about 500 yards from the Pier, were very near each otherthe Lochgoil, however, being ahead, and the bows of the Mail being about abreast of the stern of the Lochgoil. The two vessels continued to advance and make for the quay, and the Mail rapidly gained on the Lochgoil. The Lochgoil then dowed, but after having slowed for a short time, put on steam again, and went on at full speed till she came to about 120 yards from the quay, when the Mail, which was on the starboard or outside of her, moved for the quay in a line nearly across the Lochgoil's bows, which brought on the collision that took place from forty to fifty yards from the quay. On the other hand, the witnesses for the defenders say that there was not half a minute between the time when the Lochgoil began to slow and the collision, during which not more than from 85 to 100 yards could have been gone over. Be this as may, the material thing appears to be that the collision was ridently brought on by the master or pilot of the Mail when 10 yards or thereby from the pier, starboarding his helm tead of porting it, which brought the Mail under the bows the Lochgoil, and caused the collision. When she made this movement, the Mail, according to the pursuers' witnesses, going at full speed. The master of the Mail admits in evidence that he could have easily, by porting his helm keeping on the steam, have cleared the pier, and avoided my collision either with it or the Lochgoil, but by doing be says he would have lost two or three minutes. Lochgoil, however, could not have avoided the collision moving to the left when the Mail came up upon her, bee the shore lay in that direction, and she would either are gone aground, or borne down directly on the pier, when would either have been sunk or seriously damaged. Both the swifter vessel, therefore, and being on the right, and ing plenty of sea room, the Mail had the advantage of the guil, and had the ready means of avoiding any collision, the Lochgoil, being the slower sailing vessel, and ing between the Mail and the shore, was the vessel which at a disadvantage, and had not the same means as her ent of avoiding the collision. The Clyde Regulations in the slower vessel to allow the swifter one to pass, but the latter is to pass at a distance of 50 yards, but in this face the Mail attempted to pass so close that a collision brought on. It was evidently a race, latterly, between two boats, who was to get first to the pier, and the colwas brought on by the Mail, which was outside, trying race to cut in under its competitor's bows, and thereby in first. The only fault that can be ascribed to the Lochhaving first slowed, probably at the distance of between and 300 yards from the quay, and then put on steam and afterwards slowed immediately before the collision. although that was an important step it never could have ught on a collision; if the Mail, which was outside, had after gaining upon the Lochgoil, recklessly run across bows, and if there was a fault on the part of the Lochgoil, it pears to be adequately atoned for by the Interlocutor review, which discerns for a portion only of the total of the damage done to the Lochgoil, agreeably to the of sea insurance instead of the full amount, which, in of damage caused by reckless steering, the English horities adopt. the SHERIFF COURT, GLASGOW. JAMES CAIRNS, Appellant, v. ROBERT M'COWAN, Cairns & Son's Trustee, Respondent. Bankrupt-Appeal-Conjunct and Confident.—A father and son, formerly in partnership, entered into a subminion, in which the son-in-law of the one and the brother-in-law of the other, was an arbiter, in order to fad out and fix the state of accounts between them as partners. An examination of the company's books was made, and a balance was found due by the son to the father. A document was then written out and signed by the arbiters and the father and son, finding the son a debtor to the father, for which the son granted bills. Before the bills all became due, the son and the company of which he was then the sole partner, became bankrupt. The father lodged a claim on the sequestrated estate, The producing the decree-arbitral as his voucher. trustee called on the claimant to produce farther evidence. This he failed to do, and the trustee rejected the claim. The claimant appealed, and after mutual notes of objection, and answers and debate thereon, the SheriffSubstitute affirmed the trustee's judgment, but allowed a further proof to both parties. THIS was an appeal against a deliverance of the Trustee on the sequestrated estate of James Cairns & Son, clothiers, London Street, rejecting a claim for £4143 Os 8d by James Cairns, father of John Cairns, the sole partner of the bankrupt firm. The trustee's deliverance and note were as follows: .