CHAP. V. 1810. 2. Spain which had led to the new position taken by Wellington. inaction, Sir Arthur Wellesley, now created Viscount Wellington of Wellington and Talavera, had removed his army from the unhealthy shores of the Guadiana, and established it, after a march of three weeks, along the frontier between the rivers Tagus and Douro, with the headquarters first at Vizeu, and afterwards at Celorico. The motives which had led to this change of position Disasters in on the part of the English general were not merely those founded on the necessity of a move for the health of his troops. The aspect of affairs in Spain had much to do also with the determination. Since the retreat of the British army to the banks of the Guadiana and their subsequent removal into Portugal, an unbroken series of disasters had befallen the Spanish forces in every part of the Peninsula. Saragossa in Aragon, and Gerona in Catalonia, had both fallen after sieges immortal indeed in history, but which had most seriously crippled the means of resistance at this time: the Spanish army in Estremadura had sustained a dreadful defeat at Medellin ; that in La Mancha had been, as already mentioned, totally annihilated at Ocana; and the victorious French army, under Joseph and Soult, had cleared the defiles of the Sierra Morena without resistance, occupied Seville, and already commenced the blockade of Cadiz. Though the advantage was great of preserving this stronghold, yet it had been gained by an almost entire abandonment of the contest in the rest of Spain: and Wellington had already received information that three French corps, numbering 70,000 combatants, would soon assemble in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo with a view to the siege and destruction of that fortress, previous to a serious invasion of Portugal by Almeida, through the Stewart to mountainous country which separates the valley of the Douro from that of the Tagus. It was to be prepared 1810, MS.; for and to meet this impending danger that Wellington 1 Sir Chas. Lord Castle reagh, April 12, Lond. i. 449, 450. moved his army during the winter from the sands of the Guadiana to the high grounds around Almeida, leaving General Hill with a comparatively small force on the south of the Tagus to cover the Alentejo and keep up the communication with Badajos, which was still in the hands of the Spaniards. V. 1810. 3. condition of "The first good effect," says General Stewart, "resulting from this change of situation showed itself in the Improved rapid recovery of the sick, and the no less rapid restora- the British tion to full strength of such as were already convalescent. army. As the troops contrived, for the most part, to obtain comfortable quarters, neither the cold of winter nor the variable temperature of the spring were felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abundant; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have been desired, was at least less scanty than it had been in Spain. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington was devoting a large share of his attention to the fortification and proper armament of the lines at Torres Vedras; whilst the greatest exertions were made both by him and Beresford to put the regular army and the militia of Portugal into a state of efficiency. Reinforcements accordingly came in to him every hour, respectable, not from their numbers alone, but from their discipline, till he saw himself at last at the head of 27,000 British, and full 31,000 Portuguese troops of the line. The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much reliance was placed for baffling and retarding the advance of the French army, let it begin when it might, was put in a state of excellent defence. That Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of time, no one in the present stage of affairs ventured to hope. The Spaniards were, indeed, full of protestations: they spoke of burying themselves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling, Lond. i. the glory of Saragossa and Gerona; but as yet they were 450-453. not invested."1 The position occupied by Lord Wellington during this period of apparent inaction and real preparation was the celebrated one of Guarda, which, so long ago as the time V. 4. lington's position and at this time. CHAP. of Lord Galway and the war of the Succession, was deemed the most defensible and important of all which 1810. lay on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and barred the Lord Wel- approach to the capital of an enemy from the eastward. The Allied troops (for the Portuguese regulars were now prospects in line, and in some instances brigaded with the British) occupied the summit of the mountain-ridge called the Sierra de Estrella, extending from Coimbra to Guarda, and which gradually melts away into the immense plains of Castile. By this means they commanded and barred the two great roads which enter Portugal from Spain, the one of which runs to the north and the other to the south of the Sierra, and which are the only ones in the country on which an invading army can move its artillery and stores. The advanced posts were pushed forward much farther, and occupied positions beyond Almeida on the banks of the rivers Agueda and Coa. The right rested on the Tagus, and was protected by Hill's corps, which was posted at Abrantes and guarded the passage of that river; and the left, though undefended in a military point of view, was deemed sufficiently secure by the rugged and inhospitable nature of the country in that quarter, of which Soult's corps in the preceding year had had such bitter experience. This position, which was forty miles in length, was guarded by 27,000 British and 30,000 Portuguese troops.1 1 Lond. i. 453-455. 