slopes scarped, so as to impede to the greatest degree CHAP. the advance of an attacking army.

V.

27.

Notwithstanding all this, these lines, though among the 1810. strongest which combined nature and art had ever formed, weak points were not without their weak points, which Sir Charles of the line. Stewart observed, and anxiously pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief. They were thus explained by himself at the time in a letter to his brother: "In some places the redoubts have been unavoidably placed at such considerable intervals from each other, that, should there be no powerful reserves at hand, and movable columns to block up the chasms, the enemy might, without much difficulty, and with little loss, penetrate between them. This is particularly the case at the extremities, in the space between Mafra and the sea on the left, and between Torres Vedras and the Tagus on the right; and unfortunately they are precisely the places where an attack is most likely to be made. The centre is completely covered by the great redoubt on Monte Junto, and the works ramifying from it on either side; but the flanks are not equally covered, and if assailed must depend upon the valour of those who occupy them." To obviate as much 1Sir Charles as possible this danger, Wellington had constructed a fine Lord Castleroad, which ran along the position behind the lines over reagh, Oct. its whole extent, so as to afford the means of moving MS. troops or artillery rapidly from one part to another; and a line of signals was erected so as to give instant information to headquarters of any attack which might be made in any quarter. Still, with all these precautions, the Commander-in-Chief was not without uneasiness as to the effect of a sudden attack in great force on one part of a line of such extent. The outposts were pushed far into the plain towards the French videttes; the utmost vigilance was enjoined on all the guards and sentinels and the General himself rode almost every day along the whole 486, 487; line, accompanied by his staff, to inspect in person every 229-231. part of the preparations.2

VOL. I.

2 B

Stewart to

10, 1810,

2 Lond. i.

Koch, vii.

СНАР.

V.

1810.

were in some measure reopened. Yet the time would inevitably come when their stores would be exhausted, and they would be forced either to attack the British in their impregnable lines, or retire into Spain without a combat. Guided by these considerations, Lord Wellington determined to remain on the defensive, and wait till time and famine compelled them to retreat; and in the 1 Loud. ii. mean time, in imitation of the enemy, he strengthened Wellington his new and more advanced position with redoubts, and Liverpool, commenced the construction of a fresh fortified position. covering Lisbon on the south of the Tagus, to which he Gur might retire, as he had done to Torres Vedras, in the Brialmont, event of his adversary, in overwhelming strength and 330, 331. joined by Soult from Andalusia, transferring the war, as he expected he would, into that quarter.1

57, 60, 61;

to Lord

Jan. 5, 1811;

vi.

478, 479;

by Gleig, i.

34.

health and

spirits of

the troops.

Meanwhile the troops lay in their huts in the new Improved position around Cartaxo, and their health and spirits soon became excellent. When not on duty, the officers went out fishing and shooting, as if they had been in England. The desponding feelings which had been general when the retreat was going on, disappeared when the plan of their chief became apparent; and it was evident that they possessed in their rear a stronghold which could never be forced, to which they could securely retire in the event of an overwhelming force being brought against them. Provisions were abundant in the camp; the health of the soldiers, generally speaking, was excellent; and every facility was given to their enjoying themselves as much as possible. Among other expedients to enliven the vacant hours was a military pageant at the investing Marshal Beresford with the Order of the Bath, which went off with the utmost eclat. "Seldom," says Sir Charles Stewart, "has an army, occupying ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours of relaxation, or contrived to unite so completely the pleasures of country life with the serious business of war. It is probably needless to add, that so great a show of

in rear were entirely cut off; the whole provisions in the vicinity of the army were soon exhausted, and the famishing soldiers were obliged to straggle twenty and thirty miles off to extract them at the point of the bayonet from the wretched inhabitants; and Colonel Trant, having collected 5000 militia, and made an attack on Coimbra directly in his rear, captured the whole sick and wounded it contained, amounting to 5000 men.

V.

1810.

