CHAP. VI. 1811. above 300 feet per face has been constructed. It is strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp twenty feet in height; and it is capable, from the rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to offer a stout resistance, even when methodically besieged. Between it and the town, however, the communication is far from being good, inasmuch as it is carried on entirely by means of a long bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats. Against this fort was the second attack directed; and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to be as serious as, from the 1 Lond. ii. general appearance of the place, might have been ex- 146, 147." pected." 1 34. ment of the May 31. All things being in readiness, so far as the limited means at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief would permit, Commenceground was broken before both the castle and Fort St siege. Christoval on the night of the 31st May, Wellington commanding in person. The former operation passed undiscovered, and the men were under cover before they were detected by the enemy; but the latter were detected almost immediately after it began, and an incessant fire of round-shot and grape was kept up in the direction of the river. The working parties, however, bravely stood the storm, and by morning four distinct batteries, at different distances from the place, were marked out, and in part completed. On the 3d the guns opened, and a heavy fire was kept up on both sides for several days without intermission, or any sensible advantage being gained on either side. By the continuance of this fire several guns, and nearly all the howitzers, were rendered unserviceable, without any perceptible effect being produced on the walls of the castle, except that they were a little shaken. Two bastions, however, at length fell on the side of Fort Christoval, and filled the ditch with their ruins. Various reasons concurred to induce Lord Wellington to hazard an assault June 6. without delay on this fort; for reports were coming in from all quarters as to the enemy moving in great force to the CHAP. VI. 43. Movement of the army to new canton ments on the Tagus, its reinforce ment, and plan of operations. which in the end proved successful. This was nothing less than the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, an essential 1811. preliminary to any offensive operations in Spain. To effect this, however, it was indispensable that the enemy should be taken by surprise; and to secure this the siegetrain required to be moved to the vicinity of the fortress without his being aware of its approach. For this purpose Lord Wellington began openly, and in an ostentatious manner, embarking a siege-train, which had recently arrived from Woolwich, at Lisbon, in vessels which set sail from the Tagus professedly for Cadiz. Once at sea, and during the darkness of the night, the artillery was transhipped into smaller vessels, which steered for Oporto, while the larger vessels continued their course on to Cadiz and Gibraltar. From Oporto the siege equipage was moved, in a quiet way, by the Douro, as far as Lamego, where it was landed and dragged by oxen, with infinite difficulty and over execrable roads, to Celorico, on the frontier, where it was carefully concealed among a multitude of baggagewaggons. Such was the hostility of the whole rural population to the French, that, strange to say, not a rumour of these preparations reached Marmont. The siege-train having arrived and been placed in safety, Wellington broke up from his cantonments on the Caya, and, taking a northerly direction, crossed the Tagus at Villa-Velha, and, the better to conceal his real design, took up new cantonments, in which the army remained for a week, on either bank of that river. There they were joined by four regiments of foot and one of horse-the 26th, 32d, 68th, and 77th infantry, and 12th Dragoons; while General Graham arrived from Cadiz, and brought to the army the aid of great experience, high military talents, and a brilliant reputation. He received the command as to Lord Liv- second in the army around headquarters, General Hill 7.1811; being at the head of a detached corps, 10,000 strong, to 173, 174. the south of the Tagus. Finding himself now, by these July 21. 1 Lond. ii. 183-193; Brial. i. 410, 411; Marmont, iv. 63, 64; Wellington erpool, Aug. Gurw. viii. reinforcements, at the head of 40,000 men in hand, which CHAP. VI. 1811. 36. Christoval on. necessity of expedition, the siege could not be brought to a successful issue without the aid of a more powerful artillery than he had yet had at command. All that could be got, however, were seven iron guns, which were brought A second as from Elvas on the 8th; and with these, and the whole sault on Fort pieces mounted which remained serviceable, numbering is resolved only seven guns and two howitzers, an incessant fire was kept up on the breach and its defences. Little progress was made against either, and the breach seemed nearly as difficult of access as ever; but as certain intelligence had now been received that Soult and Marmont were rapidly approaching, and would certainly form a junction and raise the siege on the 12th or 13th, it was resolved to try the fortune of a second assault. We came to the conclusion," says Sir Charles Stewart, "that Badajos must either be reduced at once or not at all; because we could hardly pretend to continue the siege in presence of Marmont's and Soult's armies combined; and