-Amount of Excerpt from State of Interests, No. claim, conform to affidavit, bills, and relative account, and decree arbitral, £4143 Os 8d. The trustee, for the reasons inter alia contained in the following note, calls upon the claimant to adduce further evidence in support of his claim within fourteen days from this date; under certification that unless this order is obtempered to the satisfaction of the trustee, he will be under the necessity of refusing the claim. NOTE. This claim is for a sum of £4143 0s 8d, being the amount of certain bills granted by the firm of James Cairns & Son, of which the bankrupt was the sole partner, to the claimant, James Cairns, the bankrupt's father, of which bills a list is produced. These bills are alleged to have been granted in implement of a decree arbitral, of date 9th February, 1861, produced with the claim. The parties to these bills, which are founded on as the vouchers, stand in the relation of father and son, and are conjunct and confident with each other. Evidence must therefore be laid before the trustee in order to support the claim, more especially as the bankrupt appears to have been insolvent when he granted them. In short, the trustee must be satisfied that these bills are granted for value. It is presumed that the decree arbitral is founded on to show that the bills were granted for onerous consideration, but the trustee cannot recognise that document as precluding further investigation, as from the deposition of one of the arbiters it appears that they just adopted the balances, accounts, lists, and stock-sheet exhibited to them by the parties; and a decree arbitral pronounced under such circumstances, considering the conjunct and confident relationship of the parties, cannot be held as conclusive evidence of the claim in a question with creditors, however binding it ought to be upon the parties inter se. Keeping this in view, there appears to be no evidence The statement of assets There are no produced in addition to the bills and decree arbitral which can support the claim. and liabilities contained in the decree arbitral appears nowhere from the books of the concern. balance sheets produced, although these appear to have The claimant having deponed, been regularly made. under examination as a witness, that he destroyed them, while the bankrupt deponed, that the claimant searched for them, but could not find them. The books contain no capital accounts showing the interest of the partners in the capital of the business. There is no list of the book debts, nor of those estimated as bad, nor any evidence to prove that the estimate of bad debts was correct, nor any list of the debts actually collected by the claimant after the dissolution proving the accuracy of the valuation, and in reference to one bad debt which is particularised, being that under name Miller and Tenant, amounting to £8196 10s 10d, this is plainly overstated by £455 1s 1d, as shown by an account called Abstract of Australian account, engrossed in folio 357 of Ledger No. 3 of the firm. Besides, this account appears overstated by the sum of £6020, being the amount of nine bills which are evidently erroneously entered into the debt of that account. No evidence being adduced by these bills being dishonoured, or that they were previously credited in the account or retired by the claimant, or the firm of James Cairns & Son, the claimant is required to state from what source the funds were received which he alleges were applied in payment of these bills. In regard to the stock, which is stated to amount on value to £4264 4s 5d, there is no stock list produced, that referred to only specifying stock to the value of £3032 15s 8d. The liabilities of the firm, as specified in the decree arbitral are equally unintelligible, no list of the debts due to various parties, amounting to £3330 8s 1d is given, nor any evidence of their having been paid. No evidence is adduced of the correctness of the sum of £11,370 10s 6d said to be due to the claimant, nor of the sum of £313 12s 9d, said to be due to the bankrupt. vouchers as are necessary to support his claim, both a common law and under the bankrupt statutes. 4. Th productions made by the appellant instruct an obligatio on the bankrupt to grant the bills founded on, in fulfi ment of an antecedent obligation, and thereby exclud these documents from the operation of the statu founded on by the respondent, or subjecting them challenge at common law. The respondent pleaded-1. The appellant, in ter of section 49 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 183 was bound to have produced, along with his oath, t vouchers necessary to prove the debt referred to in t oath, and having failed so to do, even upon requisiti by the respondent, in terms of section 126 of the s statute, his claim was rejected. 