cted, with the letters and the description of the person din Perth, Kirkmichael, and Boleskine, as a cripple rutches, it may be held sufficient.

proceed with the statute, the next provision which we ith is that "such poor person shall be bound to give, linformation and assistance which it is in his power to r the purpose of ascertaining the parish or combination ch he belongs, and every other matter regarding his hich the inspector may desire to ascertain." This, it ght, is another indication that the only parish which lature had in contemplation as liable to relieve the which the poor person is, was apparently the parish nt. If a parish which had granted previous relief equally liable to relieve the parish of residence, it ely that the statute would have made such a disbetween it and the parish of settlement as to menone expressly, and say nothing at all about the might not be very conclusive in itself, but we find a distinction made in the next section, the 71st. It provided that where "relief shall be afforded to a son found destitute in a parish," the monies "may ered from any parish or combination within Scotland he may be ultimately found to belong, or from his or other persons," not parishes, "who may be legally maintain him." Although parents or other persons to liability not of a public and parochial nature are ad, not a word is said of any parish or combination hat to which the poor person belongs. If a parish relieving had been liable to relieve a subsequent ever, it might well have been expected that it ave been included in this enumeration. gain proceeding onwards, we find "that in all cases relief shall be afforded by one parish or combination person having a settlement in another parish or in, written notice of such poor person having bergeable shall be given to the inspector of the poor arish or combination to which such poor person It is only in the event of the poor person having a that any notice is to be given. And the notice is e only to the parish to which the poor person If recourse had been intended to be given against ides besides those where the poor person had a surely notice to such parishes would have been ecessary. And omission of any such requirement clear enough indication that the legislature did not originate any such recourse.

in the following section, the 72d, it is enacted that arish to which such poor person shall, as aforesaid, ascertained to belong, shall not remove such poor shall not make provision, etc., for the constant bsistence of such poor person, it shall be lawful for or combination which has given the notice to cause person to be removed to the parish or combination e belongs." Here again it is only the parish of which can be required to remove the poor person, provision for his subsistence. And it is only to of settlement that he can be removed. And here question arises, whether the exclusive mention of of settlement could have been expected if it had ed to make any parish previously granting subsisanently liable to relieve the parishes into which rson might afterwards wander.

g onwards, we find that if the poor person cannot to his settlement owing to sickness or infirmity, t continue to be relieved by the "parish or com which he is." And the parish in which he is have relief, but only against the parish of settle relief is expressly confined to this-"The parish ion in which he is shall be bound to relieve him, entitled to recover from the parish or combination longs." No right to claim relief is given to any t that in which the poor person is. This would n if any other parish had been required to advance nately due by the parish of settlement; and no en against any parish except the parish of settle also would hardly have been, if the parish in person is had recourse against any parish which y relieved him. If it had been intended that the idence should have recourse against a parish lieving, it would hardly have been provided only

that there should be recourse against the parish of settlement. And if it had been intended that not merely the parish in which the poor person is should be burdened with his relief until the settlement was determined, but that a previously relieving parish should be still more seriously burdened, being made to refund the monies advanced in the first instance by the parish in which the poor person is, it is inconceivable that the legislature should have given a right of recourse against the parish of settlement to the parish which made the temporary advance to the pauper, but was to be instantly repaid by the intermediate parish, and should have given no right of recourse against the parish of settlement to the parish which had formerly relieved, out of whose funds the monies so advanced must, upon such a view, really come.

