may be found altogether unnecessary-renders the action incompetent. The provision of the later of the Acts of Parliament above referred to is not happily expressed; but the Sheriff thinks it was thereby intended to give jurisdiction in the Sheriff Court to set aside deeds on grounds such as are maintained in this case, irrespective of the particular form in which the action is brought, and that the 10th sect. of the Act of 1856 may now be read as if the words "in the ordinary Court of the Sheriff, as in the Court of Session" in the later Act, had occurred after the words, "may be set aside either by way of action or exception," in the former, in which case there could be no question as to the competency of the action. The Sheriff does not think there is any good ground for the other preliminary points taken by the defender. In the special circumstances of this case, it is not without considerable difficulty that the Sheriff has ordered a proof at all. The bankrupt appears to have had debts of considerable amount at the date of the assignation; and neither the terms of the assignation itself, nor of the defender's statements on record, are such as to indicate distinctly the just, true, or necessary cause or consideration for which the deed challenged was granted. The defence should have stated precisely the consideration, if any, which was given for the assignation. But the defender, in article 5 of his statement, in general terms has said, that "the said William Murray duly received from the defender full value and payment for the whole subjects conveyed by said assignation;" and loose though this statement be, in the face of it the Sheriff does not see his way to dispose of the case without inquiry. He has thought it better to pronounce an order for proof in the ordinary terms, than by any finding now to settle the questions of onus which may arise on the concluded proof. (Initd.) A. B. S. In terms of the preceding Interlocutor, proof was accordingly led. The Sheriff-Substitute thereafter pronounced this Interlocutor: Stonehaven, 12th June, 1865.-The Sheriff-Substitute having heard parties' procurators on the closed record, and proof adduced, Finds that the assignation called for, being No. 11 of process, granted by William Murray, tenant of Mill of Barns, now deceased, in favour of his son, the defender, on the 3d day of January, 1863, was granted to a conjunct or confidant person without true, just, and necessary cause, and without a just price really paid, and after the contracting of lawful debts from true reditors; therefore declares the said assignation to have ocen from the beginning, and to be in all times coming, ull and of none avail, and reduces the same in terms of he conclusions of the libel, and decerns: Finds the puruer entitled to expenses, of which allows an account to e given in, and when lodged, remits the same to the uditor to tax and report. (Signed) J. DOVE WILSON. NOTE.-The Sheriff-Substitute does not see that he an usefully make many observations on the evidence in his case, as the state of the facts is too clearly made out o admit of discussion. That the granter of the assignaion was insolvent, and that the grantee was a conjunct r confident person, are both points clearly made out; nd it is equally clear that the defender has failed to rove that the assignation was granted for a just and ecessary cause, and for a just price. Whether the ransaction which took place between the granter and rantee in presence of the witnesses at the time the deed vas signed was a real or a simulated transaction there re no certain means of judging, for the defender is the nly person who gives evidence on that point; but hether it were so or not is immaterial. Even assuming he transaction to have been what it appeared to be, here is no proof that the amount of the granter's debts to the grantee was equal to the value of the things assigned; and even had that been proved, the transaction would just have been a fraudulent preference given to the defender, his son, to the entire exclusion of his other creditors. (Initd.) J. D. W. On appeal by the defender, the Sheriff pronounced this Interlocutor: Edinburgh, 25th July, 1865.-Having considered the process, proof, and productions, on the defender's appeal, Dismisses the appeal, adheres to the Interlocutor complained of: Finds additional expenses due, and decerns. (Signed) ALEX. BURNS SHAND. NOTE. The proof leaves no doubt whatever on the mind of the Sheriff that the assignation which has been reduced was a fraudulent device to defeat the rights of the creditors of William Murray, and was just such a deed as is struck at by the Act 1621, both in its letter and spirit. (Initd.) A. B. S. 28TH JULY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON AND STRATHERN). PATRICK M'GINN AND SPOUSE v. THE GLASGOW AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY. Process-Title to Sue-Married Woman-DefencesRelevancy. In an action of assythment for damages for the death of a child-Held (1) that a married woman has no right to be conjoined with her husband as a pursuer; (2) that in the record the answer "not known and not admitted" is not equivalent to a denial; and (3) a general statement that the defenders were "otherwise culpable" is irrelevant. Reparation-Assythment.