CHAP. IV. 1810. 44. He is made the Bath. Feb. 17. After this shining proof of public esteem and gratitude, it may seem superfluous to refer to other manifestations of the same feelings even in the most exalted stations. The favour of the Sovereign, however, went a Knight of along with the approbation of the country. He was created, shortly after receiving the honour, a Knight Companion of the Bath-an honour which, though it could give no additional rank to one who was "Honourable" by birth, was valuable as being a mark of military distinction, and became doubly so from being conferred at the time when his illustrious General, for the victory of Talavera, in which they both bore a part, was made Viscount Wellington. 45. of General Stewart, owing main ly to his ability and good conduct. Thus did General Stewart, at the age of thirty-oneRapid rise a period of life when an officer generally esteems himself fortunate if he has attained the rank of LieutenantColonel-receive the thanks of the House of Commons in person, for distinguished services in the field, rendered as Adjutant-General of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army in the Peninsula. Doubtless, fortune had contributed much, with good conduct and ability, to this rapid elevation; it was not every one who was born of a noble and influential family connected with the Administration, and brother to a leading Cabinet Minister. But fortune in a free country never can do more than confer the opportunities of distinction the capacity to seize and improve them belongs to individual ability alone. Fortune gave the opportunity on the banks of the Esla, but valour headed the charge: it was capacity, not influence, which won, at Sir Arthur Wellesley's request, for General Stewart the honourable post of Adjutant-General to the Peninsular army. But what must have been the feelings of that parent whose good fortune it was to see at once one son directing in arduous times with unswerving hand the councils of his country in foreign affairs, and another receiving the thanks of the House of Commons for the intrepid wielding of its sword in the field! CHAPTER V. FROM THE RETURN OF GENERAL STEWART TO THE PENINSU- CHAP. V. 1810. 1. Stewart re 1810. No sooner was General Stewart's health re-established in the spring of 1810, by the influence of a cooler climate and his native air, than he returned to share the toils and dangers of his chief on the Peninsular plains. For-State of the tunately for him, the intervening period during which he wen Gen. had been absent had been one of comparative repose, red to it unsignalised by one event of importance. The campaign in March which had just been closed had been so hard fought, its advantages so equally divided, and the difficulties on both sides of finding the means of transport or the resources necessary for active operations had been such, that neither party had been willing to renew the contest. Satisfied with having repelled the British invasion of Spain, the French generals were content to overlook their ignominious expulsion from Portugal, and submit to the reoccupation by the Spanish forces of Galicia and Asturias. They looked for brighter fields of fame, as yet untouched fields of plunder, in the beautiful provinces recently the theatre of their disgrace, to the south of the 1 Sir Chas. Sierra Morena. The British were so much weakened by Stewart to sickness in the pestilential plains of Estremadura, and so reagh, April 4, inferior in number to the forces of the enemy when 1809, MS.; united together, that they were unable to renew active 449-451. operations. Taking advantage of this forced state of Lord Castle Lond. i. V. 1810. CHAP. inaction, Sir Arthur Wellesley, now created Viscount Wellington of Wellington and Talavera, had removed his army from the unhealthy shores of the Guadiana, and established it, after a march of three weeks, along the frontier between the rivers Tagus and Douro, with the headquarters first at Vizeu, and afterwards at Celorico. 2. Spain which had led to the new position taken by Wellington. The motives which had led to this change of position Disasters in on the part of the English general were not merely those founded on the necessity of a move for the health of his troops. The aspect of affairs in Spain had much to do also with the determination. Since the retreat of the British army to the banks of the Guadiana and their subsequent removal into Portugal, an unbroken series of disasters had befallen the Spanish forces in every part of the Peninsula. Saragossa in Aragon, and Gerona in Catalonia, had both fallen after sieges immortal indeed in history, but which had most seriously crippled the means of resistance at this time: the Spanish army in Estremadura had sustained a dreadful defeat at Medellin ; that in La Mancha had been, as already mentioned, totally annihilated at Ocana; and the victorious French army, under Joseph and Soult, had cleared the defiles of the Sierra Morena without resistance, occupied Seville, and already commenced the blockade of