III. 1807. of the royal family of Portugal with the fleet to the Bra- CHAP. zils in the spring following. The Russian fleet from the Black Sea, consisting of twelve sail of the line, soon after came through the Mediterranean, and cast anchor in the Tagus, evidently to co-operate in the great naval crusade, where it fell into the hands of the British in consequence of the victory of Vimeira and capitulation of Lisbon. Finally, the chosen historians of Napoleon, M. Bignon and M. Thiers, published the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit above given, which placed beyond a doubt the intention on the part of the French Emperor to seize the Danish fleet, and rendered the vindication of the expedition complete. And thus had Lord Castlereagh and1 Thiers, Mr Canning, in addition to the bold and decisive course which extricated the Danish fleet from the grasp of France, the credit of having magnanimously withheld the secret articles in their possession from publication, lest their appearance should compromise the persons from whom they had been obtained, and borne undeserved obloquy for a long course of years, till their triumphant vindication came from the hands of their enemies.* Although the Emperor Alexander professed in public the greatest indignation at the Copenhagen expedition, yet he, in secret, was by no means displeased with its success. "An English officer of literary celebrity (Sir R. Wilson) was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British minister the Emperor's expression of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her Ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar as with a person who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."-Scorr's Napoleon, vi. 24. To the same purpose Lord Londonderry observes :-" On the 7th of November a manifesto was issued, declaring the adhesion of Russia to the principles of the armed neutrality and the Continental System. In consequence, Lord Gower, the English ambassador, left St Petersburg, and Tolstoi set out as Russian envoy for Paris. Nevertheless, Alexander, who had no scruple to play a double part in politics, gave secret assurances to the British Cabinet that he wished to continue in good understanding with it. At the same time, the Czar failed not to take advantage of the clause in the treaty of Tilsit directed against Sweden. He desired the co-operation of King Gustavus against England, and, this being refused, a Russian army prepared to invade Finland... Finland, rent in one campaign from the Swedish monarchy, was annexed VOL. I. P viii. 16. CHAP. III. 1807. The use which Lord Castlereagh made of the military force at the entrance of the Baltic, after the taking of Copenhagen, was hardly less important than that capture itself. The Russians having declared war against placing of Sweden, in order to secure, by the acquisition of Finarmy, after land, their share of the spoils of Tilsit, it became of 12. Judicious the British Copenha gen, in Sweden. great importance to prevent the Swedish fleet at Carlscrona, consisting of twelve sail of the line, from falling into their hands, and being rendered a part of the general naval confederacy against Great Britain. The transfer of the troops employed in the Copenhagen expedition to Gottenburg, on the opposite coast of Sweden, accomplished this object. They inspired the chivalrous King of Sweden with confidence to continue firm in the British alliance; and though they could not prevent Finland from being torn from the Swedish Crown and annexed to Russia, they effectually closed the Sound against hostile vessels, and retained the Swedish naval forces in alliance with Great Britain. In this manner was our supremacy in the Baltic effectually secured, and the Russian fleet, of fifteen sail of the line, at Cronstadt, blockaded and shut out from any active part in the projected hostilities by sea against England. Thus, by the direct consequences of the Copenhagen expedition, was not only the whole Danish fleet of twenty sail of the line and fifteen frigates extricated from the enemy's grasp, but the Swedish fleet of twelve was secured in our alliance, and the Russian of fifteen neutralised and kept in check by a comparatively small British squadron in the Baltic. In this way the whole right wing of Napoleon's crusade against this country, consisting of nearly fifty sail of the line, was destroyed or paralysed, and Great Britain secured from the greatest naval danger which had threatened her since the beginning of the war. The tone of Russia was rendered, in secret, more conciliatory by this decisive stroke; to the dominions of the Autocrat of all the Russias."-Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 208, 209. III. and the Czar did not conceal his hidden satisfaction at the CHAP. Danish fleet being wrested from Napoleon, provided he was secured from molestation in his designs upon Finland.* 1807. 13. of an attack America. Following out his strong impression as to the danger which Great Britain would incur from the concentration Lord Castleof all the naval forces of the world against her under the reagh's plan direction of Buonaparte, Lord Castlereagh had, ever since on South the battle of Jena, in 1806, been revolving in his mind the means of attacking and severing from Old Spain her vast colonies in South America. They were the nursery of the most formidable maritime force with which Great Britain had to contend, and the one which in time past * "Russia does not show any disposition either to resent or to complain of what we have done at Copenhagen. The Emperor wants to be assured on two grounds-1st, That the principles on which the measure has been undertaken do not apply to Russia; and, 2d, That we are not, by the evacuation of Zealand, about to uncover Sweden to an attack from France, and, by letting a French army into Sweden, expose Russia to be menaced on the side of Finland. The tone of the Russian Cabinet has become much more conciliatory to us since they heard of your operations, partly, perhaps, from alarm for Cronstadt, partly from the natural respect that attaches to a vigorous exertion against that power which they may dread but must hate. The opinion of those best disposed and informed at that Court is, that if we could maintain our position in the Baltic, the counsels of Russia would rapidly improve-at least, that she would not, in that state of things, lend herself to France as a hostile instrument against us."