goods in security of a general balance of alleged illegal rates and exactions: Holds the present application as restricted to these two points, and sustains it to that extent, but quoad ultra dismisses the application: Finds, in point of law, in regard to the respondents' right to retain for a general balance, that they are entitled to such retention, provided the rates for which it is claimed are in themselves legal and competent, but they are not entitled to such retention to support or enforce payment of illegal rates or exactions: Finds that the respondents have no right to exact higher rates for the conveyance of goods along their railway than they are exacting from other parties for the same kind of goods along the same line; and in respect both branches of the case, now sustained as competent, appear to depend upon the same point, as to whether the rates which the respondents demand from the petitioner are the same as those charged to other parties or different, upon which point the allegations of parties are directly opposite to each other, before further answer, and with a view to the proper determination of the question of interim interdict, and the interim regulation of the rights of parties pendente lite in the Court of Session, and for that purpose only, allows both parties a proof of their respective averments on the matter remitted to probation, and to each a conjoint probation: Grants diligence against witnesses and havers, and remits to the Sheriff-Substitute to fix a diet as early as possible for taking the proof, and do further in the cause as to him shall seem just: Meantime, alters the Interlocutor complained of accordingly, and, quoad ultra, reserves all questions between the parties hinc inde for the decision of the Court of Session. NOTE. The present case, as well from its novelty as from the pecuniary interests at stake between the parties, must evidently terminate in the Court of Session, and therefore the Sheriff would beg to suggest for the consideration of the able agents for both parties to remove this case ob contingentiam to that Court, with a view to its conjunction with the leading process there, when the branches of the case, as well as that embraced in the leading petition to the Supreme Court, as the matters embraced and sustained in this application may be embraced in one process, and at once disposed of by their Lordships. (SHERIFFS N. C. CAMPBELL AND ANDERSON. HUTTON & M'CALMAN v. THOS. WAUGH (M'MURRAY, WEIR & Co.'s TRUSTEE.) Purchase and Sale-Joint-Owner-Interdict.-Calico printing blocks, prepared at the joint expense of two firms, one of which became bankrupt, were sold by the trustee of the bankrupt firm. The other firm applied for interdict against their delivery to the purchaser until their interest was discharged or arranged, but interdict refused. THE petitioner applied for interdict against the respondent giving delivery of three lots of printing blocks which he, as M'Murray, Weir & Co.'s trustee, under a private trust deed, had sold, at least as much interest as the bankrupts had in the blocks. The petitioners alleged that they had an interest in the blocks to the extent of a half, because they had furnished the designs and paid for the cutting of a portion of them, and they wished their interest to be discharged or arranged before delivery to any purchaser. Interim interdict was granted, appearance was entered for the trustee, and his defence was contained in a minute. The defence was, that the blocks in question were the produce of the material and skilled labour of the bankrupts; the petitioners having, however, contributed part of the expense, the respondent merely sold the interest in said blocks which belonged to th said M'Murray, Weir & Co. (on whose estate he is trus tee), whatever that interest might be. Explained the the said blocks were sequestrated for the rent due to th landlord, and the sale was carried out by permission ( the landlord to pay him, and realise the estate amon the creditors. The petitioners' statements are not rel vant to warrant the conclusions. The record was th closed. Thereafter parties' procurators were heard, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Inte locutor: considered the process, Recalls the interim interdict, and The Sheriff-Substitute having heard parties' procuraton a misses the petition: Finds the petitioners liable in expe allows the respondents to give an account, etc. Under a private trust deed of date the 22d August las NOTE. This is a peculiar and somewhat difficult a affairs of M'Murray, Weir & Co., calico printers, Kilmarex were being wound up for behoof of their creditors. Mr Wa the respondent to this action, is the trustee. On the 4th of August, the whole of the bankrupts' da (including the subject of this interdict) had been alre sequestrated for rent at the landlord's instance. On the of October, with the landlord's consent, the respondent a the bankrupts' plant as per catalogue No. 3. Amag printing blocks thus sold, it is admitted that the petsa have a certain interest in Nos. 83, 84, and 85 of cats ga The petition sets forth