as little could we hope to fight them to advantage to the south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a state of blockade. That we might not, however, be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary, General Spencer," who had been left on the Agueda with four divisions, "received directions to move by Penamacor to Castello Branco, which place he was Lond. ii. 157-161; commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold himself in Jones's readiness to form a junction with our corps at the shortest 278. notice."1 Sieges, i. of The second storm of St Christoval took place on the 37. night of the 9th June. The assaulting column consisted Second asof two hundred, twenty-five of whom formed the forlorn Christova, hope, guided by Lieutenant Hunt of the engineers, and repulsed. again led by Ensign Dyas. Major M'Geechy commanded June 9. the storming party. At the signal given the men leapt out of the trenches and ran across the open; but on this occasion they were distinctly seen by the enemy, who opened a heavy fire of grape upon them from every gun which could be brought to bear. The brave Lieu CHAP. VI. 1811. 1 Lond. ii. 163, 164; Jones, ii. 280-284; Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 13, 1811; Gurw. viii. 12, 13. 38. Raising of and forces the siege, on both sides. June 11. tenant Hunt fell dead on the glacis, and though the troops leapt with their wonted gallantry into the ditch, yet the loss of the person who should have guided them proved fatal to the enterprise. The stormers got to the foot of the rampart with scaling-ladders twenty-five feet in length; but in the darkness, and without a guide, they applied them, not to the breach, but to a bastion near it, which was comparatively uninjured. The consequence was, that they were repulsed with the loss of 40 killed and 100 wounded. During the entire siege the loss of the Allies had been no less than 9 officers and 109 men killed, and 25 officers and 342 men wounded or made prisoners.1 On the day following this second repulse a despatch was intercepted and brought to Wellington, which clearly revealed the designs of the enemy, which was to collect their whole force in Estremadura for the purpose of raising the siege of Badajos, and pursuing their advantages by an incursion into the Alentejo; and on the same morning advices were received from General Spencer in the north, leaving no doubt of the advances of the army of Portugal in the same direction, which expected to be at Merida by the 15th. The united forces of the two armies was nearly 60,000 effective men; while the British, even all united, though on paper 49,000 strong, could not bring 30,000 into the field, there being no less than 12,500 in hospital, and 7000 unavoidably absent on detachment. The Portuguese again were only 25,000 on paper, of whom only 14,000 were in the field. Thus, though there was a great numerical superiority on the part 3 Lond. ii. of the French over the Allies, the advantage in point of Marmont, real strength was still greater, for the Spaniards were equal Wellington to nothing, and the Portuguese, through the extreme imLiverpool, becility of the regency and nearly all the authorities engaged, were in a very inefficient state. Thus the weight of the contest, as at Talavera and Albuera, would fall upon the British; but, though perfectly aware of this circum 162, 163; iv. 45; to Lord May 13, 1811; Gurw, viii. 14, 15. CHAP. VI. 1811. 46. parations, of the eue relieve convoy, is thus described by Sir Charles Stewart: "Wellington early determined to make his retreat by the great road which leads from Ciudad Rodrigo to Fuente Guinaldo. The divisions upon the more advanced chain Wellingaccordingly received orders, in case of an attack, to retire, ton's preafter having well disputed their ground, towards Fuente and advance Guinaldo. Here it was expected that a more resolute my, who stand would be made under cover of the redoubts and Ciudad Rodother works which had of late been thrown up; whilst, rigo. in the event of further falling back, everything was so settled that the movement could be executed at any moment, and with comparative security. Such was the order of the Allied army when, on the 24th of September, a considerable body of the enemy showed themselves in the plain before Ciudad Rodrigo. They came from the Salamanca and Tamames roads, and were accompanied by a countless number of waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their progress was slow and apparently cautious; but towards evening the convoy began to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which passed the Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which halted upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything further than the object which was thus attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked that night near the town. In the morning, however, as soon as objects became discernible, one corps of cavalry, amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in motion along the great road which, leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Bodon on the left; whilst another, less numerous, perhaps, but, like the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched direct upon Espeja. They both moved with admirable steadiness and great regularity; and as the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear and beautiful, their appearance 208, 209. was altogether very warlike and extremely imposing.1 1 Lond. ii. |