CHAP. II. 1803. 30. andum to on the nego France. to the Cabinet, was a model of political wisdom, charac- The progress of this angry negotiation, and the inHis memor- creasing subjects of difficulty which it came to embrace, the Cabinet from the continued encroachments, in one direction or tiation with another, of the First Consul, brought Lord Castlereagh, when a Cabinet Minister, still closer in contact with the diplomatic intercourse of the two countries. It is curious to observe how easily his master-mind caused itself to be felt in the public affairs of the State, and how entirely, within a few months of his obtaining a seat in the Cabinet, while still holding only the office of President of the Board of Control, he took the lead even on the most intricate points of European politics. It is not less remarkable how clearly he seized the salient point of the question, and the mingled temper and judgment with "Upon the whole, I see the possible and probable advantage of a distinct pledge not to submit to further encroachment on the part of France, inasmuch as it may determine her not to make the attempt. At the same time, I cannot but hesitate, where so much is at stake, and where everything may alternately hinge upon a question of time and resources rather than any effort of arms, in taking a step which may plunge us again singly in a war, without any other means of offence against France than those which touch her colonies, a species of attack which but remotely affects her present power, and is in itself inadequate to shake the sources of her authority and the stability of her military empire, whilst it bears much more severely upon our resources than it does upon hers. I am the more disposed to act with caution on this point (though I am by no means prepared to say it may not be wise), because I do entertain, in the event of its not having the effect of deterring France from her purpose, very great doubts as to the mode and time which ought to be chosen for renewing the contest. What I desire is, that France should feel that Great Britain cannot be trifled with, at the same time that I should wish to leave the line of conduct which ought to be pursued upon circumstances as they arise entirely open; and I should prefer explaining myself, both to France and the Continental powers, in private communications rather than by a parliamentary pledge. Whether anything has been said to France with reference to her late encroachment in the course of the negotiation, I know not; but I should think, now the peace is concluded, that we ought to explain ourselves very frankly with respect to our general desire of peace, provided her system was such as to permit us to adhere to it; and I should think it doubly necessary, if there is any reason to apprehend that Buonaparte has similar views with respect to Holland with those which were realised at Lyons with regard to the Cisalpine Republic."-LORD CASTLEREAGH's Memorandum, July 1802; Castlereagh Correspondence, v. 36, 37. II. 1803. which he proposed to combat and come to issue with the CHAP. First Consul on the real point at issue between the parties-viz., the occupation of Malta. "I am inclined to think," said he, in a memorandum addressed to the Cabinet, "the battle ought still to be fought on the proposition before transmitted-namely, the permanent occupation of Malta; qualifying it, if any facility arises therefrom, by leaving the Order in possession of the civil government of the island. To act up to principle, as laid down in former despatches, I think we must insist upon. permanent possession of a naval station. My opinion is, that with Malta for seven years, Lampedosa for ever, Holland and Switzerland evacuated, and the Turkish empire and Naples under the avowed protection of Russia, if not formally guaranteed by her, you would stand well at home, and well with reference to France, provided you have obtained suitable reparation on the two points affecting the honour of the country. Lord Whitworth,* therefore, should be recalled to this ultimatum, and ordered to come away, in case he should not be able immediately to sign an arrangement substantially on the basis of that proposition." This ultimatum, it is well known, was presented without success; and in Lord Castlereagh's 1 Lord Papers is a very curious account of the famous ebullition reagh's meof wrath by the First Consul, which completely justified Castlereagh the British Government in their determination, with the 43-48. declared views of Buonaparte, not to part with Malta.1† * The plenipotentiary at Paris. "Buonaparte sent for Lord Whitworth, told him that we must evacuate Malta or it was war, talked of invasion, &c.; and in the course of his conversation, although he denied any immediate wish to go to Egypt at the risk of war, avowed that it was an object France could not lose sight of, and that sooner or later it must belong to her, either by the consent of the Turkish Government, or by the dissolution and dismemberment of the Ottoman empire. "Upon the receipt of this communication we recurred to our former grounds of [complaint], which the French Government had studiously endeavoured to pass and evade; adhered to our former declaration of not entering into further discussion relative to the evacuation of Malta till we had received the explanation and satisfaction we desired; and added, that after the distinct avowal made by the First Consul of the ulterior views of the French Government in respect to Egypt, in confirmation of the many causes of suspicion and jealousy 1 Castle morandum; Corresp. v. СНАР. II. 1803. 31. Grounds stated by Lord Castle renewing the war. 1803. The grounds for renewing the war in 1803 were stated by Lord Castlereagh in a minute addressed to the Cabinet, which was adopted by the Ministers, and made the reasons for justifying that step. This minute we present in a condensed form. Between the preliminaries and the definitive reagh for treaty Buonaparte put himself at the head of the Italian Republic, annexed the island of Elba to France, and it then became known that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France. Notwithstanding these, the treaty was ratified; but it was then declared that peace could not last if the conduct of France was such as it had been since the signature of the preliminaries. The same state of things continued from the ratification of the treaty to the representation from Switzerland; and during this period the British Government was animated by a sincere desire to execute the treaty. This was manifested in their acquiescing in the mode of election of the Grand Master of Malta, in their reception of the Neapolitan troops and General Vial, in their restoring French