CHAP. IV. 1809. 35. the British would have tried the bold game of advancing at once to Madrid, the more especially as the great army which had stood the shock at Talavera was broken up; the Position of King, with Sebastiani and the reserve, 20,000 strong, army after having taken the road to Madrid, now threatened by the battle. Venegas, from New Castile, on the one side, and Sir Robert Wilson on the other, who had pushed on to within seven leagues of the capital, and entered into communication with it. But the diminished strength of his army, and the threatening aspect of the forces which were accumulating in his rear, forbade any such attempt. The loss of 6000 men at Talavera had not been compensated to the extent of one-half by Craufurd's division, consisting of the 43d, 52d, and 95th Regiments, which, by great exertions, and marching sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours, had succeeded in reaching headquarters the day after the battle. Including this seasonable reinforcement, the British troops were barely 18,000 sabres and bayonets. Victor had more than that number directly in his front; and Soult, Ney, and Mortier, who had concentrated every disposable man, were already crossing the mountains separating Leon from Estremadura, and advancing with 35,000 men to cut off his communication with Lisbon. Provisions were every day becoming more scarce; already the distribution of meat had ceased, and the troops were put on half rations, made up partly of beans, partly of rye; while 4000 wounded encumbered the hospitals of Talavera, for whose tending and even maintenance no provision whatever had been made, or was perhaps possible, by the Spaniards, in the distracted state of their country. In these circumstances Cuesta proposed that the Allied force should be divided, half to remain at Talavera, and the other half to proceed with a portion of his men against Soult and Ney in rear. But Sir Arthur, deeming such a division too perilous to be thought of, as it was evident no reliance whatever could be placed on the Spanish troops, and CHAP. IV. 1809. each half of the British force would be exposed to certain destruction when combating alongside of their inefficient allies, wisely rejected this proposal, and insisted that the English troops should be kept together. But he gave the Spanish general the choice of remaining where he was, or proceeding to the rear to combat Soult and Ney. Cuesta, deeming his men more likely to succeed in posi- Stewart to tion than in motion, preferred the former, and in conse- Lord Castlequence Sir Arthur set out on the 3d August, taking with 8,1809, him the whole British army, but leaving 2000 wounded, i. 414-417; who could not bear carriage, in Talavera, under charge of 524-534. the Spanish general.1 1 General reagh, Aug. MS.; Lond. Gurw. iv. abandons From intercepted letters obtained by Cuesta, immedi- 36. ately after the British army had begun its march, it ap- Cuesta peared that, while Soult, Ney, and Mortier had received the British orders to press on with the utmost expedition, so as to wounded. threaten the British communications, King Joseph would, with Victor's and Sebastiani's corps and his guards, again resume the offensive, and threaten Talavera, then probably stripped of the English. This intelligence so alarmed the Spanish general, that he instantly commenced the evacuation of Talavera, leaving the British wounded, intrusted at at his own request to his care, to their fate, although no enemy was as yet in sight! With such celerity was this resolution acted upon, that the evacuation was instantly commenced, and under circumstances of the most heartless selfishness. "Though literally encumbered," says General Stewart, "with cars and waggons, the old Spaniard refused to spare us more than seven for the transportation of the brave men who had fought and bled for his country. The abandonment of the town was, as may be imagined, a most heartrending scene. Such of our poor soldiers as were in a condition to move at all, crawled after us, some still bleeding, and many more with their wounds open and undressed; whilst those whose hurts were too severe to permit of this, lay upon their pallets, and implored their comrades not to desert them. By indefati IV. 1809. CHAP. gable exertions, and by sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur Wellesley got together forty cars, which enabled us to bring forward in all about 2000 men ; but there were still some hundreds left behind, all of whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or honour, might have been preserved. During the night of the 3d, the Spaniards came pouring in upon us like a flock of sheep; and a scene of noise and confusion ensued, of which no words could convey an adequate conception." 1 1 Lond. i. 417, 418. 