that the respondent sold to P M'Gregor & Co., calico printers, Kilmarnock, the bazir interest in these blocks at £20 5s, and craves interdict aga delivery of them to the purchaser, on the ground t petitioners, who have also an interest in the blocks, ad consent to the sale. selling the bankrupts' interest in the blocks to M'Gre It was admitted at the debate that the respondent, be Co., offered it to the petitioners at the ascertained vals £20 5s, and which the petitioner declined. In these cin stances, the Sheriff-Substitute thinks the petitioners are entitled to prevent the respondent from giving delivery o blocks to M'Gregor & Co. It will not do to say that are willing to sell their interest to him. He has no auth to make the purchase. He is appointed solely to realis effects and wind up the estate. It is admitted to be a re practice in the trade for two or more firms to have a ji terest in the same blocks, the manufacturer, as here, geze cutting it on the block. By the custom of the trade furnishing the design, and the printer executing the wo printer dare not print for any other manufacturer with chased the bankrupts' interest in these blocks, they o joint-owners consent. Though M'Gregor & Co. have print from them without the petitioners' permission. If attempted to do so, they could be immediately interd getting delivery. To compel the trustee to hold them, The petitioners, therefore, suffer no wrong in M'Gregor be to prevent him from winding up the estate, and den himself of the trust. The petitioners are not entita adopt this dog-in-the-manger policy. They have refe purchase the bankrupts' interest themselves, and the Substitute thinks they are not entitled to prevent the re dents from disposing of it to those who are willing to pur It is a peculiar mode of owning movables, but it is the without adverting to nicer and more difficult questions. the admitted custom of trade is sufficient in the circumst to justify the delivery to the purchaser. It is somewha the author has not parted with the copyright. logous to a publisher having stereotype plates of a work The petitioners appealed, and lodged a reclaiming tion, to which answers were ordered and lodged. I after the Sheriff pronounced a judgment adhering added the following NOTE.-It appears that the bankrupts, M Murray, W question, to the extent of one-half, and were in the ex Co., calico printers, were owners of the printing th possession of the blocks. The pursuers claims an inter them, to the extent of one-half of the value thereof, in respect they furnished the designs, and paid the cutting of some of them, or a portion thereof. This is the pursuers' own stateent of their title to sue. They do not say that they ever assessed the blocks, and it would appear they never did. What the legal nature of the pursuers' "interest" in the blocks sy be, it would be difficult to say from their statements, hich contain no averment of possession, of contract, or of mership. M'Murray, Weir & Co., being in the legal possion of the blocks, became bankrupt. The trustee on their ate exposed their right and interest in the blocks to sale by blic roup, and Messrs Higginbotham, through the intervena of an agent, became purchasers. The trustee was accordly about to place Messrs Higginbotham, a firm of the best respectability, in precisely the same position that the krupts occupied with relation to the blocks, by giving posion thereof. At this stage, and not till then, the petiers intervened, and say you shall not give the purchaser ession. They do not say that they themselves are entitled session. They could not maintain that. And it is clear the trustee selling them is not entitled to the custody of , because he sold all right and interest he had in them, ading therein any right he had to possess them. Now, is the trustee to be interdicted from putting the purin the exact position with reference to the blocks in eh he or the bankrupts stood? In asking interdict, the fers are bound to furnish some satisfactory ground or for their request. But they have furnished none save that they did not consent "to a sale of the said blocks." pears to the Sheriff that this is not a good reason for inet. There is nothing to prevent a joint-owner from sellis own pro indiviso right, and putting the purchaser into lace, unless there be some agreement to the contrary. Com. Last ed. 793, et seq., Bell's Prin., sec. 1073. This is ded by all the authorities. And this is all the trustee ses to do. It is true that a joint-owner cannot sell more his pro indiviso right, and in the present case there is no nent that the trustee is attempting to do so. Had it averred that the purchaser had intended to use the blocks lly or without the consent of the petitioners, or that the were in danger of being lost or destroyed, there might been some ground for invoking the intervention of the But no such things are averred on record. In short, is no averment of any wrong or threatened wrong, and, fore, there is no sufficient case for applying the extraor y remedy of interdict. 1.J. SIMPSON. Alt. D. R. & T. B. ANDREWS. 