29.

situation of

The great reliance of Massena in this long tarrying in so dangerous a situation, was on the expected failure of Improved supplies for the British army. Napoleon had strongly Wellington. impressed upon him the difficulty of getting provisions in Portugal, and forbade the invasion before the harvest was reaped and stored in the barns. When, therefore, the French general saw a British army, containing above 70,000 mouths, and driving before them a helpless crowd of at least as many more, retreat into the immediate vicinity of a city containing 250,000 inhabitants, and already burdened with the crews of a hundred ships lying in the Tagus, it is not surprising that he entertained sanguine hopes that necessity or want of provisions would soon compel the British, as it had done himself at Genoa, to capitulate, or evacuate the country. this manner, both the Emperor and the essential difference which the command of the sea made in the two situations. Utterly sterile and unproductive to other nations, the ocean is, as General Jomini long ago observed, prolific of life and strength to the British; it is their true base of military operations. The provident care of the English Government and Lord Wellington had secured supplies, not only in sufficient quantities, but abundance, as well for the whole fighting men assembled in front, as for the crews of the ships, the inhabitants of Lisbon, and the immense crowd of rural inhabitants who had been driven forward into the lines. Vessels laden with grain in great quantities daily arrived in the Tagus from Barbary, Egypt, and the Le

But, in reasoning in his lieutenant forgot

CHAP.

V.

enemies in savage barbarity; and numbers of the peasantry were tortured and hung for not revealing stores of 1810. provisions which really did not exist.

36.

ton's diffi

culties.

But all this notwithstanding, Wellington had his own Welling difficulties to contend with; and though of a different kind, they were perhaps even more formidable than those which assailed the French Marshal. The Government at home and the House of Commons were by no means equally convinced with him of the possibility of successful resistance to the enemy. The strong apprehensions which they had felt during the retreat in the preceding autumn, though to a certain degree dispelled by the successful stand made at Torres Vedras, returned with redoubled force when Massena halted in his retreat at Santarem and Wellington, instead of attacking him, resumed the system of procrastination, and prepared as for a lengthened campaign in the heart of Portugal. The Government were aghast at the prospect of interminable war carried on in an inland country, and at an enormous expense; nor did they see their way to any satisfactory result even after every imaginable expense had been incurred. Owing to the extreme difficulty of getting specie, the whole remittances to the army cost fifty per cent more than the sum which reached the English general; and even when the remittances did come, which was never till long after they were due, they were seldom a fourth part of what the wants of the troops required. The English system of paying for all supplies of every sort and levying no contributions, was infinitely more burdensome in the outset, though less exasperating in the end, than the French, of taking everything by force and paying for nothing. Of Spain, all in England despaired, and not without reason; and few had confidence in the ability of Portugal, even with all the assistance of Great Britain, to continue the contest with their gigantic opponent. The regency of Portugal was at once unpopular, imbecile, and disaffected; and Wellington found

1 Brial. i.

336-340; Lond. ii. 96, 97.

V.

to his cost that instead of meeting with support, he in CHAP. general experienced nothing but opposition and thwarting from the Portuguese authorities, to whose preserva- 1810. tion his own efforts were directed.

37.

Wellington

ture.

Everything, in these circumstances, depended on the firmness and resolution of the Commander-in-Chief; but, at this junchappily, these were of a kind which were proof against any danger, how great soever. No one was more aware of the difficulties of his situation than Wellington, especially after the destruction of all the Spanish armies enabled the enemy to direct their whole disposable force against him; but he never hesitated under the responsibility, or quailed under the danger, with which a perseverance in the course he had laid out for himself would be attended. "There

is no doubt," said he to Sir Charles Stewart, "that the task which I have undertaken is herculean, particularly now that the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that there is nothing in the shape of an army in the field but ourselves. I think I am, however, in such a situation that I can retire and embark whenever I please; and if that be the case, the longer I stay the better for the cause, and the more honourable to the country. Whether I shall be able to hold my ground at last must of course depend upon the numbers and the means by which I shall be attacked; and, adverting to the difficulties of subsistence even for small numbers in this country, I hope that I shall not be attacked by more than I shall be able to manage. The necessity of keeping my rear open to the Tagus is a difficulty; and I should be able to effect my object with greater ease, if I was not under the necessity of effecting everything, not only without loss, but without risk, or even the appearance of risk, in order to please the good people of England." These were Wellington's sentiments in Lond. ii. August 1810; but the difficulties of his situation were terribly increased from the causes which have been mentioned. Such was the penury of the Portuguese Government, in consequence of the devastation of the country

97, 98.