VI. 1811. CHAP. leading direct from the fortress to the French lines, he watched with attention only the right face of the town, from which no movement was likely to be made. So obvious was this misconception, that on the 11th the 4th Regiment from Erskine's division was ordered up to occupy the heights above that place: but it was too late; the enemy had already passed. Marching under the best direction, without a light and in profound silence, between the British pickets, they contrived to pass undiscovered for two hours, until the explosion at Almeida awakened every one in the army. They were then discerned, and a small body of cavalry attacked them on the right, while Pack on the left was redoubling his pace to reach Barba del Puerco before them. It was a race in the dark who should first get there; and when the French uniforms in the grey of the dawn were first seen emerging from the gloom, General Heudelet, who commanded the troops placed near the bridge to receive them, advanced in double-quick time, and met the leading companies, whom they conducted across the bridge in safety. But the rearguard was not equally fortunate. Brennier had purposely put the waggons and baggage in the rear, in order to serve as a decoy to draw off the first of the pursuers, and this succeeded with some Portuguese squadrons, who broke, and began plundering; but some British horse soon came up, and Pack occupied in force the heights overhanging a gorge on the other side through which they had to pass before reaching the bridge. Heudelet's chasseurs lent them a powerful hand here, and the fusillade was soon extremely 1 Koch, vii. warm between the tirailleurs on the opposite sides; but Lond. ii. meanwhile a heavy plunging fire was kept up from the Wellington top of the rocks on the column below, which sustained to Lord Liv- very heavy loss. Two hundred and thirty French were driven over a precipice with forty Portuguese, the most of whom perished miserably; two hundred privates and ten officers were made prisoners; and fifty were slain on 553-555; 114-117; erpool, May Gurw. vii. 548, 549. VI. 1811. the spot. Altogether the enemy lost above three hundred CHAP. and fifty men, being about a third of their number, but the rest got clear off, after an exploit conducted with equal skill and gallantry, which gave great vexation to Wellington, but attracted general admiration in both armies. 19. Two Wellington were troops and despatches stores for Almeida, when it was entered by the British troops, was found to be in an extremely dilapidated state. of the five bastions of which the works consisted indeed entire, from the accidental circumstance of the Estremadu mines intended to be sprung having missed fire; but the ra. other three were in a state of total ruin, and it was evident that considerable time and no small amount of labour and money would be required to put them in a posture of defence. Though deeply mortified at this result of his operations, Wellington and all his staff felt that it had now become comparatively of little importance for the future progress of the war. The recent victory had secured the north-eastern frontier from further insult, at least for a considerable time; and it was to the south, on the frontier of Badajos, that all eyes were now turned, as the destined theatre of important events. No sooner, accordingly, did Almeida fall than Wellington despatched the 3d and 7th divisions, under Picton and Houston, towards the Guadiana to reinforce Beresford, who, with a very inadequate force, was charged with the double duty of reducing that fortress and covering the siege operations against Marshal Soult, who, in obedience to the Emperor's orders, was advancing with a powerful army from Andalusia, not only to raise the siege, but to cooperate by an incursion into the Alentejo in the renewed attack on Portugal, of which Massena's advance to Fuentes d'Onore was a principal part. The remainder of the army was put into cantonments on the Agueda and the Coa, at Frenada, Fuentes d'Onore, Aldea de Ponte, and Gallegos, in such a situation as to observe Ciudad Rodrigo and cover the frontier, and left under CHAP. VI. 1811. 1 Lond. ii. 117-128. 20. for the first May 1. May 4. command of Sir Brent Spencer; while Wellington himself, with Sir Charles Stewart and the whole etat-major, set out from Villa Formosa on the 15th of May, and travelled with the utmost expedition towards Elvas.1 It was high time that Wellington should proceed to Operations the south to take the command there, for affairs during siege of his temporary absence in the north had become threatenBadajos. ing in the extreme. So far back as 22d April, in consequence of directions given by the Commander-in-Chief himself, measures had been commenced for the siege of Badajos. Fascines, gabions, and other implements for it, had been prepared, although the approaches had been considerably retarded by a sudden rise of the river on the 24th, which swept away the bridge of casks which had been thrown across it. On the 29th, however, the communication was restored by means of flying bridges, and on the 1st May the bridge of casks was replaced more firmly than ever. On the 4th, General William Stewart invested the fortress on the left bank of the river, but the investment on the southern side was not completed till the 8th, and then only with considerable difficulty, owing to the extreme inadequacy of the siege stores which were at the disposal of the General. The heavy artillery for the reduction of Fort Christoval, an indispensable preliminary to an attack on the body of the place, consisted of three twenty-four pounders, with three hundred rounds to each gun; and two howitzers, with two hundred rounds to each. Mortars there were none. Five hundred intrenching tools, two thousand sandbags, two hundred gabions, and a few planks, constituted the whole siege materiel provided for the reduction of one of the strongest fortresses in the south of Europe! The besieging corps consisted of one British brigade, two battalions of Portuguese of the line, and a battalion of militia-in all, four thousand men. In addition to that, the ground upon which the working-parties had to com May 8. 