Opinion of the Court-Ross, J. [February, NEUFELD v. NEUFELD. CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. FEBRUARY 2, 1889. 1. ATTACHMENT — IN FEDERAL COURTS-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT. -Under Revised Statutes, United States, section 915, entitling plaintiff in a common-law case in a federal court to remedies by attachment or other process similar to those provided by the laws of the state in which the court is held, and requiring similar preliminary proof and security, and section 933, which provides that an attachment shall be dissolved on any contingency on which an attachment would be dissolved in the state courts, proceedings in an action in which an attachment has been levied will be stayed where insolvency proceedings against the debtor are instituted in the state courts, as otherwise the plaintiff would acquire an undue advantage over the state creditors, which is contrary to the intent of the statute. Before Ross, District Judge. At law. On petition for stay of proceedings. Messrs. Graves, O'Melveny & Shankland, for petitioners. Messrs. Wells, Guthrie & Lee, for plaintiff. Ross, J. The plaintiff, Nathan Neufeld, a citizen of the state of Illinois, commenced in this court, on the 31st of December last, an action at law against the defendant, Julius Neufeld, who is a citizen of the state of California, to recover a certain amount of money alleged to be due the plaintiff from defendant, in which action an attachment was duly issued and levied by the marshal on property of the defendant situated in Los Angeles County. A few days after the commencement of the action, to wit, January 7th, the requisite number of the California creditors of the defendant instituted insolvency proceedings against him in one of the superior courts of the state, and, in pursuance of the state statute regulating such matters, the superior court made an order directing, among other things, that no creditor whose debt is provable under the insolvency act of the state be allowed to prosecute to final judgment any action therefor against the alleged insolvent until the question of his discharge shall be finally determined, and that any and all such suits and proceedings be stayed until the further order of the said superior court. Conceding that such order does not operate to stay or other 1889.] Opinion of the Court-Ross, J. wise affect the action here, the counsel for the creditors in the insolvency proceedings have, with leave of this court, filed a petition in intervention, in which is set out in full the proceedings had in the insolvency court, and which further shows that the debts and demands of the petitioners, who are residents of the state of California, accrued in said state, for goods sold to defendant, to be employed by him as stock in trade in his business; that the debt upon which the plaintiff's action is based is a debt also provable under the state law by virtue of which the insolvency proceedings are had; and that the defendant has no defense to this action, but will suffer his default herein to be entered, and thereafter judgment to be taken against him. Petitioners therefore ask that this court stay further proceedings for the enforcement of plaintiff's demand, until the state insolvency court shall have adjudicated the question of defendant's alleged insolvency, or until the further order of this court. At the hearing of the petition the facts upon which it is based were not controverted. As already observed, counsel for petitioners do not dispute the proposition, too well established to require argument, that the right of the plaintiff to prosecute his action in this court having attached prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, that right cannot be arrested, taken away, or impaired by any action of the state court. It is the action of this court that petitioners seek, and that in the interest of justice. It was not the purpose, I think, of the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the United States upon the subject of attachments in common-law causes in the circuit and district courts, to give to the non-resident creditor any unfair advantage over the resident creditor. On the contrary, it seems to me to be plain that the purpose was to give to the non-resident, who might sue in the federal courts, the same rights, but no more, in respect to attachment, as are enjoyed by the resident creditor, who must sue in the state court. And this, I think, is manifest, from the provisions themselves, which are as follows: : "Sec. 915. In common-law causes in the circuit and district courts the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies by attachment or other process, against the property of the defend Opinion of the Court-Ross, J. [February, ant, which are now provided by the laws of the state in which such court is held for the courts thereof; and such circuit or district courts may, from time to time, by general rules, adopt such state laws as may be in force in the states where they are held in relation to attachments and other process; provided, that similar preliminary affidavits or proofs, and similar security, as required by such state laws, shall be first furnished by the party seeking such attachment or other process." "Sec. 933. An attachment of property upon process instituted in any court of the United States, to satisfy such judgment as may be recovered by the plaintiff therein, except in the cases mentioned in the preceding nine sections [within which the present case does not come], shall be dissolved when any contingency occurs by which, according to the laws of the state where said court is held, such attachment would be dissolved upon like process instituted in the courts of said state; provided, that nothing herein contained shall interfere with any priority of the United States in the payment of debts." There can be