6TH FEBRUARY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, PERTHSHIRE-PERTH. (DR BARCLAY.) 2. WELCH, Writer, Coupar, v. JAMES M'ARTNEY. f Court Act-Petition, form of-Summary.a petition for ejection, the name and designation of defender was omitted in the preamble. Objection, the petition was disconform to the schedule of the riff Court Act, sustained. TITION for ejection was presented by a trustee under estration, to remove the bankrupt from his house, "operty. jected—Preliminary—The petition is not according form in the schedule to the Sheriff Court Act, in that it omits to state the name and designation of efender in the preamble annexed. This is only ory and not imperative, and the narrative shows the defender is. At all events, the petition may e amended. e following Interlocutor was pronounced and aced in: Having advised the (short) record on the preliminary plea, Sustains the same, dismisses the action, finds the defender entitled to expenses; remits the account thereof to the audi tor to tax, and decerns. NOTE. It is with reluctance the Substitute sustains the objection, but it appears one that goes to substance and not to mere form. The omission is, therefore, incapable of amendment. The Act of Parliament anxiously provides that the original writs which bring a defender into Court, whether by a summons or petition, should set forth in the front a partibus, clearly stating who are the parties to the suit, both pursuer and defender. If this be non-essential with the latter, as little can it be said to be so with the former. This is more necessary in a petition than in a summons. In the latter case it is impossible to get into the conclusion without setting forth the parties. But as a greater latitude is permitted in summary petitions if the defender is not set forth distinctly in the preamble, it might sometimes be somewhat difficult to spell out who is the party complained of, from the loose narrative often given. In point of fact, the articulate statements which were in use to be appended to petitions in the old formula (and which are still followed in bills of suspension), were decidedly preferable to the unmethodical statements now given, where facts, argument, and law, are often very inartistically blended together. Act. WILSON. Alt. SKEETE. 8TH FEBRUARY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, ELGINSHIRE-ELGIN. (SHERIFF D. M'LEOD SMITH.) CRUICKSHANK v. GARDEN. Promissory Note-Negociation-Sexennial Prescription -Minority-Sequestration.-Held that a promissory note, blank endorsed to a minor, does not prescribe within the years of minority of the indorsee. A CLAIM was lodged in the sequestration of John Cruickshank, farmer, Clones, by Alexander Cruickshank, wine merchant, Forres, for the sum of "£1000, being the amount of a promissory note granted by the bankrupt to the deceased John Burgess, farmer and cattle dealer, Phonas, Ballindalloch, on 6th Sept., 1855, payable on demand, which promissory note was endorsed by the said John Burgess, and is now held by the deponent. That the said promissory note was granted by the bankrupt for money received by him in loan from the said John Burgess. That the bankrupt's first wife was illegitimate, and a reputed daughter of the said John Burgess, but he was under no obligation to make any adand believes, was he in law or fact conjunct or confident vances to the bankrupt, nor, as the deponent is informed with the bankrupt. That the bankrupt's first wife died in the year 1851, and he married a second time in the year 1853. That the said John Burgess had, at various times, made other loans to the said John Cruickshank, and received from the bankrupt written acknowledgments therefor as the money was advanced. That the bankrupt, finding it inconvenient to make payment when demanded, and the said John Burgess being desirous to have these advances put on a proper footing, got the interest thereon calculated up to the sixth day of September, 1855, and of that date obtained from the bankrupt five promissory notes for the whole advances made by him, and of which the promissory note now claimed on was one. That these calculations were made, and the promissory notes written out by the agent of the said 2. The said note has not been duly negociated. It has never been discounted or noted, nor has any demand for payment been made. Mr Thomson, in his Treatise on Bills, p. 435, states that it must be decided from the circumstances of the case, whether the chief object of the granter or indorser of promissory notes payable on demand, was to put them into circulation as with ordinary bankers' notes, in which case there seems to be no definite time for presenting, or whether they were merely drafts or bills on third parties issued for the purpose of paying a single debt. The note in question, supposing that the bankrupt had a right to grant it, appears to fall within the latter category, and it is therefore apprehended that it ought to have been presented for payment within a reasonable time after the indorsee received it, and without undue delay (Thomson, p. 461, Bell's Com., 4th ed., vol. i., p. 321). The longest delay