37. retreats by 1 Sir Arthur, as might well be supposed, was highly Sir Arthur indignant at this unworthy desertion, and remonstrated the bridge of strongly against it, both in private and in his public deto the south spatches, but in vain. The deed was done, and could of the Tagus. not be undone, and he soon after received intelligence Arzobispo Aug. 4. Aug. 7. which rendered it evident that a change of direction in the march of the British troops, or an immediate battle with Soult and Ney, was inevitable. Advices were received that Soult had passed the Teitar stream, and was already at Naval-Moral on the highroad to the bridge of Almaraz, with 30,000 men. If the retreat was continued by this road, therefore, they would have to fight their way through these corps with little more than half the number of British troops, half-starving, worn out with fatigue, and encumbered with a large train of wounded. Wisely deeming the risk of such an encounter too great to be hazarded with the only army in the Peninsula now capable of making head against the enemy, Sir Arthur altered his line of retreat, and, defiling rapidly to the left, passed the bridge of Arzobispo with the whole British army, which was rapidly followed by the Spaniards. Both armies assembled on the south of the Tagus on the following day; and, having by great exertions surmounted the mountains to Toralida, through roads deemed impassable for artillery, they reached Deleitosa on the 7th, where at length the wearied men got a few days of repose. During this melancholy retreat the troops were in the lowest spirits; no bread had been served out from the IV. 1809. beginning to the end of that march, and the men had CHAP. tasted none for three whole days. In addition to suffering from hunger, they had a rough and precipitous mountain road to follow; the country on either side was entirely laid waste; and it was only by strenuous exertions 1 General that the guns could be dragged up the steep ascents. Stewart to Such was the state of the British army, not quite 17,000 reagh, Aug. strong, when, threatened by 60,000 excellent troops under MS.; Lond. Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Victor, they took up their ground Gurw. v. 66. on the southern bank of the Tagus.' Lord Castle 12, 1809, i. 421, 422; duct of Sir The conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley at this perilous 38. crisis was above all praise. It was universally supposed Noble conin the army that the united French forces would cross A. Wellesthe Tagus, and fall on the wearied and dispirited remnant ley. of the British host, and not a few looked upon affairs as utterly desperate, and all chance of successful resistance to the French power in the Peninsula as taken away. Sir Arthur was not insensible to the danger, and was well aware of the gloomy feelings which pervaded his army, but he never for a moment despaired. On the contrary, his language was calculated to inspire confidence in all around him. "He saw," says General Stewart, "and felt the difficulties of his situation keenly enough, perplexed as he was by being kept a good deal in the dark as to the steps which the enemy were preparing to take, and harassed and annoyed by the continued supineness of the Spanish authorities; but he was far from regarding the game as lost. On the contrary, he spoke and acted, on all public occasions, as if events were taking the very course which he had expected them to take; and he satisfied every one either that he had provided, or that he was perfectly competent to provide, against any accident or contingency which might chance to occur." But though he spoke thus to those around him, and impressed even those most in his confidence with such ideas, he was very far, in his inmost thoughts, from entertaining such sentiments. He had felt the weakness of the military force in IV. CHAP. point of numbers which Great Britain could furnish to his standards; he had seen the Spanish troops, and learned 1809. by dear-bought experience how unfit they were either to combat in the field, or furnish any efficient material aid to his army. He saw plainly that the contest would come to rest entirely upon his own men; and, contem1 Lond. i. plating a defensive struggle in Portugal, he was secretly arranging with his engineers the construction of those memorable lines in front of Lisbon, which first brought to a stand the hitherto irresistible legions of France.1 422, 423; Gurw, v. 21-33, 69 71. 39. the Span iards, and the valley of ana. Events ere long occurred which too clearly demonContinued strated the inefficient condition of the Spanish troops, and disasters of how perilous would be any combined operations in which retreat of the they were to bear a part. For a month after the passage British into of the Tagus, the British army remained unmolested in its the Guadi- quarters, during which Sir Arthur and General Stewart were incessantly occupied in improving the materiel of the force and procuring supplies, and the soldiers rapidly recovered from their fatigue. But during this time an unbroken succession of disasters had befallen the Spaniards. First, the strong rearguard left by Cuesta at the bridge of Arzobispo was attacked and defeated by Victor; next, Sir Robert Wilson was worsted at Puerto de Banos, and thrown back with his Portuguese into Portugal; and then Venegas was beaten at Almonacid. Soon after, his successor General Areizaga sustained a dreadful defeat at Ocana in La Mancha, which laid open the road to Andalusia to the victorious legions. The Duc del Parque, who had gained a transient success, was defeated at Alba de Tormes. The English general, seeing the whole Spanish forces routed and dispersed the moment the pressure of the English army upon the French was taken away, justly deemed his situation too critical to be longer maintained so far in advance in Spain; and as his troops were becoming very unhealthy, he resolved to retire to what it was hoped would prove more advantageous quarters on the banks of the Guadiana. The army accordingly broke up from |