All the provisions relating to Scottish paupers point to one conclusion, and with these the provisions relating to English, Irish, and Manx paupers, sections 77 and 79 are in harmony. By section 77, if any such pauper "not having acquired a settlement in any parish or combination in Scotland shall be in the course of receiving parochial relief in any parish or combination in Scotland," then the Sheriff or Justices having jurisdiction in that parish, "in," not "from," which the poor person is receiving relief, on complaint by the inspector "of such parish or combination that such poor person has become chargeable to such parish or combination," shall inquire into the place of his birth and last legal settlement (not the place where he has been last or was first relieved), "and if it shall be found that such person was born in England, Ireland, or the Isle of Man, and has not gained any settlement in Scotland, and has become chargeable to the complaining parish," i.e., to the parish in which he is, an order for removal shall be granted; and in section 79 the provision "that if any person who has been removed, etc., from any parish or combination in Scotland 'shall' again become chargeable' to the same parish," gives a reiterated indication that the parish from which the poor person is to be removed is the same to which he has become chargeable. We find, then, that jurisdiction is given to the magistrates of the place where the poor person actually is, and to which he is a burden. The inspector of the parish in which he is is the complainant. His complaint must state that the poor person "has become chargeable to such parish," i.c., the parish to which he is considered as chargeable is the same from which he is to be removed. And the matters to be inquired into are the place of birth, and whether a settlement has been acquired, not whether any previous parish has contracted a permanent liability to relieve the complaining parish by granting earlier relief to the poor person.

We have now examined in detail every expression in the statute which appears to have any bearing on the question here to be determined. No one of them alone may be conclusive; but they are numerous. Every one of them is more favourable to the pleas of the defenders than to those of the pursuer, and when the whole are combined, they leave no doubt at all that the statute has not enacted that a parish, or parishes, which may have been the first, or the fourth, or the fifth to give subsistence to a poor person, shall relieve another parish which has been the seventh to do the same thing.

It will be seen that the Sheriff and the Sheriff-Substitute

are pretty much agreed upon the principal question of law arising in this case; but to meet the possibility of their views on this point being overturned, it was right that the whole case should be prepared. There were disputed questions respecting the admissions by the inspector of Bellie, although it is not thought that these would have been conclusive even if they had been made by the parochial board itself. Both the defenders made allegations against each other respecting their mode of getting rid of the pauper, which could not be disposed of upon the averments without proof. And to meet certain views which may hereafter be taken of the case, it was necessary to know whether Urquhart, Kirkmichael, Boleskine, or what other parish was the first to relieve the pauper. This also could not be known without proof, although the case was repeatedly argued by eminent counsel; it was never suggested that the defenders should be assoilzied without any proof being led, or that, after it was led, the proof should be cast aside. And it still appears to the Sheriff that it was proper to have proof led, or at any rate that, having been led, it is not to be thrown aside as if it did not exist, and that the proper form of Interlocutor is that required by the Act of Sederunt in a

Agent and Client.-An agreement contrary to the rule of law agency can only be proved by the agent's writ or oath.

MR CHARLES WELCH, writer, Cupar, raised an action against John Henderson and James Henderson, St Monance, for payment of a professional account. The defence was that the pursuer led the defenders to expect that the expense of the business to be performed by him would not exceed £20, and that it was on the condition that the defenders would not be called upon to pay more than £20 that the pursuer was allowed to continue the agency.

The record having been closed on a minute of defence, the Sheriff-Substitute found that the defenders' averments could only be proved by the pursuer's writ or oath. The defenders appealed, but the Sheriff adhered, adding the following

NOTE.-The case Taylor v. Forbes, 13th January, 1853, reported in a foot note at page 19 of the Court of Session Cases for 1861-2 (24 D.), establishes the rule that where a party proposes to prove an agreement contrary to the ordinary rule of law agency, the mutual prestations of which are fixed by law, such agreement can only be proved by writ or oath. In respect of that decision the Sheriff adheres to the Interlocutor under appeal.

(SHERIFFS A. B. SHAND AND J. DOVE WILSON.)

JAMES SPENCE v. ALEXANDER M'BEY. Froof-Circumduction-Appeal-16 and 17 Vic., c. 80, sec. 19.—In the course of a proof, the defender in the cause left the Court without assigning any reason, although his agent wished to examine him as a witness at a certain stage of the proof. The defender's agent moved for a prorogation, in respect the defender had left before being examined, The motion was refused, and an Interlocutor circumducing the term for proving against both parties was pronounced. This was appealed, but appeal dismissed as incompetent under 19th sec. of 16 aud 17 Vic., c. 80.

one of the diets the defender was present duri taking of the greater part of the proof, but le was concluded he left the Court and went an the county town, for some reason never ap The proceedings which took place at the cle examination of the defender's other witness were m at the end of the notes of evidence, as follows:Crockatt, for the defender, moved for a pro in consequence of the defender having left being examined.

