Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [October, wig, or cultivate his beard in such a way, or wear false whiskers, or in some other way disguise himself, in addition to moving to another state, or while staying in some secluded spot in the state, where his obligation was incurred, that would be no legal obstacle to bringing a suit. It would be simply throwing a difficulty in the way of finding, or recognizing, the man. So, taking on an additional name is only another element of the same kind of disguise. It interposed no legal impediment to the pursuing of the remedy, provided he should be found. It might make it more troublesome to find him. I think, therefore, it is not a case under our statute, or upon equitable principles established before the statutes, covering the points upon which the party can be restrained from setting up the statute of limitations. The taking on of another name is an act of disguise, and of secretion, but it interposes no legal impediment. Then, again, the bill, I think, does not allege any diligence in hunting defendant up. (See Norris v. Haggin, supra.) The bill states that it was rumored, or supposed, that defendant was killed in Nicaragua, and intimates that, perhaps, he caused the rumor to be spread. If complainant believed public rumor, without taking the trouble to verify its truth, and failed to pursue its rights for that reason, that is its misfortune, or its fault. The defendant has lived openly and publicly in one of the most frequented parts of the state for thirty years. It is scarcely possible that he has not met hundreds of people who knew him under the name of Kissane during the last thirty years. Even imbecility of the creditor is stated by Story not to afford any excuse in equity for not commencing a suit within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. (Story, Eq. Jur. 1521 a; Norris v. Haggin, 12 Sawy. 56, 57; 28 Fed. Rep. 282.) Much less should a failure to hunt for a debtor by reason of belief in a public rumor that he is dead excuse neglect, and abrogate the statute. Then, again, there is a technical ground against maintaining this bill. There is no allegation that complainant has commenced a suit at law, or that defendant has attempted to set up the statute of limitations, or that he has even intended to set it, should a suit be commenced. Non constat that he would set it 1887.] Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. up. Complainant cannot know that he will do it, until it commences a suit and ascertains. There is no allegation of a threat to set it up. The bill only alleges that complainant believes the statute would be set up. This is insufficient. I do not think that complainant's belief, or fears, without some facts indicating the purpose of defendant, can constitute equitable grounds for relief. But there is no equity in the bill, and the objection is radical, and cannot be obviated by amendment. The demurrer must be sustained, and the bill dismissed; and it is so ordered. THE DUNDEE MORTGAGE TRUST INVESTMENT COMPANY v. J. R. CHARLTON, SHERIFF. CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF OREGON. 1. COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION-WHO MAY APPEAR BEFORE IT. - Any person who has property listed on the assessment roll of a county for taxation is "interested" in the proceedings of the county board of equalization, and may appear before it and have redress against an unjust and unequal valuation of property on said roll, to his injury, whether the same is caused by an over-valuation of his own property or an under-valuation of that of others. 2. SUIT TO RESTRAIN THE COLLECTION OF A TAX.- A person who is aggrieved by the wrongful action of an assessor in the valuation of his own or others' property for taxation, cannot maintain a suit in equity to enjoin the collection of any portion of the tax resulting from such action, unless he first seeks redress at the hands of the county board of equalization, as provided by statute. Before DEADY, District Judge. Mr. John W. Whalley, for the plaintiff. Mr. W. R. Bilyeu, for the defendants. DEADY, J. This suit is brought to restrain the county of Linn and the defendant Charlton, its sheriff, from collecting the one half of the taxes levied by the county in 1884 on the mortgages owned by the plaintiff on real property therein, amounting to $1,172.85. From the bill it appears that the plaintiff is a foreign corporation, formed under the laws of Great Britain, and is the owner of promissory notes of the nominal value of $150,348.71, secured [October, Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. by mortgages on lands in Linn County; that the same were assessed by the assessor of said county in the year 1884, for taxation, as real property, under the act of October 26, 1882, at their nominal value, while all real property not under mortgage was only assessed at from one third to one half its value; that the tax levied on said assessment of the plaintiff's notes and mortgages amounts to $2,345.90, one half of which is in excess of the taxes levied on property generally of the same value, and is therefore alleged to be illegal. It also appears that the plaintiff has paid the one half of said taxes, and that the county through its proper officers will, unless restrained by the decree of this court, proceed to make the balance of said tax by the sale of said notes and mortgages. The answers of the defendants admit the allegations of the bill, except as to the valuation of the real property not under mortgage, and aver that the same was valued for taxation at its true cash value, as required by law. The evidence in the case is quite voluminous and contradictory. But considering the relation of the witnesses to the subject-matter, and the interest