CHAP. III. 1809. 60. of the Cabi ing up their mind on to resign his situation as Commander-in-Chief, in consequence of the outcry raised against him from the disclosures made as to the participation of his artful mistress, Mrs Mary Ann Clarke, in the disposal of commissions at the Horse Guards. His Royal Highness was succeeded by Sir D. Dundas, a respectable veteran, but past the period of active exertion, such as the extremity of the crisis imperatively required. What was still more unfortunate, Lord Castlereagh was constrained, by the weight of the highest influence, to offer the command to the Earl of Chatham, the Master-General of the Ordnance, whose services in that department led the Sovereign to suppose that the son of the great earl, Mr Pitt's brother, would signalise his command by exploits worthy of the long-established fame of his house. So much time was lost by the Cabinet in making up Great delay their mind, and taking the opinion of military officers net in mak on the proposed expedition, that it was not till the 14th June that it was finally resolved on, and Lord the subject. Chatham suggested to his Majesty for the command; and even then the Cabinet hesitated, without further investigation, to go into the proposal which Lord Castlereagh had so anxiously urged upon them in the first week of April preceding. This delay was the more reprehensible on their part, as both the military and naval armaments could have been got ready by the 10th of June, and as they had been informed that the whole "Lord Castlereagh begs leave to acquaint your Majesty that your Majesty's confidential servants, having considered the information which has been collected relative to an operation against the enemy's naval resources in the Scheldt, are humbly of opinion that, by employing an adequate force of not less than 35,000 men, the attempt may be made with every prospect of success, provided the practicability of a landing at Sandfleet can be assured. Till this point can be further investigated, they are desirous to postpone receiving your Majesty's final commands upon the measure, requesting, in the mean time, your Majesty's permission to proceed, with as much secrecy and expedition as possible, with all the preliminary arrangements, which, when completed, will contribute to render the troops equally applicable to any other service."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, June 14, 1809; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 275, 276. 1 1809. reagh Cor 276. maritime preparations would certainly be complete by CHAP. that time, so far back as the 16th May preceding. The III. battle of Wagram was not fought till the 6th July, so that if the expedition had sailed on the 16th June, the Castleperiod assigned by the Admiralty, it would have been in resp. vi. ample time to affect the war on the Danube. Lord Castlereagh, who, endowed by nature with real military genius, was perfectly aware of the value of time in war, was in despair at this disastrous delay; but all his efforts to terminate the procrastination of the Cabinet were for long unavailing; and it was not till the 19th June that orders were given to the ordnance department to get the artillery and siege equipage ready, nor till the 28th July, three weeks after the battle of July 28. Wagram had been fought, that the expedition set sail. This long delay was, of course, fatal to one great object of the expedition, which was to rouse Prussia and Northern Germany into action; and it would be inexplicable, did not subsequent events reveal the existence of an intrigue in the Cabinet at this time to overturn Lord Castlereagh, which will be immediately detailed. The intensity of feeling excited by this intrigue rendered the Ministry alike blind to the great design of the Minister at War, and insensible to the value of time in carrying it into execution. se 61. force employed at last on the expedition. Although, however, the long hesitation of the Cabinet in finally determining on the expedition was fatal to it as Immense a diversion to Austria, and a means of resuscitating the war in Germany; yet, considered in reference to the parate interests of Great Britain, and as likely to lead July 28. to the destruction of the enemy's naval forces in the Scheldt, the delay could hardly be considered as an object of regret. Such were the necessities of Napoleon's situation at that time, after he had been brought to the brink of ruin by the result of the battle of Aspern, that, so far from having been able in this interval to make any efficient preparations for the defence of Antwerp, he had СНАР. III. 1809. 1 Castle reagh Cor resp. viii. 209, 210. 62. forces there, less state of been under the necessity of drawing off every disposable sabre and bayonet from the Low Countries to support himself on the banks of the Danube. In the meanwhile, the forces of Great Britain, both by sea and land, seemed to augment in an almost miraculous manner, and were accumulated at the decisive point by the officers of both services in the most able way. The armament, when it did at last set sail, was the most formidable in point of numbers, equipment, and efficiency, both by sea and land, which ever was conveyed across the ocean from the beginning of time, and, beyond all doubt, fully adequate to the success of the undertaking. The naval forces consisted of 35 sail of the line, 2 of 50 guns, 21 frigates, 33 sloops, and 82 gunboats-an armament considerably greater than that which conquered at Trafalgar. The land forces amounted to 39,143 men, of whom 3032 were artillery, and 2657 cavalry, with 150 mortars and heavy guns; the infantry, including 2867 foot guards, being 33,000.1 To resist this formidable