the spot. Altogether the enemy lost above three hundred and fifty men, being about a third of their number, but the rest got clear off, after an exploit conducted with equal skill and gallantry, which gave great vexation to Wellington, but attracted general admiration in both armies. CHAP. VI. 1811. 19. Two Wellington were troops and despatches stores for Almeida, when it was entered by the British troops, was found to be in an extremely dilapidated state. of the five bastions of which the works consisted indeed entire, from the accidental circumstance of the Estremadumines intended to be sprung having missed fire; but the ra. other three were in a state of total ruin, and it was evident that considerable time and no small amount of labour and money would be required to put them in a posture of defence. Though deeply mortified at this result of his operations, Wellington and all his staff felt that it had now become comparatively of little importance for the future progress of the war. The recent victory had secured the north-eastern frontier from further insult, at least for a considerable time; and it was to the south, on the frontier of Badajos, that all eyes were now turned, as the destined theatre of important events. No sooner, accordingly, did Almeida fall than Wellington despatched the 3d and 7th divisions, under Picton and Houston, towards the Guadiana to reinforce Beresford, who, with a very inadequate force, was charged with the double duty of reducing that fortress and covering the siege operations against Marshal Soult, who, in obedience to the Emperor's orders, was advancing with a powerful army from Andalusia, not only to raise the siege, but to cooperate by an incursion into the Alentejo in the renewed attack on Portugal, of which Massena's advance to Fuentes d'Onore was a principal part. The remainder of the army was put into cantonments on the Agueda and the Coa, at Frenada, Fuentes d'Onore, Aldea de Ponte, and Gallegos, in such a situation as to observe Ciudad Rodrigo and cover the frontier, and left under CHAP. VI. 1811. 1 Koch, vii. 540-543. 15. donderry's on this battle. rations for the following day. The consequence was, that the caissons set out at daybreak, with orders to bring up, not ammunition, but bread; all thoughts of renewing the battle or relieving Almeida were laid aside, and the army retreated at all points towards Ciudad Rodrigo, after remaining a day inactive on the field, during the 6th, as if to give him some ground for claiming the victory, which he took credit for in a proclamation to his troops. 1 The battle of Fuentes d'Onore was the most critical Lord Lon- in which Lord Wellington was engaged in the whole war, reflections and in which the chances of irreparable defeat were most against the British army. Sir Charles Stewart has left the following judicious reflections on this battle: "Massena's superiority to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was very great; whilst the thick woods in our front afforded the most convenient plateau which he could have desired for the distribution of his columns unseen, and therefore disregarded. Had he rightly availed himself of this advantage, he might have poured the mass of his force upon any single point, and perhaps made an impression before we could have had time to support it. Had he commenced his attack with a violent cannonade, it must have produced some havoc, and probably considerable confusion, in our line. He might then have moved forward his cavalry en masse, supporting it by strong columns of infantry; and had either the one or the other succeeded in piercing through, our situation would have been by no means an enviable one. Had he thrown his cavalry round our right flank-a movement which we should have found it no easy matter to prevent -crossed the Coa, advanced upon our lines of communication, and stopped our supplies, at the moment when, with his infantry, he threatened to turn us; then pushed upon Sabugal and the places near, he might have compelled us to pass the Coa with all our artillery at the most disadvantageous places, and cut us off from our VI. 1811. best and safest retreat. There was, indeed, a time during CHAP. the affair of the 5th, when his design of acting in this manner was seriously apprehended; and Lord Wellington was in consequence reduced to the necessity of deciding whether he should relinquish the Sabugal road or raise the blockade of Almeida. But Lord Wellington's presence of mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt no distrust in his troops; to retain his hold over a secure and accessible line of retreat was therefore to him a consideration of less moment than to continue an operation of which the ultimate success could now be neither doubtful nor remote; and he at once determined to expose Sabugal rather than throw open a communication with Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not adopted without due consideration, and it received an 1 Lond. ii. ample reward in the successful termination of this hard- 109, 110. fought battle."1 turning Chas. Stew tunes. 520. "Throughout these operations," said Wellington in his 16. official despatch to Lord Liverpool, "I have received This was a the greatest assistance from Sir Brent Spencer and all point in Sir the general officers of the army, and from the adjutant art's for and quartermaster-general, and the officers of their respective staffs." 