CHAP. IV. 1809. 24. Plan of operations. June 30. Cuesta represented to the English general that the enemy's force to be encountered in the attempt to dislodge him from Madrid consisted of Victor's corps, 26,000 strong, which lay at Merida and Caceres, 13,000 foot and 3000 horse under Sebastiani at Ciudad Rodrigo, and 4000 at Madrid-in all, 49,000 men, but separated from each other by considerable distances and a range of mountains, the direct roads over which were impracticable for artillery or carriages. Still, to advance against such a force with only 20,000 British soldiers, was obviously a very hazardous undertaking, especially as the Spaniards under Cuesta, it was well known, could not be relied on. The Spanish general, however, who had all the pride and self-confidence of his nation, contended strongly for a united forward movement a project to which both Sir Arthur and General Stewart made the greatest possible objections. Considerable delay occurred in consequence of this divergence of views; and, meanwhile, the soldiers, whose spirits had been highly elated by the passage of the Douro, became very impatient for action, and loudly complained that some mark of the Sovereign's favour had not been bestowed on their chief and those who had distinguished themselves on that occasion. The three weeks' rest, however, which were gained while the plans were under consideration, were of great service in bringing up reinforcements from the coast, and improving the strength both of the men and horses; and certain forward movements were made with part of the troops so as to menace Victor's flank. That general in consequence, dreading the convergence of the two armies against his single corps, withdrew his whole army across the Tagus, and commenced his retreat towards Madrid, followed by Cuesta. Upon hearing of this Sir Arthur resolved to enter Spain, which he immediately did in two columns, the one moving upon Placencia by Coria, another upon Sebastiani with his corps was really to the south of the Tagus in La Mancha. IV. the same point by Moraza. It was easy to see that CHAP. these movements would soon lead to important operations, for advices were received that Victor had halted 1809. in his retreat at Talavera de la Reyna, where he had taken up a strong position; and that King Joseph, with General 5000 men from Madrid, and Sebastiani, with 17,000 from Stewart to La Mancha, were moving on the same point, while Soult reagh,, July 11, and Ney in the north had united their forces, and occu-1809, Ms.; pied Orense, threatening a renewed invasion of the north 371-375. of Portugal.1 Lord Castle Lond. i. 25. with Cuesta, ance of the July 10. The army commenced its march on 30th June, by Castello Branco, and arrived at Coria on 5th July. Cuesta Interview was approaching from the south with 38,000 men; but and appearthe greater part of them were new levies upon whom no Spanish reliance could be placed. The two armies came into my; communication on the 10th, at Placencia, where Sir Arthur had a personal conference with Cuesta, whose irritability, naturally great, was much increased by having been kept, with all his troops, four hours under arms awaiting the arrival of the English general, who unfortunately had missed his way by the fault of his guides. The appearance of the men and horses was far from inspiring any confidence in their efficiency in the field. "With the exception," says General Stewart, "of the Irish brigade, and a battalion or two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of their grenadier battalions, the infantry was little better than armed peasants, armed partially like soldiers, but completely unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark applied fully as much to the cavalry as the infantry. The horses of many of them were good, but their riders manifestly knew nothing of movements or discipline; and they were, on this account, as well as on the score of miserable military equipment, quite unfit for general service. The artillery, again, was numerous, but totally unlike, both in order and arrangement, that of other armies; and the generals appeared to have been selected according to one rule alone-namely, that of seniority. IV. 1809. CHAP. They were almost all old men, and, except O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties of one hard campaign. Cuesta, after the interview was over, retired to rest, quite overpowered with fatigue. He returned to supper, however, at eleven, and sat till past midnight, perfectly silent, neither taking the least part in the conversation, nor, 1 General apparently at least, paying any attention to it. Those Stewart to around him assured us that this manner was not assumed, reagh, July but perfectly natural, and always the same. He governed his followers by a system of silence and terror, of which they all stood wonderfully in awe."1 Lord Castle 15, 1809, MS. 26. Offensive operations having been agreed on at this Advance to conference between the two generals, Sir Arthur reand prepar- turned to his own headquarters on the following day, battle there, and orders were immediately given for the troops to ad Talavera, ations for a July 20. vance towards Talavera. The plan arranged was that Cuesta, with his whole force, should press on Victor in front, while Venegas, who commanded a Spanish army in La Mancha, threatened his left, and Sir Arthur his