required by the Table of Fees, Art. 16, that the precognition shall be initialed by the Clerk immediately before or even on the same day that the party commences his proof. That authentication by the Clerk may take place any time before that proof is begun; and the Clerk's presence is not therefore requisite for that purpose at the commencement of the proof. Mr Jenkins was, besides, the last witness examined, and the precognition applicable to him, if taken, should have been suthenticated, not immediately before his examination, but before the pursuer's proof began. The Steward-Substitute has repelled with some reluctance and hesitation the 14th, 15th, and 16th objections. It seemed to him at first, and indeed still seems somewhat hard and anomalous, that where the Sheriff is unable from unavoidable causes to conduct the proof on the day for which the witnesses have been cited, no fee should be chargeable for countermanding the witnesses. The expenses attending that proceeding sem not only a reasonable but a necessary charge, arising from an unavoidable contingency, and from no fault of the party. The reasons assigned by the auditor for rejecting the Lim are nevertheless very formidable-1st, The charge is rot included in the Table of Fees; 2d, It is not vouched in acordance with General Regulation No. 13; and 3d, With regard to the charge for attending Court when a new diet of proof was fixed, it seems expressly prohibited, under the exceptions in the 12th Article of the Table of Fees. In these circumstances, the Steward-Substitute has not found sufficient rounds for altering the auditor's judgment in that matter. Nor does he see cause to disturb his deliverance on the rges referred to in the 17th and 18th objections. There is nothing so exceptional in this case as to justify the owance of a higher rate of remuneration to the witnesses Lo attended for examination, than is uniformly given in ilar cases in this Court. This Interlocutor was appealed, and the Sheriff proDanced the following judgment: The Sheriff having considered the Interlocutor appealed sist and process, dismisses the appeal and affirms the erlocutor, except in so far as concerns the precognoscing esses disallowed by the auditor; also, in so far as concerns charges for countermanding witnesses, in consequence of proof not proceeding at the diet fixed, through the Steward. itute's indisposition; and in so far as the Interlocutor the defender entitled to the expenses of the discussion: ds that if precognitions were actually taken under circumces, or at a time or times which prevented them from being ited to the Steward-Clerk, and authenticated by his als, before the party commenced his proof or examination the precognosced witnesses, the charges for precognoscing y be allowed, notwithstanding the want of such authenticaby the Steward-Clerk: Finds that if the proof did not ced at the diet fixed through no fault of the pursuer, but Consequence of the Judge's indisposition, the charges for ssarily countermanding the witnesses and of citing them subsequent diet lawfully appointed, may be allowed at the unsuccessful party; and with these findings recalls Interlocutor in hoc statu in so far as concerns the charges i expenses above referred to, and remits the case to the ard-Substitute, in order that he may direct the auditor aire further and revise his report, and with power to the Ard-Substitute to dispose of the cause as shall appear just. The account was remitted to the auditor, and on his Having resumed consideration of the cause, with the auditor's report of 20th April, 1861 (No. 32 of process), Finds it proved by reasonably conclusive evidence that the precognition of witnesses, charged for in the pursuer's account of expenses, was taken by his agent on 27th September, 1863: that the examination of these witnesses in causa, before the Steward-Substitute, commenced on 18th November, 1863, that six of these witnesses were then examined, and that the remaining two of those precognosced witnesses were examined before the judicial referee on 7th January, 1864: Finds with regard to the precognitions of the six witnesses examined before the Steward-Substitute on 18th November, 1863, that it is not stated in the objections by the pursuer, No. 33 of process, to the auditor's first report of 20th February, 1864, nor in the auditor's last report of 20th April, 1864, nor estab lished that these precognitions were "taken under circumstances, nor at a time or times, which prevented them from being exhibited to the Steward-Clerk or his depute, and authenticated by the initials of either of them, before the pursuer commenced his proof, or examination of the precognosced witnesses:" Therefore, of new repels the objections to the auditor's report, in so far as it disallows the charges in the pursuer's account of expenses, applicable to these precogni tions, for the reasons assigned in the Note to the StewardSubstitute's Interlocutor of 8th March, 1864, and in the Sheriff's Interlocutor of 28th March, 1864: Finds, in respect of the absence of the Steward-Clerk and his depute, from the diet at proof before the judicial referee, on 7th January, 