to his cost that instead of meeting with support, he in general experienced nothing but opposition and thwarting from the Portuguese authorities, to whose preservation his own efforts were directed. CHAP. V. 1810. 37. Wellington Everything, in these circumstances, depended on the Firmness of firmness and resolution of the Commander-in-Chief; but, at this juuchappily, these were of a kind which were proof against any ture. danger, how great soever. No one was more aware of the difficulties of his situation than Wellington, especially after the destruction of all the Spanish armies enabled the enemy to direct their whole disposable force against him; but he never hesitated under the responsibility, or quailed under the danger, with which a perseverance in the course he had laid out for himself would be attended. "There is no doubt," said he to Sir Charles Stewart, "that the task which I have undertaken is herculean, particularly now that the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that there is nothing in the shape of an army in the field but ourselves. I think I am, however, in such a situation that I can retire and embark whenever I please; and if that be the case, the longer I stay the better for the cause, and the more honourable to the country. Whether I shall be able to hold my ground at last must of course depend upon the numbers and the means by which I shall be attacked; and, adverting to the difficulties of subsistence even for small numbers in this country, I hope that I shall not be attacked by more than I shall be able to manage. The necessity of keeping my rear open to the Tagus is a difficulty; and I should be able to effect my object with greater ease, if I was not under the necessity of effecting everything, not only without loss, but without risk, or even the appearance of risk, in order to please the good people of England." These were Wellington's sentiments in Lond. ii. August 1810; but the difficulties of his situation were terribly increased from the causes which have been mentioned. Such was the penury of the Portuguese Government, in consequence of the devastation of the country 97, 98. CHAP. V. 1811. Admiral Berkeley for the embarkation of the troops in certain events. In the British army, indeed, there was no want of anything, owing to the provident care of Wellington, the vigour of the commissaries, and the liberal expenditure of the Government; but the expenditure had now reached such a point that it was doubtful whether it could continue much longer. The Portuguese troops, not supported by an equally powerful exchequer, were in the most miserable state. Like the French, they were literally starving, and but for the supplies from the British magazines they would nearly all have died of famine. The commissariat was inefficient, the Government lukewarm or treacherous; and at the crisis of the contest, some of the members of the regency, instead of attending to the wants of their forces, were busied in writing anonymous letters to Lord Wellington. From the combined operation of these causes, the Portuguese army had become during the winter not only relaxed in discipline and efficiency, but extremely reduced in numbers. Desertion went on to an alarming extent. In the middle of March it was reduced to less than a half of the amount it had reached at the battle of Busaco, and many regiments had scarce a third of their complement on paper around their standards. As to the militia, it exhibited more than the usual inefficiency of this species of force. It was set down on paper at 45,000; but the fact was, there never had When been so many as 25,000 actually in the field. Massena began his retreat, and Wellington his pursuit, the entire force of the former had been reduced to 40,792 men, with 7619 horses and 53 guns. No less than 1 See Tables 19,000 men and 4597 horses had been lost since the in575, 590. vasion commenced, of whom 4071 were prisoners of war, Welling including those taken at Coimbra. Wellington's army morandum, present under arms at the same time consisted of 29,497 British and 29,000 Portuguese, but of these upwards of 299. 5000 were at Lisbon, Elvas, and Cadiz, leaving about 52,000 present on the two banks of the Tagus.2 in Koch, vii. ton's Me Feb. 23, 1811; Gurw. vii. fully withstand such formidable masses, acting on concentric lines and in concert. CHAP. 1810. 39. as to cross Tagus. On the 29th December Drouet arrived at Massena's outposts with 9000 men. He was the bearer of the first Massena's despatches which that Marshal had received since he difficulties crossed the frontier on the 16th September. The posi- ing the tive orders of the Emperor to carry the war to the south of the Tagus, compelled Massena, much against his will, to attempt the passage of the river. But in the interim, Wellington, who was fully alive to the importance of preventing that movement, had been beforehand with him, and not only strengthened Abrantes, so as to put it altogether beyond the reach of a coup-de-main, but so disposed Hill's corps along the left bank of the river, that the passage at any point would be extremely difficult. In obedience to the Emperor's orders, however, Massena resolved to make the attempt, and it was anxiously and long debated at the French headquarters whether the bridge