The Sheriff-Substitute, in respect no reas stated for the defender's leaving, refused the moti This Interlocutor was then pronounced:Circumduces the term for proving aga parties, and appoints them to debate.

This Interlocutor was appealed in the terms:

I appeal against this Interlocutor in respect cumduces the term for proving against the defend

On considering the process, the Sheriff pr the following judgment:

defender's appeal, dismisses the said appeal u The Sheriff having considered the proc tent in hoc statu.

NOTE.-By sect. 17 of the Act 16th and 17 c. 80, appeal is rendered competent, on the prod closed, only against Interlocutors "on the ad of evidence pronounced during the leading of the The Interlocutor complained of does not fall wa description, and is not an Interlocutor agains appeal is, in hoc statu, competent under sect. I

statute.

Act.

All. JAMES CROC

14TH JANUARY, 1864. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE—GLAS (SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON AND BILL)

WILLIAM COok & Co. v. ALFRED JOHNS A. W. SINGLETON.

Charter Party.-A vessel was chartered fro to Glasgow to be consigned to charterers' frie the charterers authorised an agent at Glasgow i to the ship's business. On arrival at Glas master and another, alleging that they actes owners, attempted to take charge of the vessel upon the charterers' friends applied for ant prevent them interfering with the vesselgranted.

THIS was a petition for interdicting the respond master of the barque "Enterprise" and Mr from interfering with the "inward busines vessel, on the ground that it had been consigned as the elected friends of the charterers, Messrs and Smythe, New York.

The Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the follow terlocutor:

Having heard parties' procurators, in terms of the ing appointment, and having seen the certified

arty produced in the said petition, and admitted by ders to be a correct copy, and also the charterers' dressed to the pursuers appointing them their convirtue of the power possessed by them under the rty, grants interim interdict as craved.

spondents appealed, and after a hearing the ronounced the following judgment:-

heard parties' procurators under the defenders' inst the Interlocutor for granting interim interdict, reto for the reasons stated in the following Note, ses the appeal.

-The point involved in this case is one of interest tance to the mercantile world, but it is singular that athority on the subject has been produced from the of England or Scotland. But the principles of law to it are so obvious that the case appears to the admit of an easy solution. The facts of the case these-a charter party was entered into at New ween the master of the barque, Enterprise, and urdoch and Smythe of New York, by which the ies, who shall be called the charterers, contracted e of the vessel for a voyage from New York to n the terms therein particularly stated, it being, a condition of said charter party that the vessel consigned, "inwards to Glasgow"to "charterers' ying not over two and a half per cent. commision ng to her inward business." In pursuance of this ty the vessel came from New York to Glasgow, titioners were selected as the friends of the charwhom the management of the vessel was to be at Glasgow. The letters appointing them are in d on the strength of that appointment it appears orrespondence that they had accepted a bill drawn by the charterers for £90 odds, and made other nts, as the elected consignees of the vessel, for dise duties connected with the vessel in the harbour When about to begin these duties, however, interrupted by the respondents, the master of the the party Singleton, who allege that they are by the owners to take charge of the vessel in that the right of the pursuers extends only to their ed payment of their commission of 2 per cent., void dispute, they are willing at once to pay them, o provide for the bill which the petitioners had the charterers, and in short to keep them entirely of any engagements which they had come under with the vessel. The question involved in this efore, is, whether in this competition for the nt of the vessel in Glasgow, the petitioners or 8 are entitled to prevail. It appears to the Sheriff that the petitioners are entitled to do so, for the asons:-The petitioners are the elected "friends" terers of the vessel from New York to Glasgow, unquestionable right to select their own agents ees here, resting on the undoubted principle that is entitled to select his own servants, agents, or to assist him in a matter in which they are jointly The respondents do not dispute that proposition, y that although the delectus persona is with the yet the right which their choice conferred upon the s only a right to their stipulated commission, and om any engagements come under for the vessel or nd as they are willing to satisfy the petitioners in espects, they (the petitioners) have no farther he matter nor right to interfere with the responmanagement of the vessel. The Sheriff, however, esce in that argument. No one can be deprived tto select his own consignees or agents merely ther party says he will secure the agents against ventual damages. The delectus persona comes in clude any such pretension. It is true there vity of contract between the charterers and the Whatever difficulties that might raise in the the Scotch principle of jus quesitum tertio comes e them entirely in this country. By entering into party, which stipulated for the right of the charct "friends" to manage the vessel in Glasgow, it right upon whomsoever they selected as their stand forward in their own persons in an action

