which are found a rarely free from marks of violence; ligatures are fr quently found round the neck; the skull is found fra tured; the throat cut; sometimes more horrible mutil tions are found; and not unfrequently the body is cut pieces. What is the reasonable and moral presumption such cases? Certainly not that the children died natural And what presumption obtains when the body is not d covered? This may be answered by the fact that, in a c tried at our last Autumn Circuit, the woman in her ded ration stated that she burned the body of her child in kitchen fire (and we are afraid that she spoke the trut that others have admitted throwing the bodies into rive and that, in one case, there was good reason to believe body had been thrown to, and devoured by pigs. Wh as we have stated, under the ancient law, a presumption murder was held to be established though there was appearance, of wound or bruise upon the child," no s presumption-and the presumption is nothing less t deliberate murder, no presumption whatever-is ra against the mother in the most atrocious case of mutilat A mother may destroy the body of her child, and ens her escape from punishment by having previously divul her pregnancy to the father, who may not have 1 averse to the commission of the unnatural deed. W not overlook the fact that, apart from the statute, mother may be put upon trial for child murder; m of them are so charged, and justly so, along with statutory offence: but such charges are rarely insisted and when insisted in, an acquittal almost invari follows. There is no lack of reasonable and moral that the child has been murdered; but the proof that law requires is next to impossible, which is, proof the child was fully born alive, and had an indepen and separate existence from its mother; and that injuries were inflicted on the child when living, and on a mere dead body. The law does not punish a m for killing her child before it is entirely separate her body; still less does it punish her for mutilating dead body, if such ever takes place. Medical sci as we may on a future occasion attempt to show, ca with any pretensions to certainty, furnish the nece legal evidence from an examination of the body o child; and the punishment for concealment of preg is substantially the punishment for child murder. mother has effectually disposed of the body, the que of child murder is not even raised.

Frequent as such trials are, it is matter of surpris regret that no attempt is made to remedy the deplo state of our law-a law which possesses no terro guilty mothers, who, to conceal their shame, ruth sacrifice their illegitimate offspring, and which child murder-the most frequent of all murders-i front rank of our class of privileged crimes. Th officers at the head of our criminal administration render valuable service by bestirring themselves procuring such a measure of law as would provide certainty of conviction and adequate punishment fo most frightful crimes which now disgrace our Criminal reform is of slow growth, and we do not ourselves with a speedy reformation; but we do some day to see the present law effaced from the Sta Book, and a law founded in reason substituted.