1888.] Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. And he did in fact, To exonerate Hinz or having taken the stand, testified falsely in bad faith in favor of, instead of against, the defendants on trial. finally refuse to testify at all, till too late. now would be through his action to secure not only his own immunity, but also that of Boyd, the other original and principal conspirator, all the principals, and to turn their united efforts upon Ciprico. This would savor too much of a conspiracy encouraged by the government, of the two original and principal offenders — the concocters and most active executors of the nefarious schemes -to convict an accomplice, who, if particeps criminis, came later into the conspiracy, and played a secondary and subordinate, however important and criminal part, in carrying it out. Should Hinz go free there only remains Ciprico to be tried again, McLean having been acquitted, and the jury having disagreed as to Ciprico. It is true that Hinz at last offered in rebuttal to testify fully, and as he did before the grand jury, and to thus ultimately carry out his agreement; and so desirous of doing so was he that upon his rejection by the United States attorney, Carey, that he offered to go upon the stand without conditions. But this was too late. The mischief had been accomplished. The arrangement had been made with Boyd, who had performed his part, and had been exonerated; and Hinz, in the mean time, had been arrested, and held to answer the indictment. It was not till he found himself in this predicament, when he was likely to be tried and convicted on the testimony of Boyd and other corroborating evidence pointing to him that did not point towards Ciprico, and perhaps on his own previous testimony, that he became so anxious. At this time the prosecution had no possible use for him. His testimony at that stage of the case, after Boyd had testified, would have had no legal effect. It could not under the law of evidence have strengthened the case. As we have seen: "If two or more accomplices are produced as witnesses, they are not deemed to corroborate each other, but the same rule is applied, and the same confirmation required as if there were but one." (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 379.) Under this rule Hinz's testimony would have been of no possible use. It was too late, and nothing could have been done affording an equitable consideration for immunity. So there will be no use Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [May, for him on the trial if Ciprico should be tried again, as Boyd is still under obligation to testify in that case, in order to maintain. the immunity that has been accorded to him. We see no good grounds for favor or reason for continuing the case in order that Hinz may apply to the President for a pardon in advance of conviction. To grant the motion for the purpose desired would doubtless be regarded as a tacit or implied recommendation by the court that the pardon be granted; a position in which we cannot conscientiously place ourselves. Besides, the prosecution now has the evidence at command, and should a pardon be granted, there is no knowing whether or not it can be had at the next term of court, two months or more hence. Should a plea of guilty be entered, or a conviction had, the same grounds for pardon will exist then as now. It will not prevent the President from extending the executive clemency if, in his judgment, there are good grounds for such action. The conviction will in no way affect the question. The discretion and responsibility in that matter rest upon the executive, and not upon the courts. We are clearly of the opinion that the application for a continuance should be denied, and it is so ordered. UNITED STATES v. C. HUFFMASTER. CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. MAY 21, 1888. 1. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS - JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT.-Under the act of March 5, 1887 (Supp. Rev. Stats. 173), the circuit courts have no jurisdiction of an action to recover money or property wherein the United States are plaintiffs, unless the amount or value of the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Mr. J. T. Carey, United States Attorney, for plaintiff. Mr. Wm. H. Cook, for defendant. SAWYER, Circuit Judge. This is a suit by the United States for the value of fifty cords of wood, cut upon the public lands 1888.] Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. in Colusa County by the defendant, and converted to his own use. The wood is alleged to be of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars, for which sum plaintiffs demand judgment. The suit was brought on June 6, 1885, when the act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, etc., approved March 3, 1875 (Supp. Rev. Stats. 173), was in force. The objection is made by the defendant that the amount in controversy being less than five hundred dollars, this court has no jurisdiction, and that the action must be dismissed on that ground. The court is of the opinion that the objection is well taken. The clause in the act of 1789 (1 Stats. p. 78, sec. 11), giving jurisdiction to the circuit courts in this class of cases, reads as follows: "That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners." It is perfectly clear that, under this act, the circuit courts would not have jurisdiction in a case of this kind brought by the United States, where the amount sought to be recovered is less than five hundred dollars. The language is susceptible of but one construction. In the Revised Statutes, which were only intended to collate and consolidate the existing statutes without changing the meaning, section 629, covering these matters of jurisdiction, arranges the subject-matter in classes, and expresses the various provisions in language as well as arrangement somewhat different from that found in the original statutes then in force. The provision embracing the subject-matter of this suit is as follows: "Sec. 629. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and an alien is a party. . . . Second. Of all suits in equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are petitioners. Third. Of all suits at common law where the United States, Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [May, or any officer thereof suing under the authority of any act of Congress, are parties." It is contended that, under this third clause, the value of the matter in controversy, as an element of jurisdiction, was eliminated in all actions at common law wherein the United States are plaintiffs, and that this provision is applicable to the case in hand. It may be doubtful what the effect of the change in the language and arrangement is, but it is not probable that any change in the law was contemplated by the commissioners, for that would be to exceed their authority. Whatever the construction should be, however, it cannot affect this case, for the whole subject-matter was again gone over, and embraced in the act of March 3, 1875, in which these several provisions determining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in such matters was reconstructed; and the question raised must be determined by the provisions of that act. Section 1 of the act of 1875 provides as follows: "That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners," etc. Thus Congress returns substantially to the language used in the act of 1789, and makes beyond question the value of the matter in controversy an essential element in the jurisdiction. If, therefore, section 629, Revised Statutes, will bear the construction insisted on by the United States attorney, it is necessarily in conflict with the act of 1875, and is expressly repealed by section 10 of that act. (See Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 410; King v. Cornell, 106 U.S. 396; Railroad Company v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464.) It follows from the views expressed that the circuit court has no jurisdiction of this case, the value of the matter in dispute being only two hundred and fifty dollars, and it must be dismissed on that ground. The United States will have to go into the state court if they desire to recover; and it is just that Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. 1888.] it should be so, as it would be a great hardship upon litigants if they were compelled to go four or five hundred miles from home to litigate such small amounts with the government, as many would be obliged to do in this state. Let the suit be dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction. UNITED STATES v. L. HUFFMASTER. CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. MAY 21, 1888. 1. CIRCUIT COURTS-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. Under the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Rev. Stats. 552), the United States circuit courts have no jurisdiction of an action to recover money or property wherein the United States are plaintiffs, unless the amount or value of the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Mr. J. T. Carey, United States Attorney, for plaintiff. Mr. Wm. H. Cook, for defendant. SAWYER, Circuit Judge. This is an action to recover the possession of sixty cords of wood cut upon the public lands, alleged to be of the value of three hundred and seventy-two dollars. The suit was commenced on July 12, 1887, and it therefore falls under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, amendatory of the act of 1875, to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, etc. (24 Stats. 552.) The provision of section 1, conferring jurisdiction, is, in all respects affecting the question of jurisdiction in this case, substantially the same as in the act of 1875, except that it raises the value of the matter in controversy in order to give jurisdiction from five hundred dollars to two thousand dollars. The value of the wood sought to be recovered being much less than two thousand dollars, the court has no jurisdiction, and, as in the preceding case (No. 3,704), and for the reasons therein given, the suit must be dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction, and it is so ordered. |