CHAP. V. the violence of Napoleon's temper, and the confident expectations he had formed of decisive success from the invasion of Portugal, forbade all thoughts of a retrograde 1810. movement, except in the very last extremity. He resolved, therefore, to run the risk, and sent forward immediately two regiments of horse to occupy the summit of the Sierra. When they reached it a magnificent view opened on their astonished eyes of rich plains, hanging orchards and vineyards, sparkling streams, and a splendid champaign country, extending from the foot of the mountain to Coimbra. Overjoyed at this discovery, Massena despatched Junot with two divisions at nightfall, to occupy the pass in force; and at break of day Ney was to march 1 Koch, vii. with his entire corps, to be immediately followed by the 201, 202. whole army.1 retires to Vedras. 553. Wellington has frequently said that he expected the 23. battle of Busaco would have stopped the advance of the Wellington French into Portugal, and that, if their general had been Torres directed by the true principles of the military art, he would have retired after that check. Influenced by this Gurw. vi. belief, and supposing that the pass on his left, over which Massena was preparing to move, was impassable for an army, he did not occupy it; and when, on the evening of the 28th, he saw the French army defiling in that direction, he wisely made no attempt to disturb them, but gave orders for the whole force to break up and retire by Coimbra towards Lisbon. His policy was now to leave nothing to chance. Behind him were the lines of Torres Vedras, now completed, and mounted with six hundred guns. He withdrew, therefore, rapidly towards this stronghold, driving the whole corn and cattle of the country as he retired, accompanied by nearly the whole inhabitants; and at the same time he wrote to the Mar- mana, Sept. quis de la Romana to come across from Estremadura and Gurw. vi. join him there, which that gallant officer immediately did ii. 11, 12; with 4000 men. It was a joyful day for the Spanish 132. troops when they entered Portugal, for they immediately 3 3 Welling ton to Ro 30, 1810; 450; Lond. Belmas, i. CHAP. V. 1810. 24. received the same rations as the British-viz., a pound of bread, a pound and a half of biscuit, and a pound of meat a-day: a wonderful change to men who, however inured to abstemious habits, had previously been literally starving. There can be no doubt that this retreat, and the order Horrors of to the Portuguese to evacuate their houses and retire the retreat. with the army before the French approached, was absolutely necessary, and largely contributed to the ultimate success of the campaign; but, in the first instance, it led to very great confusion and suffering, and excited the warmest feelings of commiseration in the British officers and soldiers who witnessed it. Sir Charles Stewart has left the following graphic picture of it and its attendant horrors: "Crowds of men, women, and children—of the sick, the aged, and the infirm, as well as of the robust and the young-covered the roads and the fields in every direction. Mothers might be seen with infants at their breasts hurrying towards the capital, and weeping as they went; old men, scarcely able to totter along, made way chiefly by the aid of their sons and daughters; whilst the whole wayside soon became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other species of household furniture, which the weary fugitives were unable to carry farther. During the retreat of Sir John Moore's army numerous heartrending scenes were brought before us; for then, as now, the people, particularly in Galicia, fled at our approach; but they all returned sooner or later to their homes, nor ever dreamed of accumulating upon our line of march, or following our fortunes. The case was different here. Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook them under the persuasion that they should never behold them again; and the agony which such an apprehension appeared to excite among the majority exceeds any attempt at description. . . . It could not but occur to us that, though the devastating system must inevitably bear hard upon the French, the most serious evils would, in CHAP. V. 1810. all probability, arise out of it, both to ourselves and our allies, from the famine and general distress which it threatened to bring upon a crowd so dense, shut up within the walls of a single city. At the moment there were few amongst us who seemed not disposed to view it with reprobation; because, whilst they condemned its apparent violation of every feeling of humanity and justice, 1 Lond. ii. they doubted the soundness of the policy in which it 12, 13. originated." 