right flank. General Stewart thought the French general would not fight where he stood, but he proved to be mistaken. On the 20th the army reached Oropesa, where it halted for a day, and was reviewed by Cuesta. The splendid appearance, exact discipline, and martial bearing of the troops, exhibited a very different spectacle from the melancholy one which his own men had presented some days before. The troops of both armies were now arranged in the order in which they were to attack the enemy, who was known to be in position in great strength close to Talavera, a short distance in front, though not yet in sight. The Spanish army advanced on the highroad to that town; the British by a parallel road through the mountains in the direction of San Roman. When the Spanish advanced-guard approached Talavera, the French horsemen showed themselves outside the town, and the Spanish cavalry, who were greatly superior in numbers, had several IV. 1809. admirable opportunities to charge. Of these, however, CHAP. they did not avail themselves, but hung back-a circumstance which created not a little disappointment in the breasts of Sir Arthur, General Stewart, and the other July 22. officers who were witnesses of the discouraging exhibition. The French stood firm in front of Talavera as long as the Spaniards alone were in sight; but no sooner did the heads of the red-coated columns begin to show themselves on their right than they retired precipitately, and took up their defensive position on the eastern bank of the Alberche, in rear of that town. Sir Arthur approached to the edge of the stream, which was fordable at nearly all points; and as Victor's corps alone was as yet on the ground, he was extremely anxious to begin the attack next day before the enemy's strength was doubled by the reinforcements which were coming up. Nothing, however, could overcome the procrastinating habit of the Spanish general; and when at length he was brought, late on the evening of the 23d, to agree to an attack with the united force on the following morning, and the British advanced- Lord Castleguard moved on at two for that purpose, it was discovered, reagh, July to their infinite mortification, that the enemy had de- 4,1809, camped during the night, and not a vestige of their army 389-397; i. was to be found on the ground they had occupied on the 499. preceding evening.1 July 23. Stewart to 30 and Aug. MS.; Lond. Gurw. iv. 27. forces unite, approach On the morning of the 24th, General Stewart was sent forward with two squadrons of cavalry to reconnoitre, and The French he came up with the enemy's rearguard, with which he and again had a sharp action near St Olalla. From the prisoners Talavera. taken on that occasion, he ascertained the route which the July 25. retiring columns of the enemy had taken, which was to Torrijos, on the road to Toledo. Meanwhile, Cuesta followed close upon the retiring French army, fondly hoping that they were in full retreat to Madrid or the Ebro; but, in truth, they were only falling back to the fixed-on point of junction of the three armies of Victor, Sebastiani, and Joseph in person, which were converging to one point. IV. 1809. July 25. CHAP. They met, accordingly, behind the Guadarama, on the 25th, and constituted an imposing mass of fifty thousand men present with the eagles, under Victor, Jourdan, and Sebastiani, three of the most experienced chiefs in the French army. No sooner was the junction effected than they wheeled about, and advanced against Cuesta's advancedguard, which had got in pursuit as far as St Olalla. It immediately fell back in such confusion that a total rout Sir A. Wel- would have ensued if Sir Arthur had not hastily moved reagh, Aug up Sherbrook's division, which protected them. 1 Lond. i. 398-401; lesley to Lord Castle 1, 1809; Gurw. iv. 504. 28. the troops This done, that general withdrew over the ford into the camp at Talavera, leaving Mackenzie's division in possession of a convent and wood on the right bank of the Alberche.1 Cuesta's position was now extremely perilous, for he Position of was threatened in front by an army greatly superior to his at Talavera, own, both in numbers and efficiency; and in his rear was a river into which, if attacked, he would infallibly be driven, and where he would lose all his guns and baggage. From this strait he was delivered by the quickness and decision of the British general, who, early next morning, drew the Spanish troops across the Alberche, and placed the whole army, Spanish as well as British, on an extremely advantageous position, having the right leaning on the town of Talavera, where the Spaniards were posted, and their other flank stretching to a rocky hill, the lowest ridge of the Sierra de Gata, which covered the extreme left. The Spanish troops were, for the most part, stationed among some olive groves, and along a road the embankment of which formed an excellent parapet. The British stood in the open field, their right touching the Spanish left, and leaning on an eminence, on which a redoubt had been begun, their left on a craggy mount protected by a deep ravine, at the bottom of which ran a rivulet. The French, when they arrived, drew up directly opposite to them, and their forces were massed in formidable proportions against the British left, where it was evident the principal attack would be made. Numerically, the Allies were superior : |