undoubtedly be sued in the courts of California. The extension of the operations of the corporation, however, beyond the limits of the state of its creation, does not constitute it an inhabitant of every district in which it may do business. It can have but one residence or habitat, and that is the place where its principal business is done. "A corporation," said the supreme court in Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 12, " may for the purpose of suit be said to be born where by law it is created and organized, and to reside where, by or under the authority of its charter, its principal office is. A corporation, therefore, created by and organized under the laws of a particular state, and having its principal office there, is, under the constitution and laws, for the purpose of suing and being sued, a citizen of that state, possessing all the rights, and having all the powers, its charter confers. It cannot migrate nor change its residence without the consent, expressed or implied, of its state; but it may transact business wherever its charter allows, unless prohibited by local laws." As the complaint itself shows that defendant at the time of the bringing of this action was not an inhabitant of this judicial district, the summons should be quashed, and the action dismissed; and it is so ordered. UNITED STATES v. BORNEMANN. CIRCUIT COUrt, Northern DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. JULY 31, 1888. 1. INDICTMENT - CAPTION - MISRECITAL OF DATE OF FINDING. - A misrecital in the caption of an indictment of the date of its finding, it reading "1885," for "1888," where from the whole record the error appears to be merely clerical, is not fatal, as the caption is no part of the indictment. 2. SAME REVISED STATUTES, UNITED STATES, SECTION 1025. Such error also comes within the purview of the Revised Statutes, United States, section 1025, which provides that no indictment shall be deemed insufficient by reason of any defect in matter of form only, which does not tend to prejudice the defendant. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. At law. Motion to quash indictment. Mr. Jackson Hatch, United States District Attorney, for the United States. Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. Mr. S. G. Hilborn, for defendant. [July, SAWYER, Circuit Judge. The caption of the indictment commences as follows: "At a stated term of the said court, begun and holden at the city and county of San Francisco, within and for the district of California, on the first Monday of February in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five," whereas it should have been eighty-eight, the word "five" by a clerical error having been written for the word " eight." The offense charged is alleged, in the body of the indictment, to have been committed on the twenty-first day of August, 1885, after the date when the grand jury is recited in the caption to have been impaneled. For this discrepancy between the caption and the body of the indictment, defendant moves to quash. The indictment is signed by "John T. Carey, United States Attorney," who was such officer at the February term, 1888, but not at the February term, 1885. The indictment is indorsed, "A true bill. ALEXANDER BOYD, Foreman;' and it is also indorsed by the clerk of the court, "Presented and filed in open court, this first day of May, A. D. 1888. L. S. B. SAWYER, Clerk." The minutes, journals, and other records of the court show, that the grand jury was in fact impaneled for the February term, 1888, of which Alexander Boyd was foreman, and that a bill for the offense charged in said indictment was duly presented and filed on the day indicated by the filing of the bill, while there was no such proceeding indicated anywhere in the records of the court for the February term, 1885. Thus all the records, except the date in the caption, show that the indictment must have been, and, in fact, it was found, and presented by the grand jury duly impaneled at the February term, 1888, and the defendant's attorney was present when the jury was impaneled, and took part in their examination. The question is, whether the clerical error, apparent from the whole record, of writing the word "five," for the word "eight," in the caption, vitiates the indictment. In the opinion of the court it does not. Under the practice in England, to which the criminal practice in the national courts generally, and substantially conforms, in the language of Mr. Archbold, "the caption 1888.] Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, Č. J. is no part of the indictment. It is merely the style of the court where the indictment was preferred, which is prefixed as a kind of preamble to the indictment upon the record, when the record is made up, or when it is returned on certiorari.” (Archb. Crim. Pl. 27.) He then gives the form of the caption, which is somewhat more full than that of the indictment in this case. Mr. Bishop, after stating that the practice in some of the states is different from that of England, says: "It follows from what has been said, that though the caption is a part of the record, it is not of the indictment, and it may be amended to the same extent as the record in any other place." (Bishop on Criminal Procedure, sec. 661.) And he adds: "The commencement, whether in England or this country, is not a part of the indictment. It is a preliminary statement, liable to be corrected, like an indorsement on the indictment by the clerk of the court, or a docket