1 Stewart's of Torres Driving this agitated and weeping crowd before them, 25. the British army, under its indomitable chief, now ap- Sir Charles proached the lines of Torres Vedras-the chosen strong- description hold and battle-field on which the fate, not of Lisbon it- of the lines self, but of the Peninsula, was to be decided. Sir Charles Vedras. Stewart, who rode along its entire extent almost every day for the next two months, has given the following account of these celebrated lines: "Along the neck of the peninsula, at the extremity of which Lisbon is built, there extend several ranges of high and rugged hills, intersected here and there by narrow passes, and covered for the most part by deep ravines and defiles, in the usual acceptation of the term impassable. Along this, at the distance of perhaps twenty-five English miles from the city, Lord Wellington had selected two lines, one considerably in advance of the other, but both of tremendous strength; and he had bestowed upon their fortification so much of care, and diligence, and science, as to place them almost equally beyond the reach of insult from any assailing force, however numerous and well supplied. The system pursued on this occasion was quite novel, and the works erected were altogether such as were not to be met with, under similar circumstances, in any part of the world. 26. "The first line rested its right upon the acclivities of Alhandra, on the summits of which several formidable Descripredoubts were erected, and was flanked by the fire of a first line. dozen gunboats at anchor in the Tagus. The faces of these tion of the CHAP. V. hills were all carefully scarped; the road which led through them was destroyed; and it was with perfect 1810. justice concluded that here at least our position might be pronounced impregnable. On the left of these heights lay a ravine or gully, called the Pass of Maltao, the gorge of which was effectually blocked up by two formidable redoubts, whilst it was completely commanded on one hand by the hills of Alhandra, and on the other by those of Armeda. The latter, like the former, were scarped, and otherwise rendered inaccessible; and they communicated with the centre of the position, which was a huge mountain, crowned by a redoubt more extensive than any other on the line. As this mountain overhung the village of Sobral, its castle kept completely at command the great road which conducts from thence to Lisbon, and rendered it utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as to attempt a passage in that direction. On the left of this redoubt, again, some high and broken ground looked down upon Zebreira, and stretched, in formidable shape, towards Pataneira. Just behind that village there is a deep glen, succeeded by other hills, which cover the roads from Ribaldeira to Exara and Lisbon; whilst, on the left of the whole, was a lofty mountain, which crowded up all the space between these roads and Torres Vedras." The works ended at the extreme left at the mouth of the Zezambre, on the sea, distant twenty-five miles from the other extremity on the Tagus. "Along this line were erected, at convenient distances, no fewer than one hundred and eight redoubts, differing in dimensions according to the extent of the ground allotted for them and the purposes which they were severally intended to serve; and the whole were armed with a train of four hundred and twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre." In addition to this, the ascents, by nature, were all steep, 1 Lond. ii. arid, and rocky. Sloping vineyards for the most part covered the front; and wherever these obstacles were awanting, strong palisades were erected, ditches cut, and 15-17, and i. 485. slopes scarped, so as to impede to the greatest degree CHAP. the advance of an attacking army. V. 27. Notwithstanding all this, these lines, though among the 1810. strongest which combined nature and art had ever formed, weak points were not without their weak points, which Sir Charles of the line. Stewart observed, and anxiously pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief. They were thus explained by himself at the time in a letter to his brother: "In some places the redoubts have been unavoidably placed at such considerable intervals from each other, that, should there be no powerful reserves at hand, and movable columns to block up the chasms, the enemy might, without much difficulty, and with little loss, penetrate between them. This is particularly the case at the extremities, in the space between Mafra and the sea on the left, and between Torres Vedras and the Tagus on the right; and unfortunately they are precisely the places where an attack is most likely to be made. The centre is completely covered by the great redoubt on Monte Junto, and the works ramifying from it on either side; but the flanks are not equally covered, and if assailed must depend upon the valour of those who occupy them.”1 To obviate as much Sir Charles as possible this danger, Wellington had constructed a fine road, which ran along the position behind the lines over reagh, Oct. its whole extent, so as to afford the means of moving Ms. troops or artillery rapidly from one part to another; and a line of signals was erected so as to give instant information to headquarters of any attack which might be made in any quarter. Still, with all these precautions, the Commander-in-Chief was not without uneasiness as to the effect of a sudden attack in great force on one part of a line of such extent. The outposts were pushed far into the plain towards the French videttes; the utmost vigilance was enjoined on all the guards and sentinels: and the General himself rode almost every day along the whole 486, 487; line, accompanied by his staff, to inspect in person every 229-231. part of the preparations.2 VOL. I. 2 B. Stewart to 10, 1810, 2 Lond. i. Koch, vii. |