which most of them have in the question involved in the controversy, their several means of knowledge, the character of their testimony, and the difference in the value of lands as appears from the assessment roll and that for which they were sold by the owners, as appears by the county record of conveyances, it is evident that the average valuation of lands in the county not under mortgage did not exceed sixty per centum of their "true cash value," and probably not over fifty per centum thereof, such "value," as defined by statute (2 Or. Laws, 1887, p. 1285), being "the amount such property would sell for at a voluntary sale, made in the ordinary course of business, and not what it would bring at public auction or forced sale." And this discrimination appears to have been the result of a deliberate purpose on the part of the county assessor, and made in accordance with the established practice of his office and the prevailing power of public opinion. On these facts the plaintiff appears to be entitled to an injunction to restrain the collection of so much of this tax as results from this unlawful discrimination between its mortgages and 1887.] Opinion of the Court - Deady, J. other real property in the valuation of the same for taxation. (Dundee M. T. I. Co. v. Parrish, 11 Sawy. 92; Cummins v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153.) Nor is it material that, at the filing of the bill, the plaintiff had only paid fifty per centum of this tax, instead of sixty. All was paid that was then conceded or appeared to be due. That was sufficient to give the company a standing in court to litigate the question; and the fact that the court has at the end of such litigation found there was sixty per centum due does not affect such standing, or the plaintiff's right to relief against the payment of the remaining forty per centum. (State Railway Cases, 92 U. S. 617; Nat. Bank v. Kemball, 103 U. S. 733.) But on the hearing the defendant made the objection that, conceding the error and injustice of the assessor, the remedy of the plaintiff in the first instance was an appeal to the county board of equalization to correct the same; and that unless it appears that it has resorted to this means of redress without avail, it cannot have relief in a court of equity. By the statute of the state on the subject of assessing property for taxation it is made the duty of the assessor to list all lands in the county subject to taxation, and assess them at their "true cash value," or what they would bring at a voluntary sale under ordinary circumstances, and a mortgage on a land which is a security for a debt is required to be assessed as real property in the county in which the land lies for the nominal value of the debt, unless the land is not worth so much. When the assessment is completed, the roll is returned to the county clerk, and public notice is given by the assessor that on a day named the board of equalization, consisting of himself, county judge, and clerk, will attend at the office of the latter and publicly examine the assessment roll, and among the other things correct all errors of valuation therein. If property has been valued by the assessor "under or beyond its actual value" this board is authorized to make the proper correction; but it cannot increase the valuation of any person's property without first giving him notice to show cause. It is also declared to be "the duty of any person interested to appear" before said board at said time and place. (2 Or. Laws, 1887, ch, 17.) Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. [October, Counsel for the plaintiff insist that it was not bound to appear before the board of equalization, and seek a revision and correction of the assessment in this particular, for the reason, if none other, that it could not be heard and had no standing there to complain of the under-valuation of other people's property. Neither could it complain of the over-valuation of its own considered by itself. The injustice done by the assessor was caused by the fact, not that the plaintiff's property was assessed too high, but that of others was systematically assessed too low. The constitution of the state (Art. 9, sec. 1) requires that "the legislative assembly shall provide by law for an uniform equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property." Now this board of equalization is the only provision that the legislature has made for the correction of errors or the equalization of values in the work of the assessor. The presumption is that the legislature has thereby undertaken to comply with the injunction of the constitution, to secure uniform and equal assessment and valuation of property for taxation. And the statute should be so construed, if it reasonably can. But if the assessor can assess one class of property at its cash value and another at anything less, and the owners of the first class cannot be heard to complain of the result because their property, abstractly speaking, is correctly valued, and the owners of the second will not complain because they are not injured, but the contrary, then the legislature has made no sufficient provision on the subject. The statute gives any person "interested" a right "to appear" before the board of equalization. The right "to appear" before a tribunal engaged in the transaction of particular business implies the right to be heard thereabout, so far at least as the party is "interested." Now every one who has property on the assessment roll is so far "interested" in seeing that all other property subject to taxation in the county is put on such roll, and is valued thereon relatively, as high as his own, or that his own is valued no higher than others. In the assessment of property, for general taxation, a "just" or equal |