2. In respect that facie of the affidavit, the appellant's claims in resp of a verbal agreement in modification or extinction an obligation constituted by writing, the proof said verbal agreement must be restricted to the oath writ of the respondent as vested in the estate of the s John Cairns, and James Cairns & Son. 3. At comm law the fact of the bills founded on by the appell having been granted in insolvency between conjunct confident persons, and of their being dependent for t onerosity ex facie of the appellant's productions claim on an accounting between the drawer and accep and the circumstances generally of the alleged accepta exclude them from the benefit of the presumption of o osity, and lay upon the appellant the burden of prov that he gave value for them. 4. The appellant b conjunct and confident with the bankrupt, is obliged terms of the Act 1621, cap. 18, to prove that he true, just, and necessary cause for the alienations obligations contained in the bills and documents ter deed of submission, and decree arbitral upon whic founds. 5. The documents termed deed of submis and decree arbitral are, from their defects in form The trustee does not find that the sum claimed is not due, but he cannot find evidence to prove it, and he has called for further evidence in support of it, before pronouncing his final deliverance, as the only course open to him to enable him to deal fairly with the claimant, and the estate whose funds he is bound equitably to admi-matter, entitled to none of the privileges of regular de nister. The above remarks are meant to guide the claimant to the difficulties which the trustee experiences, and he will delay disposing of the claim further until the order now pronounced is obtempered. The appellant failed to lead proof on the points referred to in the deliverance and note, and the trustee thereafter rejected the claim by the following deliver ance: or of a submission and decree arbitral, and they had in law the effect of conferring upon the appellan absolute power of selecting £2000 worth of stock Esto, that the pretended deed of submission and d arbitral were proper and formal deeds, they are probatio probato of the appellant's claims, at least question with the respondent as representing the creditors of the estate, but "the documents, letters, Excerpt from state of interests, No. 83. Amount of books" upon which the decree arbitral bears to have claim, £4143 Os 8d. The trustee rejects this claim in respect the claimant has failed to obtemper the deliverance of 12th April last, and in respect generally of the claim being unfounded and unvouched. Had the claim been admitted, the dividend thereon would have amounted to £397 0s 9d or thereby. In his appeal, the appellant generally denied the averments in the trustee's note, and pleaded-1. The vouchers founded on by the appellant are probatio probato of the appellant's claim. 2. In the whole circumstances the deliverance of the trustee should be recalled, the affidavit and claim of the appellant sustained, and decree pronounced finding the claimant entitled to the dividend applicable to his claim. 8. The appellant has produced such accounts and ceeded must be produced to entitle it to any fait judgment. 7. Esto, that the pretended deed of sub sion and decree arbitral were proper and formald they afford no foundation for the appellant's claim, u supported by production of a full account of the s lant's intromissions under them. 8. The said de submission and decree arbitral and stock-sheet are in law vouchers sufficient to prove the debt referr in the appellant's claim. 9. In respect of the des tion by the appellant of the balance-sheets referre the respondent is entitled to the presumption of law, they vouched a state of accounts between the said Cairns and the appellant, which could not give ri the present claim. 10. The alienations and obliga contained in the pretended deed of submission and cree arbitral, and in the bills founded on in the a lant's claim should be set aside in the present proceedings under the Act 1621, cap. 18, as having been granted without true, just and necessary cause, and without a just price really paid, and at common law as in fraud of jast creditors. the bankrupt, who then produced the ex post facto state, No. 13, by which it was attempted to be shown that, although his firm was insolvent at the dates in question, he was not so individually. It is plain, however, notwithstanding the ingenious efforts which had been made to bring out a favourable balance, that such balance is altogether illusory, being made up of an imaginary reversion of £1213 on foreign shipments, A proof was thereafter allowed, and having been led, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following judg-vances which had been made upon them, and of an ideal sum of which, instead of yielding a reversion, did not realise the ad Dent: £500 for goodwill of business, which was never either given or obtained. The