into the defenders' warehouse there, as there was no one to receive them. They were burned that night in the warehouse, and the Court held that the carriers were not liable for the loss. The ground of decision was thus stated by Judge Buller-"The keeping of the goods in the warehouse is not for the convenience of the carrier of the goods, for when the voyage to Manchester is performed, it is the interest of the carrier to get rid of them directly; and it was only because there was no person at Manchester to receive these goods that the defenders were obliged to keep them." The present case is just the converse of that, for here the keeping of the goods in the shed was not for the convenience of the owner of the goods or his consignee, but for that of the defenders, the carriers; and they must be held, in the words of the Mercan tile Law Amendment Act, to be still "in their custody or possession." Now, there seems to be no reasonable room for doubt that, when put into the shed at the Broomielaw, the goods were still in the possession of the carriers, and were put there for their convenience. The engagement of the defenders was to deliver the goods in Glasgow to the pursuer's order. That order was sent from Dublin after the goods were shipped without a moment's delay. It arrived in due course of post in Glasgow, and was immediately presented to the defenders for delivery, but the goods had in the interim been burned in the shed. The contract of the defenders with the pursuer had not been fulfilled or come to an end when the conflagration took place. The carriers had still something to do before they were freed of their charge of the goods, and that something was to deliver them in Glasgow to the pursuer's order when presented, which it was in due time. The shed in which the goods were placed by the defenders and burned was in no respect the warehouse of the consignee. He did not pay rent for it, nor was any portion of it set apart for his convenience or the reception of his goods. On the contrary, all these qualities attached to the defenders. The goods were burned in a portion of the shed set apart by the Clyde Trustees for their use, guarded by their paid watchman, and for the goods deposited in which they had effected a large insurance against fire. In every point of view, therefore, the goods were burned when still in the custody or possession of the defenders as carriers, and consequently the obligation to make good the loss occasioned by the accidental fire attaches to them. The principle on which this case has now been decided, though apparently at variance, is in reality in harmony with a decision in a previous case, decided by the Sheriff some time ago in this Court. It was an action against the Glasgow & South-Western Railway Company for the value of some goods which they had Brought from Ayrshire to Glasgow, and which had been destroyed by fire while in their premises in Glasgow, and from which the Sheriff assoilzied the railway company. But the ground of that decision was that the goods there were addressed to a party in Glasgow, "to lie till called for." These words, after the goods had been carried to their destination, at once took the Case out of the category of liability of the railway company as 3. The defender was not liable for any part of the arriers, because the goods had arrived at the end of their expense of lining and ceiling the vessel, because (1) it ravels; and if the owner assigns a railway shed or warehouse was the duty of the master or owners of the vessel to is the place for their deposit till called for, he has no pretext line and ceil the ship, as this was required to make her or saying that they are still in the railway company's posses-ready for cargo according to the custom and practice ion as public carriers. But in the present case the goods had ot reached their final destination, but were still on their ravels till delivered over to the pursuer's order, and were mporarily deposited in the defenders' shed till they could be elivered over to the party holding the pursuer's order, who as to take them off the defender's hands, and did all he could o do so without any delay. lading, which contained a stipulation to pay “freight and all other conditions as per original charter-party," held liable for such charges only as were ejusdem generis of the freight, and not liable to pay demurrage, or for ceiling and lining incurred before the bills of lading were signed. THESE were two counter actions—the one at the instance of Smales and others, owners of the barque "Merrie England," against James Bald, corn factor in Glasgow, concluding for payment (1st) of £58 6s 2d, being the balance of the freight of a quantity of wheat and flour which had been shipped at New York, in pursuance of a charter-party between the pursuer, Gideon Smales, jun., and Messrs D. C. Barker and Company, merchants, Glasgow, and delivered to the defender as holder of the bills of lading, or as representing the charterers or shippers, granted therefor by the master of the said barque; and (2d) of the sum of £93 15s 8d, being the proportion payable by the defender as holder of the said bills of lading, or as representing the charterers or shippers, of certain charges incurred by the master for ceiling and lining the said barque in the port of New York, and for demurrage at New York, Falmouth, and