such as the present, both to defend their own right under the principle of jus quesitum tertio, and also the right of their authors, the charterers, to have their business in Glasgow done by parties of their own selection. The charter party admits of immediate specific implement, and no man is bound to accept damages or an equivalent where specific implement, in terms of the contract, is at hand, and tendered. The rule of law is in locum facto Imprestabilis, succedit damnum et interesse, but it is nowhere said that the same succession takes place in loco facti PREStabilis. Alt. GALBRAITH & MACLAY.

Act. BURNS & MACLEAN.

14TH JANUARY, 1864.

SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (MR SHERIFF GlassFord BELL.)

WM. MENZIES, Appellant, v. MICHAEL HONYMAN (Carmichael and Neilson's Trustee), Respondent. Sequestration-Claims-Bankrupt Act 19th and 20th Vict., c. 79, sect. 133.-A dividend was accelerated on 6th August, to be paid four months after the date of the first deliverance, of which the usual notices were given, calling on claimants to lodge their claims one month prior to 31st October. A claimant did not lodge his affidavit claim till 6th October. The trustee having rejected the claim, the creditor appealed, but Sheriff' affirmed trustee's deliverance.

A PETITION was presented to the Sheriff to have a dividend on the bankrupt estate of Carmichael and Neilson, masons and builders in Glasgow, accelerated, and on 6th August, 1863, a deliverance was pronounced authorising the trustee to pay a dividend at the expiry of four months from the date of the deliverance awarding This sequestration, which was 31st October, 1863. deliverance was advertised in the Edinburgh Gazette, and intimation was also made that creditors must lodge their claims one month prior to 31st October, that is on or before 30th September next, in terms of the statute. This was also intimated to the individual

creditors, and among others to the appellant on 15th September. The appellant did not lodge his claim till 6th October, 1863. The respondent rejected the claim because, among other reasons, it had not been lodged within the statutory period.

After mutual minutes and answers, and parties' procurators having been heard, the Sheriff pronounced the following judgment:

Having resumed consideration of this appeal, Finds it instructed by the production No. 6/3, that at the meeting of the bankrupt's creditors, held on the 4th August last, the respon dent was directed to make application to the Sheriff for authority to accelerate the time for making payment of the first dividend in terms of the provisions of sec. 133 of the Bankrupt Act: Finds it instructed by the petition No. 6/4, and deliverance thereon, that the respondent made application accordingly, and was authorised by the Sheriff to make payment of the dividend on the 31st day of October last, and was appointed to intimate the acceleration by advertisement in the Edinburgh Gazette, and by notice to the creditors at least seven days prior to the expiry of the period for lodging claims, which was one month prior to the said 31st October, in terms of the 123d sec. of said Act, which provides that "to entitle any creditor to the payment of the first dividend, he shall produce his oath and grounds of debt one month before the