that the trustee knows to have been sanctioned by the Court was five months, Leith Banking Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 221 January, 1836. But in this case more than eight year John Burgess. That the said John Burgess endorsed the promissory note now claimed for of the date it bears, and delivered it over as a gift to James Cruickshank, sometime wine merchant in Forres, who is a son of the bankrupt's by his first wife (the reputed daughter of the said John Burgess), and a full brother of the deponents, and the same was afterwards acquired by the deponent from him for a valuable consideration. That the said John Burgess died in the year 1857, leaving a considerable amount of money. That the said James Cruickshank was born on the fourth day of December, 1837, and became of age on the fourth day of December, 1858. That the deponent was born on the twenty-second day of November, 1840, and became of age on the twentysecond day of November, 1861, and the deponent is informed and believes, that the prescription of the said bill or note is interrupted by the minority of the said James Cruickshank and the deponent during the period they were the holders of the said note, and the creditors therein." Upon this claim the trustee pronounced the following have elapsed, without the note being presented or prodeliverance, dated 19th July, 1864: The trustee rejects the claim for the following reasons: 1. The promissory note founded on has undergone the sexennial prescription, but the deponent states in his claim that the prescription of said note was interrupted by the minority of James Cruickshank, sometime wine merchant in Forres, who originally held the note, and from whom he acquired it, and also by his own minority, the said James Cruickshank having been born on 4th December, 1837, and come of age on 4th December, 1858, and the deponent having been born on 22d November, 1840, and come of age on 22d November, 1861. But the trustee is of opinion that the law that the years of minority of the creditor in a bill or promissory note are not counted in the six years, the expiry of which deprives promissory notes of their value as grounds of diligence or action, does not apply to the case of a minor being a blank indorsee. The statute which introduces the exception of minority is the 12th Geo. III., cap. 72, sec. 36. It is there enacted, "That the years of minority of the creditors in such notes or bills, shall not be computed in said six years." The words "creditors in such notes or bills" evidently means the party named in the bills. The trustee is not aware that the point has ever been matter of judicial determination, and he believes writers differ in opinion on the subject. Professor Bell, in his Commentaries (5th ed., p. 395), states the rule thus:-"The years of minority of the holder are not computed in the six years;" but it is not unworthy of notice, that in his Principles, which are subsequent in date, he uses the words of the statute, and speaks of the minority of the "creditor," and so also does Dickson, vol. i., p. 354, and Glen on Bills, p. 308, Mr Thomson on Bills, p. 689, and Mr Napier on Prescription, p. 849, both state broadly, that the exception of the years of minority is available to an indorsee, but they evidently refer to a special not a blank indorsation. It is stated by Professor Menzies, p. 375, that the benefit of the Act applies only when the minor is himself nominatim the creditor in the instrument, and it appears to the trustee that any other rule would open a wide door for fraud. tested. 3. Mr Burgess, the indorser of said note, was conjunct with the bankrupt. The circumstance of the bankrupt's first wife having been illegitimate, cannot affect this relation. Conjunct persons have been held to include parents and children, fathers and sons-in-law, and the mother of an illegitimate male child, to the father thereof. If an illegitimate child is acknowledged by the father, the relationship is as close as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock, and if that child be a daughter, and enter into the marriage relation, the husband is a truly the son-in-law of her father as if he had married his legitimate daughter, and sons-in-law have been hel to be conjunct persons (Bell's Com., 4th ed., vol. ii., P 193). 4. Such being the case, it is necessary that the bank rupt should have been solvent at the date of granting th note on 6th September, 1855. It is not stated that he was so, and the trustee understands that he was The bankrupt, in the deposition emitted by him befor the Sheriff-Substitute of Elginshire on 8th April states that in 1851 he lost upwards of £4000 by b brother, Alexander Cruickshank, and he also enumerat various other losses of large amount; and says farthe that in consequence of these losses, he found himself difficulties, but kept matters going on, by paying inter on his liabilities, till the year 1861. He was unable pay the losses sustained by him through his brother, a the liabilities incurred for him are now mixed up and form part of his own liabilities. It seems very likely that a man who, in 1851, had lost upwards £4000, after which he acknowledges he found himsel difficulties, should be in solvent circumstances in 18 when these obligations, with accumulated interest, w still due, and be capable of undertaking obligations the amount of nearly £2500. The trustee would, in event, require evidence on this point. 