Glasgow. Act. T. C. YOUNG. Alt. MONCRIEFF, PATERSON, Forbes, & Barr. 12TH MAY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. tories v. JAMES BALD, et e contra. The other action was at the instance of Bald against Smales and others, concluding for payment of (1st) £48 15s, being loss and damage sustained on account of the delay of the pursuers in delivering the said cargo; (2d) of the sum of £20, being loss and damage sustained in consequence of the improper stowage of part of said cargo; (3d) of the sum of £28 15s, the price of twenty-five barrels of flour which were not delivered; and (4th) of the sum of £2 2s, for sundry charges. Appearance was entered in both cases. action the following defence was stated:— In the first 1. The defender, in taking delivery of the cargo, did not represent Messrs D. C. Barker and Company, but was holder of the bills of lading, the same having been indorsed to him. 2. The pursuers charged freight on 1000 barrels of flour, but they only delivered 975. observed at New York, and which was in the view of the parties when the charter-party referred to was entered into; (2) as indorsee of the bills of lading, the defender was not liable for the expense of lining and ceiling the vessel, no notice of any such obligation being given in said bills of lading; (3) if the defender had been liable for said expense, he would have been entitled to receive the timber used in lining and ceiling, and it was of the value of £40. The pursuers had no right to sell said timber if they were to charge the defender with the cost of it. 4. The vessel was not detained by the charterers or the defender beyond the lay days stipulated. After she was ready to receive cargo at New York she was loaded with all despatch, and her cargo was taken delivery of bip-Charter-party-Freight-Demurrage-Bill of at Glasgow as quickly as the master would give it. He lading-Assignee.-An onerous indorsee of bills of unwarrantably delayed and refused to give delivery, and H* the defender had raised an action against the pursuers to account of freight, without making any intimation for loss occasioned by said refusal. 5. Compensation to the extent of £97 10s sterling, as stated in summons, raised at the defender's instance against the pursuers, dated 31st day of March, 1864. 6. The statements in the summons, in so far as inconsistent with the above, were denied. In the other action the following defence was stated for Smales and others, viz., a denial of the statements in the libel, so far as inferring liability against the defender for the sum sued for. The records were closed in both cases, and the second action was remitted ob contingentiam to the first. Proofs of their averments were allowed to the parties respectively and conjunct proofs, and the same having been led parties' procurators were heard, and the SheriffSubstitute pronounced the following Interlocutor:— Glasgow, 31st January, 1865.-Having again heard parties' procurators, and resumed consideration of the proof, productions, and whole conjoined processes, Finds, as regards the conclusion in the action at the instance of Smales, jun., and others, for the sum of £93 15s 8d as proportion of demurrage, at the rate of £6 per day, and of other charges payable by the party Bald, conform to account No. 2, annexed to the summons in said action, that it is proved, First, that the ship, "Merrie England," referred to in the charter-party No. 4/1, was ready to receive cargo at New York on 26th October, 1863, but that the agent there for the freighters refused, in consequence of instructions received from his principals, to put any cargo on board until the ship was lined and ceiled by the shipmaster for the owners: Finds that the master refused to do this, both because he was not certified that a grain cargo would be put on board, which is the only cargo where lining and ceiling are resorted to, and because the charter-party did not in any case lay the onus of lining and ceiling upon the owners, its only condition being that the "Merchants should find mats and the ship the wood for dunnage:" Finds that the master was justified for the above reasons in refusing to line and ceil, and it was not until the agent for the freighters granted the letter No. 4/4, and the master took the protest No. 4/14, that the agreement was made to line and ceil upon the conditions set forth in said letter: Finds that the delay thus occasioned, with the farther time necessary for lining and ceiling, extended to twenty-seven days, whilst the lay days at New York were forty-one in all, the loading having commenced on the 22d November, and having finished on the 5th December: Finds that it is proved, Second, That the cost of lining and ceiling was £48 10s 03d, and that the nett proceeds of the sale in Glasgow of the timber used for that purpose was £4, leaving £44 10s 0d as a proper charge against the freighters: Finds that it is proved, Third, That the other petty charges at New York, amounting in cumulo to £5 128 51d, are proper charges against the cargo for which a lien is reserved by the charter-party: Finds that it is proved, Fourth, That the "Merrie England" arrived at Falmouth on the 15th January, 1864, "for orders," in terms of the charter-party, which were "to be given in course of post from London, or lay days to count:" Finds that the course of post between Falmouth and London is three