1864, that the precognitions of the witnesses, then examined by the pursuer, may have been taken in circumstances which prevented them from being exhibited to and initialed by the Steward-Clerk or his depute, before these two precognosced witnesses, viz., Mrs Rankine and Dr Campbell were examined: Therefore, in accordance with the finding in the Sheriff's Interlocutor of 28th March last, sustains the objection to the auditor's report, in which the pursuer's charges for these two precognitions are disallowed, and allows these charges: Finds that it now appearing from the auditor's last report that the pursuer has at last produced a voucher of the payment to the Steward officer for countermanding the witnesses, the charge for that payment must, in accordance with the Sheriff's Interlocutor of 28th March last, be sustained: Therefore, sustains the objection to the auditor's report as regards that charge, and again remits to the auditor that he may give effect to the foregoing findings in an amended report, reserves consideration of expenses until that report is lodged by the auditor, and decerns. This Interlocutor was appealed, and the Sheriff' pronounced this judgment: The Sheriff having considered the Interlocutor appealed against by the pursuer and process, in respect it is stated in the pursuer's account of expenses that the witnesses in question were precognosced on 27th October (not September, as embraced in the auditor's last report, and Interlocutor of the Steward-Substitute), 1863; and in respect it does not appear that written precognitions might not have been exhibited to the Steward-Clerk or his depute for the purpose of being authenticated by his initials before the party commenced his proof on 18th November, in terms of the note in the Table of Fees approved by Act of Sederunt, 1st March, 1861, dismisses the appeal, and affirms the Interlocutor so far as appealed against; with this explanation, that the sus taining of the objection as to the expense of countermanding witnesses shall be held applicable to the agent's fee for directing the countermand, as well as the officer's charge for it. On considering the auditor's revised report, the StewardSubstitute pronounced the following Interlocutor: Having resumed consideration of this cause, as regards the matter of expenses, with the auditor's revised report of the 14th inst., approves of said report, and in terms thereof decerns against the defender for payment to the pursuer of the sum of £31 10s 9d sterling, as the taxed amount of expenses found due by the Interlocutor of 12th February last; and in respect of the number and nature of the pursuer's £2 18s 3d. objections to the auditor's report of 20th February last, and of his failure to substantiate the greater part of these objec. tions: Finds no expenses due to either party relative to the discussion and disposal of these objections, and decerns. NOTE.-The pursuer in his pleading, No. 33, objected to twenty-one deliverances by the auditor in the taxation of pursuer's account of expenses. Of these objections five have been sustained and sixteen repelled; 2d, These twenty-one objections applied to charges, amounting to £4 4s 9d, which had been disallowed by the auditor. By the Sheriff's final deliverance the charges disallowed by the auditor have now been sustained to the amount of £1 6s 6d, and rejected to the amount of It is thus obvious that to the extent of two-thirds in number, and more than two-thirds in pecuniary amount, the pursuer's objections have been groundless and unsuccessful. It is no less clear, from that result, that the defender had a substantial interest to appear and uphold the auditor's report, and that his success has been greater than the pursuer's by the criteria above referred to. But it further appears to the Steward-Substitute that, on a third ground, the pursuer is not entitled to the expenses incurred by him in this discussion. With regard to the charge of 8s to officer for countermanding witnesses, embraced in the fifteenth objection, no voucher was produced to the auditor at the taxation on 20th February last. It was therefore imperative on the auditor to disallow the charge on that ground; and if by the indulgence of the Court the pursuer's agent was subsequently permitted to remedy that defect, originating in his own neglect, it certainly cannot, with a shadow of justice, be done at the expense of the defender. The Steward Substitute has had more difficulty in disposing of the defender's claim to the expenses of this discussion. He has not only succeeded in having the pursuer's account reduced by the auditor just about one-fourth-irrespectively of the disputed portion of it included in his objections, but when these objections are fully investigated, the result is found to be more favourable to the defender than to the pursuer. At the same time, the pursuer, having established his grounds of objection as regards four at least, if not five, of the disallowed charges, was entitled, to that extent, to seek redress. certain fields in the neighbourhood of Stirling. It ap peared that in the last year of the respondent's possession he had failed to maintain