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APPENDIX.

Opinion of the DUKE OF WELLINGTON on the Boundary

Treaties.

The difference of opinion between Great Britain and the United States respecting the true course and position of the St. Croix River appears important in the discussion of the question respecting the boundary in the following views.

The second article of the treaty says, "From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the Highlands," &c.

The conclusion to be drawn from the perusal of this article is that the position of the river St. Croix must have been known to both parties when the treaty was concluded; and it must be supposed to have been the intention of both to fix the north-west angle of Nova Scotia upon a point in the Highlands due north of that position. This point had before been fixed, by the Commissioners of the United States, at the source of the St. John's River.

It appears, however, from subsequent transactions, that the real St. Croix River and the position of its real source were not known till the year 1794.

The British Commissioners considered the Penobscot to be the St. Croix. The river designated by that name in the treaty was at length fixed upon by Commissioners appointed under the article of the treaty of 1794.

Even if the position of the source of the St. Croix had been accurately known at the moment that the treaty of peace was concluded in the year 1783, the north-west angle of Nova Scotia as described in the second article remained to be found. That point depended on the Highlands described on

which the due north line from the source of the St. Croix should strike those Highlands. But in the article as framed everything was to be discovered-the St. Croix River, its course, its source; the due north line from that source, and the point at which that due north line should touch the Highlands.

It is very important that the arbitrator who shall decide the difference which has arisen under the treaty of Ghent should understand exactly what passed respecting the St. Croix River and its source; and seeing how little was known of that important point at the time the article was drawn, should seek for the intentions of the parties from other sources of information besides the words of the article itself.

We should attend to the original instructions of the Commissioners of the United States in 1779; to the admission which they contain that the north-west angle of Nova Scotia was to be found at the source of the river St. John; to the geographical features of the country; and to the distinction which clearly exists between the term sea and the term Atlantic Ocean, and between those parts of the sea called respectively Atlantic Ocean, Bay of Fundy, Bay of Chaleurs, and Gulf of St. Lawrence, in the diplomatic act referred for his arbitration. It is quite clear that neither party knew what was the real source of the St. Croix River. Is it not probable, considering the source of the negociation of the definitive treaty, that both parties considered it to be placed further to the westward than it has been found to be? In that case the due north line from that point would have struck the Highlands not far from the source of the river St. John.

Translation of one of the Addresses presented to SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS by the Chiefs of the Spanish Alarms.

"SIR,

TO BARON DOUGLAS.

"Sn. Esteban deribas del Sil, 4th April, 1812.

"When I was anxiously expecting to see you, Sir, in this province of Orense, in order to have the honour of paying you my respects as the most beneficent representative of the British Nation, and to present to you my Company of Alarm (in which although you would not find military men for parade, yet you would meet with a few brave Mountain Tirailleurs, good Spaniards, lovers of their religion, their country, and their King, which they have proved at the time of the first invasion of the enemy, and are ready to do it again, if again he dared to invade us, if the Nation would assist us with such articles as are necessary to render this point inaccessible), my heart was overwhelmed with grief to learn that you had returned to Corunna, and the motives you had for taking that step; my grief was increased when I announced to my companions your return, as I saw that it filled them with the same sentiments, to see their hopes frustrated, and thus deprived of the aid and protection they expected to receive from you, Sir. They expressed their sorrow to me in these very words: Why, Sir, should we molest ourselves with exercising and sacrificing our families and properties when we see that fortune is so very adverse to us? If till now after so many sacrifices we have not been able to advance a step, what shall we do now without them? And what can we do without arms, without ammunition, and without hopes that the generous nation who assisted us will furnish us? These and other such plaints which they expressed to me, filled my breast with sighs, and I could not help exposing the whole to you, adding, that if the representatives of the Spanish Nation do not take a leading part with regard to the opposition of the military in the organisation of the Alarms and their armament, this same Alarm will

become a monstrosity and its enthusiasm be turned into a lamentable terror.

"I have sworn with them to defend these points at the cost of my life; for this purpose we need arms of every description; my means and faculties are already sacrificed for the benefit of the country; I supplicate you, Sir, in the name of the whole, that you will assist us with those necessary articles, and may the Almighty preserve you many years, &c.

66

(Signed)

BR. JOSÉ ROZAL."

SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS and GENERAL FOY.

The following paper was drawn up by Sir Howard on the operations of General Foy in 1812, and submitted to him on his visiting England in 1817 by the Right Hon. W. Wickham :

"After the retreat of the Galician army before General Foy, from Valladolid and Tordebaton, in August, 1812, to Benavente and La Bañeza, it was an object of extreme solicitude to me, in the then critical state of the campaign, to ascertain in time what General Foy would attempt when he should hear of the fall of Astorga; being persuaded, from his character, that he would attempt some important blow.

"On Friday night, the 21st of August, I was in a small village near the Bañeza, and remained the next day near that place, after the Spanish Division had retired from Castrocontrigo and Torneros. Having ascertained General Baron Foy's march to be in the direction of Tabra, I imagined the following to be his aim. That he would march rapidly upon Carvajales; by gaining which point before the Portuguese Division then before Zamora, he would certainly have captured that division; and as Toro as well as Zamora was in possession of the French, I suspected that, should General Foy succeed in his well-arranged plan against the Portuguese, that he would then attempt a coup de main upon Salamanca. Lord Wellington was then at Madrid with the

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