entry, before it becomes of record, or afterwards, in the same manner as any other part of the record. Such is pretty plainly the true view, though the authorities on the question are not entirely uniform and distinct." (Bishop on Criminal Procedure, sec. 622.) So that neither what is technically called the "caption" nor the "commencement" is a part of the indictment. That clerical errors of the kind apparent on the face of the whole record do not vitiate the indictment is determined in Commonwealth v. Hines, 101 Mass. 33; Commonwealth v. Stone, 3 Gray, 453; Commonwealth v. Mullen, 13 Allen, 551; United States v. Thompson, 6 McLean, 56. In the case of State v. Davidson, 36 Tex. 325, the facts are not fully stated. But if in point, it is against the current of authorities where the matter does not depend upon statutes. In United States v. McNeal, 1 Gall. 387, the error was in the body of the indictment. So in State v. Litch, 33 Vt. 67, the error was in the body of the indictment charging the offense to have been committed at an impossible time. These cases do not affect the question. We are satisfied that the error in the caption, where the whole record clearly shows it to be a mere clerical error, is not fatal. We also think the case is within the provisions of section 1025, Revised Statutes, which are that "no indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other Opinion of the Court - Deady, J. [Angust, court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant." If not within this statute it is difficult to perceive what useful purpose this section can serve. There is no defect or imperfection that can, possibly, tend to the prejudice of the defendant. The motion to quash the indictment is denied. THE UNITED STATES v. JOHN WAINOR. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF OREGON. AUGUST 4, 1888. 1. ATTEMPTING TO VOTE ILLEGALLY.-Section 5511 of the Revised Statutes, for the prevention and punishment of corruption and misconduct at a congressional election, does not include an "attempt" to do or commit any of the acts therein specified and prohibited, except that of voting in the name of another person, and the act of aiding, counseling, procuring, or advising any person, voter, or officer, to do or omit to do any act, the commission or omission of which is thereby made a crime, and therefore an indictment will not lie thereon against one for attempting to vote at such election a second time. Before DEADY, District Judge. Mr. Lewis L. McArthur, for the plaintiff. Mr. Robert G. Morrow, for the defendant. DEADY, J. The indictment. in this case charges that the defendant, on June 4, 1888, at an election then being held in the state of Oregon for a representative in the Congress of the United States, did knowingly "attempt and offer to vote a second time" for such representative, at polling place numbered 1, in South Portland precinct, in the state aforesaid, he having already voted once for such representative at said polling place, on said day. The defendant demurs to the indictment, for that the facts stated therein do not constitute a crime. The indictment is found under section 5511 of the Revised Statutes. 1888.] Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. The section is a very long one, over-crowded with particulars. It is a crude, bungling piece of composition, and considering the importance of the subject, shamefully obscure and uncertain. Although intended to punish and prevent bribery and corruption at congressional elections, it does not make the reception of a bribe a crime, and only includes the case of a briber by the obscure indirection of making it a crime to prevent, "by force, threat, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer thereof," any qualified voter "from freely exercising the right of suffrage." The section contains nine clauses, separated by the conjunction "or" and a semicolon, specifying a great number of acts and omissions relating to elections for representatives in Congress, which are thereby made criminal and punishable by fine and imprisonment. The first four relate to unlawful voting by any person-as voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person, voting more than once, or at a place where the party is not entitled to vote, or without having a lawful right to vote, or doing any unlawful act, to secure an opportunity to vote. But nothing is said concerning an attempt to do any of these acts except the first. The next four clauses relate to the preventing of any person "from freely exercising the right of suffrage by force, threats," etc., or compelling, or inducing by any such means any officer of election to act unlawfully, or interfering in any manner with him in the discharge of his duty. The eighth and ninth clauses read as follows: "Or knowingly receives the vote of any person not entitled to vote, or refuses to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote; or aids, counsels, procures, or advises any such voter, person, or officer to do any act hereby made a crime, or omit to do any duty the omission of which is hereby made a crime, or attempt to do so," shall be punished, etc. the subject of these two But from the nature of - the receiving or refus The "person" or "officer" who is sentences or clauses is not expressed. the acts prohibited in the first of them ing a vote illegally-it must be an officer at a congressional election, and in the case of the second one it may be "any person" who gives the "aid, counsel," etc., therein prohibited. |