derived from this language of the statute no intent to confer upon the non-resident creditor any other or greater rights than are enjoyed by the resident creditor. It is true that the contingency has not yet occurred in the insolvency proceedings referred to, which, under the state law, would operate a dissolution of all attachments against the alleged insolvent issued out of the state courts, and which, under the express terms of section 933 of the Revised Statutes, would operate to dissolve the attachment issued out of this court; and such contingency may not occur, in which event the plaintiff herein would of course be allowed to proceed to judgment, for the satisfaction of which the property attached would be liable. But by the state law the attachment to which the resident creditors are entitled is subject to be, and as to this defendant has been stayed by the insolvency court pending the insolvency proceedings; and unless a stay of proceedings in this case is granted by this court the plaintiff may, and doubtless will, take judgment against defendant, the manifest effect of which will be to give to the non-resident creditor a remedy by attachment for the enforcement of his demand against the defendant, which is not Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. 1889.] enjoyed by the resident creditors of defendant. And this, in my opinion, is contrary to the intent and meaning of the provisions of the Revised Statutes on the subject. It is ordered that all proceedings in the cause be stayed until the further order of this court. THE CITY OF SALEM-A. F. REED, LIBELLANT. FEBRUARY 12, 1889. 1. THE REGULATION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS. - The power to regulate commerce among the several states comprehends the power to regulate the navigable waters of the United States on which such commerce may be or is carried, and to this end Congress may make any regulation concerning such navigation, including the vessels engaged therein, as may be necessary and proper to secure and maintain the safety and convenience of the water-way, which regulations are so far applicable to vessels engaged only in intrastate commerce thereon as to those engaged in interstate commerce. 2. REGULATION LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS.-The regulation contained in section 4465 of the Revised Statutes, forbidding a steamboat to carry more passengers than allowed in her certificate of inspection, held to apply to such boats engaged in carrying passengers on a navigable water of the United States between ports of the same state only. 3. CARRYING PASSENGERS ON STEAMBOATS-PENALTY FOR EXCESS IN NUMBER. — The regulation contained in section 4465 of the Revised Statutes, forbidding a steamboat to carry more passengers than are authorized by the local inspectors, held applicable to such boat, engaged in carrying passengers on a navigable water of the United States, between ports of the same state only. Before DEADY, District Judge. Mr. W. Scott Beebe, for the libellant. Mr. Charles J. Macdougall, for the defendant. DEADY, J. This suit is brought by the libellant, A. F. Reed, against the steamboat City of Salem and Robert Thompson, her owner, to recover sundry penalties for carrying more passengers than is allowed by the vessel's certificate of inspection. An exception is filed to the libel, to the effect that the transportation of passengers in question was wholly within the state, and was therefore not within the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce nor the jurisdiction of this court. Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. [February, Section 4399 of the Revised Statutes declares: "Every vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam shall be deemed a steam vessel within the meaning of this title" (52); and section 4400 of the same provides: "All steam vessels navigating any of the waters of the United States, which are common highways of commerce or open to general or competitive navigation, excepting public vessels of the United States, vessels of other countries, and boats. . . . for navigating canals, shall be subject to the provisions of this title. (52.) It is also provided in this title that there shall be an inspector of hulls and one of boilers in each district who shall inspect all steam vessels, and when they "approve a vessel and her equipment" they shall make a certificate to the collector to that effect. (Sec. 4421, Rev. Stats.) In case of a steamer "carrying passengers, other than ferryboats, the number of passengers of each class that any such steamer has accommodation for, and can carry with prudence and safety," shall be stated in said certificate (sec. 4466, Rev. Stats.); and if any steamer shall "take on board" any more passengers than the number stated in the certificate of inspection, the owner shall be liable to any person who may sue for the same in the penalty of ten dollars for each such passenger (sec. 4465, Rev. Stats.), and such penalties shall be a lien on the vessel. (Sec. 4469, Rev. Stats.) It appears from the libel that on July 4, 1888, the City of Salem was a vessel wholly propelled by steam and engaged in navigating the Wallamet River, and was duly enrolled and licensed therefor; that by her certificate of inspection she was only entitled to carry 60 passengers; that on said day this vessel was engaged in carrying passengers from the port of Portland to other points and places on said river and within this district, and did on four such trips carry in the aggregate 2,910 more passengers than allowed by her certificate. The precise question raised in this case has never been passed on by the supreme court. In the district courts there have been apparently conflicting decisions on the point. In the Gretna Green, 20 Fed. Rep. 901, it was held that a steamboat "regularly enrolled and licensed" for the navigation |