CHAP. VI. 1811. 1 Lond. ii. 90, 91. 5. d'Onore. the same time that it appuyed upon ground extremely favourable. With respect to the arrangement of the troops a few words will suffice. On the extreme right of the line General Houston, with the 7th division, took post, the cavalry being formed next to him, though somewhat in advance. After the 7th came the 1st division, thrown considerably forward, and upon very advantageous ground, and communicating on its left with the 3d, which again held connection with the light, as it did with the 6th and 5th. The 5th division, under Sir William Erskine, formed the extreme left of the line; whilst the blockade of Almeida was, in an especial manner, committed to the 6th division, under General Campbell. Every division and brigade was, however, in a situation to move at a moment's warning, and by short and direct paths, to any part in the entire line which might be threatened; and hence, though to external appearance our flanks were far removed from one another, the space of three hours would have brought the most distant battalions in position to the same ground at any given point.' ... "Fuentes d'Onore," which gave its name to the sanDescription guinary battle which ensued, "was not, strictly speaking, of Fuentes embraced in our position; and though occupied by the light troops of the 1st and 3d divisions, supported by the 7th Regiment, it was held merely as an advanced post. It stands at the bottom of a valley, and on the bank of a small rivulet or brook. On either side are rising grounds, and through it passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos, and thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Rodrigo side an extensive morass is bounded, at some distance, by a thick wood; and though the ground certainly rises there, as it does in rear of the village, still the troops which advance in a hostile attitude from that quarter must pass over a considerable tract where they will be exposed to a heavy and destructive fire from almost every point. The village itself is crossed in various directions by walls, which afforded excellent cover for infantry, and were not CHAP. V. 1811. ing in the French retreat, when he was confined to bed by fever, and only rejoined the Commander-in-Chief on the Spanish frontier. The glory of them necessarily redounded chiefly to the Commander-in-Chief. A subordinate officer's duty consists in the faithful and energetic carrying out of the orders of his superiors; a staff-officer's in being the right hand of the general. The AdjutantGeneral of the army, Sir Charles Stewart, was in every sense the Adjutant of the Commander-in-Chief; and if we would read aright the story of the great services 1 Wellingwhich, during the Peninsular campaign, he rendered to ton to the his country, we must study the annals of those memor- Wellesley, able victories and deep combinations by which Wellington 1811; then laid the foundation of the deliverance of Europe, and 317. in which he bore so important a part.1 Hon. Henry March 20, Gurw. vii. CHAPTER VI. SIR CHARLES STEWART FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL IN MAY 1811 TO THE FALL OF CIUDAD ROD- CHAP. VI. 1811. TAUGHT by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign in Portugal, Napoleon lost no time in transmitting to Massena detailed orders for the renewal of the war in that country on a new and more judicious plan. The plan for the basis of these operations, which were prescribed at a time Portugal. when he was not aware of the entire evacuation of the 1. Renewed invasion of disputed territory by the French troops, was, that Coimbra and the tête-du-pont at Murcella should be fortified, Almeida dismantled, Wellington attacked and driven into his lines at Torres Vedras, where he was either to be assailed, if Massena was in sufficient strength to do so, or, at all events, kept in check, so as to be prevented from sending detachments into Estremadura, while the French general should send out foraging parties to Oporto, so as to lay all the northern provinces of Portugal under contribution. Having by these means restored the discipline and efficiency of his army, he was in September, after the harvest had been gathered in, to commence a fresh advance upon Lisbon, in conjunction with a powerful force fitted out by Soult from the army of Andalusia. For this purpose the whole army of Massena, aided by the Imperial Guard under Bessières, which was to advance from Valladolid to its support, was to move forward along the right bank of the Tagus, and form a junction with a powerful CHAP. VI. 1811. detachment from the army of the centre, which was to move upon Alcantara, and unite with the army of Portugal at Abrantes. At the same time Soult, with the whole force he could spare from Andalusia, was to advance into the Alentejo from Badajos to the same point, and threaten Lisbon from its southern and comparatively defenceless side. The united strength of the three armies would amount to 80,000 men-a force with which it would be easy to drive the English into the sea. "Recollect, Marshal," the letter concluded, "that you are in presence of an army which represents a power against which the least advantage is, politically speaking, of the utmost importance. They speak in Spain of a war with Russia in the first place, there is no foundation for the report; in the next, if it was true, that would have no influence on the April 2, war in Spain. The Emperor is strong enough to make vii. 460-463. head against them all." 1 Berthier to Massena, 1811; Koch, ton's move Wellington was too sagacious not to anticipate that, if 2. Portugal was again to be invaded, it would be on the plan Wellingdetailed in this despatch; and accordingly he attached ments to rethe utmost importance to the possession of Badajos, Jos. which, if maintained by the Allies, would effectually prevent this co-operation between the armies of the north and the south. It has been seen, accordingly, with what mortification he received the account of the surrender of that fortress, and how rapidly he had taken measures, after the retreat of Massena commenced, to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. He had detached Beresford with the second and fourth, and Hamilton's Portuguese division, the 13th Light Dragoons, and two brigades of artillery, to raise the siege of that town; and on the 25th March that general came up with a convoy which was making for Badajos, and by a brilliant charge made himself master of it, though our troops, having advanced too far in pursuit, and got under the guns of the fortress, were thrown into disorder. The convoy slipped out of their hands in consequence, and, with the VI. 1811. April 11. 1 Lond. ii. CHAP. exception of a single howitzer and a few ammunitionwaggons, got into the fortress. Great difficulty was then experienced in crossing the Guadiana so as to invest April 5 & 6. Badajos; and during the time consumed in making the necessary preparations, the enemy had time to repair the breaches made by Soult's guns, and throw considerable supplies into the fortress. This done, Mortier retired to Seville, leaving it to its own resources, having previously thrown 400 men into Olivenza, in order to retard the advance of the Allies against the principal fortress. Beresford intrusted the attack of this fort to General Cole, who sat down before it on the 11th April; and on the 15th, a practicable breach having been made, the place surrendered at discretion. Having thus cleared the way, Cole threw a small garrison into Olivenza, and hastened to return to Beresford, who meanwhile had established a bridge of casks over the ford at Juramenha, so as to render it practicable for artillery. The guns and small 86-88; Sir siege-train were immediately crossed over, and a tête-duChas. Stew-pont, garrisoned by 1500 men, established for the proCastlereagh, tection of the bridge; and the bulk of his force having April 24, 1811, Ms. been established in an intrenched position at Santa Martha, the investment of Badajos was rendered complete.1 Matters were in this state when Lord Wellington, Wellington having finished the expulsion of the army of Massena the siege of from Portugal, and deeming it incapable of resuming offensive operations for a month or six weeks to come, resolved to take advantage of the breathing time afforded to wrest Badajos from the enemy. Having disposed everything for a cautious defensive campaign in the north accordingly, and for the blockade of Almeida, which it was expected would soon fall from want of provisions, he hastened in person to Beresford's headquarters, and took the command of the siege. It was indispensable to the success of this operation that it should be conducted with the utmost expedition; for in less than three weeks, it was well known, from the time of trenches being opened, Soult art to 3. undertakes Badajos. |