-Circumstances in which it was held that a railway company was not responsible for the death of a child who had strayed on their line. THIS was an action at the instance of Patrick M'Ginn, shoemaker, Tradeston, Glasgow, and Catherine Duffy or M'Ginn, spouse of the said Patrick M'Ginn, with his consent and concurrence, as her curator and administrator-in-law, against the Glasgow & South-Western Railway Company and the Caledonian Railway Company, concluding for payment of £200, being damages sustained by the pursuers, and as solatium due to them, by and in consequence of the death of their son James, a child between six and seven years of age, which occurred on or about the 14th day of October, 1862, "through the fault, culpable recklessness, carelessness, or neglect of duty of the defenders, or their officials, officers, or servants, or others for whom they are jointly and severally, or severally, responsible, in having their railway or line, or part thereof at or near the head of Centre Street, Tradeston, Glasgow, open, unfenced, or unprotected against the public, or insufficiently so fenced or protected, or otherwise, through the fault, etc., of the defenders, whereby, on the date foresaid, the pursuers' said deceased son James, along with other children, was allowed to stray or go thereupon, and was then run over by a truck, waggon, or carriage, or other vehicle, which passed across the * K thigh of his left leg, and bruised and injured him severely, required the leg to be amputated, and caused his death," with interest and expenses. The record was made up by condescendence and defences. The pursuers in their condescendence set forth the circumstances of the case, and pleaded that the death of their said son James having been caused culpably by the defenders or others for whom they are jointly and severally, or severally, responsible, the pursuers are entitled to decree in terms of the conclusions of the summons. The defenders, the Glasgow and South-Western Railway Company, admitted that the accident took place, but denied that there was any fault on their part, and stated that the fault lay with the pursuers, in having allowed their child to stray to a place where he had no right to be. They also averred that they had given the pursuer, Patrick M'Ginn, £2 in charity, to help him to pay his son's funeral expenses, and he had given a receipt therefor, in which he acknowledged he had no claim. This receipt was signed by a mark in presence of two witnesses. They pleaded as follows: Preliminary-(1) The husband during the marriage being the sole administrator of the goods in common, is the only party entitled to sue, or liable to be sued in reference thereto. The summons in this case, which is at the instance both of the husband and the wife, is inept and incompetent, and the action ought to be dismissed. (2) The summons and condescendence do not set forth with sufficient accuracy and precision the grounds of action against the defenders. The accident is said to have happened in consequence of the railway being unfenced, or insufficiently fenced, or otherwise, and is ascribed to want of fencing, or insufficient fencing, or other fault. The summons and condescendence are thus alternative, vague, indistinct, and indefinite; the averments made in the summons do not warrant the conclusions of the libel, and the action should be dismissed. action as laid against them is incompetent, and ought to be dismissed with expenses. Their other pleas were the same as those stated for the other defenders. The pursuers' answer to the first article of the statement of facts for the Caledonian Railway Company, was "not known and not admitted." The defenders' statements regarding the payment to M'Ginn and the receipt were admitted; the others were denied, and the following additional pleas-in-law were stated:—(2) The receipt referred to in the defences is informal, and insufficient in law to any effect or intent. (3) Generally the defences are unfounded in fact and untenable in law. The record having been closed, a debate took place on the preliminary pleas, and the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor: Glasgow, 21st April, 1863.-Having heard parties' proce rators on the closed record, for the reasons assigned in the following Note, sustains the first preliminary defence stated for the Glasgow and South-Western Railway Company, and the second preliminary defence for the Caledonian Railway Company, and dismisses the action so far as it proceeds at the instance of the female pursuer: Finds it averred, as ground of liability against both defenders, that the pursuers' child was mortally injured by being allowed to stray on their railway or line at or near the head of Centre Street, Tradeston, the same having been left open or unfenced, and where the child was run over by a truck, waggon, or carriage: Finds it stated in defence by the Caledonian Railway Company, that that part of the railway or line whereon the child was so injured did not belong to them, but belonged exclusively to and was under the control of the other defenders, the Glasgow and Southmanagement thereof; and it is