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V.

1810.

CHAP. and the occupation of a large part of it by the enemy, that their whole army would have perished if they had not been fed from the English magazine; the pay to all the troops was nearly a year in arrears; above 10,000 regular soldiers, and double that number of militia, deserted; and in such a train of difficulties was the Government involved, that they were engaged in a conspiracy to drive the English leaders from the country, and place the Duke of Brunswick at the head of affairs.

38.

plan for a fresh inva

sion of

Portugal.

While Wellington was thus systematically pursuing his Napoleon's plan of operations, and calmly awaiting the action of famine and disease to drive the invaders from the Portuguese territory, Napoleon was busy organising a fresh plan of attack, even more formidable, and which, if earlier adopted, might have led to very different results from what actually occurred. The Emperor, who had been made acquainted by General Foy, despatched from Massena's headquarters, with the whole necessities of that Marshal's situation, and the difficulties with which he had to contend, resolved now upon a double attack upon Portugal, both to the north and south of the Tagus. With this view, while he strained every nerve to reinforce Massena's army by means of the corps of Drouet, he advanced a large body of the Imperial Guard, under the Duke of Istria (Bessières), containing 12,000 sabres and bayonets, in the same direction. He sent, at the same time, the most positive orders to Soult to leave the siege of Cadiz, and his much-loved fields of plunder in Andalusia, and invade the Alentejo from the side of Estremadura with the whole disposable force which he could collect from the three corps which had been carried beyond the 1 Napoleon Sierra Morena. Estimating Massena's force, even after all the losses it had undergone, still at nearly 50,000 combatants, these reinforcements would raise it to 70,000;1 and if to these were added 20,000 invading the Alentejo, it was difficult to see how Wellington, with a force not in all mustering 60,000 combatants, could success

to Soult, Dec. 15, 1810; Brial. i.

351-353

Koch, vii.

300, 301.

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fully withstand such formidable masses, acting on concentric lines and in concert.

CHAP.

V.

1810.

39.

Massena's

as to cross

Tagus.

On the 29th December Drouet arrived at Massena's outposts with 9000 men. He was the bearer of the first despatches which that Marshal had received since he difficulties crossed the frontier on the 16th September. The posi- ing the tive orders of the Emperor to carry the war to the south of the Tagus, compelled Massena, much against his will, to attempt the passage of the river. But in the interim, Wellington, who was fully alive to the importance of preventing that movement, had been beforehand with him, and not only strengthened Abrantes, so as to put it altogether beyond the reach of a coup-de-main, but so disposed Hill's corps along the left bank of the river, that the passage at any point would be extremely difficult. In obedience to the Emperor's orders, however, Massena resolved to make the attempt, and it was anxiously and long debated at the French headquarters whether the bridge should be established at Punhete or Santarem. Reynier strongly supported the latter place, because, close to it, and under cover of guns placed on the heights of Bonavista, there was an island, on which a lodgment might be made. But General Eblé objected that he had not animals of transport sufficient to convey the bridge equipage there by land, and that it would be highly dangerous to attempt to convey it by water under the fire of the English guns. Perplexed with so many difficulties, the French general determined to defer the operation till Soult came up with the fifth corps from Andalusia, so as 1 Koch, vii. to dislodge Hill from his commanding position on the 304-329. southern bank of the river.1

40.

rations in

The military viceroy of Spain to the south of the Sierra Morena had no inclination to exchange his isolated Soult's opeoperations in his own rich domains for a hazardous war- Andalusia. fare to the north of those provinces. The positive orders of the Emperor, however, compelled Soult to do something, but he studiously made it as little as possible.

V.

1811.

CHAP. Napoleon's orders were forthwith to suspend all operations in Andalusia except the blockade of Cadiz, and direct the entire fifth corps with the siege train upon Abrantes, in order to facilitate Massena's passage of the Tagus. Soult represented to the Minister at War, with truth, that such an operation would be hazardous in the extreme, if not impossible, as long as Olivenza, Badajos, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, remained in the hands of the enemy, and that it was indispensable to begin with the reduction of these fortresses. He engaged, however, to make his appearance in Estremadura with 20,000 infantry and 3000 horse, and with these; if joined by 15,000 under Drouet detached from old Castile, he promised not only to reduce these strongholds but to make incursions into the Alentejo to support Massena, and even give a good account of Lord Wellington if he should attack him with his whole force.1

1 Soult to Berthier, May 4, 1811; Joseph's Mem. vii.

399.

41.