should be established at Punhete or Santarem. Reynier strongly supported the latter place, because, close to it, and under cover of guns placed on the heights of Bonavista, there was an island, on which a lodgment might be made. But General Eblé objected that he had not animals of transport sufficient to convey the bridge equipage there by land, and that it would be highly dangerous to attempt to convey it by water under the fire of the English guns. Perplexed with so many difficulties, the French general determined to defer the operation till Soult came up with the fifth corps from Andalusia, so as 1 Koch, vii. to dislodge Hill from his commanding position on the 304-329. southern bank of the river.1 40. rations in The military viceroy of Spain to the south of the Sierra Morena had no inclination to exchange his isolated Soult's opeoperations in his own rich domains for a hazardous war- Andalusia fare to the north of those provinces. The positive orders of the Emperor, however, compelled Soult to do something, but he studiously made it as little as possible. V. 1811. CHAP. Napoleon's orders were forthwith to suspend all operations in Andalusia except the blockade of Cadiz, and direct the entire fifth corps with the siege train upon Abrantes, in order to facilitate Massena's passage of the Tagus. Soult represented to the Minister at War, with truth, that such an operation would be hazardous in the extreme, if not impossible, as long as Olivenza, Badajos, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, remained in the hands of the enemy, and that it was indispensable to begin with the reduction of these fortresses. He engaged, however, to make his appearance in Estremadura with 20,000 infantry and 3000 horse, and with these; if joined by 15,000 under Drouet detached from old Castile, he promised not only to reduce these strongholds but to make incursions into the Alentejo to support Massena, and even give a good account of Lord Wellington if he should attack him with his whole force.1 1 Soult to Berthier, May 4, 1811; Joseph's Mem. vii. 399. 41. cesses of Soult in Estremadura. Jan. 22, 1811. The operations of Soult against the fortresses were Great suc- attended in the outset with extraordinary success. Olivenza was blockaded on the 11th January; and on the 22d, the garrison, 4280 strong, was obliged to capitulate, the negligence of the Spaniards having left it wholly without provisions. After this success, Soult moved forward Mortier's corps to form the siege of Badajos, which, being a place of much greater strength, and garrisoned by 9000 men, was expected to make a resolute defence, and at all events to detain the enemy before its walls until Wellington was in a situation to detach a corps for its relief. These hopes, however, were miserably disappointed. Ground was broken before the walls on the 28th January, and on the 11th February the outwork of Pardaleras was taken by assault. The operations were, after this, retarded by the flooding of the Guadiana and the Gebora, which covered the army of Mendizabel, which Lord Wellington, after the death of Romana, had detached from his army to co-operate in the defence. But the floods having fallen, the French forthwith forded V. 1811. Feb. 18. both rivers, and, having established a mortar battery CHAP. which threw a few shells into the camp under the guns of the place which Mendizabel held, the Spaniards abandoned the position, and were immediately after attacked by Girard and Latour Maubourg, and totally defeated. The siege was now resumed, and, the Governor having been unfortunately killed, the command devolved on Imaz, a man of a very different stamp. A breach of the most imperfect kind having been effected, he immediately proposed to capitulate, and surrendered with 9000 men on the 11th March. This untoward event was the more inexcusable and to be regretted, that before it took place the Governor had been informed that Beresford was approaching with 12,000 men to raise the siege; so that if he had held out a few days longer this important fortress would have been saved. The treachery which had surrendered this stronghold was made manifest by what immediately after occurred at Campo Mayor, which, though garrisoned only by two hundred men with five guns, being under the 1 Mem. de Joseph, vii. command of Major Tallaia, a gallant Portuguese officer, 394, 395; only surrendered on 23d March after a regular siege, 73-76. and having exhausted all means of defence.1 Lond. ii. 42. order to Meanwhile, on the north of the Tagus, Massena with his wearied and famishing army was struggling between Napoleon's the necessities of his situation and the positive orders of Massena at the Emperor. On the 5th February, General Foy re- this period. turned with a reinforcement of 1862 foot and 140 horse, bearing with him a despatch of great value, as unfolding both the views of Napoleon on the prosecution of the campaign, and the ulterior designs which rendered him so desirous for its continued prosecution. "The Emperor," said Berthier, "attaches the greatest importance to your continuing to keep the English in check, and having bridges on the Zezere and the Tagus. The season is about to become favourable for military operations, and you will easily find means to harass the English and cause |