admitted by these other defen Western Railway Company, who had also the sole use and ders that the place of the occurrence formed part of their line of railway: Finds that to said allegation of the Caledonian and not admitted:" Finds that no ground of liability whatever Railway Company the pursuer in answer states, "not known can attach to the Caledonian Railway Company, unless the occurrence happened on the line of railway belonging to and used by them; and they are not accountable for the want of fences or for insufficient fences on a line or part of a line of railway with which they have nothing to do; and the purser having failed specifically to aver that the line at the place in dispute belonged to the Caledonian Railway Company, sad having further failed to deny that company's statement that the line is not theirs, must be held as confessed on that point; therefore sustains the first defence stated as preliminary for said company (but which is a defence on the merits), and assoilzies them from the conclusions of the action: Finds the account thereof to be lodged, and remits the same to the and male pursuer liable to said company in expenses, allows an tor to tax and report, and decerns. Farther, and so far as the action is directed against the remaining defenders, the Glas gow and South-Western Railway Company, Finds that the only relevant ground of action libelled is, that the line of rail On the Merits (1) The accident to the pursuers' son not having happened through the fault or negligence of the defenders, but having occurred in consequence of the boy's own fault, or through the fault of his parents in not looking properly after him, the pursuer, Patrick M'Ginn, has no claim against the defenders. (2) All claim on the part of the pursuer Patrick M'Ginn is barred and excluded by the terms of the receipt granted by him to the defenders. (3) The amount of damages claimed is extra-way at the place before mentioned was culpably and negëvagant and excessive. (4) Generally, and in the whole circumstances of the case, the defenders are entitled to decree of absolvitor, with expenses. The defenders, the Caledonian Railway Company, stated in the first article of their statement of facts, that the place where the accident occurred forms no part of the joint-line between Glasgow and Paisley, but belongs exclusively to, and is under the entire control and management of the other defenders, the Glasgow and SouthWestern Railway Company. Their other statements were the same as those made by the other defenders. Their first preliminary plea was that the ground on which the accident occurred, being no part of the property of the Caledonian Railway Company, or of the joint-line between Glasgow and Paisley, and they having no control or care of the same, and it not being used by them, the gently unfenced, or insufficiently fenced, in consequence (Signed) ALEX. STRATHERN, NOTE. It is an indisputable principle that all debts or claims accruing to a married woman (stante matrimoni where the husband's jus mariti and right of administration are not excluded, vest in him, and he alone has the right of action to recover. So firmly fixed is this rule, that a chim of damages for personal wrong, suffered by a married wom, to the level of the depot, and it has not been proved that the pursuers' son entered by any unfenced aperture in said wall, as alleged by him: Finds, therefore, in point of law, that the cause of the calamity in question was unhappily attributable to the pursuers' deceased son himself, and was not occasioned by any insufficient fencing of said depot, or other fault of the said defenders: Therefore sustains the defences and assoilzies the defenders, the Glasgow & South-Western Railway Co., from the conclusions of the action: Finds the pursuers liable and occurring during marriage, passed to her husband as a moveable right of hers, and which on his death transmitted to his representatives to the exclusion of the woman herself (Milne or George v. Gauld's Trustees, 14th January, 1841, 3 Session Cases, 345). Much more strongly, therefore, does this rule apply where the claim sought to be indicated by a married woman is derived through injuries done to a child. (Initd.) A. S. Both parties appealed, and, after a hearing, the in expenses; allows an account thereof to be lodged, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and Sheriff pronounced the following Interlocutor:decerns. (Signed) ALEX. STRATHERN. NOTE. The defenders' mineral depot, it is proved, was, at the date of the occurrence, the scene of constant traffic, rendering an open gate for access and egress absolutely necessary in business hours. That gate led to the defenders' own exclusive property, where children had neither right nor occasion to be, and from which nothing short of an entire staff of watchmen could possibly have entirely excluded them. The circumstance of part of the wall which enclosed the depot being at the time rebuilding, appears to have been entirely accidental, and has not been proved to have had anything to do with the occurrence. The boy was injured before two o'clock in the day, when masons and other workmen were busily occupied with the building, and was therefore