real question remaining, therefore, is whether, Having heard parties' procurators and resumed consideration seeing that the bankrupt was in insolvent circumstances ef the proof and whole process: Finds it proved that on 22d when he entered into the submission and became a party to January, 1861, being the date of the deed of submission and the decree arbitral, the appellant is entitled to rest on these contract contained in No. 4/3, as also on the 9th February, deeds, and on the relative acceptances, as affording indisput 19:1, being the date of the decree arbitral and contract like-able evidence of the debt he claims, and barring all challenge wise in No. 4/3, as also at the date of the acceptances said to have been granted in implement of the said decree arbitral, bankrupt John Cairns and his firm of James Cairns & Na were insolvent: Finds that the appellant is the brankrupt's father, and was the senior partner of the firm of James Cairns & Son prior to the 5th January, 1861, or thereby, at which date it is said to have been dissolved; but the bankrupt red on business in the name of the firm till 29th November thereafter, when he was sequestrated: Finds that the firm was Event at the time the appellant states he left it, and on the asion of his doing so the deeds No. 4/3 were entered into tween him and the bankrupt: Finds that by the first of the deeds they agreed on certain terms therein set forth to to the two arbiters therein named the ascertainment of balance due to the appellant by the bankrupt, "arising A co-partnership in the firm of James Cairns & Son:" is that one of the arbiters was the son-in-law of the apt and brother-in-law of the bankrupt: Finds that by the * of said deeds, executed shortly after the first, it is set that there was a balance against the firm of £7346 2s And that, as between the partners themselves, there was a 44540 4s 9d owing by the bankrupt to the appellant: that the said deed contains, in addition, various findings pointments extra fines submissi, and resembles in many Tramore a mutual contract than a decree arbitral, with view it is signed both by the arbiters and by the appel: bankrupt, as parties thereto: Finds that the accepgranted to the appellant by the bankrupt, in conformity the provisions of the said deed, were inter conjunctos, the per being at their date insolvent: Finds that, in the whole nstances, the respondent, as representing the general y of creditors on the bankrupt's sequestrated estate, was ined in refusing to hold the said productions as sufficient dence of the debt for which the appellant claims, and in on him to adduce further evidence in support of said Finds that, although in respect of the appellant's failThe to comply with said call, the respondent afterwards rejected claim in toto, he nevertheless states in his revised minute, he repeated the statement at the debate, that he is ing that an opportunity should still be afforded the appelof supporting and instructing his claim, and it is at all tts competent to the Sheriff to afford such opportunity: Terefore, before pronouncing further, and under reference to aLLexed note, a proof pro ut de jure of the subsistence of Lett referred to in his affidavit, and allows the respondent junct probation; grants diligence against witnesses and 14, and appoints the cause to be enrolled in the diet roll. Nor-The insolvency of the bankrupt, at the time the hers founded on by the appellant came into existence, is y established. The appellant himself admitted, when ined as a witness in the sequestration, that the firm of anes Cairns & Son, of which he was a partner, was insolvent te dissolution, and that he was then aware that the bankrt had no funds of his own. (See Sederunt Book, vol. i., p. Under the respondent's proof in this appeal the bankrupt deponed: "I was not able at the date of said balance(31st Dec., 1860,) to pay any portion of the loss of 8 118 7d, shown by said state as due by me; nor at the e of the deed of submission; nor at the date of granting the after the decree arbitral; the firm of James Cairns & Son ad not wasets to pay the liabilities, or debts shown in said rate at any of the above dates." In the sequestration it has sufficiently ascertained that this insolvency continued rm January till November, 1861; when notour bankruptcy place. In his conjoint proof the appellant re-adduced to. But where a submission is entered into between a father more except by reduction; the Sheriff cannot so hold. It may be true that, as in all questions between the submitters themselves, a decree arbitral, until reduced, has, in the ordinary case, the strength of a res judicata, and must be given effect and an insolvent son, one of the arbiters being conjunct to both parties, and where what is called the decree arbitral bears ex facie to be also a mutual contract upon which the father