armament, the forces at AntFrench werp, and in the fortifications defending the approach to and defence it, were of the most contemptible description when the Antwerp. fleet first appeared on the coast of Zealand. In truth, Napoleon, entirely engrossed with the war on the Danube and in the Peninsula, both of which were daily assuming more colossal proportions, was by no means aware of the danger which his naval establishments in the Scheldt were running, and he trusted to the timidity of the English in land operations, for that security which he could no longer hope to insure by his own exertions. Antwerp, in particular, was in the most defenceless state; not one-half of the bastions were armed ; the ditch, in most places dry, was in some filled up; two old breaches had never been repaired; the garrison consisted only of 2500 men-a force wholly inadequate to man the works-even of this small body, only one-half were regular soldiers. Such had been the demand of the CHAP. III. 1809. Emperor for sabres and bayonets on the Danube and in Spain, that the Minister at War had no troops that he could send to the Scheldt. In truth, no one contemplated an attack in that quarter; and although they had received some vague accounts of armaments in the British harbours, they took it for granted they were intended to recruit the army in Spain, and never for a moment contemplated an attack upon the territory of the great nation. The island of Walcheren was not in quite so defenceless a state as Antwerp; but it was in no condition to stand against such a formidable army as was now about to be directed against it. Flushing, its principal fortification, was slenderly fortified, except on the side of the sea, where it was very strong, and garrisoned only Con. et by 3000 men, composed of Prussian deserters, colonial xi.201, 202. troops, and a battalion of Irish.1 1 Thiers, l'Empire, 63. reagh's in to Lord Aware of the defenceless state of the fortifications of the Scheldt, and of the importance of striking the con- Lord Castletemplated blow with the greatest possible expedition, structions Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Lord Chatham were Chatham to advance with the utmost rapidity, and direct his for the conforces against the decisive point of Antwerp without a expedition. moment's delay." He concluded with the emphatic de "MY LORD,-The importance of checking the naval power which the enemy is so rapidly accumulating in the Scheldt, and of making a powerful diversion in favour of the Austrian arms at the present moment, has determined his Majesty to direct the efforts of his naval and military forces to that quarter. Your Lordship will consider the operation in question as, in its execution, more immediately directed against the fleet and arsenals of France in the Scheldt. The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruction of the whole of the enemy's ships either building at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war. "As the accomplishment of these important objects, in their fullest extent, must in a great measure depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise is carried into execution, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an amount of force to this service as may enable you, at the same time that you Occupy Walcheren and South Beveland, to advance at once a considerable corps against Antwerp, which may be reinforced so soon as Flushing is invested, if not actually reduced. As the attainment of the entire of the objects which his Majesty has in view may ultimately be disappointed, should the enemy have the means of assembling in such strength upon Antwerp as to render duct of the 1809. CHAP. rison of Flushing, sent under General Osten to oppose them, and soon got possession of the whole island except the fortresses of Middleburg and Flushing, which were invested, and the former of which immediately surrendered. At the same time, Lord Huntly, with 7000 men, appeared off the island of Cadsand, lying to the south of the southern branch of the Scheldt, so that, if they had gained it, the British at the very outset would have became masters of both mouths of the Scheldt. Unfortunately the commander, descrying a force on the beach, which, though only 1500 men, looked stronger than it really was, did not venture to hazard a landing. This was much to be regretted; for it is now known that if the whole 7000 had landed and been reinforced by the troops in the east channel, which were entirely disposable, they could have made themselves masters of the whole batteries on the southern bank of the Scheldt, and arrived without resistance at the Tête du Flandre, directly opposite to Antwerp.1 1 Thiers, xi. 206. 65. First suc cesses. As it was, the expedition met in the outset with great success, and, beyond all doubt, had the means of achieving the whole objects for which it was destined with very little resistance. Batz is an important fort at the extremity of South Beveland, where the two branches of the Scheldt unite, and within thirty miles of Antwerp. North and South Beveland were inundated with troops under General Ross, and 25,000 men could in a day have been concentrated to advance from these islands to that fortress. The position of the French fleet in the Western Scheldt off Flushing was now very perilous; for the British naval force in its front was greatly superior to it, so that it could not remain in its present position; and, on the other hand, the guns of the fort at Batz, which might at any moment fall into the hands of the invaders, commanded the passage up the western branch of the river into the central stream. In these circumstances, which seemed all but desperate, it was rescued |