the least likely place for boys to have attempted entrance at; but beyond that, even if they had so entered, they would still have had a steep bank to scale just within the wall, and which was itself a fence against approach to the level of the depot. The evidence of the witness Ure, however, rather tends to instruct that the trespass had been effected by the gate, because when that witness chased the pursuers' son from the depot a very few minutes before the casualty, it was in the direction of the gate the boy ran. It was impossible to impute blame to the defenders or to their servants, who seem to have been pestered by boys straying on their depot among the property piled there. And with respect to the law of the question, it seems to be determined by the strictly analogous cases of Davidson v. Monklands Railway Co., 5th July, 1855, 17 Sess. Cases, 1038, and Balfour v. Baird & Brown, 5th June, 1857, 20 Sess. Cases, 328. (Initd.) A. S. Glasgow, 13th August, 1863.-Having heard parties' procurators under their mutual appeals, upon the Interlocutor appealed from, and whole process, adheres to the Interlocutor in so far as it dismisses the action in so far as insisted in by the female pursuer, in respect any claim for damage or solatium competent to the female pursuer on account of the death of the child is vested, jure mariti, in her husband, the other pursuer, and it is incompetent for a husband and wife each to claim damages for the loss of their child; and, upon the merits of the action, adheres to the Interlocutor in so far as it assoilzies the Caledonian Railway Company; but, in the whole circumstances of the case, Finds no expenses due to that company; and, as regards the other defenders, the Glasgow & South-Western Railway Company, Finds that the statement in the summons that the pursuers' child met with its death in consequence of the said railway company having left their line of railway unfenced, or insufficiently fenced, whereby the child was enabled to stray upon the line of railway, where it met with its death, is relevant and suffiiently specific to be admitted to probation; but that the general allegation that in addition to that the defenders were Otherwise guilty of culpable negligence, whereby the child vas killed, is too vague, and cannot be admitted to probation, and so far varies the Interlocutuor, but quoad ultra adheres o it, allowing the proof, with this addition, that the pursuer allowed a proof of the whole circumstances attending the granting of the receipt, founded on by the defenders, granted y the male pursuer, which is signed by a mark, and the lefenders a conjunct probation thereanent, and dismisses the ppeals. (Signed) A. ALISON. Thereafter proof was led by both parties, and after a lebate on the closed proof, the Sheriff-Substitute proounced the following Interlocutor: Glasgow, 18th April, 1865.-Having heard parties' proarators on the concluded proof, and whole cause, Finds it roved that the pursuers' son, James, a boy between seven nd eight years of age, was, on the 14th October, 1862, the ate libelled, and shortly before two o'clock in the afternoon, ortally injured while swinging on a low truck loaded with ig iron, and which truck was moving along unattended in a ye or side line of rails within the enclosed mineral depot ear the head of Centre Street, Glasgow, belonging to the efenders, the Glasgow & South-Western Railway Company: inds that the boy had fallen from the truck on which he as swinging before one of the wheels, which passed over his ft thigh, crushing the limb and fracturing the bone, and hich limb was soon afterwards amputated, and the boy ed: Finds that he had, along with other children, been espassing on said depot at the time of the occurrence, and d no right or occasion to be there, and he had been chased the depot a very short time before he was injured by the tnesses Smith and Ure; but he had contrived to return noticed: Finds that although part of the wall which ensed said depot, next Centre Street, was then being taken wn and rebuilt in sections of twenty feet at a time; and hough a service gate of about three and a half feet wide i been formed in the wall, yet workmen were constantly re, and who were expressly warned to prevent and did vent children trespassing on the depot by these openings: ads that, in addition to this protection, there was a preitious bank of about sixteen feet in height inside said 1, and between it and the level of the depot: Finds that re was a great deal of trade and traffic carried on at the ot during business hours, and access to and from it was a gate near the point where the wall was being rebuilt, by which trespassers generally found access unobserved The pursuer appealed, and parties having been again heard, the Sheriff adhered, and pronounced the following judgment: Glasgow, 28th July, 1865.-Having heard parties' procu rators under the pursuers' appeal upon the Interlocutor ap pealed against, and made avizandum, and considered the proof adduced and whole process, for the reasons stated by the Sheriff-Substitute, adheres to the Interlocutor appealed against; but in the whole circumstances of the case, Finds no expenses due, and so far varies the Interlocutor complained of; but, quoad ultra, dismisses the appeal, and decerns. Act. AGENTS FOR POOR. (Signed) A. ALISON. Alt. JAMES MORRISON. 