the fences of one of the fields. By the lease he was bound to keep up and leave the fences in a good and sufficient condition, at his own expense. The ish was at Martinmas, 1863. On 29th August and 7th November, 1863, the petitioner called on the respondent by letter to repair the fences. The defence was that the hedge had a 'good many gaps in it, the result of old age, and that the stobs which were inserted in these gaps were every year carried off by some unknown depredators. The Sheriff-Substitute remitted to a land valuator in Stirling in these terins:-"On the craving of the respondent's procurator, and before answer, authorises the respondent, at the sight of Mr Robert Paterson, lani valuator in Stirling, to put the fences in question into a good state and condition, agreeably to the terms of the lease." The fence having been repaired in terms of the remit, a report was made to the Court, and the Sheriff-Substitute thereafter pronounced the following Interlocutor:heard parties' procurators, approves of the said report, Having considered the report by Mr Paterson, anl and in respect that Mr Mathie, on behalf of Mr Christie, the respondent, undertakes to pay Mr Paterson's account. and considering the trifling nature of the dispute betweel the parties, finds no expenses due to either party, and decerns. Against this judgment the petitioner appealed, so far as expenses were refused, and the Sheriff altered, and found the petitioner entitled to expenses, stating, in a note, that he could see no ground for refusing expenses to the petitioner: "The defender was duly called on This Interlocutor was appealed, but affirmed by the by letter to put the fences in order, but he chose to tak: Sheriff. Act. ROBT. BROATCH. Alt. ANTHY. MACKENZIE. .... no notice of the letter sent to him. . . . . The action was necessary, for without it apparently the defender would have done nothing." SHERIFF COURT, PERTHSHIRE-PERTH. (SHERIFF BARCLAY.) PETER PALMER in Sequestration of C. D. YOUNG. Lease-Tenant's obligation to fence-Expenses.-The tenant of certain fields bound himself to keep and leave the fences in a good state of repair, but when called upon by the landlord, he failed to repair them. In a Sequestration-Appeal-Bankruptcy Act, 1856, sect summary action at the landlord's instance to have the tenant ordained to repair the fences, the tenant was held liable, and (reversing the judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute) also in expenses. Tuis was a petition at the instance of Alexander Hill, writer, Stirling, against Alexander Christie, sometime vintner in Stirling, praying the Court to appoint proper persons of skill to inspect the fences and report as to their state, and thereafter to grant warrant to put them into a proper state and condition at the sight of the reporter, and also to decern against the respondent for the expense of the repairs, and of process. The respondent was tenant, under the petitioner, of 43-Mora-Limitation of actions-Sheriff Court Act 16 & 17 Vict., c. 80, sect. 15-Falling asleep a actions.—In a bankrupt estate a creditor claimed a pre ference. His claim, as such, was rejected by the trus tee, but he was ranked as a common creditor. T creditor appealed. After the lapse of two years, appeal being undisposed of, a dividend was declare The appeal was then taken up, to which it was objects that the process had, eo ipso, been dismissed by the lap of time prescribed in the Sheriff Court Act, 1853 Held, that judicial proceedings in sequestrations are e cluded from the operation of the Sheriff Court Act sect. 43 of the Bankruptcy Act, and that an appeal a sequestration does not fall by the lapse of six months A CREDITOR claimed a preference in respect of a poinding beyond the sixty days before the sequestration of the estates of the debtor. The trustee, on adjudicating on the claims, admitted the claim to rank as a common debt, but rejected the preference on the ground of mora. The creditor appealed, and a diligence was granted to recover writings to elide the plea of mora. No proceedings took place for a period of two years, when a first and final dividend was declared, and the creditor was admitted to rank as an ordinary creditor. He thereon resumed his appeal to have his preference made good. Objected that the appeal had fallen by the lapse provided by the Sheriff Court Act. The following Interlocutor was pronounced:-- On pursuer's motion to renew the diligence against havers, and having heard parties' procurators on the objection of the trustee that the appeal had fallen, repels that objection, renews the diligences, and assigns Wednesday next at ten o'clock for reporting the same. Lords Cowan and Anderson held that a small debt action did Act. KIPPEN. 