could not have founded unless it had been signed by the son, such deeds are not per se vouchers, sufficient to esta the son, then, as in a question with third parties, creditors of blish the debt, and their validity may be objected to ope exceptionis. In the first place, the bankrupt's insolvency operated as a bar to his entering effectually into a submission, and still beneficial to his father. In the next place, even although to his concluding certain gratuitous arrangements there was nothing suspicious in the documents themselves, it has long been settled that acknowledgments of debt to near relations cannot be given effect to in bankruptcy unless sup ported by other evidence. In the third place, it is expressly enacted by section 10th of the Bankruptcy Act of 1856, that the deeds made void by the Act, and all alienations of property by a party insolvent, which are voidable by statute or exception, and by the 11th section it is provided that "the at common law, may be set aside either by way of action or trustee on a sequestrated estate under this Act shall be entitled to set aside any such deed or alienation for behoof of the whole body of creditors, and in so doing shall be entitled to the benefit of any presumption which would have been competent to any creditor." By these enactments, the former law that gratuitous alienations falling under the Act 1621, could be set aside only by prior creditors, is abrogated; and not only is the onus of proving solvency in the granter laid on the conjunct or confident person founding on the deed that is challenged, but the challenge may be made and sustained by way time it is to be observed that whilst the respondent refuses to of exception without any formal reduction. At the same admit the deeds in question as affording complete evidence of the alleged facts set forth in them, he does not seek to reduce them in as far as they may be available in questions in which the appellant and bankrupt alone are personally interested. Finally, it is settled in the words of Mr Bell, in his work on arbitration, p. 241, that "every award must in substance be essentially the actual judgment or sentence of the arbiters who pronounce it. It must be the embodiment of their own opinion as private judges on the merits of the case submitted to their arbitration. Where, therefore, a document which purported to be an award ex facie, and which, in all merely formal requisites, was a regular award, proved to be in reality not the judgment of the arbiters at all, but only a colourable form given to an agreement previously made between the parties themselves; it was held, in a reduction of the award, that it was not truly an award, and could not be defended on any of the pleas applicable to a genuine award." In the case here referred to, the judgment of the House of Lords declared, "that the alleged submission and decree arbitral ought not to be considered as having in law the effect of a submission or decree arbitral, but as a form adopted by which an agreement previously made between the parties to the said submission, was concluded." (Maule, May 10, 1814; 4th Dow, p. 391.) Where the same occurs under a ranking in a seques tration, a statutory right is conferred on the trustee to "except" to such alleged decree arbitral, which is in reality simply an agreement inter conjunctos. No doubt the Court must be satisfied that the "exception" is taken on good grounds, but if so no reduction seems necessary. A bill granted by an insolvent son to his father may, where its onerosity is established, be entitled to have due effect given to it, but it requires to be supported by further evidence before a dividend is payable on it. In like manner, any species of deed, whatever garb it may assume, which is substantially nothing more nor less than the bankrupt's acknowledgment, granted during insolvency to a conjunct and confident person, is per se ineffectual to confer upon such person the privilege of an ordinary creditor. For the Appellant-Wм. MATHIESON. 9TH MARCH, 1863. SHERIFF COURT, AY R. (MR SHERIFF ROBISON.) is entirely derived from statute and explicatory Acts Sederunt. Beneath the Judicature Act of 6 Geo. IV., 120, which first conferred this jurisdiction on the Sheriff, an relative Act of Sederunt, he could not repone if letters horning were obtained-M'Lean v. Bell & M'Kinlay, 2 January, 1827. This restriction was removed by the Sher Court Act of 1 and 2 Vict., c. 119; and, as beneath th statute, a poinding, although not followed by a sale, has bee held to bar reponing-Stephenson & Co. v. Dobbins & Bill 17th February, 1852. It has also been made a questio under the same statute, whether imprisonment ought not have the like effect-M'Lachlan v. Rutherford & Co., 10 June, 1854. The present case does not fall under the abo Act of the Queen, but is governed by the Small Debt