days, but no orders were received for the ship till the evening of the 27th January, so that nine lay days fall to be counted at Falmouth: Finds that it is proved, Fifth, That the ship arrived at Glasgow on 12th February, 1861, and was ready to discharge on the 13th; but owing to a dispute which then arose as to the party Bald's liability for demurrage, the discharge was not begun till the 17th February: Finds that on the 12th February the master received from Bald £350 that he had any claim against him for demurrage, and delivery orders were then granted; but the said master for, of any portion of the cargo effeiring to the freight refused to give delivery, which was forthwith applied paid, until the agreement No. 23/1 was entered into: Finds that the master was not justified in this absolute refusal, after having received unconditionally the said £350, he having abundance of remaining cargo to meet his claim for demurrage, and his agents, being the 16th February the letter No. 41/6, in which they for parently aware of this, wrote to Mr Bald's agents on the first time say, "Our clients are desirous to meet the wishes of the holders of the bills of lading as far as possible, and they will not object to the discharge of the cargo to a reasonable extent, and equivalent to the entitled to count as demurrage days the five days from freight paid: the 13th to the 17th February inclusive, and as the discharge was completed by the 29th, only twelve lay days fall to be reckoned at Glasgow: Finds that the total number of lay days were thus sixty-two, which is an excess of twenty-seven days over the lay days stipulated for by the charter-party, and for which twenty-seven days, instead of for thirty-one as set forth in the summons, demurrage is chargeable, making the gross sum of demurrage £160 instead of £186: Finds that it is proved, Sixth, That the party Bald is onerous indorsee of the bills of lading Nos. 7/7, 7/8, and 79, granted after the cargo was shipped at New York, and under which the obligation is to deliver for "freight si all other conditions, as per original charter-party:" Finds that by the said charter-party, No. 4/1, the owners serve to themselves a lien upon the cargo and goods laden on board for the recovery and payment of all freight, dead freight, demurrage, and all other charges whatsoever:" Finds, in point of law, that where the conditions of the charter-party are carried into the bill of lading by such words as are in the bills of lading held by Bald, the indorsee is liable, by virtue of the contract expressed in the bills, to the shipowner for demurrage and the other charges for which a lien is reserved against the cargo (see authorities quoted in the annexed Note): therefore Finds that the party Bald is liable under the said account No. 2 in the sum of £83 78 6d, being the same proportion to the reduced sum of £210 that £93 158 8d is to £236 23 6d claimed by the party Smales, jun., and others: Finds a regards the conclusion in the same action for the sum of £58 68 2d, as balance of freight, that it is not denied by the party Bald that said balance would have been due if the whole flour and wheat for which the said freight is charged had been delivered in due course; but Finds that in the counter action at Bald's instance he concludes, First, for the sum of £48 15s as the loss sustained by him through the refusal of the shipmaster to deliver, on the 12th, 13th, and 15th days of February last, the 10 barrels of flour for which Mr Bald held bills of lading, which were the top part of the cargo and the first deliverable, and the freight effeiring to which was greatly more than paid by the £350 paid to account by Bald on 12th February: Finds, as already stated, that the master was not justifiable in declining to honour the delivery orders after taking the above payment unconditionally. and is liable in the loss accruing by said refusal; bu Finds it not proved that the loss amounted to the sa sum of £48 15s-the more especially as it does not set established that the flour was deliverable sooner than 18th February, and the only direct evidence of loss is the given by Bald himself: Finds, however, that it is reason able to suppose that some loss and inconvenience d accrue from the delay which took place, and in tär whole circumstances assesses the same at the sum £20: Finds that the Second conclusion of the action at Bald's instance is for the sum of £20, as "Finds that the owners are therefore not ccasioned by the improper stowage of the wheat in bulk, at New York; and, 2d, That the conditions of the nd its consequent depreciation in value to that amount: charter-party giving a lien over the cargo for demurrage inds it proved that the bulk wheat was stored in the and other charges attached to Bald as onerous indorsee wer part of the ship and the flour in barrels was stowed of the bills of lading held by him. Upon the first point ove it; that it is customary with all vessels from Ameri- it is clear, ex facie, of the charter-party that no obligan ports to have boards or dunnage between bulk wheat tion is undertaken therein by the owners to line and d barrels of flour; that there was no such dunnage in ceil, so that there is no ground for holding them bound e "Merrie England" on the voyage in question, al- to do so, unless it could be shown that it was the known ough there always had been on previous