14TH AUGUST, 1864. SHERIFF COURT, SUTHERLANDSHIRE – DORNOCH. (SHERIFFS G. D. FORDYCE AND MACKENZIE.) WILLIAMINA MACKAY, OR MACLEOD, and Husband v. NOTE. The agent for the trustee opposed the motion, and pled that the case had fallen under the clause of limitation in the Sheriff Court Act. He stated that, on the understanding that the appellant had fallen from his appeal, and allowed it to lapse, the trustee had declared a first and final dividend, without recognition of the appellant's claim of preference, and Damage-Reparation-Relevancy-Probable cause.is appeal against the rejection of such preference. The Substitute was a good deal impressed with the objec tion, and whilst of opinion that neither the appeal any more an the sequestration itself fell under the Sheriff Court Act, he was somewhat inclined to view it as falling under the recognised rule of the common law as to the lapse of judicial procedure by the currency of year and day without any dicial step being taken. The Substitute took time to conder, and has had communication with other counties. He nus from the Bill Chamber, and from the Sheriff Court at Casgow (where proceedings in bankruptcy are perhaps equal in amount to that of all Scotland), that though the question A never directly arisen to be decided on, yet the opinion of the officials is that appeal in sequestrations do not come within range of Sheriff Court processes, either under statute or t common law, but endow as long as the process of seques tration itself. He is informed, however, that a different derstanding and practice prevail in the adjacent county of Forfar, where such appeals are dealt with as ordinary processes in the Sheriff Court, and so are held to lapse by the running f the three months' conditional and the six months' absolute. It appears to the Substitute that the provision in the 43d tion of the Sequestration Act, 1856, settles the question. It is thereby declared that "no process of sequestration, either a the Court of Session or Sheriff Court, shall fall asleep, or all be liable to be dismissed under the 15th section of the eriff Court Act." The only remaining point of inquiry is ether an appeal on a sequestration is part and parcel of the process of sequestration." No doubt it is so far indedent that it admits in its turn of appeal to the Supreme But it can have no separate origin or existence outthe process of sequestration. Questions of competition -trusteeship, personal protection of the bankrupt, discharge the bankrupt, and the trustee, and many other similar atters of isolation, are all grafts on the parent stock, deriving r life from it and maintaining that life during the existence the parent. It follows that all such collateral processes ay continue during the currency of the sequestration, and sted may perhaps exist after it has terminated as a general ess of division. ven though there had been no express provision in the te, the Substitute would have reached the same conThe process of cessio and all proceedings under special Pates are regulated by the particular statute, and the riff Court Act applies only to the common law process, on. his ruled by no special formula. The Substitute at one time had greater dread of the annular e than of the mensal; but both are expressly provided for the clause in the statute. Besides, "the year and day" le exists not by statute but by consuetude in ordinary judicial edings not falling under any special statute. Accordingly In an action of damages, it was not substantively averred that the slanderous statement had been made falsely and calumniously. Objection-that the libel was therefore irrelevant-repelled. Facts and circumstances held sufficient to infer malice and want of probable cause. TIE summons in this action concludes for "the sum of £25 sterling, being damages sustained by the pursuers, and as a solatium to them in consequence of the defender having on or about the 6th day of April, 1863, accused the said pursuer, Williamina Mackay, or Macleod, of having stolen a sheep, and thereafter killed said sheep, or used words to that effect; and in consequence of the defender having also falsely, maliciously, and calumniously, on or about the 22d day of April, 1863, given information to William Mackay, police officer, Lochinver, to the effect that the said Williamina Mackay, or Macleod, had killed a sheep not her own property or the property of her husband, but belonging to some other person, or words to that effect, whereby the said Williamina Mackay, or Macleod, was on or about the 22d day of April, 1863, apprehended and brought before G. C., one of the Justices of the Peace for the county of Sutherland, and her declaration taken, when the complaint against the said Williamina Mackay, or Macleod, was not entertained, and she was liberated. The pursuers, inter alia, in substance pleaded-tltat as the defender's statements were defamatory and not privileged, it was unnecessary to aver that they were made falsely and calmuniously. The defender pleaded substantially-Preliminary(1), That the first branch of the summons could not be insisted in, in respect it was not averred that the statements founded on were false and calumnious; and (2), That the second branch of the summons was likewise defective, in so far as it did not aver that the information given to the police was given from any bad or felonious motive. And, on the merits, he pleaded that never having made the accusation, or having given the information libelled on, he was entitled to absolvitor. angry with him for speaking so, for others were saying the same. The