time fixed for payment of the first dividend, where such time shall have been accelerated:" Finds it instructed by the productions Nos. 6/6, 6/7, and 6/8, that the respondent advertised and gave notice as required, and in particular that he gave timeous notice to the appellant that his claim would require to be lodged not later than the 30th September last: Finds that the appellant nevertheless did not lodge his claim till the 6th October: Finds that the appellant pleads that the respondent cannot validly object to the late lodging of the claim in respect that as the sequestration was awarded on the 30th June, 1863, which day is not included in reckoning four months from the date of sequestration (see sec. 5), and as the accelerated dividend could not be paid sooner than four months from said date (sec. 133), the 31st October was a day too soon for paying said dividend: Finds, however, in the first place, that it is by no means clear that it was a day too soon, or that it was "earlier than four months" from the date of the deliverance awarding sequestration, seeing that although the word month means a calendar month (Smith, February 10, 1826), yet in reckoning from a particular day in one month, the month must be held to expire on the arrival of the same day in the next month, and the dividend was not to be paid till the day after that day: Finds, in the second place, that all things were rite et solemniter acta by the respondent, and that he proceeded under the authority of the Court in giving the notices and paying the dividend, and the statute is imperative that no dividend is payable to any claimant who does not lodge his claim "one month before the time fixed" for payment of the accelerated dividend, and the claimant was therefore bound to have complied with the terms of the Act and of the notice as regarded the lodging of his claim: Therefore sustains the first ground of rejection of the appellant's claim, as set forth in the deliverance appealed against, namely, that the said claim was not lodged within the statutory period, and dismisses the appeal, reserving to the appellant his right to an equalising dividend out of the first of the fund, if there be sufficient for that purpose, on occasion of payment of a second dividend: Finds the appellant also liable in expenses, allows an account thereof to be given in, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns.

C. G. KEWNEY & Co., Liverpool, and Mandatory v. THOMAS STEEL, Glasgow.

Purchase and Sale-Principal and Agent.-F. purchased goods from K., naming S. as the person on whose account he purchased. F. had previously acted as agent for K. F. subsequently sold the goods to S., and received the price. F. became bankrupt; thereafter K. raised an action against S. for payment-Held that F. was the purchaser from K., and action against S. dismissed.

THIS was an action for payment of a sum of £39, the price of a quantity of Allsopp's India Pale Ale, alleged to be sold by the pursuer to the defender. In defence it was pleaded that neither by himself nor any one having his authority did he purchase from the pursuers the ale in question, with an explanation that a purchase of the ale, and to the extent mentioned, was made by him from Mr Alexander Finlayson of Liverpool, to whom the price was paid. The record was closed on this minute, and after a hearing the Sheriff-Substitute, before answer, allowed both parties a proof, and to each a conjunct probation. Proof was also taken on commission in Liverpool. Proof having been taken and concluded, and parties' procu

rators heard, the Sheriff-Substitute pronouned t following Interlocutor:

Having resumed consideration of this process, h i proof and productions, and having heard parties' pa thereon, Finds that the pursuers have proved tha April last they sold to Alexander Vaughan Fins agent for the defender, 30 barrels, 4 dozen each, of A India Pale Ale, at the price of 3/6 per dozen, bez in all: Finds that, at the time of the sale, Finlays to the pursuers the defender's letter to him, of l April, 1862, No. 6/3 of process, being his authority t chase the ale, and told the pursuers that the parehas made for the defender, and the pursuers sold the sle credit of the defender: Finds that the defender paid Fin son the price of this ale, but Finlayson neglected and ta to pay the pursuers: In law, finds that Finlays purchased the ale as agent for the defender, having his principal in the transaction, and the purses an sold on the credit of the defender, the defender is a the pursuers for the price: Therefore repels the defence decerns against the defender in terms of the conclusion summons: Finds the defender liable in expenses, a account to be given in, and remits to the auditor to tar report.