subjects to all privileges within the country, and putting their commerce on the footing of other foreign nations. On the other hand, the conduct of France showed no signs of moderation. Her troops continued to occupy Holland in breach of the treaty of Amiens; Piedmont was annexed to France without the condition in the treaty as to a suitable indemnity being provided to Sardinia being fulfilled; Parma and Placentia were claimed by France under reagh's me- a secret article with Spain; the Government of Portugal was insulted by General Lannes, and the dismissal of D'Almeida insisted on by France; Switzerland was Castlereagh ultimately told that, if she did not submit to the will 62-69. of the First Consul, a French army would enter the 1 Lord Castle morandum on the re newal of the war; Corresp. v. country. Nor was the direct conduct of France towards before existing, we could not avoid requiring some substantial security against those views; and that we conceived it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any security that could be deemed satisfactory other than the military occupation of Malta."-Detached Memorandum by LORD CASTLEREAGH; Castlereagh Correspondence, v. 50. this country more calculated to inspire confidence. Sequestrations were not taken off British property in conformity with the treaty; prohibitions against the imports of British produce continued as during the war; British vessels were detained, and no redress given; angry representations made with respect to the press and French emigrants in this country; and libels published in the Moniteur directly levelled at the British Government. CHAP. II. 1802. 32. reagh's early and cordial lesley. The position of Lord Castlereagh in the Cabinet, the Lord Castlehead of the Board of Control, brought him immedi- intimacy ately in contact with Lord Wellesley, then exercising ity with the high and responsible duties of Governor-General in Lord WelIndia. The period when this intercourse began, as already noticed, was the most critical one which had yet occurred in our Eastern annals, when the regulation of the recently ceded districts of Oude and the Carnatic was in progress, and the great Mahratta confederacy was forming, which it required the whole firmness of the Governor-General, aided by the military talents of his brother, General Wellesley, then unknown to fame, and of General (afterwards Lord) Lake, to withstand. In these critical circumstances, Lord Wellesley had much need of the active support and ardent co-operation of the President of the Board of Control to aid him in his arduous undertaking: nor were either awanting. From the very first there sprang up the most cordial feeling and intimacy between him and Lord Castlereagh; and on every occasion the latter rendered him all the assistance in his power, both in supporting his projects and shielding him from the shortsighted and dangerous interference on many occasions of the East India Directors. He gave proof in the very outset of the disinterested principles on which he had determined to discharge his duties at the Board of Control, by declining all patronage connected with his office, which he left exclusively to the GovernorGeneral. The first correspondence between these two great men is not the least interesting point in the biogra II. 1802. CHAP. phy of both; and it becomes doubly important in a general point of view, as it first brought Lord Castlereagh into contact with General Wellesley, and led to that high estimation of his talents which ended in his appointing him to the command of the British army in the Peninsula.* In those days, in the beginning of the century, the only communication with India was by means of sailing vessels going round by the Cape of Good Hope, * A month after Lord Castlereagh's appointment to the Board of Control, he thus expressed himself in a letter to Lord Wellesley : "I avail myself of the first tranquil day I have had to address myself to your Lordship, and to express the very particular satisfaction I derive from feeling myself placed in a situation which connects me in close official habits with your Lordship; from which I promise myself not less advantage in my public capacity, than the gratification to my individual feelings, from former intercourse, from common connections, and from the zeal we shall both feel in the same object. I venture to flatter myself that I shall have the good fortune to possess, as I shall endeavour to deserve, your unqualified and unreserved confidence; and I trust it is unnecessary to assure you that my utmost exertions shall be employed to give stability to your administration, and to co-operate with you in the conduct of Indian affairs with that cordiality which can alone render our united exertions successful. "Whatever circumstances may have occurred in the course of your official intercourse with this country not altogether satisfactory, and however your Lordship may feel many strong motives inclining you to return to Europe, yet I am led to hope that nothing will induce you to deliver up the govern ment to other hands till you have fully completed all those arrangements, equally connected with the most important and brilliant features of your own administration as with the conclusion which has been put to the late war [with Tippoo Saib by the taking of Seringa patam]. In whatever degree the pecuniary affairs of the Company may have felt the pressure of the contest, it is connected with your Lordship's distinguished reputation, in which every friend of yours, and of the country, must feel a deep interest, that you should be the individual to lay the foundation of that system and of those measures which are in peace to accomplish the prosperity of those possessions which you have so successfully preserved and improved in war; and I feel the strongest persuasion that the same energy of mind which led you so happily to conceive, and so effectually to execute, the many arduous measures connected with the late contest, will, when applied to another state of things, be as fruitful in drawing from peace the resources of which it is susceptible, as you have proved yourself in war competent to direct those resources to their true and legitimate purpose. Your Lordship's reputation as a statesman during a period of war has been established on the most solid foundation; it only remains to exhibit the qualifications which belong to less arduous times to perfect in result, as well as in the estimation of those who are now inclined to watch your progress with a critical eye, the character of your administration."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to Lord Wellesley, Doneira, August 10, 1802; Wellesley Despatches, iii. 32. |