female pursuer and her sister-in-law, Sarah defender for letting them know that such reports were going Macleod, were present, and the latter said she thanked the about." This shows too that in what he was about the defender was acting in perfect good faith, and that he at to complain of. Apart, then, from the question of relevancy, least was not the originator of any report the pursuers have which it is now unnecessary to take up, the Sheriff-Substitute is of opinion that the facts on which the pursuers found the first branch of their case have not been proved, and that on it The Sheriff-Substitute reserved the preliminary pleas, closed the record, and allowed a proof before answer. Under this proof, and in support of the second branch of the libel, the pursuers recovered the following letter to Mackay, the police constable, signed by, or in name of, the defender and five other tenants, his neighbours: "Elphin, 17th April, 1863.-Sir, the undersigned tenants of Elphin wish you to come to this place, so as to investigate a case of stealing sheep and slaughtering, which happened on the 2d inst. There was some of the flesh The second branch of the pursuers' case is that the defender found hidden outside, and the marks of the hatchet in it."falsely, maliciously, and calumniously, on or about 291 We are, etc." Parties' procurators were heard on the import of the proof, and in the course of the debate, the defender's procurator, while arguing that the pursuer had failed in her proof, founded strongly on the case of Cameron, 1st February, 1856, 28 Jur., 179, as ruling that the action ought to be dismissed, in respect want of probable cause had not been averred. the defender is entitled to absolvitor. April, 1863, gave information to William Mackay, police officer" (etc., etc., as stated in summons). The evidence recovered on this branch of the case consists of a letter, No. 9 of process, addressed to Mackay, the police constable, and containing the information on which the pur suers found. That letter was signed in name and by authority of the defender and others of the tenants, but, as it will be seen, bears no reference to the female pursuer, and it does not therefore bear out her charge against the defender. It is true, however, that, acting upon it, the police constable came to Elphin, and after investigating the case, as reported to him, The Sheriff-Substitute assoilzied the defender, adding went to the female pursuer, and, as he states in his examina the following NOTE.-This is an action raised by the female pursuer, with advice and consent of her husband, and by the husband for his interest, against the defender for defamation; and damages are claimed in respect of two acts of slander, which are narrated at length in the summons, and are said to have been committed by him on the 6th and 26th April, 1863, respectively. The defender having denied these statements, it was thought expedient, before entering upon the question of relevancy which the defender raised, to have the disputed points investigated, and with this view a proof before answer was ordered. That proof has now been taken, and in the debate upon it the questions both of fact and relevancy were argued. It appears from the proof that in the beginning of April last year part of the carcase of a sheep had been discovered by the defender hid in a hole at or near Elphin, where the parties reside. The circumstances under which this discovery was made having excited suspicion, various of the tenants (and amongst them the defender) resolved to investigate the matter. The procedure agreed on was to carry the mutton so discovered to the different houses in the hamlet, and to request information respecting it; and in this work the defender is proved to have acted, not on his own responsibility, but as the "spokesman" of the party. Accordingly on the 6th April, 1863, in pursuance of this task, the party carrying the mutton visited various houses, at one of which it is proved that they were informed that the female pursuer had been seen shortly before driving some sheep from the hill into an outhouse, and that she had soon afterwards been seen carrying a sheep's head under her petticoat. The party still continuing their investigation came at last to the pursuer's house, and it was on this occasion that the defender is charged with what is set forth in the first branch of the libel, namely, with having accused the female pursuer "of having stolen a sheep, and thereafter killed said sheep, or used words to that effect." The proof which has been led, certainly does not bear out this statement-the gravamen of which is the theft of a sheep-for both the female pursuer and her sister-in-law, Sarah Macleod, state respectively that "the defender on this occasion did not say that I had stolen a sheep;" and, "I cannot be sure that they (the party) accused the female pursuer of the theft of a sheep." But it is further shown conclusively by the testimony of the defender, corroborated by that of the witnesses John Macleod and Kenneth Macleod, that no such words as those libelled were used, they all being unanimous in stating that the defender did not accuse