NOTE. The evidence, parole and documentary prove that the defender employed Finlayson goods for him in Liverpool and ship them for the f markets; that he was in the habit of purchasing th in his own name, and drawing upon the defa price, with his own commission of 2 per cent. month's date; that the defender accepted these dra in London, with the proceeds of which Finlay sellers, and in the transaction in question acted far as he drew upon the defender for the price of this of other goods shipped in the same vessel, adding his mission of 24 per cent., and the defender accepted La payable in London one month after date, which the retired when due. But Finlayson appears in this tra to have departed from his usual practice so far as he t pursuers the principal for whom he acted and show. authority to make the purchase. He did this evils shown from his own evidence, because the pursuers his credit, and hesitated to sell to him without k whom he acted. The pursuers, therefore, clea sale on the credit of the defender, and whater 2 been the relationship of Finlayson and the defe usual transactions, in the case in question he was defender's agent, and as he failed to pay the p are entitled to look to the defender for payment.

This Interlocutor was appealed, and after sha the Sheriff pronounced the following judgment Having heard parties' procurators under the appeal upon the Interlocutor appealed against, made avizandum with the debate, and considered proof adduced, and whole process, Finds that this is for payment of £39, of a quantity of ale, alleged to hav defender, a merchant in Glasgow, through an agen sold by the pursuers, who are merchants in Liverpool » name of Finlayson, residing in Liverpool: Finds defence pleaded is an entire denial of liability fr with the explanation that the ale in question was b Finlayson as a principal, who in other transactions the defender, not from the pursuers, but from the the defender's agent, and who was paid the price defender: Finds that the Interlocutor under revie repels the defences, and decerns in terms of the libel Finlayson disclosed the defender as his principal. on the ground that in purchasing the ale from the fore that the transaction was between the pursuers defender, through Finlayson: Finds that the purcha "9th April. A. V. Finlayson. We have this day made by the writing, No. 8/1 of process, and in these 30 barrels, each containing 4 dozen ale, free on board, understanding that you pay in cash for the same after the vessel has sailed, less 23 discount, to be stipen this is a contract between the pursuers and Finla Isabella, for Antigua account, Thomas Steel: F contains no mention of the defender, Steel, either

ough Finlayson, except that the ale was to be shipped, el's account, in a vessel for Antigua, or to be to his as Finlayson's place of delivery: Finds that the defenleges that he bought the ale, which was sold by the puro Finlayson, from him, on the condition that it should pped, to his order, for Antigua: Finds that on the same he entry in the pursuers' day book is in exactly the same as the writing No. 8/1, but with the words "Thomas per," written immediately above the name "A. V. son," which words, "Thomas Steel, per," are above the or line forming the space or frame for the entry: Finds e blotting that is opposite shows that these last words, as Steel, per," were written at a different time from t of the entry, as they alone are blotted out, while the the entry is not so: Finds that a few pages on in the here is an entry to the effect that Finlayson wished the of the sale to be made to Thomas Steel, to enter the o him, which proves that Steel's name in the original as it now appears, was a superinduction: Finds that no ce that this alleged change in the contract was made e defender Steel's cognizance, or his approval: Finds ed that a bill for £101, which included the £39, the I the ale in question, was granted by the defender to

letter was shown to the pursuers or that the defender's credit was relied on in the transaction, which is evidently contradicted by the written contract itself, which immediately after was entered into between the parties; upon the whole, the present case seems to be one in which the defender bought the ale from a party, whom he had sometimes employed as his agent, as a principal, and which was paid for by him to that party, and an attempt is now made to compel him to pay the price a second time to a third party, the original seller of the goods, but with whom he never contracted. Act. JOHN NAISMITH. Alt. WM. BURNS.

4TH FEBRUARY, 1864.

SHERIFF COURT, KINCARDINE. (SHERIFFS SHAND AND J. DOVE WILSON.)

