CHAP. III. soon after ensued, was the indication of the change of tactics produced by the taking of Copenhagen. But 1807. though the ultimate effect of this vigorous stroke was in the highest degree favourable to Great Britain, yet its immediate results were extremely prejudicial to her interests. Public opinion on the Continent, entirely guided by the enslaved press of France, was almost unanimous against her. Copenhagen had been attacked and the fleet taken without any declaration of war or any angry negotiations before the British pennants appeared off the shores of Zealand. There was ample ground, not only for political declamation but for well-founded complaint, on the face of the transaction, and before the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, known to the British Government, were brought to light. Accordingly, they formed the subject of impassioned invective both in Parliament and by a large part of the press in England; and a painful feeling of doubt as to the justification of the measure came to pervade a considerable and respectable portion of society in the British Islands. It was made the subject of debate directly, or on incidental petitions, no less than fourteen times in the next session of Parliament. The following abstract of Lord Castlereagh's defence of the measure will afford the best view of the grounds on which it was vindicated, and of his now matured power as a parliamentary orator. 7. In the King's speech at the opening of Parliament, the Arguments vindication of the expedition was rested on the assertion of Opposit that Ministers were in possession of the secret articles of the expedi- the treaty of Tilsit, by which it was stipulated that the tion against tion. Danish fleet was to be employed against this country. "If so," said Mr Ponsonby, the leader of the Opposition, "why are they not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet at the first sumWhat grounds are there for such an assertion? True, the ships at Copenhagen were in a certain state of mons. III. 1807. preparation, but not more so than they have been for the CHAP. last half-century. Is it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by French troops? When the Copenhagen expedition set out, there were three hundred and fifty Danish ships in the British harbours, with cargoes worth £2,000,000; and when the British consul applied on the subject to the Chamber of Commerce at the Danish capital, he received an answer that there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as the Danish neutrality was not likely to be disturbed. But even supposing it could be proved beyond a doubt that Buonaparte intended to have seized the fleet at Copenhagen, and had a force at his command adequate for that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that the enemy meditated a similar spoliation, and that it is but fair to be beforehand with him? Is it not a principle of morality, applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not justify another, and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation. from the laws and usages of war? Better, far better would it be to have had to combat the Danish fleet manned by disaffected seamen, and fitted out by a reluctant government, than to have as now the fleets of Parl. Deb. France and Russia to fight manned by the indignant and 355-358. exasperated sailors of the North."1 x. 254-267, reagh's answer. To these arguments it was replied by Lord Castle- 8. reagh and Mr Canning: "It is needless to ask for Lord Castleadditional documents to justify that great and saving measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident that after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated all hopes of present naval ascendancy, and the victory of Friedland had laid all Continental nations at his feet, all the efforts of Buonaparte would be turned to effect a naval confederacy against Great Britain. Were any proof CHAP. III. 1807. 9. necessary to show that such was his object, and that he would pursue it by all the methods in his power, it would be found in the use to which on every occasion he has turned his Continental conquests. Has it not been always to compel the people whom he has subdued to furnish auxiliaries to co-operate with him in hostilities against the nations which still required to be subjugated? Actuated by these motives, is it to be supposed that that profound statesman and consummate general would not proceed in the same manner in carrying out the great object of his life-the destruction of the maritime strength and resources of this country? that after his great land victory, when he had all the Continental nations at his command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner within his grasp, to his resources? "If any doubt could remain on this subject, it would be Continued. removed by the open declarations and subsequent conduct of the French Emperor himself. Immediately after the battle of Friedland he announced his intention of uniting all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against this country; and all his subsequent conduct has been but the carrying out that design. It was not confined to Denmark-it extended also to Portugal: and before the 1st September he publicly demanded of the Portuguese ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the Court of Portugal to shut their ports against the British flag, and confiscate all the property of its subjects within the Portuguese territory; and having done so, he immediately turned to the Danish minister and asked if he had transmitted the same order to his Court. This was done on the 16th August, the very day when the British expedition landed on the coast of Zealand, and before the destination of that armament could have been known. The Cabinet of Lisbon transmitted official intelligence to the Court of Great Britain that a formal demand had III. 1807. been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and CHAP. the closing of their harbours against British ships; and upon their failure to comply with the last and most iniquitous of these requisitions, a notice appeared in the Moniteur that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign.' Can it be doubted after this how it would have fared with the house of Denmark if they had not yielded obedience to a similar mandate? 10. "It is idle to suppose that the Court of Copenhagen could, even with the support of Great Britain, have with- Concluded. stood the united armies of France and Russia ready to pour down upon her. The Great Belt, frozen in winter, would have rendered the seizure of the Danish fleet a matter of certainty. And that fleet of twenty sail of the line, manned by the bold and hardy sailors of the North, would have formed an addition to the already formidable forces of the Continental confederacy, on which England, with all her maritime strength, could not look with indifference. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to at least as many more. The Russian fleet in the Euxine, consisting of twelve line-of-battle ships, has already proceeded to Lisbon to join the Portuguese navy, which, together, will make up twenty ships of the line. Spain could furnish a like number. A maritime force would be united against this country, consisting of fifty sail of the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, with two wings of forty each, supplied by his northern and southern confederates. Distracted, as even the great navy of Great Britain is, by the necessity of maintaining squadrons in every quarter of the globe to protect her distant possessions, it is certain that she could not produce any force in the Channel at all equal to the enormous weight of enemies thus accumulating against her. The seizure of the Danish fleet, and consequent paralysis x. 267-287, of the right wing of the hostile armament, had thus be- 350-383. come a matter of absolute necessity.' Self-preservation 1 Parl. Deb. X. 310-342, CHAP. III. is the first law of nature; and that law loudly called for the Copenhagen expedition, which has so happily para1807. lysed the designs of the confederates in the quarter where they were most formidable-the north seas."* 11. Powerful as these arguments were, and ably as they Vindication were enforced by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning, it of the is doubtful if they would, if taken by themselves alone, expedition have satisfied the doubts or stilled the conscience of the by Napoleon nation on this question, so completely had the decisive Copenhagen furnished to his his torians. advantage gained by the measure obliterated the perception of the danger it had removed. But, fortunately for the cause of historic truth, the vindication at length came, and in the most conclusive of all ways, for it was furnished by our enemies. Napoleon's rage knew no bounds when he heard of the success of the expedition, and he affected the utmost indignation at the proceeding; but his own acts, not less than his words, soon afforded it the best vindication. On the 16th August, as Lord Castlereagh noticed in the House of Commons, he publicly asked the Portuguese minister, in presence of all the ambassadors of Europe at the Tuileries, whether he had transmitted the orders to his Court to close their harbours against the British and join the confederacy against England, and immediately turned to the Danish minister and asked him if he had done the same. Nor did the matter rest on verbal injunctions; for, finding that the Portuguese Government hesitated as to immediate obedience to these mandates, he despatched Junot from Bayonne with a powerful army to seize the fleet, which was only extricated from his grasp by the vigorous measures of the British Government, and the departure Ministers were supported on this question by a majority of 253 to 108 in the Commons, and of 105 to 48 in the Peers.—Parliamentary Debates, x. 383. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouché, was the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to have been at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoleon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous coup-de-main was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."-Memoires de Fouché, ii. 37. |