voyages with and uniform practice at the port of New York. Now, similar cargo; that the barrels had in consequence it is admitted, in the first place, that it is only in the tled down in the wheat, and that a good many barrels case of a grain cargo being to be shipped that lining and in this way become loose, and had broken up, and ceiling, which is much more expensive than ordinary ir contents had run out and mixed with the wheat (see dunnage, is ever resorted to, whilst by the charter-party rveyor's Report, No. 17); that the wheat was thus in question the freighters had the option to put in a eriorated to the extent of one shilling per boll (see miscellaneous cargo, and their agent at New York would port No. 40, and evidence of witnesses Hart and not pledge himself to a grain cargo when he first dett); and that the loss thus sustained amounted to manded that the owners should line and ceil. In the least as large a sum as that concluded for; therefore, next place it is not proved that the burden of lining and tains the said conclusion: Finds that the Third ceiling falls at New York upon the shipowners irrespecclusion of said action is for the sum of £28 15s, tive of any undertaking to that effect; on the contrary, ng the price or value of twenty-five barrels of flour it is expressly deponed by the witness William Cook, ich the shipowners failed to deliver under the said Vice-Consul for the United States at Glasgow, that "it s of lading: Finds it proved that ten of said twenty- is not a rule at New York that a vessel to be loaded barrels were short delivered, they having apparently with grain must be lined and ceiled," and there is no ppeared altogether, and the other fifteen were ten-evidence which contradicts this testimony. The delay, ed for delivery, but refused from the damaged state heir contents (see letter No. 32/8): Finds that Bald ntitled to charge the price of the said ten barrels, ich seem to have been broken up by improper wage; but he is not entitled to charge the price of said fifteen, which he was bound to take in the state which they were tendered, seeing that it is not proved it their damaged condition was owing to improper wage, there being, on the contrary, evidence to show t it was attributable to an influx of salt water through ss of weather and straining of the vessel when at for which the owners are not responsible (see said ort No. 17, and the Log Book): Therefore, sustains said conclusion only to the extent of £12 2s 6d, g the value of said ten barrels at 22s 3d per barrel, which price the others were sold: Finds that the rth and last conclusion of said action is for the sum 12 2s, being the survey fees incurred by Bald; but, espect the said survey was necessary and customary, instructs that there was damage from stress of ther, as well as from improper stowage, disallows the claim: Finds that the sums thus found due to Bald, unting together to £52 28 6d, as also the freight ring to the ten barrels short delivered, being £3 making in all £55 17s 6d, fall to be deducted the balance of £58 6s 2d of freight concluded by the party Smales, junior, and others, leaving 88d still resting-owing in name of freight, which added to the £83 78 6d of demurrage for which is liable, leaves him debtor to Smales, junior, others, in the sum of £85 16s 2d, for which decerns in the action at their instance against said party Bald, and, in respect that his counclaims have been given effect to against the ht, assoilzies the party Smales, junior, and rs, in the action at Bald's instance against them: s, as regards the question of expenses, that each party been to a large extent successful in their respective ons; Therefore finds them mutually entitled to exes, with certification that the smaller amount will educted from the larger, and decree given for the ace against the party by whom it may be owing; 8 accounts of said expenses to be given in, and ts the same to the auditor to tax and report. (Signed) HENRY GLASSFORD BELL. OTE.-There is a congeries of questions involved in action. The two points which the party Smales, and others are most interested to make out areThat they were not bound to line and ceil the ship therefore, which took place at New York in consequence of the dispute about lining and ceiling was a delay occasioned by the freighters making a demand they had no right to insist in, and the loss of time so occasioned falls to be imputed against their lay days. As to the liability of the party Bald to pay the accruing demurrage, it is settled that the obligation to make such payment arises out of the terms of the contract, and, therefore, that if it be covenanted in the charter-party that a specified number of days shall be allowed for loading and unloading, and that there shall be a payment of a daily sum for detention beyond the specified time; and if words are introduced into the bill of lading, carrying this covenant into it, the person claiming and receiving the goods under the bill of lading is answerable for whatever may be due in respect of detention. (Abbot on Shipping, 10th ed., p. 220; M'Lachlan on Shipping, p. 446.) Accordingly, in the case of Wagener v. Smith, C. B. Reports, vol. xv., p. 285, it was held good evidence that the indorsee of a bill of lading was liable as per contract for demurrage that he had taken a bill of lading which made the goods deliverable on payment "of the agreed freight and other conditions as per charter-party." That case is on all fours with the present, where a lien over the cargo for demurrage and all other charges is expressly conditioned for in the charter-party, and where that portion of the cargo comprehended in the bills of lading held by Mr Bald is therein stated to be deliverable "for freight and all other conditions as per original charter-party." In the case of Chappell, May 29, 1861, Jurist, vol. viii., N.S., p. 177, Chief-Justice Erle said-"Í quite agree with the case of Stindt (5 D. & L., p. 460), Wagener (ut supra), and the other cases, a whole string of them which bear on this subject. And if a bill of lading contains a promise by the master to deliver on performance of a condition, the assignee who claims under such bill of lading the delivery of the goods from the master, impliedly promises he will do all things conditioned for if the master gives up his lien." Justice Wills said "That where it was stated, in Wagener and other cases, that the goods were to be delivered on payment of the freight and other conditions of the charter-party, the holder of a bill of lading which contained such statement was bound to look to the charter-party to see what were the terms used there, so far as they related to something to be done in regard to the delivery of the goods, and then the persons receiving the goods would be bound to pay demurrage if the payment of demurrage were mentioned in the conditions in the charter-party. It was bills of lading for any claim for demurrage incurred at the port of lading, or for the item charged for ceiling and lining the vessel at the port; and in respect the Sheriff cannot find sufficient materials in process, to decide what were the number of days charged for demurrage at New York, before the bills of lading were signed, the demurrage being claimed in the account No. 2, in cumda, as due both at New York, Falmouth, and Glasgow, although the charge for ceiling and lining the vessel is specifically stated, appoints parties' procurators to be heard there, and upon the sum to be decerned for, before the Sherif at the end of his appeal roll on Thursday first, the Zal instant; and with this exception, and the question of expenses, which is reserved for consideration, adheres to the Interlocutor appealed against, in so far as the findings are concerned, and dismisses both appeals, bat supersedes decerning for any sum till parties are heard thereon, and on the question of expenses. (Signed) A. ALISON. NOTE. This is a very nice and difficult question, rendered the more so by the elaborate and able Interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute, which, on some points, is at variance with the findings contained in the preceding Interlocutor. contended for Mr Bald that this general doctrine did not apply where demurrage was claimed as here for detention at the port of shipment before the bill of lading was signed; and he referred in support of this contention to the case of Smith v. Sieveking, W.R., Exch., vol. iv., p. 25, but that case does not bear out the argument, or lead to any such limitation. The action was, no doubt, directed against the holder of a bill of lading for demurrage which had occurred at the port of lading, and the claim was not sustained, but simply on the ground that the words in the bill of lading, "They paying for the said goods as per charter-party," did not carry forward into the bill of lading any obligation except to pay freight. Chief-Justice Campbell, in giving judgment, took care to say that he entirely approved of the case of Wagener, and that the notice of refusal at the time of receiving the goods would have availed nothing if the bill of lading had sufficiently indicated that they were deliverable on payment of demurrage. In Wagener's case no inquiry was made whether demurrage had occurred at the port of lading or the port of discharge; and the SheriffSubstitute can find no authority for making any distinction, the sole question being, is there a contract to pay demurrage whenever arising in the bill of lading? This view of the common law is materially strengthened by the terms of the statute 18th and 19th Vict., cap. 111, the first section of which is in these words: "Every consignee of goods named in a bill of lading, and every indorsee of a bill of lading, to whom the pro-ance thereof in the claim for demurrage, and for cling perty in the goods therein mentioned shall pass upon, or by reason of such consignment or indorsement shall have transferred to and vested in him all right of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract contained in the bill of lading had been made with himself." It is quite true that under this contract the bill of lading must be looked to in the first instance to ascertain what the contract there is, but if the conditions of the charter party be imported into it, then these conditions attach to the indorsee of the bill of lading. The questions raised by the action at Bald's instance do not so much involve matter of law as of fact, and the consequences flowing from the facts, as established by the evidence, have been given effect to by the findings in the above Interlocutor. The view which the Sheriff takes of the case is this. The main questions involved in the conjoined actions is, whether the party Bald, who is admitted to