2D AUGUST, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON, BART., AND H. GLASSFORD BELL.) Carson, Warren & Co. v. A. G. Scott & Co. Bill of Exchange-Endorsement-Lex Loci.-A foreign bill of exchange, drawn for payment of a debt due in this country, and endorsed according to the law of Scotland, is a negotiable enstrument, although the endorsation be invalid according to the law of the country where the bill was drawn. Proof-Writ or Oath-Competency.—In an action by the endorsees and holders of a first bill of exchange against the drawers, who refused to accept or pay on the ground that they had accepted and paid the second by . advances made to the endorsee-Held that the defence could only be proved by the writ or oath of the pursuer, or of their endorsee. THIS action proceeded on a summons at the instance of Carson, Warren & Co., bottle manufacturers in Glasgow, against A. G. Scott & Co., merchants there, concluding for payment of £84 7s 2d, contained in a first bill of exchange drawn by Weir, Scott & Co. of Valparaiso upon the defenders, dated 30th August, 1862, payable six months after sight to the order of Neil Lamont, sometime commission merchant and bottler in Glasgow, now abroad, and endorsed by him to the pursuer for value; and which bill was, on 24th October, 1862, duly presented to the defender for acceptance, and thereafter, on 27th April, 1863, presented for payment, and which bill was duly protested both for non-acceptance and non-payment. It was alleged also that the defenders were bound to accept and pay said bill when due, or at all events to pay it when due in respect that they had at the date of the presentation for acceptance, and also at the date of the presentation for payment, or at all events at the latter date, funds in their hands belonging to the drawers of a greater amount than the sum contained in the bill; in respect also that the drawers of the said bill and the defenders are identically or substantially the same firms, or at all events they hold themselves out to the public to be so. The record was made up by condescendence and defences. The defenders admitted that the partners of their firm, and of Weir, Scott & Co., were the same; and that the bill in question had been duly presented for acceptance and payment, but they averred that at the date of the presentation of the bill, the second of exchange of the same bill which they hold had already been paid by advances made by them to Lamont, under an agreement with him. They also averred that the bill of exchange founded on had not been validly endorsed and transferred to the pursuers by the law of Chili. Blank endorsements of bills of exchange are absolutely prohibited, and are null and void, and endorsements must be made on the back of the bill, describing the name of the person to whom it is made over, the value, if that was in money, in merchandise, or in deduction of account, the date and the signature of the endorser. These are the same formalities as are required by the law of France, and specified in articles 136, 7, 8 of the "Code de Commerce." The endorsation in question is blank, and is deficient in all the formalities, and the same is by the law of Chili of no force and effect, and null and void. The pursuers replied that the law of Chili did not apply. Parties were heard on the question of international law involved, and the nature of the proof to be allowed, and thereafter the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor: Glasgow, 27th February, 1865.-Having heard parties' procurators, and reviewed the process, Finds that the bill of exchange, No. 8/1, founded on by the pursuers, was drawn in Valparaiso, in the republic of Chili, and was admittedly a good bill according to the law of Chili when so drawn: Finds that it was transmitted to the payee in this country to obtain | acceptance and payment, and was by him endorsed to the pursuers, the present holders: Finds that the defenders plead that the endorsation is invalid, not being in the form recognised by the law of Chili: but Finds that said bill was drawn for the purpose of effecting payment of a debt due in this country, made here in common form, according to the law of Scotland, and is a negotiable instrument here; and the endorsation being the said bill was thereby effectually transferred to the pursuers; therefore repels the defences founded on the said plea, and in respect it is not denied that the defenders are substantially the same parties as the drawers of said bill, being their Glasgow house: Finds that their defences upon the merits can be established in the face of their own document only by the writ or oaths of reference of the pursuers, or of their endorser, Neil Lamont; allows the defenders a proof by writ accordingly, and to the pursuers a conjunct probation; grants diligence against havers, and appoints the cause to be enrolled in the diet roll of the 7th proximo. (Signed) HENRY GLASSFord Bell, NOTE--It is settled law that whatever relates to the con stitution of a contract is to be governed by the law of the country where it is