Act 1 Vict., c. 41, although it will be proper to consider bo statutes in connection, for the purpose of marking the diff ence in the language used in each in reference to the Sheri power of reponing against a decree in absence. That difference is so remarkable and important as to sugg a solution of the present question in favour of the defend The Small Debt Act, in section 16, provides, in the event a decree in absence being pronounced, for the obtaining 'a warrant sisting execution" on the requisite consignat HUGH WYLLIE, Draper, Kilmarnock, v. JAMES LAWSON, being made "at any time before a charge is given, or in Miner, Dalmellington. Small Debt Statutes-Poinding-Implement of Decree -Reponing. Under a Small Debt Decree in absence the defender's effects were poinded and at same time valued, but no sale took place. The defender then obtained a sist. The pursuer appealed, and objected that the poinding was implement of his decree, and no reponing could be granted. Held, that poinding without a sale following is only implement in part, and which, under the Small Debt Acts, does not bar a reponing, and sist held competent. THIS is a small debt complaint, in which the defender is sued for the sum of 14s 51d. The pursuer obtained decree in absence on 11th December, 1862; the defender was charged thereon on 12th December, and on 29th December (the charge being expired) his effects were poinded to the appraised value of £1 128. Meanwhile, the defender had, on 23d December, obtained a sist, in order to the case being heard on 15th January, 1863. By no fault imputable to the defender or his agent, this warrant was not served upon the pursuer, and no use was made of it; and on 10th January the defender obtained another sist for a hearing of the case on 22d January, and to which day the pursuer was duly cited in terms of this warrant. The pursuer now objects to the case being further proceeded with, in respect that the poinding at his instance, which has followed upon the decree in absence, is implement of that decree, and effectually bars the defender from being reponed against it. So far as is known, this is the first time that a question of this nature has occurred in reference to a small debt case, although the point is not a new one in regard to ordinary actions in the Sheriff Court. The question turns upon a comparison of statutes, and upon the mode of interpreting them connectedly with the diligence that has been used in each particular case. The diligence against property authorised by the decree obtained in this case is (1) arrestment; and (2) poinding and sale. The conjunctive description of the latter mode of execution seems to make it one diligence, although consisting of two acts-attachment by poinding and transference by sale. The statutory form of reporting it in the shape of a Report of Poinding and Sale," also favours the same view of its character, as does, likewise, the practice observed in the manner of executing it, according to which there is neither an execution of poinding returned, nor a warrant of sale obtained, separately, as in the ordinary case, but the whole is carried through very summarily, and reported in the end as one proceeding. There was no sale in this case, but only a poinding; and, consequently, there is no report of poinding and sale. In short, the authorised "Execution" by "Poinding and Sale" to enforce the decree in this case, has been carried through but half way. The Sheriff's power of reponing against a decree in absence 66 event of a charge being given before implement of the dec has followed thereon." In section 18 of the Sheriff Co Act provision is made, in the same event, for "a reponir on the conditions therein expressed, against such a decr "where the same shall not have been implemented in wh or in part." Thus it appears that while in the former sta: it is "implement of the decree" that is made preventatory redress, in the latter it is the fact of its being implemen in whole or in part," which is to bar reponing. N "implement" must be taken to mean whole implement, implement "in part" must be something different from t But implement is not payment, agreeably to the decisions the subject, although payment is implement and the best b of implement. Diligence operates as implement, more or according to these decisions, on the theory, it is supposed the law being satisfied by the application of its executo powers. But whether the kind of diligence which is used the enforcement of a decree in absence be implement in w or in part is what would appear to be the overruling ques in the present inquiry. The case of Stephenson & Co. se only to decide that a simple poinding is implement in par way of execution, although, even if this were all its virta is sufficient, and was so held in that case, to bar reponin terms of the Sheriff Court Act. The poinding