5. It would be also necessary for the claimants to s that the note in question was granted for a necess cause. The cause of granting is stated in the claim, the bankrupt in his deposition states that he got no ma with his wife at the time he married her, but sui quently to that his father-in-law advanced, at different tines, sums amounting to £2500. He thought when he got that money that he should not have to repay it. This statement, coupled with the fact of no diligence having been done on the bill either by the father-in-law rindorsee, and no demand of payment having ever een made or any interest paid on it, are circumstances afficiently out of the ordinary course of bill transactions, render it necessary for the claimant to bring other and ronger evidence than he has done of the grounds of the bt. If the sum contained in the note was gifted, and the bankrupt was in solvent circumstances at its date, was not entitled to grant the note. The trustee has not ordered the claimants to produce y additional evidence, because, if his decision on the stion of prescription and negociation is well-founded, h evidence will not be required. This deliverance was appealed, when, after hearing ties, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following erlocutor: The Sheriff-Substitute having considered the closed record, the productions in process and whole cause, recalls the verance appealed against: Finds that the promissory note ed on by the appellant was not prescribed at the date of kaging his claim in the sequestration, and repels the pleas he respondent to that effect: Repels also the second plea w of the respondent to the effect that the said promissory was not duly negociated, and before answer quoad ultra s to both parties a proof of their respective averments, in as the same are not admitted, and to each of them a unct probation, and appoints the proof to proceed at a and place to be afterwards fixed. The principle contended for by the respondent in his second plea in law, relates entirely to the negociation as regards the question of recourse. No question of this kind arises in the present case. Act. F. C. MACKENZIE, Forres. 13TH FEBRUARY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-AIRDRIE. (MR SHERIFF LOGIE.) ROBERT LIVINGSTONE'S SEQUESTRATION. Appeal-Sequestration.-In consequence of some irregularities at a meeting of creditors, on appeal by the bankrupt, a new meeting called by the Sheriff in terms of section 169 of the Bankruptcy Act. THE bankrupt was the appellant in this case, founding on certain irregularities in the proceedings of a meeting of his creditors, which are referred to in the Sherriff's Note. Having heard parties' procurators viva voce on the minutes in process and whole cause, Finds that a meeting of the appellant's creditors was held on 9th December, 1864, for the purpose of finally deciding on an offer of composition made by him at a previous meeting of his creditors: Finds, from the minute of said meeting, it is recorded that twelve creditors in number, whose debts respectively were not under £20, and creditors in value to the amount of £610 12s 2d, voted for the motion of Henry M‘Lachlan, accountant, Coatbridge, that said offer be rejected, while nine creditors in number, and OTE.-The appellant is at any time entitled to fill up the creditors in value to the amount of £1617 7s 0d are recorded k indorsation which at present stands on the promissory in said minute as having voted for the motion of James claimed on, with a special indorsation in his own favour. M'Laren, sheriff-officer, Airdrie, that said offer be accepted: n the case of Patrick v. Watt, 8th March, 1859, 21 D., p. | Finds that it was thereupon resolved by the creditors assemthis may be held as done, and being so held to be done, bled at said meeting, that a majority in number of the crediippellant must be held, in virtue of such indorsation on tors having voted for the rejection of the offer of composition, romissory note, to be the creditor therein in terms of the and there not being four-fifths of the said creditors who voted of Parliament founded on. The date of such indorsation for its acceptance, that the said offer of composition had been held by presumption of law, in the absence of any state- rejected: Finds that against this resolution the present appeal to the contrary, to be the date of the promissory note, has been taken, on the grounds that the resolution of the credear, that if the minority of the appellant during the ditors is not truthfully recorded in the minute of said meetsubsequent to the date of the promissory note being, and that several of the claims ranked upon said estate are cted from the currency of the prescriptive period, that not due by the bankrupt, and therefore craving that