made, and that whatever relates to the enforcement of it is to be governed by the law of the country in which the remedy is sought. A bill of exchange, therefore, "drawn and endorsed in blank in a country where an endorsement in blank does not operate, as a transfer of the bill, cannot be sued upon by the holder in the courts of this country" (Trimbey, June 9, 1834, Ross's Leading Cases on Commercial the laws of the country where it is made, and drawn with the Law, Vol. I., p. 804). But, on the other hand, a bill good by express view of having effect given to it in this country, may be validly endorsed in Scotland in the manner recognised by our law, either before or after acceptance (See Lord Mansfeld's observations in Robinson, Ross, ut supra, p. 774). (Initd.) H. G. B. The defenders appealed, and the case was debated before the Sheriff, who pronounced the following Interlocutor, adhering: Glasgow, 2d August, 1865.-Having heard parties' procurators under the defenders' appeal, upon the Interlocutor appealed against, and whole process, Finds that this is an action founded on a bill drawn at Valparaiso, and transmitted by the drawers to the payee in this country to obtain acceptance and payment, having by him been endorsed according to the present action for payment of the contents of the bill; and the Scotch form in favour of the pursuers, who have brought the defence is, that the bill not being endorsed according to the lex loci of the drawers, the pursuers have no title to sue on the bill; in respect the endorsation is good by the law of Scotland: Finds that it is immaterial that the bill was not endorsed according to the law of Valparaiso; therefore adheres to the Interlocutor on the objection to the pursuers' title, and in respect the proof allowed is by the writ or oath of the parsuers, or of their indorsee, which is the proper mode; adheres on the mode of proof, and dismisses the appeal. (Signed) A. ALISON. NOTE. It has been often decided that a foreign bill of exchange, if accepted, falls to be negotiated according to the law of the acceptor's domicile; but it is contended that an unaccepted bill must be judged of in a question as to whether But although it is undoubted law that the validity of every it has been duly transferred by the lex loci of the drawer. bill itself must be judged of acording to the lex loci where the bill was drawn, it is a different question whether, if the bill has left that country, and is endorsed according to the law of the country where it is made the ground work of an action, is may not be enforced according to the law of that country. The lex loci of the endorsation seems to be the proper rule für such a question, and the law of the country where the bill was originally drawn is irrelevant. Storey, p. 516, 5th ed., lays it down that if the lex loci of the endorsement makes a bill endorsable, it becomes actionable, though it may not be so according to the law of the loci contractus. Act. JAMES GALBRAITH. (Initd.) A. A. Alt. T. G. WRIGHT. 8TH AUGUST, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, CLACKMANNANSHIRE ALLOA. (SHERIFFS TAIT AND CLARKE.) ALEXANDER M'DONALD v. JAMES SNOWDOWNE. Process-Title to Sue-Mines Inspection Act, 1860Summary Procedure Act, 1864-Appeal-Competency.-A summary complaint at the instance of a person designed as Secretary to the miners of Scotland, against a coalmaster for contravention of the Mines Inspection Act-dismissed on the ground that the pursuer had no title to sue, and an appeal to the Sheriff against this decision held to be incompetent. THIS was a complaint under the Summary Procedure Act, 1864, raised at the instance of Alexander M'Donald, secretary to the miners of Scotland, against James Snowdowne, coalmaster, Tillicoultry, setting forth that the said James Snowdowne had contravened the Act 23d and 24th Vict., cap. 151, in so far as on the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th days of July, 1865, the coal in the coalpit situated in the parish of Tillicoultry and county of Clackmannan, known as the Woodlands pit, of which he was the owner, having been in the course of being wrought out by him, a number of his workmen being employed for that purpose, and black damp or carbonic acid gas, being a noxious gas, having accumulated in the said mine or colliery, the said James Snowdowne neglected to produce an adequate amount of ventilation in said mine, to dilute and render harmless the said noxious gas, and in consequence thereof the working places of the pit levels, and workings of the mine, and travelling places to and from such working places were not, under ordinary circumstances, in a fit state for working and passing therein, whereby the said James Snowdowne was liable in a penalty not exceeding £20 sterling. Mr J. GUTHRIE SMITH stated, in behalf of the responlent, that action had been taken by the pursuer under the Summary Procedure Act. He had two objections to the competency of the complaint. It could not be enterained, first, because complainer was not entitled to sue; and, second, because he had no interest to insist in the complaint. His Lordship would observe that the complaint bore to be at the instance of Alexander M'Donald, ecretary to the