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CHAP.

V.

1811.

Lond. ii.

44.

retreat.

cut through a rocky mountain, to the point selected for embarkation at Montalvao. But the vigilance of Beresford defeated his projects, for he erected batteries opposite to the point where the passage was to be attempted, and stationed signals along the whole line so as to enable him to bring a powerful force to any point. Defeated in this project, Massena next attempted to effect the passage at Santarem; but there too he found the Koch, vii. opposite bank so strongly guarded, and the difficulty of 307-309; the crossing, owing to shoals in the river at that point, 76, 77. such, that the design was abandoned as impracticable.1 But matters had now reached a point in the French army which rendered an early decision indispensable; Massena's for in a very few weeks, if they remained in their present quarters, both men and horses would die of famine. On the night of the 5th March, accordingly, Massena suddenly, and with great secrecy, commenced his retreat from Santarem; and with such skill was the movement conducted, that it was not till noon on the following day that their departure was discovered. The British immediately broke up and advanced in pursuit, and headquarters were the same evening established in the same town, while dispositions were made for following the enemy, both on a Welling the main road, which their principal column had taken, Liverpool, and also on all parallel routes by which part were retir- March 14, ing. The French, however, "retired from the country as Gurw. vii. they had entered it," as Wellington said—" in a solid ii. 78, 79; mass," affording little opportunity for harassing them in 336-338. their retreat with any but a force equal to their own.2

ton to Lord

1811;

344; Lond.

Koch, vii.

45.

state of the

at this pe

It is remarkable that at the time when this retreat was finally commenced, the British army was in hardly less Gloomy difficulties than the French, in consequence of other and British army not less powerful causes. Not only was the Government riod. at home beyond measure alarmed at the expense of the contest, and doubtful of its ultimate success, but they had carried their desponding views so far that Wellington, in obedience to their wishes, had made preparations with

VOL. I.

2 c

CHAP.

V.

1811.

Admiral Berkeley for the embarkation of the troops in certain events. In the British army, indeed, there was no want of anything, owing to the provident care of Wellington, the vigour of the commissaries, and the liberal expenditure of the Government; but the expenditure had now reached such a point that it was doubtful whether it could continue much longer. The Portuguese troops, not supported by an equally powerful exchequer, were in the most miserable state. Like the French, they were literally starving, and but for the supplies from the British magazines they would nearly all have died of famine. The commissariat was inefficient, the Government lukewarm or treacherous; and at the crisis of the contest, some of the members of the regency, instead of attending to the wants of their forces, were busied in writing anonymous letters to Lord Wellington. From the combined operation of these causes, the Portuguese army had become during the winter not only relaxed in discipline and efficiency, but extremely reduced in numbers. Desertion went on to an alarming extent. In the middle of March it was reduced to less than a half of the amount it had reached at the battle of Busaco, and many regiments had scarce a third of their complement on paper around their standards. As to the militia, it exhibited more than the usual inefficiency of this species of force. It was set down on paper at 45,000; but the fact was, there never had been so many as 25,000 actually in the field. When Massena began his retreat, and Wellington his pursuit, the entire force of the former had been reduced to 40,792 men, with 7619 horses and 53 guns. No less than 1 See Tables 19,000 men and 4597 horses had been lost since the in575, 590. vasion commenced, of whom 4071 were prisoners of war, 2 Welling including those taken at Coimbra.1 Wellington's army morandum, present under arms at the same time consisted of 29,497 British and 29,000 Portuguese, but of these upwards of 5000 were at Lisbon, Elvas, and Cadiz, leaving about 52,000 present on the two banks of the Tagus.2

in Koch, vii.

ton's Me

Feb. 23, 1811;

Gurw. vii. 299.

V.

1811.

46.

First opera

lington in

When the retreat commenced from Santarem, the CHAP. French retired with such precipitation that it was some days before their rearguard could be overtaken. Wellington, however, threw forward his divisions with such skill that the enemy, to avoid being turned, were obliged tions of Welto evacuate all the positions in the mountains which they pursuit. successively took up, and, being unable to gain time sufficient to construct a bridge over the Mondego, they were thrown back from Coimbra and Upper Beira, for which they were making, and obliged to fall back upon the old and wasted line by Ponte de Murcella. By these means Coimbra and the northern provinces were saved from their ravages, and a communication with the latter, long closed, was opened up. Ammunition-waggons were blown up, and guns destroyed and abandoned in many places; and as the troops had no provisions with them, and were obliged to forage in an exhausted country for the commonest food, the sufferings of the men were extreme. But as the British followed them over the same wasted line, and the march was so rapid and the means of transport so scanty that the supplies from the rear could not keep pace with them, the pangs of want were also felt in their army. Rapid pursuit was often rendered impossible from the want of animals to carry the necessary food for the troops; and the French were frequently saved from disaster by the extent of the howling wilderness they had created around them. "The line of the enemy's march," 1 Lond. ii. says Sir Charles Stewart, "could be everywhere traced by lington to the smoke of cottages, hamlets, and towns, which they Lord Liverreduced to ashes; and even those which escaped the 13, 1811; ravages of the flames were left in a state of total dilapida- 346, 347. tion and absolute destitution."1

82; Wel

pool, March

Gurw. vii.