5. Wellington's position was undoubtedly advantageous; Position and but he had need of all its strength, for it was likely to the French be taxed to the uttermost by the force which Napoleon strength of forces. was accumulating against it. Having completed the routing and dispersion of all the Spanish armies in the field in other parts of the Peninsula, the French Emperor had now accumulated an overwhelming force to accomplish its final pacification by driving the English into the sea. It consisted of three entire corps-viz., that of Ney, composed of three divisions; that of Reynier, of two; and that of Junot, also of two. Besides these, General Kellermann had arrived in Valladolid with 9000 V. 1810. infantry and 2000 cavalry, and the whole were under CHAP. the command of Marshal Massena, whose reputation, always great, had been raised to the highest point by his undaunted courage at the battle of Aspern. The whole army was 85,000 strong, of whom at least 68,000 might be reckoned on as present with the eagles; and the troops, deeming victory and plunder secure, were in the highest spirits and eager for the conflict. Wellington could not collect above 40,000 on any one point for active operations; and with such an inferior force he was well aware it was impossible he could hazard a battle in the open field, the more especially as fully half his men were Portuguese who had never yet been tried in a serious conflict. But he wisely remained on his mountain-ridge as near the frontier as possible; hoping that he might, by Mem.; availing himself of strong positions, protract the campaign 455-457; till the approach of the bad weather rendered a serious 564-567. approach to the capital impossible.1 1 Joseph. Lond. i. Koch, vii. the army. A consciousness of this great superiority of force on 6. the part of the enemy, as well as the disastrous termina- Desponding tion of the war in Austria, which had been closed by the feelings in thunderbolt of Wagram, excited a very general feeling of despondence in the British troops. All were indeed resolute to do their duty to the last, and dispute every inch of ground with the enemy; but it was with a heavy heart that they looked forward to the future, and they entered on the campaign rather with the constancy of martyrs resolute to maintain their principles at the stake, than the confidence of heroes marching to assured victory. Lord Wellington, also, though he abated nothing of his confident language and demeanour, had to contend with obstacles which would have overwhelmed any ordinary man, from the extreme difficulty of getting supplies of specie to make the necessary purchases for the army. But in the midst of these anxieties, and though he did not in reality think they would be required, his provident care had provided ample shipping at Lisbon to bring CHAP. V. 1810. was placed, because, if the place could hold out for a few weeks, the heavy rains of autumn would set in, and further movements in the field, on the part of the investing army, would be rendered impossible. To encourage the defence, and, if an opportunity should present itself, either interrupt the siege, or throw in some succour to the beleaguered garrison, he moved forward to the ground he had previously occupied, and approached close to the outposts of the besieging army. But the hopes which he entertained of a prolonged defence were disappointed. On the evening of the 26th, when the enemy were throwing shells, still at very long range, into the fortress, one of them blew up the principal magazine of the place. This was a serious misfortune, for nearly all the guns were blown into the ditch, and great part of the artillerymen killed or wounded; but the garrison might still have prolonged the defence some time longer; and subsequent events showed that, whether it had occurred or not, they would have capitulated, and were already in terms with the French general. No sooner had the explosion taken place, than the whole officers in the place, with the Portuguese second in command at their head, waited on General Cox, and insisted on his instantly surrendering. Cox, like a gallant soldier, refused, adding his resolution, if matters became desperate, to cut his way through the French lines, and join Lord Wellington. The officers remonstrated, and withdrew in sullen discontent; but Cox found, on going out to the troops, that matters Stewart to had become hopeless; for they had already all laid down reagh, Aug. their arms, and not a man would obey his orders. Cox had MS.; Lond. now no alternative but to close with the French general's Wellington offer of a capitulation, and next day he formally surrendered. Massena entered the town immediately, and the 1816 treachery was then made manifest.' The garrison being to General paraded before him, he dismissed the militia to their homes, on a promise they would not serve against the French during the war, and offered the regular soldiers service under the banners of Napoleon. They all accepted 1 Sir Chas. Lord Castle 30, 1810, i. 508-510; to Lord Liverpool, and Hill, Sept. 1, 1810 Gurw. vi. 389-399. |