used in case, as already explained, can never be regarded as amo ing to more, if it is to be considered at all, while the pro tory condition which, by the Small Debt Act, is attache the privilege of obtaining a sist of execution, being implen anything short of implement in whole must be ineffectu exclude the benefit of review of a decree in absence. Whe if a sale had followed the poinding here, and a report been made of poinding and sale as directed by the Act, proceeding would have been implement in whole of the de it is unnecessary to inquire, although I think it would be For these reasons I am of opinion that the sist here good sist, and entitles the defender to be heard agains decree in absence obtained by the pursuer in this case. Act. W. F. M'CUBBIN. Alt. GEORGE MORN 10TH MARCH, 1863. SHERIFF COURT, AIRDRIE. (MR SHERIFF LOGIE.) LATHAM v. WALKER. Truck Act-Discounts for Advances-Medical Fee allowed. A collier who had obtained advances in between pays was charged one shilling per pound the At first he objected, but latterly acquiesced or du object. After leaving his employment he raised an for repetition of the sums as charged and retained, contrary to the Truck Act. Held, that the charge was a violation of the Truck Act, and decree given for the sums retained. The fees for medical attendance were disallowed because the workman had not given his consent in writing to retain them. This case is one of such general importance, that I greatly regret it should have fallen to be disposed of in the Small Debt Court; but as the sum in dispute is under that to which all debt actions are limited, I must not shrink from deciding it, though I do so with much diffidence and hesitaThe facts of the case are simple and not disputed. In October or November, 1861, the pursuer was engaged by the defender as engineman at his colliery. The pay at defender's was fortnightly. The defender keeps no store, but he has been in the practice, ever since the pit was opened-four Tars ago-to charge any of his workmen who get advances ring the currency of their pay, or rather to make a deducto on the pay-day from their wages of 18 per pound on all Ley intermediately advanced. No bargain was made with Le pursuer to that effect when he was engaged, either written verbal. When the first pay-day came round, 18 per pound was acted from the balance of wages he had to receive on all payments made to him during the currency of the pay; this, it appears, was the first intimation to the pursuer of prevalence of the practice at defender's work. He Erously objected, but in spite of his remonstrance the tion was made, and he was told by defender's son that infiture, if he did not uplift any part of his wages before the ay, no deductions would be made. There are printed at the work, but these are silent as to such deductions. Faser continued in defender's employment until December etting advances regularly during each pay, and always the 1s per pound deducted thereon, apparently without acquiescing or objecting. In December last he left ployment, and he now sues his master for the balance ages, and also for payment of these deductions-his course, being that these deductions are struck at or wed by 1 & 2 William IV., cap. 87, commonly called the Truck Act. The Truck Act is an Act to prohibit the payment, in certrades, of wages in goods, or otherwise than in the at coin of the realm. It was passed, after an extensive Famentary inquiry, for the protection of the workmen, entitled to a liberal interpretation as regards the and intention for which it was passed. Blackstone -"Statutes are to be construed not according to their Letter, but the intent and object with which they were and "it is an established rule that remedial statutes to be more liberally, and penal more strictly construed." 4ying these principles fairly to the Truck Act, I shall proceed to consider its provisions. Eection 3 it is enacted, "That the entire amount of the Farned by or payable to any artificer" in the trades enumerated shall be actually paid to such artificer in rrent coin of the realm, and not otherwise. rection 4, that every such artificer shall be entitled to from his employer the whole or so much of the wages by him "as shall not have been actually paid to him h his employer in the current coin of this realm." e sections, it will be observed, enact that the employer pay to his workman the entire amount of the wages 1, and that the workman shall be entitled to recover Tortion thereof not "actually" so paid to him in money. the Act allows certain payments or deductions to be y the master, for which he is entitled to credit on the y. I shall next proceed to consider these, with the of ascertaining whether they give any sanction to the ons now made. The excepting clauses are sections 23 Pection 23 it is enacted that nothing therein contained revent