be an ener· ous indorsee of the bills of lading, is liable by his accept and lining, or in other words, for stowing the cargo at the port of lading, before the bills of lading ver signed or the vessel had sailed. That these are all go charges if properly substantiated against the freighters is sufficiently evident, and that equally whether they e mentioned in the charter-party or not. If the compe tion of the voyage is the mother of the freight, the celling and lining the vessel to receive the cargo may be aptly termed its father, for without it the freight conkl not be earned at all. In addition to this, by the charterparty produced in process, it is expressly stipulated that the owners of the vessel shall reserve to themselves ** lien upon the cargo and goods laden on board, for the recovery and payment of all freight, dead freight, demurrage, and all other charges whatever." There can be no question, therefore, about the liability of the original freighters, for both the charges of demurrage, and for Both parties having appealed, and been heard, the ceiling and lining, which are in dispute in the present Sheriff pronounced the following Interlocutor: (Initialed) H. G. B. Glasgow, 20th March, 1865.-Having considered the Interlocutor appealed against, and heard parties' procurators under their mutual appeals at great length thereon, and made avizandum, and considered the record, productions, and whole process in the conjoined actions, Adheres to the Interlocutor appealed from in so far as the findings, in point of fact, are concerned: Adheres to it also as regards the findings in point of law, with this exception, that the finding in the Interlocutor, "that where the conditions of the charter-party are carried into the bill of lading by such words as are in the bills of lading held by Bald, the indorsee is liable, by virtue of the contract expressed in the bills, to the shipowner for demurrage, and the other charges for which a lien is reserved against the cargo" is hereby recalled, and in lieu thereof it is found that where the bills of lading contain only the words that the indorsee shall be liable in freight, "and all other conditions as per original charter-party," the indorsee of the bill of lading becomes liable in such charges only as are ejusdem generis with the freight, and does not undertake the responsibility for payment of the demurrage incurred at the port of lading, before the bill of lading was signed: Finds, in pursuance of this finding, in point of law, that the party Bald, the holder of the bills of lading, is not liable under the assignment of the action. But the present case is different. It lies not between the owners of the vessel and the original freighters, but between these owners and an onerous assignee to the bills of lading. The latter is a third party, an onerous hohler of the bills of lading of the cargo, and there seems to be an obvious distinction on principle between the demanda with which he can be met, when he demands delivery of the cargo under the bills of lading, and those which, however good against the freighters, cannot properly stated against the recipient of the cargo. It is obviously the business of the charterers to put the cargo on board, and clear it of all the charges incurred up to the date the sailing of the vessel, leaving all other charges, incl ing freight and demurrage at the port of delivery, settled for and paid by the holder of the bills of lading To hold that that assignee is liable for the whole charg for which the freighters may have become responsi before the vessel sailed, is somewhat similar to what would be to hold that an onerous indorsee and holder of bill of exchange is liable for expenses incurred in const tuting and getting ready the sum contained in the bu The decided cases in England, accordingly, seem recognise this distinction. In the case of Wagener Smith, 17 Com. Bench Reports, p. 285, it was held tha the acceptance of "goods under a bill of lading taining words of reference, e.g., against payment of the agreed freight, and other conditions as per charter-party, to a charter-party by which demurrage is payable, will be vidence from which a jury may imply a contract by the consignee to pay it, but not if demurrage be claimed for etention at the port of shipment before the bill of lading as signed;" and in the case of Russell v. Niemann, 24th une, 1864, Common Pleas, C. B. Reports, xvii., p. 163, here the condition in the bill of lading was, that be goods were to be conveyed "into order, on assigns aying freight for the said goods, and all other conitions, as per charter-party," dated so and so, the uestion came up for decision, whether these words ported an obligation on the assignee of the bill of ding to pay all the obligations contained in the arter-party, and, in particular, a claim of damage r delay, though not specified in the bill of lading. nd Justice Wills, who delivered the opinion of the ourt, used these words-"The question is, whether e exception contained in the bill of lading is expanded the exception in the charter-party. That depends on whether the words, and other conditions, as per arter-party,' included all the stipulations and contions contained in that instrument, or whether they e not limited to conditions ejusdem generis with that eviously mentioned-namely, payment of freight. is a mere question of language