1 III. 1809. reagh Cor 276. maritime preparations would certainly be complete by CHAP. that time, so far back as the 16th May preceding.1 The battle of Wagram was not fought till the 6th July, so that if the expedition had sailed on the 16th June, the Castleperiod assigned by the Admiralty, it would have been in resp. vi. ample time to affect the war on the Danube. Lord Castlereagh, who, endowed by nature with real military genius, was perfectly aware of the value of time in war, was in despair at this disastrous delay; but all his efforts to terminate the procrastination of the Cabinet were for long unavailing; and it was not till the 19th June that orders were given to the ordnance department to get the artillery and siege equipage ready, nor till the 28th July, three weeks after the battle of July 28. Wagram had been fought, that the expedition set sail. This long delay was, of course, fatal to one great object of the expedition, which was to rouse Prussia and Northern Germany into action; and it would be inexplicable, did not subsequent events reveal the existence of an intrigue in the Cabinet at this time to overturn Lord Castlereagh, which will be immediately detailed. The intensity of feeling excited by this intrigue rendered the Ministry alike blind to the great design of the Minister at War, and insensible to the value of time in carrying it into execution. 61. force em expedition. Although, however, the long hesitation of the Cabinet in finally determining on the expedition was fatal to it as Immense a diversion to Austria, and a means of resuscitating the ployed at war in Germany; yet, considered in reference to the se- fast on the parate interests of Great Britain, and as likely to lead July 28. to the destruction of the enemy's naval forces in the Scheldt, the delay could hardly be considered as an object of regret. Such were the necessities of Napoleon's situation at that time, after he had been brought to the brink of ruin by the result of the battle of Aspern, that, so far from having been able in this interval to make any efficient preparations for the defence of Antwerp, he had CHAP. III. 1809. 1 Castle reagh Cor resp. viii. 209, 210. 62. been under the necessity of drawing off every disposable sabre and bayonet from the Low Countries to support himself on the banks of the Danube. In the meanwhile, the forces of Great Britain, both by sea and land, seemed to augment in an almost miraculous manner, and were accumulated at the decisive point by the officers of both services in the most able way. The armament, when it did at last set sail, was the most formidable in point of numbers, equipment, and efficiency, both by sea and land, which ever was conveyed across the ocean from the beginning of time, and, beyond all doubt, fully adequate to the success of the undertaking. The naval forces consisted of 35 sail of the line, 2 of 50 guns, 21 frigates, 33 sloops, and 82 gunboats-an armament considerably greater than that which conquered at Trafalgar. The land forces amounted to 39,143 men, of whom 3032 were artillery, and 2657 cavalry, with 150 mortars and heavy guns; the infantry, including 2867 foot guards, being 33,000.1 To resist this formidable armament, the forces at AntFrench werp, and in the fortifications defending the approach to and defence it, were of the most contemptible description when the less state of fleet first appeared on the coast of Zealand. In truth, forces there, Antwerp. Napoleon, entirely engrossed with the war on the Danube and in the Peninsula, both of which were daily assuming more colossal proportions, was by no means aware of the danger which his naval establishments in the Scheldt were running, and he trusted to the timidity of the English in land operations, for that security which he could no longer hope to insure by his own exertions. Antwerp, in particular, was in the most defenceless state; not one-half of the bastions were armed; the ditch, in most places dry, was in some filled up; two old breaches had never been repaired; the garrison consisted only of 2500 men-a force wholly inadequate to man the works-even of this small body, only one-half were regular soldiers. Such had been the demand of the CHAP. III. 1809. Emperor for sabres and bayonets on the Danube and in Spain, that the Minister at War had no troops that he could send to the Scheldt. In truth, no one contemplated an attack in that quarter; and although they had received some vague accounts of armaments in the British harbours, they took it for granted they were intended to recruit the army in Spain, and never for a moment contemplated an attack upon the territory of the great nation. The island of Walcheren was not in quite so defenceless a state as Antwerp; but it was in no condition to stand against such a formidable army as was now about to be directed against it. Flushing, its principal fortification, was slenderly fortified, except on the side of the sea, where it was very strong, and garrisoned only Con. et l'Empire, by 3000 men, composed of Prussian deserters, colonial xi.201, 202. troops, and a battalion of Irish.1 1 Thiers, 63. reagh's in to Lord Aware of the defenceless state of the fortifications of the Scheldt, and of the importance of striking the con- Lord Castletemplated blow with the greatest possible expedition, structions Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Lord Chatham were Chatham to advance with the utmost rapidity, and direct his for the conforces against the decisive point of Antwerp without a expedition. moment's delay. He concluded with the emphatic de * * "MY LORD,-The importance of checking the naval power which the enemy is so rapidly accumulating in the Scheldt, and of making a powerful diversion in favour of the Austrian arms at the present moment, has determined his Majesty to direct the efforts of his naval and military forces to that quarter. Your Lordship will consider the operation in question as, in its execution, more immediately directed against the fleet and arsenals of France in the Scheldt. The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruction of the whole of the enemy's ships either building at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war. "As