2 The Adjutant-General, Sir Charles 2 Gurw. vii. Stewart, had borne a distinguished part in them; so much so, indeed, that they proved a turning-point in his fortunes. He had been in the battle wherever danger was greatest he had been beside the 71st in the desperate bayonet-fight in Fuentes d'Onore on the 3d; and alongside of Sir Stapleton Cotton, he had, with a few English squadrons, stemmed the furious onslaught of Montbrun's vastly superior cavalry, and gained time for the infantry to fall into square and commence their methodical retreat on the 5th. The gallantry with which he had unhorsed and made prisoner Colonel La Motte of the 13th French Chasseurs, in single combat, had attracted universal notice; but the experienced and discerning eye of Wellington had ere this discovered in him talents of a peculiar kind, admirably VI. 1811. 22. Forces on CHAP. where he formed a junction with Latour Maubourg, who brought to his standard about 5000 men; he then found himself at the head of 16,000 chosen infantry and 3000 of the finest horse; and with this force, and both sides. 40 guns, he advanced to raise the siege. The French marshal was full of confidence, and boasted in his letters to Berthier that he would soon have 35,000 men and 5000 horse with 50 guns in Estremadura, with which he would give battle to the whole English army, whom he had no doubt he should conquer. The Allied army had at first been ordered to assemble at Valverde, at no great distance from Badajos; but as that position left one road to that fortress open, it was determined on the 15th to make the rendezvous a little farther on, at ALBUERA, which better covered the approaches to it. Thither, accordingly, Marshal Beresford directed his steps; but in consequence of this change of position, to be taken farther in advance than had been originally ordered, and of the extraordinary rapidity of Soult, who came up by forced marches of eighteen miles a-day, the French were first assembled on the field of battle, and had occupied in force an extensive wood, of which the British commander had intended to have taken possession. The Allied troops came up to the ground irregularly, and some of them after very forced and fatiguing marches. Blake with his Spaniards did not arrive till three in the morning of the 16th, when he appeared with troops sadly jaded by a long and fatiguing night-march; Cole's division only appeared at nine on that day, after the battle had begun; Kemp's brigade and Madden's cavalry never came up at all. It was more by accident than anything else that there were troops enough to hold the position on the evening of the 15th till the remainder of the army successively came up and took their ground. The entire force of the Allies who took part in the action which followed were 7500 British, 8000 Portuguese, and 12,000 Spaniards-in all nearly 27,000 men. But the cavalry was very weak, VI. long-cherished designs against Badajos. But an unex- CHAP. pected event dashed all these hopes, and deprived the English general of the triumph for which he had fought 1811. so hard, and which he was so well entitled to expect. No sooner had he come to despair of raising the siege by main force, than the French general sent orders to the governor of the fortress, General Brennier, to blow up the works, and make the best of his way off by Barba del Puerco. This order was made out in triplicate, and delivered to three trusty messengers: the two first went disguised, and never reached their destination; the third, André Tillet, a chasseur of the 6th Light Infantry, set out in uniform, armed only with his sabre, and he reached Almeida in safety. Brennier immediately set himself to work, with zeal and ability, to execute his instructions. The prescribed salvoes of guns were fired at the appointed time, warning Massena that his orders had been received, 1 Koch, vii. without attracting attention in the British camp; and at Lond. ii. half-past eleven, on the night of the 11th, a tremendous 113, 114; explosion was heard far and wide, and soon after it was to Lord Liverpool, May whispered in the English army that the garrison of 14, 1811; Almeida had blown up the place, and was marching in 548. good order towards Barba del Puerco.1 546-548; Wellington Gurw. vii. of Almeida, The bridge over the Agueda at this place was the 18. obvious line of retreat for the garrison, and where, accord- Blowing up ingly, the 2d French corps was in readiness to receive it. and escape Although, however, Brennier's measures were taken with of Brennier. equal skill and foresight, and executed with decision, he did not get back unscathed. General Campbell, a zealous and gallant officer who had greatly distinguished himself at the battle of Talavera, had been intrusted, with the 6th division, which he commanded, with the blockade of the place, and at his own earnest request he had received the entire direction. Unfortunately, he misapprehended the direction in which the escape of the garrison would be attempted; and instead of occupying in force Barba del Puerco, commanding the bridge over the Agueda |