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD CATHCART, September 22, 1807; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 183. "We have accomplished a British object of the first importance in getting the Danish fleet; but the northern powers will reproach us with having purchased a separate advantage at their cost—indeed, such is already the unofficial language of those in confidence in Russia-if the entry of French troops into Zealand, and subsequently into Sweden, should immediately follow our evacuation of that island. We are, above all things, anxious to preserve our character for good faith untainted; but, as far as it can be done consistently with the engagements entered into, we are desirous of converting our present position in Zealand into an instrument for keeping the French out of it. . . If good faith prevents us from using our position at Copenhagen to bring Denmark to terms, we have only to submit and be grateful for what has been gained."-Ibid., 184, 185. "Should your Majesty's endeavours to put an end to the war with Denmark fail of success, your Majesty's servants are humbly of opinion that the defence of Sweden ought to be looked to by a corps posted in Sweden, rather than by an attempt to reoccupy and retain the island of Zealand. In order to give the fullest effect to this measure, they humbly beg leave to recommend that a respectable force may be employed in this service, and that Lord Cathcart should be directed, for the present, to remain in the personal command of it."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, October 9, 1807; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 193. III. 1807. CHAP. had most seriously endangered the national independence. It was the combined fleets of France and Spain which, in 1784, had ridden triumphant in the British Channel, and held Plymouth in blockade. It was the squadrons of the same powers which, in 1805, had recently menaced in a still more serious manner the national independence, and but for Sir R. Calder's victory, and the disobedience of his orders by Admiral Villeneuve, in steering after it to Cadiz instead of Brest, would have rendered Napoleon the master of the British Channel, and given him the means of effecting a landing on our shores with 150,000 men. The trade which Spain carried on at this time with her transatlantic colonies was immense, and much exceeded that which at that period, and for long after, Great Britain enjoyed with her colonial possessions. It amounted to 1 Humboldt, £15,000,000 of exports and as many imports.1 It justly Espagne, iv, occurred to Lord Castlereagh as a most perilous condition of things, that this great trade, necessarily conducted by such an amount of shipping, should be entirely in the hands of a power which had become the willing vassal of France, and had joined her great maritime resources to a state which had already arrayed the whole naval forces of Europe from Cronstadt to Cadiz against this country. Nouvelle 153, 154. 14. Spanish Deeply impressed with these ideas, Lord Castlereagh His plan for had long revolved in his mind the means of severing these detaching it from the important colonial possessions from the Spanish Crown. The present time seemed to be eminently favourable for such an enterprise; for the greater part of the fleets of France and Spain had been destroyed at Trafalgar; and the attention of Napoleon having for long been fixed on his Continental operations against Austria, Prussia, and Russia, he had neither enjoyed the leisure nor had the means of re-establishing his marine from the vast conquests he had effected in Northern Europe. There was no time to lose in effecting this object; for, when the power of the French Emperor over the whole Continent, including Russia, was established by the victory of Friedland and treaty of Tilsit, there would no longer remain a land enemy to combat; and the whole resources of Europe would to a certainty be turned to the great object of the French Emperor's life-the increase of his naval means, and the subjugation of this country, either by the withering effects of a Continental blockade, or by a great naval victory, and subsequent descent with an overwhelming land force on our own shores. CHAP. III. 1807. 15. conferences with Sir A. The first thing which Lord Castlereagh did in pursuance of these views, was to consult his intimate friend-on His early whose sagacity and sound information he had the greatest regarding it reliance-Sir Arthur Wellesley, as to the means of carrying Wellesley. it into execution. The earliest trace in his correspondence which is to be found on the subject, is in a communication. to Sir Arthur on 2d November 1806, only sixteen days after the battle of Jena, when the Whigs were in office, but when the decisive victory of Napoleon rendered it evident that the Continental war would speedily be at an end, and the naval one against this country be resumed. The plan submitted to Sir Arthur was to attack New Spain, combined with a descent upon Manilla, and thus to acquire a base for general and more extensive operations against the Spanish colony.* Sir Arthur, however, pronounced it impracticable at that season of the year, and practicable only in July. He drew out several memorandums at that time, going in detail into the project, which are an enduring monument of his widespread information and practical sagacity. This project continued to occupy the attention of Government, and General Miranda was consulted on the subject; but these plans proved abortive, and terminated only in disaster, owing to the unfortunate attack on Buenos Ayres in 1807. * "Upon the whole, I believe that, with a view to the conquest of New Spain, the best mode of disposing of the 4000 men (3000 now at Buenos Ayres and 1000 destined to go to India) would be to send them to the general rendezvous at Jamaica in the proper season. The best season for going to Mexico is from November to May. The rains cease in November and commence in May."— SIR A. WELLESLEY'S Minute, Nov. 2, 1806; Supplementary Despatches, vi. 38. |