the accomplishment of these important objects, in their fullest extent, must in a great measure depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise is carried into execution, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an amount of force to this service as may enable you, at the same time that you Occupy Walcheren and South Beveland, to advance at once a considerable corps against Antwerp, which may be reinforced so soon as Flushing is invested, if not actually reduced. As the attainment of the entire of the objects which his Majesty has in view may ultimately be disappointed, should the enemy have the means of assembling in such strength upon Antwerp as to render duct of the III. CHAP. claration that the expedition, in the first instance at least, was to be regarded as a coup-de-main, in which every1809. thing would depend on celerity of movement; and that the retaining or retiring from the advanced position of Antwerp, when gained, would be matter for future consideration and instructions. With how much wisdom these instructions were framed, and how admirably calculated they were, if they had been literally complied with, to have secured, with very little loss, the whole objects of the expedition, will be abundantly proved in the sequel, and is confirmed by no less an authority than that of Napoleon himself. Unfortunately, the same views were by no means shared by all the members of the Cabinet; and the Board of Admiralty, with the caution characteristic of boards and old men, insisted that Walcheren should be taken before the expedition moved further.* perseverance on your Lordship's part inconsistent with the security of your army, your Lordship will, in that case, use your utmost endeavours, in concert with the navy, to secure as many of the objects above pointed out as the circumstances of the moment will permit; and, as the possession of the island of Walcheren and the port of Flushing may, in themselves, under certain contingencies, be acquisitions of the utmost consequence in the further prosecution of the war, I am to signify to your Lordship the King's commands that, in the event of your being obliged to retire from the more advanced positions on the Scheldt, you do maintain the island of Walcheren till his Majesty's further pleasure is signified. "The state of the campaign on the Continent does not, at the present moment, permit his Majesty's Government to contemplate the possibility of commencing operations with a British army from a point so much in advance towards the frontier of France as Antwerp; neither is there any allied force as yet in the field in the north of Germany of sufficient magnitude, with whom an advance from thence could be combined; nor has it been deemed consistent with the celerity of movement, on which the success of the intended attack may depend, to send the army equipped upon a scale which would qualify it to enter immediately upon a campaign. The expedition must therefore be considered as not, in the first instance, assuming any other character than that of a coup-de-main. While the operation is in progress, other prospects may open themselves, and events occur, which may induce his Majesty's Government to extend their views."-LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Instructions to LORD CHATHAM, July 1809; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 290-292. * "It is the opinion of the sea Lords of the Admiralty that, in the first instance, the island of Walcheren should be taken. They do not take upon them to say where the landing should be made, or how the military force should be distributed this should be arranged between the General and Sir Richard Strachan."-Admiralty Minute, June 9; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 279. III. 1809. There could be no doubt that it was necessary to occupy CHAP. the island of Walcheren generally, in the first instance, in order to secure the passage of the troops in the channels leading to the Scheldt on either side; but there was not the slightest occasion to take Flushing before proceeding further, as the troops could get up, and, in point of fact, did so, when it was still in the hands of the enemy. It was the unfortunate determination of the naval and military officers employed to reduce Flushing before proceeding further, instead of, as Lord Castlereagh had directed, doing both at once, for which there were ample forces, which was the sole cause of the ultimate miscarriage of a descent devised with so much wisdom and ability, and for the successful termination of which such ample forces, both by sea and land, had been put at the disposal of the officers commanding. 64. at length coast of July 29. Devoured with anxiety to expedite operations in a matter where so much depended on not incurring a mo- The troops ment's delay, Lord Castlereagh strongly urged, on 21st embark, and June, that the embarkation of the troops should commence reach the forthwith, in which case the expedition might have been Holland. afloat at latest on the 5th July. But he found it impossible to push on the different services at a pace corresponding to his own clear and fervent impressions, and the expedition did not begin to embark for a month after, and reached the coast of Walcheren only on the 29th July. The fleet, entering the East Scheldt, moored at the entry of the Weere Gat, and landed 15,000 men in a few hours, who easily put to flight 2000 of the gar- July 30. "Lord Castlereagh would humbly propose to your Majesty that the regiments most remote from the points of embarkation should be immediately put in motion. It is intended to embark at Portsmouth in the ships of the line about 17,000 men, a proportion of which force, in order to mark the operation as destined to the westward, will be moved from the eastern district; and as the troops from Essex will require fourteen days for their march and embarkation, it is presumed that the embarkation and equipment of the whole force, including ordnance stores, &c., may be completed within that period, counting from Monday next."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, June 21, 1809; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 281, |