WILLIAM MELVIN v. JAMES Ross.

d this payment, become bankrupt: Finds it proved by suers themselves that the invoice was sent to Finlayson to the defender, and that no copy of it was sent to ender before 5th May, when Finlayson was insolvent: That the invoices said to have been sent to Finlayson in ender's name are not produced: Finds that the defenme appears in the shipping note, per "Isabella," for Finds that the defender in his deposition in causa that he always dealt with Finlayson as a principal as an agent: Finds it proved that the invoice which anied the letter by Finlayson, asking the bill for £101, , included the £39, the price of the ale in question, t the bill of £101 was accordingly granted and paid: hat the correspondence between the parties produced, s that on some occasions the defender dealt with Fins principal when Finlayson had the articles wanted, others when he had them not, he got the goods from uers: Finds, however, that in the present case, as the for the sale of the ale in question was in writing, and Insively between the pursuers and Finlayson, without tion of the defender, and a subsequent purchase of by the defender from Finlayson, and payment of the ving been made to him, that in these circumstances ved upon the whole that the pursuer's contract was Alayson, and that their claim lies against him and not nder, and that Finlayson's subsequent sale of the e to the defender has been paid for and satisfied: e, alters the Interlocutor appealed against, sustains Loes and assoilzies the defender from the conclusions tion: Finds the defender entitled to expenses, of which an account to be given in, and remits to the auditor e same and report, and decerns.

-The accounts of the transaction in question, given yson after his bankruptcy in his examination-in-chief, is cross-examination, are directly contradictory to each id the Sheriff is driven to determine to which of the it is to be given, by considering which is most supy other evidence, and especially the written contract ices in process. These appear distinctly to prove original contract, to which alone the pursuers were a as with Finlayson alone, and that the subsequent le of the ale to the defender by Finlayson, was by him pal. Finlayson says he was responsible for the price rauers, and so he undoubtedly was, as the original

m them, and he adds that his whole interest in the nt sale to the defender was a commission of 21 per he defender's agent. The document No. 6/5, which n says was shown to the pursuers when they hesitated ting Finlayson have the ale except for cash, does not t it was the defender's credit which was relied on in al sale by the pursuers, because if that had been the original entry of the sale in the pursuers' books would a in the defender's name, or in Finlayson as his agent, it is in Finlayson's alone. It only proves that the had given Finlayson private instructions to buy the private matter between them, but it is inconceivable layson was speaking truly when he said that this

counted by a bank; at maturity another bill was granted and also discounted by the bank. On the back of the first bill was written, "paid by renewal," and signed by the bank agent. The acceptor's (defender's) name on this second bill was a forgery—it was endorsed by the pursuer. When due, the pursuer had retired it, and raised this action for payment, founding on the original bill. The defender pleaded (1) That the bill was finally discharged when the renewal bill was granted; and (2) That the bank and the pursuer (without his knowledge) had made an arrangement with the acceptor, by which they agreed to give time (during the currency of the bill), whereby his right of recourse on the original bill was lost or injured-Held, (1) That the first plea was bad, and repelled; (2) That the second plea was good-the same sustained, and action dismissed.

THE summons concluded for payment of £31 contained in a bill drawn by the defender upon, and accepted by, James Molyson, and blank endorsed by the defender to the pursuer, dated the 22d February, 1861, and payable two months after date, with the interest thereof, at the rate of £5 per centum per annum, from the 25th April, 1861, when the said bill became due and payable, till payment, with expenses.

The bill on which the pursuer sued was found, when produced, to have been blank endorsed by him, and to bear on the back of it a receipt by the Bank of Scotland's agent at Stonehaven, stating that on 8th July, 1861, (some time after the bill fell due) it had been "paid by renewal of £30 15s." The pursuer stated that the renewal bill (which had been accepted by the acceptor of the original bill) having been dishonoured, he was ultimately obliged to pay the amount of the original bill

to the bank. This statement was denied.

The Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor:

The Sheriff-Substitute having heard parties' procurators on the closed record, before farther answer, allows to both parties a proof of their respective averments on record, so far as denied or not admitted: Grants diligence, etc.

NOTE.-At the debate, the pursuer mentioned that he was entitled, as holder of the bill libelled, either to have decrce at once for the sum sued for, or to have the defender limited to proving his defence by writ or oath. On examining the