Cadiz. Though the advantage was great of preserving this stronghold, yet it had been gained by an almost entire abandonment of the contest in the rest of Spain: and Wellington had already received information that three French corps, numbering 70,000 combatants, would soon assemble in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo with a view to the siege and destruction of that fortress, previous to a serious invasion of Portugal by Almeida, through the How to mountainous country which separates the valley of the Douro from that of the Tagus.' It was to be prepared M for and to meet this impending danger that Wellington moved his army during the winter from the sands of the Guadiana to the high grounds around Almeida, leaving * Sir Chas. Lord Castle Fingh, 440, 450. General Hill with a comparatively small force on the south of the Tagus to cover the Alentejo and keep up the communication with Badajos, which was still in the hands of the Spaniards. CHAP. V. 1810. 3. condition of "The first good effect," says General Stewart, "resulting from this change of situation showed itself in the Improved rapid recovery of the sick, and the no less rapid restora- the British tion to full strength of such as were already convalescent. army. As the troops contrived, for the most part, to obtain comfortable quarters, neither the cold of winter nor the variable temperature of the spring were felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abundant; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have been desired, was at least less scanty than it had been in Spain. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington was devoting a large share of his attention to the fortification and proper armament of the lines at Torres Vedras; whilst the greatest exertions were made both by him and Beresford to put the regular army and the militia of Portugal into a state of efficiency. Reinforcements accordingly came in to him every hour, respectable, not from their numbers alone, but from their discipline, till he saw himself at last at the head of 27,000 British, and full 31,000 Portuguese troops of the line. The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much reliance was placed for baffling and retarding the advance of the French army, let it begin when it might, was put in a state of excellent defence. That Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of time, no one in the present stage of affairs ventured to hope. The Spaniards were, indeed, full of protestations: they spoke of burying themselves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling, Lond. i. the glory of Saragossa and Gerona; but as yet they were 450-453. not invested." "1 The position occupied by Lord Wellington during this period of apparent inaction and real preparation was the celebrated one of Guarda, which, so long ago as the time V. 4. lington's position and at this time. CHAP. of Lord Galway and the war of the Succession, was deemed the most defensible and important of all which 1810. lay on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and barred the Lord Wel- approach to the capital of an enemy from the eastward. The Allied troops (for the Portuguese regulars were now prospects in line, and in some instances brigaded with the British) occupied the summit of the mountain-ridge called the Sierra de Estrella, extending from Coimbra to Guarda, and which gradually melts away into the immense plains of Castile. By this means they commanded and barred the two great roads which enter Portugal from Spain, the one of which runs to the north and the other to the south of the Sierra, and which are the only ones in the country on which an invading army can move its artillery and stores. The advanced posts were pushed forward much farther, and occupied positions beyond Almeida on the banks of the rivers Agueda and Coa. The right rested on the Tagus, and was protected by Hill's corps, which was posted at Abrantes and guarded the passage of that river; and the left, though undefended in a military point of view, was deemed sufficiently secure by the rugged and inhospitable nature of the country in that quarter, of which Soult's corps in the preceding year had had such bitter experience. This position, which was forty miles in length, was guarded by 27,000 British and 30,000 Portuguese troops.1 1 Lond. i. 453-455. 5. Wellington's position was undoubtedly advantageous; Position and but he had need of all its strength, for it was likely to the French be taxed to the uttermost by the force which Napoleon strength of forces. was accumulating against it. Having completed the routing and dispersion of all the Spanish armies in the field in other parts of the Peninsula, the French Emperor had now accumulated an overwhelming force to accomplish its final pacification by driving the English into the sea. It consisted of three entire corps-viz., that of Ney, composed of three divisions; that of Reynier, of two; and that of Junot, also of two. Besides these, General Kellermann had arrived in Valladolid with 9000 |