and construction, and think it enough to say that the latter is the construcn which we put upon these words." In the present case, the words in the bill of lading are pay "freight and all other conditions, as per original arter-party." These are the exact words which were the bill of lading in the English case above quoted. nd since the Court of Common Pleas held that these ords imported only an obligation to pay charges ejusdem neris as the freight, and did not let in claims for murrage, which were not expressly mentioned in the I of lading, the Sheriff cannot see how a different ision can be given in the present case, which seems be identical with the English one above quoted. (Initd.) Parties' procurators having been heard regarding the mber of days charged for demurrage at New York ore the bills of lading were signed, and upon the sum be decerned for in terms of the preceding Interlocutor, Sheriff thereafter pronounced the following Inter ator: A. A. lasgow, 29th April, 1865.-Having resumed conration of these conjoined actions, and again heard ties' procurators in regard to the sum falling to be erned for, Finds, that under the findings and principles down in the last Interlocutor, that in the action at instance of the party Smales against the party Bald, des the balance of the freight sued for, which is adted, being £58 68 2d, the only claim which has been ained or allowed is for ten days' demurrage at Falth, during which the vessel was detained waiting for ers, which at £6 per diem amounts to £60, and that Party Bald's proportion thereof is £23 168 8d, which sum, added to the balance of freight above stated, es the total amount found due to Smales in the action is instance £82 2s 10d: Finds that in the counter on at the instance of the party Bald against Smales, sums to which Bald has been found entitled, are, 1st, item of £20 found due as the loss sustained by him ugh the refusal of the master to deliver the cargo; the item of £20 allowed as damage for improper rage; 3d, the item of £11 2s 6d as the value of ten els of flour not delivered; and 4th, the sum of £1 6d deducted from the claim for freight as the freight e ten barrels not delivered: Finds these various items ut in all to the sum of £53, which sum being deed from the £82 2s 10d found due to the party Smales, in the action at his instance, leaves a balance due to him in all of £29 2s 10d under the conjoined actions, for which sum decerns in favour of the party Smales against the party Bald, with interest as libelled, and quoad ultra assoilzies the defenders respectively in each of the actions; and upon the question of expenses, in respect the main discussion has been in regard to the claim for demurrage in the action at the instance of the party Smales, in which he has been unsuccessful, except for the proportion of the demurrage at Falmouth, and he has also been unsuccessful in the claim for ceiling and lining: Finds two-thirds costs due to the party Bald in the action at Smales' instance against him, and in the action at the instance of the party Bald against Smales, in respect the sums concluded for in that action were £99 12s in all, and the sum to which Bald has been found entitled is £53, and the party Smales resisted the claims in toto: Finds the party Bald entitled to two-thirds also of the costs incurred by him in the action at his instance, and to half-costs in the conjoined actions subsequent to the date of their conjunction; appoints accounts of said expenses to be given in, and remits to the auditor to tax the same and report: Alters the Interlocutor appealed against accordingly, and decerns. A. ALISON. (Signed) On 12th May thereafter the Sheriff-Substitute approved of the auditor's report, decerning against the parties Smales, jun., and others, and their mandatories, for the taxed amount thereof, being £20 2s 5d. Agent for Smales, Junior, and Others-J. B. DILL. 22D JUNE, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON, BART., AND STRATHERN.) GEORGE MACFARLANE, Curator Bonis of PETER PEEBLES, v. JAMES PEEBLES. Process-Title to sue-Curator Bonis.—In a summary action at the instance of a curator bonis to an imbecile person-Held that the curator bonis was entitled to suc in his own name, as curator, and was not bound to sue in name of the ward. THIS was an action commenced by a summary petition at the instance of George Macfarlane, curator bonis of Peter Peebles, an imbecile person eighty-seven years of age, against James Peebles, a nephew of the ward, craving for delivery of certain documents, etc., belonging to the estate of the late James Peebles, a brother of the ward, and uncle of the defender, and to whom the ward had been decerned executor. A minute of defence was lodged, objecting to the pursuer's title to sue, and the record was closed. Parties having been heard, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor: Having heard parties' procurators on the closed record, Finds it admitted at debate that the deposit receipts and others belonging to the estate of the deceased James Peebles, and concluded for, have been delivered over to the pursuer, and that the only point remaining for determination was the question of expenses; and on this subject finds that it depends on the sufficiency of the statements made, and pleas urged in defence, whether or not the defender is liable in expenses: Finds that the |