2 Jones's Sieges, i. 24-27; Lond. ii. 123, 124. 2 VI. 1811. mence their labour proved extremely hard and rocky; CHAP. insomuch that, though four hundred men were employed on the trenches, ten men only were able to work under cover when daylight appeared! It may be conceived what progress was made in a siege attended with such difficulties, and with such means. 21. the siege, Notwithstanding these difficulties, Marshal Beresford and his troops persevered most resolutely in the attack. Progress of On the 10th a sortie of the besieged took place, which, which is although attended at first with some success, was ulti- suspended. mately repulsed. The besiegers, however, following up their advantages with too much eagerness, got within the range of the guns of the fort over the glacis, in consequence of which, in a few minutes, four hundred brave men were struck down without any advantage to the Allies. Notwithstanding this loss, serious to so small a besieging force, the approaches continued to be vigorously pushed forward; on the 11th the three heavy guns opened their fire in the hope of effecting a breach in the smaller flank of Fort St Christoval, while the two howitzers strove to keep down the fire of the place. Nothing but defeat could be anticipated from such disproportionate means; and so it turned out, for before evening the three guns were silenced, and one of the howitzers rendered unserviceable. Still persevering even with means which rendered success hopeless, Beresford was renewing his efforts and constructing a fresh battery to breach the fort, when he learned that Soult was approaching with so Joseph, vii. powerful a force from the south as would strain the whole ii. 125, 126; force at his disposal, including those engaged in the siege, ford to Lord to repel. He instantly took his line, and orders were Wing given to disarm all the batteries, send the stores back to 1811; a place of safety, and march every disposable man to the 573, note; defensive position at Valverde, there to await the attack 391. of this fresh enemy.1 In effect, Soult, having collected 14,000 admirable troops in Andalusia, had advanced into Estremadura VOL. I. 2 E 1 Mem. de 398; Lond. Lord Beres Wellington, May 18, Gurw. vii. Brial, ii, CHAP. 1811. 28. the British. away every attempt at extending into line; the British soldiers, raising loud shouts as they saw the enemy's confusion, pressed incessantly forward, and at length drove them headlong down the hill.* The battle was now gained, but the French general Victory of ably and gallantly covered the retreat. Latour Maubourg's dragoons rapidly advanced in close order, and threatened in the most formidable manner the right flank of the fusiliers, while Ruty quickly disposed his guns on some heights in the rear, so as to cover the retreat. Menaced in this manner both in front and flank, the victorious brigade was obliged to halt, and endure for some time the iron tempest, on the top of the hill. There, however, it stood firm, and its standards waved in proud defiance to the defeated enemy, whose masses, dark and threatening still, did not venture to make another attack on the blood-stained eminences. Farther to the left, several attacks were made by Godinot's division on the village of Albuera, in the direction of the bridge; but they were all defeated by the steadiness of the Portuguese regiments and Alten's light Germans, who lined the walls and approaches to it. Several bodies of horse showed them1 Lond. ii. selves here; but their efforts, which were not in such force Beresford to as those made by Latour Maubourg's heavy dragoons on Wellington, the right, were all baffled by the 13th Dragoons and Colonel Otway's horse, supported by General Lumley's 576; Thiers, brigade, who, moving parallel to the enemy's squadrons, Brial. i. 395. effectually prevented any impression being made in that quarter.1 135, 136; May 18, 1811; Gurw. vii. xii. 690; * By a singular coincidence, on the very day on which these lines were written, the author received the following letter from one of the few survivors of the Fusilier brigade, who was present at this sanguinary battle: "Reading in your History of Europe the account of Albuera, you say that General Cole's division was still fresh when it came into action.' So far from this, we were at Badajos at eleven the preceding night, marched all night, and arrived on the ground just when the Polish lancers had driven the Spaniards and Houghton's division back. We were immediately ordered to charge by Colonel Hardinge." The writer of this letter has nine clasps, and was one of the forlorn hope at San Sebastian, and was noticed by General Blakeney as one of the best soldiers in the army. |