the female pursuer of having stolen and killed a sheep. What really did take place appears to have been that the defender merely repeated the report or information his party had already obtained regarding her in the course of their investigations, and one of the witnesses, Kenneth Macleod, adds, "the defender said she (the female pursuer) need not be tion, suggested that "she should accompany him to Stronechabroad that she had had to do with the sheep which had been rubie, to be examined before a magistrate, as a suspicion was She accompanied the police constable, but was found." liberated. whether, supposing the female pursuer had proved her aver The pursuers appealed, and after a hearing the Sheri pronounced the following Interlocutor:— The Sheriff having considered the appeal for the pursue against the Sheriff-Substitute's Interlocutor of 22d April las along with the closed record, proof, and productions, an having heard parties' procurators and advised the cause, su tains the appeal, recalls the Interlocutor complained of: Find in point of fact, 1st, that the summons in substance alleg that the female pursuer was apprehended illegally on April, 1863, and taken into custody of the police, and bef a magistrate, on false, malicious, and calumnious informati given by the defender to the police, of having stolen a shee 2d, Finds that the summons contains a relevant charge to effect: 3d, Finds no facts or circumstances proved which that any theft had been committed by any one, far less by hended on the day named, and taken by the police on female pursuer: 4th, Finds that the female pursuer was app April, 1863, before Mr Clarke, a Justice of Peace, in cir stances which shew that the charge on which she apprehended was one of sheep stealing: 5th, Finds facta a circumstances proved which shew that she was taken. custody in consequence of information given to the police several parties, of whom the defender is one: Finds, in of law, that no theft having taken place or been proved s the female pursuer or any one, the information on which apprehension proceeded was false and calumnious, and tha the circumstances it is to be inferred that it was malici and finds that she is entitled to damages in the prem therefore sustains the action to the above effect: Finds pursuers entitled to five pounds sterling in name of dans Finds the defender liable to the pursuers in the expense process, etc. NOTE. If the summons could be viewed as containing charges, then the Sheriff is of opinion that the first bran t does not set forth a relevant charge, as it is not said to be be, calumnious, and malicious. But he is unable to view be structure of the summons as showing anything but one harge throughout. What is said to be the first charge seems mply to be an introduction to the second part of the libel taining the real charge, which is that of illegal apprehenby the police, and is used to explain that she was taken to custody on the 22d April, 1863, for the act of which she ad been previously accused by the defender on 6th April, z, of having stolen a sheep. The summons is certainly not awn according to very correct scientific form, but, giving it ir play, the substance of it seems to amount to what is stated the Interlocutor; and as it is said to be false, calumnious, i malicious, enough seems to have been done to make it levant, without saying it was done without probable cause. There can be no doubt that the defender and others were the pursuer's house on 6th April, making inquiry as to the rit of a sheep, which was supposed to have occurred on the April, and there can be as little doubt that if they did not woods charge the female pursuer with it, their whole cons and line of investigation just as distinctly betokened to „ bystanders and to her that she was under that accusation. aloet and behaviour will just as precisely point out what, E accusation was meant, as words can. Now here it is ght that the whole procedure was meant as an accusation eft against the female pursuer. It is all very well to atain that it was a merely friendly court of inquiry into a ster of social importance in a small community, and so able; but why connect it with the presence of a police. A. M'Donald)? The fact of his presence demonstrates character of the matter to have been not of a friendly racter, and that the knot of people who were concerned t with a foregone conclusion that she was guilty of theft, I thought to entrap her into a confession. It is very plain the defender actually charged her with the theft. The nce of Hugh M'Lean (p. 16) and Kenneth M'Leod shows plainly enough. en what occurs? Why, the defender puts his name to a , calling on the policeman at Lochinver to investigate a case of sheep-stealing, which happened on the 2d April, bbt without naming any one as the accused, but the cir dances show that what was alluded to was the very case defender had been in the pursuer's house about on the This is shown significantly by the fact that the person wrote the letter was A. M'Donald, the policeman, who present in the pursuer's house when the defender was with investigating, as it is called, on the 6th, into the case Left