said resod was not nearly run at the date of the sequestration, or lution be recalled: For the reasons stated in the annexed note, e date of the claim lodged for the appellant. sustains the appeal, and in the circumstances appoints a new might have been more satisfactory, in regard to the date meeting of the creditors to be held to reconsider said resolue acquisition of the promissory note by the appellant if tion, under and in terms of the 169th section of the Bankrupt etual date had been expressly set forth, instead of being Act: Finds the respondent liable in expenses, allows an account o be inferred from a presumption of law. The actual of the appellant's expenses to be given in, and when lodged, in question has not been thus set forth. It is, however, remits the same to the Depute-Clerk of Court, as auditor, to 1 by the appellant, and admitted by the respondent, that tax and report, and decerns. romissory note was, on the day on which it was granted, indorsed, and delivered by the payee to an elder brother sppellant, who at that time was also a minor, and that s acquired by the appellant from the elder brother to it was so delivered; it is assumed by the pleas for the adent that it was so acquired by the appellant, while he was a minor; and it is not alleged or maintained by the dent that it was prescribed either before or when it was quired by the appellant. The presumption which has acted on as to the date of the indorsation now held by ppellant is, therefore, substantially consistent with all It may be further presumed, that if it were not so, f the respondent considered it to be of advantage to his he could have called upon the appellant to have been explicit on this point. Even if it were necessary to the f the appellant that the minority of the previous holder promissory note should be computed as well as his own, y no means clear that he would not be entitled to have omputed, or that the argument of the respondent to the that the admitted holder of the promissory note was not r the time the creditor therein in the sense of the Act liament, would be held to be tenable. NOTE. Some nice points of a novel character arise in this appeal. The appeal itself is not at the instance of a minority of the creditors, but at the instance of the bankrupt himself, directed against a resolution of his creditors, come to at a meeting held for the purpose of deciding upon an offer of composition made by him, at which meeting ex facie of the minute, his offer was rejected. At the meeting in question, the vote appears to have been taken in an unusual and irregular manner. In the case of three of the creditors, John Maxton, Alex. Bizzett, and Robert Lumsden, the trustee is recorded as having voted as their mandatory for the rejection of the offer, although in each of these cases a later mandate was produced at the meeting in favour of parties who supported the motion for the acceptance of the bankrupt's offer, and de facto, in two of the cases, those of Maxton and Bizzett, the votes are recorded and counted as having been given in favour of both motions. So also in the cases of James Taylor, M'Gilchrist & Co., John Martin, and John Dick, the votes are counted for the sum in the original claim and affidavit, although the trustee had adjudicated upon and sustained the claims to the extent in some cases of a third only, and in others to the extent of about a half of the original claim; and in the case of Thomas Buchanan, a creditor claiming to the extent of £70 odds, the whole claim had been rejected by the trustee as prescribed. In no case had his decision been appealed from, and it is now final. These votes were all recorded for the rejection of the offer; some of the votes, including Buchanan above referred to, having been given by the trustee himself for the claimants. In like manner the votes of the following parties are recorded as having been given for the acceptance of the offer: James Livingstone, the bankrupt's father, James Christie, Charles Wilson, William Duncan, John Pate, Wm. Waddell, and James Duncan, although in each and all of these cases the trustee had rejected the claims, also without appeal, his decision being now final. To some of the other votes given there are formidable objections, which would probably have been sustained in the event of a scrutiny. But it appears from the minute that no resolution was come to at the meeting as to the right of any of the parties to vote, and in the case of the double mandates as to which mandate should be sustained, and no protest was taken by the apparent minority of the creditors to the result, as recorded in the minutes. Had, therefore, the present been an appeal at the instance of creditors, it would seem, from the judgment of the Court in the case of Robertson v. Shiells, 13th Dec., 1842, that they could not now have been heard on appeal. The bankrupt himself, however, appears to the Sheriff-Sub stitute to stand in a different position in a case of this kind, although he has a material interest in the decision come to by his creditors. He had no right to attend the meeting and object to the