any employer from supplying medicine or mediendance, or fuel, or any materials, tools, or implements, 17, corn, or provender for horses employed by the artificer; demissing the whole or any part of a tenement at rat, to be therein reserved; nor from supplying victuals, dressed or prepared under the roof of the employer, and there consumed by the artificer; nor from making, or contracting to make, any stoppage or deduction from the wages of the artificer for any of these purposes; or "for or in respect of any money advanced to the artificer for any such purpose." Provided always that such stoppage or deduction shall not exceed the real and true value of such fuel, materials, tools, implements, hay, corn, and provender; and shall not be in any case made from the wages of the artificer, unless the agree ment or contract for such stoppage or deduction shall be in writing, and signed by the artificer. The exceptions in the next section have still more important bearing in this case. By section 24 it is enacted that nothing therein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent the employer from advancing to the artificer any money to be by him contributed to any friendly society or savings bank; nor from advancing to him any money for his relief in sickness, or for the education of his children; nor from deducting, or contracting to deduct, any sum or sums of money from his wages for the education of his children; in which case the agreement or contract for such deduction must be in writing, and signed by the artificer. These two clauses contain the only deductions which the employer is entitled to make from the artificer's wages, and the only advances which he is entitled to give, and, with these exceptions, the entire amount of the wages must be paid to him in money. Neither by fair construction nor by implication do they afford any ground or authority for the deduction here attempted to be made. It must be borne in mind that the portion of his wages so advanced by the employer is wages actually wrought for and earned by the workman, although not demandable by him until his pay-day-the pay-day being fixed in some cases once a fortnight, in others once a month, to suit the employer's own convenience. It was contended for the defender in this case that as it is optional to him whether or not he will pay his workmen any portion of their wages before the pay-day, that if he does so he may make what conditions he pleases, and, as the usury laws have now been repealed, that he may charge what rate of interest he thinks proper. The argument is ingenious, but, I think, unsound. The Act, I must again repeat, is not merely an Act against paying wages in goods. It is an Act to secure that workmen shall be paid the entire amount of their wages, subject only to the exceptions mentioned in sections 23 and 24. The present case is not that of a loan to the pursuer at a certain rate of interest, for the charge is the same whether he had the use of the money for a week or for a day. In the one case it would be at the rate of above 250 per cent., and in the latter at upwards of 1800 per cent. per annum. If the master is entitled to contract with his workmen that every pound of wages he pays to them, otherwise than on the pay-day, shall count as 21s, it would be equally competent for him to stipulate that every sum, say of 158, so advanced, shall count as 20s. Were it lawful for needy workmen and unscrupulous masters to make such contracts, it would be infinitely worse for the workman than if a portion of his wages were paid to him in goods. In the latter case, if the master advanced to him 15s in money, and 5s worth of goods, instead of getting credit at the pay-day for 20s of wages, the master would only be entitled to debit the workman with the 15s, paid in the current coin of this realm, while he would require still to pay the 5s advanced in goods. In the former case, on the plea of contract, the master who had advanced only 15s, would debit the workman with an additional 5s, for which no value whatever had been given. This, no doubt, is to assume an extreme case, but it illustrates the fallacy of the defender's pleas. Another justification for the practice was assigned, that it gives the master more trouble in book-keeping to make payments between pays. No weight, I think, can be given to this argument. It required a more complicated and expensive system where orders by the pay-clerk were given to the storekeeper for goods to be supplied to the workman, but all such devices for preventing the workman getting payment of his entire pay actually in cash, were made illegal and of no avail by the Act before referred to. The result at which I have arrived is, that if an employer, during the currency of the pay, advances or pays to a workman that portion of his wages which he has earned, or any |