The operations of Soult against the fortresses were Great suc- attended in the outset with extraordinary success. Olivenza was blockaded on the 11th January; and on the 22d, the garrison, 4280 strong, was obliged to capitulate, 1811. the negligence of the Spaniards having left it wholly

cesses of Soult in Estrema

dura.

Jan. 22,

without provisions. After this success, Soult moved forward Mortier's corps to form the siege of Badajos, which, being a place of much greater strength, and garrisoned by 9000 men, was expected to make a resolute defence, and at all events to detain the enemy before its walls until Wellington was in a situation to detach a corps for its relief. These hopes, however, were miserably disappointed. Ground was broken before the walls on the 28th January, and on the 11th February the outwork of Pardaleras was taken by assault. The operations were, after this, retarded by the flooding of the Guadiana and the Gebora, which covered the army of Mendizabel, which Lord Wellington, after the death of Romana, had detached from his army to co-operate in the defence. But the floods having fallen, the French forthwith forded

1811.

both rivers, and, having established a mortar battery CHAP. which threw a few shells into the camp under the guns V. of the place which Mendizabel held, the Spaniards abandoned the position, and were immediately after at- Feb. 18. tacked by Girard and Latour Maubourg, and totally defeated. The siege was now resumed, and, the Governor having been unfortunately killed, the command devolved on Imaz, a man of a very different stamp. A breach of the most imperfect kind having been effected, he immediately proposed to capitulate, and surrendered with 9000 men on the 11th March. This untoward event was the more inexcusable and to be regretted, that before it took place the Governor had been informed that Beresford was approaching with 12,000 men to raise the siege; so that if he had held out a few days longer this important fortress would have been saved. The treachery which had surrendered this stronghold was made manifest by what immediately after occurred at Campo Mayor, which, though garrisoned only by two hundred men with five guns, being under the command of Major Tallaia, a gallant Portuguese officer, only surrendered on 23d March after a regular siege, 73-76. and having exhausted all means of defence.1

Mem. de

Joseph, vii.

394, 395;

Lond. ii.

42.

Meanwhile, on the north of the Tagus, Massena with his wearied and famishing army was struggling between Napoleon's the necessities of his situation and the positive orders of Massena at the Emperor. On the 5th February, General Foy re- this period. turned with a reinforcement of 1862 foot and 140 horse, bearing with him a despatch of great value, as unfolding both the views of Napoleon on the prosecution of the campaign, and the ulterior designs which rendered him so desirous for its continued prosecution. "The Emperor," said Berthier,"attaches the greatest importance to your continuing to keep the English in check, and having bridges on the Zezere and the Tagus. The season is about to become favourable for military operations, and you will easily find means to harass the English and cause

CHAP.

V.

1811.

them to experience considerable losses. The position of the English army in Portugal keeps London in a continual agony; and the Emperor considers it of the utmost importance to hold the English in check, still contriving to draw them on so as to cause them to experience losses in affairs of the advanced-guards, until you are in a condition to engage them in a general battle. I have reiterated the orders to the Duke of Treviso (Mortier) to march on the Tagus with the fifth corps. Your bridges being established on the Zezere, the most natural line of operations will be by the left bank of that river. The Emperor has sent despatches to Count D'Erlon (Drouet) to give no rest to Silviera, Trant, or Wilson, to retake Guarda, Ponte Murcella, and Coimbra, and to use the utmost efforts to keep open the communications with the army of Portugal. He has also decreed the formation of an army of reserve in the north of Spain, and has given orders to its commander, the Duke of Istria (Bessières), 1 Berthier to hold a corps of 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Jan. 15, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, ready to relieve the two vii. 305,306. divisions of the ninth corps which is to pass under the orders of the Prince of Essling."

to Massena,

1810; Koch,

43.

of the

crossing the

Tagus.

In pursuance of these peremptory orders, preparations Operations for crossing both the Zezere and the Tagus were made French and with the utmost vigour. General Eblé had by indeEnglish for fatigable efforts collected and built one hundred and twenty boats at Punhete, and got together the materials for three bridges, of which one was intended for the Zezere, and the two others for the Tagus. But meanwhile Wellington was not idle. By the end of January, when the French preparations for the crossing of the latter river were completed, the left bank was so defended by batteries of heavy artillery that all crossing below Punhete had been rendered impossible. Attempts were then made to effect the passage above that town; and to avoid the fire of the English batteries, Eblé constructed fifty carts, on which the boats were conveyed, by a passage

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