votes given, or to protest against their validity; and secondly, in the appeal taken by him against the resolution of his creditors, no objection is taken by the trustee in the minute lodged by him to the appellant's right to appeal and dispute the accuracy and truthfulness of the minute of meeting. But in Ord v. Barton and Mandatory, 3d July, 1846, it was held that a party in an appeal to the Court from the Sheriff's judgment, was not entitled to plead his cause on grounds different from those contained in his minutes, so that on the same principle the trustee is now shut out from objecting to the competency of this appeal. As it is incompetent to ask the Sheriff's judgment in the first instance as to the validity of any claim or vote recorded at a meeting of this kind (Robertson v. Shiells above), where there has been no resolution of the creditors themselves, either sustaining or rejecting it, there seems no other course, assuming the competency of the appeal, but to order a new meeting of the creditors, to be held in terms of the 169th section of the Act. For Appellant, WM. YOUNG, Coatbridge. 14TH FEBRUARY, 1865. SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE---AIRDRIE. (SHERIFF LOGIE.) THE pursuer, Andrew Knox, had been an inmate of the poor-house of New Monkland for four years. Knox had brought an action for damages against two of the leading members of the board for alleged assault and wrongous imprisonment, and thereafter the board passed a resolution by which the inspector was instructed to demand a disposition or assignation executed by Knox. This he refused to sign. In consequence of this refusal, Knox was expelled the house, and refused relief of any kind. An application was made to the Sheriff on behalf of the pauper. The statement for the inspector was as fol lows: 1. The petitioner was admitted as an inmate of the poor-house of New Monkland on the same terms and conditions as the other inmates, one of these conditions being, that if the parochial board granted either outdoor or indoor relief, the pauper would grant and subscribe the declaration and disposition annexed to the schedule of application for relief used by the New Monkland Parochial Board. 2. The said John Alston, as instructed by the parochial board, requested the petitioner, in terms of the conditions upon which relief is afforded by the parochia. board, or as otherwise entitled to demand the same, to grant a general disposition and assignation in the terus contained in the said schedule, a copy of which is herewith produced, in security and for the purposes 23 therein specified, and upon his refusal to do so he was expelled from the poor-house, and a certificate of refusal of relief granted to him, which certificate the petitioner is called upon to produce. 3. The respondent has nothing whatever to do, either as an individual or as inspector, with the said action referred to in the petition, and any reference to it in the petition is irrelevant, and the petition itself is uncalled for and unnecessary. The 73d section of the Poor Law Act prescribes the mode of action which ought to have been adopted by the petitioner. 4. It is admitted that the petitioner is a fit subject for parochial relief, and the said parochial board ben offers to admit him into the poor-house, and thereby afford him adequate relief, upon his complying with the terms and conditions upon which relief is afforded by the parochial board, including the signing of the gener assignation before referred to, as contained in said printed schedule herewith produced, or such other dis position and assignation as may secure to the parochis board repayment of any expenses and aliment that may ANDREW KNOX, a Pauper v. JOHN ALSTON, Inspector be incurred by them in affording relief to the petitioner of New Monkland. assignation of his estate then presently belonging, which may thereafter belong to him as may secure them repayment of any advances which they may ma to such paupers. 5. The parochial board, while affording relief, is Pauper-Assignation.-A pauper was admitted to a poor- titled to demand from any pauper, and the pauper house and remained therein for four years without hav-bound to grant in their favour, such a disposition ing been asked to sign any declaration or disposition. At the end of that period he was then asked to sign a disposition. He refused and was expelled the house. On an application to the Sheriff to be restored-Held that it was incompetent for a parochial board to make it a condition of relief to insist that a pauper should sign a disposition, and that even under such a deed it would be incompetent to raise any action either against the pauper or others through him for repetition, because relief was in the nature of a gift or donation, and not a debt. It was answered on behalf of Knox as follows:petitioner's answer is, that he has no present means, any vested interest on which funds can be raised. has no funds or means, present or prospective, which be made available, or of which a conveyance can demanded, and he pleads in law 1. The petitioner being seventy years of age and |