Redinha.

The first place where Massena's rearguard showed a 47. disposition to make a stand was at Redinha, on the 11th Action at March. On the 9th, at Pombrel, the leading brigade came March 12. up with the enemy, and made two hundred prisoners; and on the evening of the 11th, the two armies were so near

CHAP.

V.

1811.

that arrangements were made for bringing the French to action; and six divisions, mustering 27,000 combatants, were brought up for that purpose. In the night, however, the enemy retired, covered by a large body of cavalry, the entire 6th corps of infantry, and part of the 8th; March 12. and when day broke on the morning of the 12th, a strong rearguard only was visible guarding the entrance of a defile in front of the village of Redinha. It consisted of Ney's corps, which had been forced by Massena to stand firm there, in order to give the artillery and carriages of the army time to retire through the defile. At four in Koch, vii. the morning, Wellington put all the forces which he had Wellington in hand, consisting of the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light Liverpool, divisions, with the cavalry and some light guns, to turn 1811; on each flank the rearguard at the entrance of the defile. 345, 346; The Allied troops advanced in beautiful order, in three lines against the enemy in front, while the two wings moved forward in similar array to turn their flank.1

1

351-365;

to Lord

March 13,

Gurw. vii.

Brial. ii.

361,

362.

48.

carried by

Ney, with this rearguard, stood firm and disputed the Which is pass, repulsing all attacks for several hours; but at the Allies. length the increasing masses of the Allies, which were threatening his flank, obliged him to withdraw, and Redinha was occupied by the British. The French again showed front on some high and rocky ground on the other side of the village; and, as the position could only be reached by crossing a narrow bridge, or a ford adjoining it, both of which were under the fire of the enemy's guns, some delay was experienced before they could be passed in sufficient force to enable the position ton to Lord to be carried. At length, however, a force equal to the Liverpool, attack having got over, Picton moved forward and drove 1811; the enemy in splendid style from the rocky height on 345, 346; which his left rested; upon which Ney, with the main body, retired towards Condeixa; and night having come on, 365, 366. Wellington's men bivouacked on the ground they had won, close to the outposts of the enemy.

2 Welling

March 14,

Gurw. vii.

Lond. ii.

79, 80; Koch, vii.

In the position to which Massena now retired, which

CHAP.

treat.

49.

was singularly strong, he collected three entire corps, forming his whole army, with the exception of the second V. corps, which was at Espinhel; and Wellington, deeming 1811. an attack in front likely to induce too great a loss of Continuance life, resolved to dislodge them by turning their flank. of the reWith this view he moved Picton's division through the mountains on the enemy's left, which, after a long and fatiguing circuit, succeeded in reaching their communications in rear of Condeixa. Upon seeing this Ney instantly threw his troops into columns of march, and began his retreat through that town, which was committed to the flames. This retreat, though in the circumstances unavoidable, highly irritated Massena, who declared it was done without his knowledge or consent. But Ney, however vacillating and irresolute in devising measures to avert future danger, never failed to recover his presence of mind in presence of it. At the head of a solid mass of 10,000 men, which formed the rearguard, he retreated slowly, and in the best order, taking advantage of every Wellingposition where it was possible for a few hours to arrest on to Lord the pursuers, and arranging his troops so skilfully, that, March 14, when one rearguard fell back, it was only to re-form and Gurw. vii. again present a menacing front to the enemy in pursuit, vii. 374; under cover of another already drawn up and prepared 80, 81." to dispute the passage.1

Liverpool,

1811;

346; Koch

Lond. ii.

the bridge

March 15.

Once only during this part of the retreat the Allies 50. pressed so closely on the rearguard that a considerable Combat at disaster was sustained by the retreating army, and a still of the Ceira. greater was on the point of being suffered. Ney had left two divisions on the British side of the bridge which crosses the stream of the Ceira, to cover the passage of the army over that narrow defile. Wellington instantly saw his advantage, and, giving orders to all the troops to advance in double-quick time, and the guns at the trot, succeeded in reaching the column before half of them had got over. The position held by the rearguard was very strong; but Wellington made the attack with such vigour,

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