of the 2d, and which they were laying at the pur's door, and also by the circumstances that it was ald who suggested to the defender and others, at the ang at the pursuer's house, to send that communication. possible, therefore, to doubt that the defender was a y directly to giving the information, on which the police i, and that the request for inquiry had reference excluy to the pursuer and the case of theft investigated at wse by the defender on the 6th April. e result was that the pursuer was taken into custody by lice, and carried before a magistrate on 22nd April, for examination as to the charge of theft made against ¤ her own house, and in the letter in question. It is said the pursuer went voluntarily with the constable, on a gestion of his for another friendly inquiry, but that of the question. Whenever a constable acts on such mation as he had, he acts officially, and any such step as taking before a magistrate, is just as complete an act rehension in law as can well be conceived. A constable d to act gently and quietly, so that anything of the sort was simply accessory to his duty officially. result of being brought before the magistrate was, that rener was set at liberty. She never had an indictment ! brought against her, and there is no evidence that any the district either was convicted for sheep-stealing at or t the time, or was even charged with it. Plainly, then, male pursuer was illegally charged with the theft of a and as clearly illegally apprehended, on information buy the defender, for which he must be responsible. w, what are his pleas in defence? They are (1) That he Lot make any accusation; (2) That the information was antially true; and (3) That it proceeded on probable Now, the letter No. 9 of process proves that he did information, and though it accused no particular person, The still his conduct and proceedings, along with others, had already pointed out in the district, and to the constable who received the letter, who was inculpated in the letter. constable had no difficulty, and is at no loss as to who is meant, for he goes direct to, and apprehends the pursuer, for there is no proof that he made a search for, or even suspected any others after receiving the letter. The other two grounds of defence are equally casily disposed of, by recollecting the fact that there is no proof of any theft of sheep-stealing having occurred at the time in the district, far less of the pursuer having been convicted of such, or of even having had a libel served against her. It is, therefore, impossible to affirm that the information either was substantially true, or that there was probable cause. There may have been suspicion in the place as to the crime existing, but mere suspicion will not justify such proceedings as took place in this case. Certainly the information did not name any one, but the previous acts of the defender had already trumpeted forth that it was the pursuer who was meant, and he must abide the consequences. As the pursuer has not proved any case of special damage, it is thought that the sum given will be a sufficient solatium, and will sufficiently mark her liberation from the charge, and, it is hoped, put down all such friendly courts of inquiry which are apt to be used or become mere engines of oppression. Act. MUNRO & MACLEAY. Alt. A. LESLIE. 16TH AUGUST, 1864. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON AND H. G. BELL.) JOHN STEEL v. JAMES CLYDESDALE AND EADIE BROTHERS. Contract-Joint Contractors.-Two joint adventurers, one a mason, the other a wright, agreed to build two villas. The mason purchased stones to form his contribution to the joint stock, and the wright, wood. The mason failed to pay the price of the stones. In an action at the instance of the person who sold the stones against the joint adventurers-Held that the individual contractor alone was liable, as he alone had contracted with the seller, who at the time was in ignorance of the joint adventure. THE pursuer sued the defenders, as joint contractors for erecting two dwelling-houses and offices, or double villa and offices, at Langbank for Mr Thos. B. Seath, for the sum of £19 12s 3d for stones sold by the pursuer to the defenders. The defence was contained in the following minute:-A denial of the whole of the pursuer's averments. Explained that the defenders Eadie Brothers and the other defender James Clydesdale, as joint adventurers, entered into a contract with Mr Thomas B. Seath of Rutherglen to build two cottages at Langbank for a slump sum. Thereafter the said joint adventurers contracted with various parties to complete the various portions of the work, and, inter alia, contracted with the said James Clydesdale to do the mason work for the sum of £306. Clydesdale accordingly proceeded with the contract, and it is believed purchased some stones from the pursuer. It is not known and not admitted that the stones he purchased were employed by Clydesdale in implementing his contract; but esto that they were, the liability of the said Eadie Brothers, or the joint adventurers, is denied. The pursuer, when said stones were furnished, sold them to Clydesdale, invoiced them to |