miners of Scotland. What the nature f this gentleman's office was they did not know. It was not a partnership, nor an association; and what the erms of admission to the ranks were, or for what purpose was in existence, they were entirely in the dark, so far s it affected the present action, and therefore these words ought to be deleted. It amounted to this, that a ertain member of the community, having no interest, ad taken it upon himself to come before his Lordship nd say that the law was not being carried out. If Mr I'Donald was entitled to come in this way, everybody om John O'Groat's to Land's End, was entitled to me forward at any time and present a complaint. The ct of Parliament 1862 bore to be for the regulation and spection of mines. Its provisions were of a twofold nd. In the first place, it contained sundry provisions to the persons to be employed in the mines; secondly, contained sundry provisions for the safety of the iners. It provided under the first head that no child der ten years of age could be employed in the mines, d under the second head there were certain duties delved on the owner of the mine. He then went on to read the Act at considerable length, which set forth the mode of procedure to be adopted for the prevention of defective ventilation in coal pits, which consisted of their being inspected by an officer appointed by Government for the purpose; the communication by that officer regarding auy irregularities; appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of the cause of complaint not being removed, followed by an action at the instance of the ProcuratorFiscal, and, in the event of a conviction, the imposition of a penalty not exceeding £20. The law on the subject was divisible into two parts, the first of which was for the protection of the workman against the owner, and the second for the protection of the owner against the workthe special or general rules laid down he was liable to imman. If any person employed in the mine violated any of prisonment. Now, the question was one of a very comprehensive and important description, and it came to this, that if this person of the name of M'Donald, who lived in Lanarkshire, came and prosecuted the owner, he was equally entitled to come and prosecute the workmen, whether the party interested chose to take proceedings in the matter or not. Now the only provision in regard 25th section, which set forth that all penalties were to to the recovery of penalties was the one contained in the be recovered in a summary manner prescribed by the law before two Justices of the Peace or the Sheriff; that was to say, in the manner prescribed by the law prior to the passing of this Act of Parliament; in other words, legislation would seem to have said that inasmuch as the enforcement of the statutory and common law of Scotland in relation to offences is already entrusted to a public officer specially authorised for the purpose, we don't think it necessary to make any change. If any doubt were entertained upon this construction it was removed by the words which followed, showing the they were imposed. These were not to come into the manner in which the fines were to be disposed of after pocket of any private member of the community, they were to go to the Queen, subject to the disposal of the Secretary of State, and failing his interference in the matter, they were to be put into the Consolidated Fund for the purposes of the country. He then pointed out that, considering the terms in which the decree of the Court would require to be expressed in the event of a contravention of this statute being proved, it would devolve upon his Lordship to adjudge to whom the money was to be paid. The payee, the person entitled to grant a receipt to the pursuer for the penalty, must be named in the decree, otherwise it would be void. His Lordship could not decree the penalty to be paid to the Clerk of Court in behalf of her Majesty. The decree would be, "pay to the complainer." The consequence would be this, that they would have an unknown individual of the name of M'Donald, who lived in the county of Lanark, constituting himself recipient of monies levied for behoof of the Queen. Thus the maxim of constitutional law which lay at the root and foundation of all civil law, that no person was entitled to represent the Queen unless he was empowered or commissioned by her Majesty so to act, would be set at naught. No person was entitled to come into Court in any other character but his own, and if he assumed to represent the Queen he must have a commission to that effect. He then went on to show that to entitle any informer to prosecute for penalties the statute itself must give him the right so to do, and he cited a number of cases where the right to do so had been repudiated. Only a public prosecutor or an interested party could do so, neither of which Mr M'Donald could claim to be. He cited a case in which the Duke of Roxburgh was prosecutor for another party, being himself an interested party, but in consequence of the fact not being stated in the complaint the action was dismissed. For three good and sufficient reasons it must be held that the prosecutor in the present action was not entitled to |